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GAṄG ŚA'S
PHILOSOPH OF GOD

Dr. JOHN VATTANKY, S.J.
M.A. (Oxon), Ph.D. (Vienna)

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GAṄGEŚA'S PHILOSOPHY OF GOD

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Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of
Īśvaravāda Section of Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi with
a Study on the Development of Nyāya Theism

DR. JOHN VATTANKY, S. J.
M.A. (Oxon), Ph.D. (Vienna)

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FOREWORD

Inspite of the pioneering works of a number of eminent scholars, large areas of the history of Indian Philosophy still remain unexplored. Some editors of early Śāstra texts, many of whom stood in the unbroken line of rigorous traditional scholarship, have fortunately provided us already with vast material for sustained researches, though of course, many more texts remain to be critically edited. What we need now is a series of studies on individual authors, accurate translations of their works in modern languages and commentaries on them, so that the exact contributions of those authors to the development of the systems could be assessed.

In this context the work of Dr. Vattanky is to be understood and appreciated. He has chosen an admittedly difficult and abstruse system, Navyanyāya, for his researches, of which the source book is the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa. This work has inspired the subsequent developments of Navyanyāya. Hence for a correct understanding of the development of later Indian logic mastery of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is necessary. With the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* we have a new method and new concepts in philosophical circle. No branch of Indian thought in the post-Gaṅgeśa period can be understood without a grounding in it, for all other systems of Indian Philosophy including even works on aesthetics freely borrowed the techniques and terms of Navyanyāya.

Fortunately pioneering scholars like Saileswar Sen, D.H. Ingalls, E. Frauwallner, B. K. Matilal, J. N. Mohanty, C. Goekoop and others have already made significant contributions towards the study *Tattvacintāmaṇi*; they have also translated some sections of the work. With this present work which comprises accurate translation, faithful interpretation and scholarly study of the *īśvaravāda* section of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa, Dr. Vattanky has joined this group of eminent scholars. The *īśvaravāda* of Gaṅgeśa has not been translated and studied so far in any modern language, Indian or Western. Even among Sanskrit commentators only Pragalbha (whose work exists only in manuscript) has gone into details. Dr. Vattanky has made use of this work also and this enhances the merit of his work.

I have gone through the translation carefully; it is done with accuracy. The commentary brings out the meaning of the text clearly and the study is exhaustive and in some respects original. He has also studied carefully the *pūrvapakṣa* arguments in Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. And contrary to earlier beliefs that in the Nyāya tradition everything connected with the problems of God has been already said by Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Dr. Vattanky has shown conclusively that Gaṅgeśa has made original contribution on important topics. He has also shown that even for Gaṅgeśa the Buddhist position of the school of Dharmakīrti forms an important *pūrvapakṣa*. All these —the exactitude of his translation, the faithfulness of his commentaries, and the rigour of his studies—show that Dr. Vattanky is carrying on the traditions of the eminent scholars under whom he had the good fortune to study. He learnt Sanskrit under Prof. Burrow of Oxford and then assimilated the rigorous research method of Vienna set up by the late Prof. E. Frauwallner and continued so worthily by Prof. G. Oberhammer. He also continued reading regularly the difficult texts on the śāstra-s with a distinguished Pandit. Dr. Vattanky's work reflects the influence of all these scholarly sources. The present work, in my opinion, combines thoroughness with subtlety.

A word of caution is in order. Nyāya texts are admittedly difficult. Any translation or study will naturally reflect the difficulties of the original. But if anyone has the patience and the intellectual ability to study step by step each line and each section, he will soon be in a wonderful world of profound ideas and depth of argumentation and that will be sufficient reward for all the toil and sweat. I wish the work will win the admiration of scholars and hope that, in future, Dr. Vattanky will continue his study of other sections of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

Gopikamohan Bhattacharya
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Kurukshetra,
Haryana.

PREFACE

Although in recent times giant strides have been made in translating, studying and interpreting the basic texts of Indian philosophical systems, still we are far from the ideal of having all the important texts of Indian thought so worked out. This is particularly true with regard to the Nyāya system. Indeed pioneering scholars like Ganganatha Jha has translated and studied some of the basic texts of the old Nyāya like the *Bāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, and the *Vārttika* of Udyotakara. But even in old Nyāya a lot of further work remains to be done. Udayana who stands between the old and the new Nyāya, deserves much more attention. Most of his works are edited; this already is an achievement. But none of his work has been really furnished with accurate translation, interpretation and study. The situation with regard to Navyanyāya studies also cannot be viewed with any degree of satisfaction. The very basic text of Navyanyāya, Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, has indeed been edited with the voluminous commentary of Mathuranātha. But the text itself of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* has not been so far critically edited in such a way that the book could be easily used for studies. Some parts of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, however, have been translated, interpreted and studied by scholars like Sen, Ingalls, Matilal, Goekoop, Mohanty and Frauwallner[1]. Frauwallner has also done considerable service by his few articles on Raghunathaśiromaṇi[2] in drawing attention to the corpus of writings in the form of commentaries on *Tattvacintāmaṇi* between the time of Gaṅgeśa and Raghunathaśiromaṇi. But the commentaries themselves of Vāsudevasārvabhauma, Pragalbha, Jayadeva and others remain largely to be edited. In fact, for a proper evaluation of the Navyanyāya system much work still remains to be done. It is in this context that the present work is to be viewed. It is chiefly a translation, interpretation and study of the *īśvaravāda* section of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa and probably it is also the longest single section of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* so far thus worked out.

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[1] cf. Bibliography for the details of the works of these scholars.

[2] Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kund Süd-und Ostasiens, 1966, 1967 & 1980.

It may be appropriate also to point out the true significance of Navyanyāya studies. Any one who is acquainted with the primary sources of any system of Indian thought since the time of Udayana or, at any rate, since the time of Gaṅgeśa would certainly agree that it is impossible to understand these texts properly without a thorough grounding not only in the technical vocabulary of Navyanyāya but also in its techniques and in the ways of argumentation and even in the subjects treated. It is indeed a historical necessity to acknowledge and accept this fact. All schools of Vedānta since the time of Gaṅgeśa make use of the techniques and terms of Navyanyāya. In fact, later works on *Advaita Vedānta, Viśiṣṭādvaita*, and *Dvaita,* grammar and poetics remain closed books to those who have not studied and mastered the Navyanyāya. But more than this one should have a proper appreciation of the intrinsic worth of Navyanyāya. Its unique feature lies in the fact that it studies with unparalleled rigour and exactitude the nature, dimensions and conditions of human knowledge. And as we know the philosophical problem par excellence is the problem of knowledge. With rare insight Navyanyāya examines the problems connected with human knowledge and sets forth in detail the exact conditions in which valid knowledge is possible. But in so describing human knowledge, Navyanyāya does not forget itself in details of the question. In fact, in and through the analysis of human knowledge Navyanyāya presents us also with a self-understanding of man which deserves attentive study and unqualified appreciation. Thus its definition of *vyāpti* is not a sterile definition of the concept involved but a profound description of an aspect of human knowledge itself and its true significance comes out in the *īśvaravāda* section. Similarly its treatment of word and its meaning is practically unsurpassed in philosophical literature of all times. In this way when one is really acquainted with the nature of Navyanyāya one will also see how erroneous it is to describe Navyanyāya as mere hair-splitting. One's impression however, is that those who held such opinions about Navyanyāya were not really acquainted with the primary sources of this system of philosophy. Apparently they did not study the works of the most creative thinkers of the school like Udayana Gaṅgeśa and Raghunathaśiromaṇi. If they had done so, probably they would not have expressed such opinions. When one is only superficially acquainted with these works, one gets the impression that they are primarily interested in correct definitions and always busy with the problems of avoiding *ativyāpti* and *avyāpti*. The fact is that while trying to avoid these faults of *ativyāpti* and *avyāpti* they discussed in detail and often in depth, some of the basic philosophical problems connected with the subject. It was simply the methods of the Navyanaiyāyika-s to treat the problems in this way.

It can plausibly be argued that the intrinsic worth of Navyanyāya can be seen at its best in the *īśvaravāda* section. Here we find two different schools of thought fighting tooth and nail against each other defending their respective positions. And as I have pointed out in the study as well as in various places in the commentary all that the human mind could possibly bring forward for or against rationally establishing the existence of God could be found in this treatise. But to appreciate the implication of this statement one should obviously first master the techniques and terms of Navyanyāya and grasp the thought pattern that is expressed through the peculiar methodology of the Navyanaiyāyika-s. Viewed in this way one sees that the inference that establishes the existence of God as well as the answers to the two of the most significant objections to this inference, namely, the reason in the establishing inference has the faults of additional condition and counter reason, are very rich in philosophical implications. Shorn of its technical vocabulary Nyāya asserts that on the basis of what is known we can have a knowledge of what is unknown even if that unknown does not belong to the class of what is already known. Buddhists of the Dharmakīrti school would deny this position. Arguments and counter-arguments centre around this basic point about the nature of human knowledge and it may be pointed out that the arguments of the Naiyāyika-s are fairly unassailable. Such is the central theme of this work of Gaṅgeśa which I have here translated, interpreted and studied. Commentaries of Jayadeva and Pragalbha have been of immense help to me to prepare my own explanations of the text of Gaṅgeśa. It may perhaps be pointed out here that the present work can be appreciated only by those with at least a good introductory knowledge of Navyanyāya if not a mastery of all its techniques and terms. For this purpose two of the books which could be warmly recommended are Ingall's *'Materials for the study of Navyanyāya'* and Matilal's *'The Navyanyāya Doctrine of Negation'*. However, the best introduction to the Navyanyāya itself is to have a thorough knowledge of *Muktāvalī, with Dinakari and Rāmarudrī*.

In the preparation of this work several people have rendered invaluable help to me and I thank them all. I began to study Sanskrit in a systematic way under Professor T. Burrow of Oxford where I took my M.A. in Oriental studies with Sanskrit and Pali as my specialization. At that time I had the good fortune also to be introduced into Indian Philosophical and religious thought by the late Prof. R. C. Zaehner who was then the Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at the University of Oxford. With Professor R. Gombrich of the same University, I had the privilege to learn Sanskrit composition. I am extremely grateful to these Professors. I continued my specialization in Indian Philosophy taking Nyāya as my special subject at the Institute of Indology of the University of Vienna from where I took my Ph. D. under the guidance of Prof. G. Oberhammer. It was Prof. Oberhammer, who taught me the exacting methods of philological and historical analysis of texts. During this time I had the privilege also to come to know Professor B. K. Matilal, at that time at the University of Toronto, and to read with him the *īśvaravāda* for the first time. I thank him very warmly for his continued interest in my work even after he assumed new responsibilities at Oxford. After finishing my formal studies and gaining Ph. D. also, I continued to read more advanced texts in Navyanyāya with a distinguished traditional scholar, Paṇḍitaraja Sri Damodara Pisharody, a close disciple of the late H. H. Ramavarma Parikṣit Thampuran, the Maharaja of Cochin, who was one of the most renowned scholars of the time in Nyāya. Sri Pisharody's erudition helped me to grasp clearly the ideas in many obscure passages in the texts. I express my most sincere thanks to him. The late Dr. Venkitasubramonia Iyer, who was professor of Sanskrit of the Kerala university, had always been a friend, philosopher and guide to me. I am really grateful to him for his warm interest in all my activities. Professor Gopikamohan Bhattacharya of Kurukshetra was kind enough to go through the whole of my translation of the *īśvaravāda* and suggest many improvements. He also worte a very valuable Foreword to this work. I express my profound thanks to him. Professor E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma of Tirupati has gone through the whole manuscript and suggested many improvements. I cannot thank him sufficiently for all his interest and encouragement in my work. I am also grateful to Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, the present Director of Adyar Library and Research Centre, for having accepted my work for publication in the famous Adyar Library Series. I thank also the authorities of St. Joseph's Press, Trivandrum for their fine cooperation in neatly printing this work.

However as a member of the Society of Jesus I have been able to persue these researches largely because of the constant support I have received from my superiors and the interest of many of my companions. It is a pleasure for me to acknowledge this here and thank them all. I would like, however, to single out the names of Fr. A. M. Varaprasadam, S. J. and Fr. J. Mekat, S. J., who were my superiors some years ago. The support of Fr. Varaprasadam at a particular time, perhaps with considerable inconvenience even to himself, was invaluable to me. And Fr. Mekat continued this encouragement. Over the years the experience of this support has grown into me and took on a more profound significance: It became for me a sign and symbol of God's own never-failing support and strength and as such it has become for me a well-nigh inexhaustible source of interior strength in all my pursuits. I express here my warmest thanks to Frs. Varaprasadam and Mekat.

Trivandrum,
July 1984

JOHN VATTANKY

DEDICATED

to the loving memory of my mother
Mariam Vattanky
and of my father
Luke Vattanky
who taught me to love knowledge
and to walk in the ways of God.

ABBREVIATIONS

JN	Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali
NSD	Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa
PV	Pramāṇavārttika
RN	Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali
TC	Tattvacintāmaṇi
TCI	Tattvacintāmaṇi Īśvaravāda
TS	Tattvasaṃgraha
TSP	Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā

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PART I

STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NYĀYA THEISM

1

STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NYĀYA THEISM

One of the most fascinating phases in the development of Indian philosophical thought is the prolonged and persistent polemics between the Buddhists and the Naiyāyika-s. The controversy ranged over a vast variety of topics such as the nature of reality, means of valid knowledge and so on. The conflict, however, was most intense regarding the nature of inference and as a consequence the arguments purporting to establish the existence of God assumed great importance. While the Naiyāyika-s tried their best to marshal arguments with superb logical acumen to prove the existence of God, the Buddhists sought every means that logic and reason had to offer to disprove the same. Not all the original sources from which the history of this most acute intellectual controversy can be reconstructed have come down to us. But even that which has been preserved is enough to form an idea of the most sophisticated arguments that were brought for and against the position.[1] A large part of this study will consist in drawing a picture of these controversies which in early Nyāya culminates in

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[1] Briefly the chief primary sources that are frequently referred to in this study are the following: the three theistic sūtra-s in the *Nyāyasūtra-s* and their commentaries by Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra, the sections of the works of Dharmakīrti, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti in which they argue against the existence of God, the works of Udayana: *Ātmatattvaviveka*, *Kusumāñjali* and *Kiraṇāvali*, the *īśvaravāda* sections of the works of Vallabha and Śaśadhara and of course the *īśvaravāda* of Gaṅgeśa. The details concerning these works can be found in the bibliography.

Udayana; then we are in a position to appreciate the worth of the original contribution which Gaṅgeśa himself makes to the final solution of the problem on the Nyāya side. We will pay special attention to describe how Gaṅgeśa himself met these opponents and to delineate the exact nature of his contribution.

Nyāyasūtra[1]

At the fountain-head of all development of *Nyāya* thought on the existence of God are the three aphorisms in the *Nyāyasūtra-s*, the earliest extant work of the *Nyāya* school. The following are the aphorisms in question:

Sūtra 4.1.19. *Īśvaraḥ kāraṇaṃ puruṣakarmāphalyadarśanāt*. God is the cause because we find fruitlessness in the actions of men. 20) *na puruṣakarmābhāve phalāniṣpatteḥ*. It is not so because no fruit appears without the actions of men. 21) *tatkāritatvādahetuḥ*. This reasoning is not correct since it (the actions of man) is influenced by him (God).

These are the three theistic sūtra-s which had such an important role to play in the history of Nyāya theism. It is not easy, however, to determine their exact meaning. And in fact there have been varied interpretations given for these sūtra-s both by ancient and modern Naiyāyika-s. The early commentators Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara consider these sūtra-s as holding the Nyāya view that God is the cause of the world. Accordingly they take sūtra 19 to mean the Nyāya doctrine that God is the cause of the world; against this position an objection is raised in sūtra 20, viz: no fruit occurs without the action of man and hence God is not the cause. Sūtra 21 refutes this objection and establishes the Nyāya doctrine that God is the cause of the universe since even the action of man is caused by him. Among Sanskrit commentators Viśvanātha also follows this interpretation. But Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana interpret these sūtra-s differently. Vācaspati takes sūtra 19 as expressing the Vedānta view that

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[1] On this section, cf. Vattanky, J. : Aspects of early Nyāya theism, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 1978, pp.393-404.

Brahman is the material cause of the world. In sūtra 20, this view is rejected on the ground that there is no fruit when there is no action of man. Sūtra 21, then asserts the Nyāya view that God is the efficient cause of the world. This is also the interpretation of Udayana and of his commentator Vardhamāna as Ganganatha Jha states. Let us examine in detail the opinions of these commentators.

With fair certainty we can conclude that the meaning of the sūtra-s is practically the same as in the interpretation given by Vātsyāyana, and this inspite of some of the opinions of certain modern commentators.[1] The reason is that in the context in which these theistic sūtra-s stand they naturally take such a meaning; and when we compare the doctrine contained in these sūtra-s with the theories accepted or rejected by Gautama in the other sections of the Nyāyasūtra-s, this interpretation is confirmed. The discussions on God and his existence occur in the fourth chapter of the Nyāyasūtra-s where the question about the origin of things is treated. Four opinions are mentioned here about the origin of the world; they are the following:

1) All manifest things originate from manifested things (N. S. IV, 1, 11–13)
2) Beings originate from non–being (N.S. IV, 1, 14–18)
3) God is the cause of the origin of things (N.S. IV, 1, 19–21)
4) Things originate without cause (N.S. IV, 1, 22–24)

Among these theories, the second and fourth cannot be accepted from the Nyāya point of view: for the second theory that things originate from non-being could be taken without any violence to the text as the Buddhist view which is refuted by Gautama. This is also the interpretation of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. The fourth theory that things originate without a cause is a denial of such basic tenets of Nyāya as the *asatkāryavāda* that it cannot be reasonably taken to be the view of Gautama. Therefore these two theories cannot be taken as representing the mind of Gautama. Of the remaining two theories the first one, viz, all perceptible things originate from perceptible things can be simply interpreted as the Nyāya theory of *asatkāryavāda*, and as such it would express the thought of Gautama. This would also fit in with the third theory that God is the cause of the world. Besides, the theory that God is the cause of the world is not only not against any tenets of Nyāya system but is in perfect agreement wih them and it can be safely assumed that Gautama himself subscribes to the view that God is the cause of the world. Such also is the opinion of all the commentators without any exception, whatever be the particular way in which they arrive at this conclusion. Hence it can be said without any reasonable doubt that according to Gautama, God is the cause of the world.

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[1] Thus for instance Ruben (*Die Nyāyasūtra-s*, note, 250) and probably following him Bulcke also, (The Theism of Nyāyavaiśeṣika, p.32) think that there is a contradiction here in the *sūtra-s* and that the interpretation of Vātsyāyana does not do justice to the text of the *sūtra-s*. According to them, the contradiction lies in the fact that Vātsyāyana has already stated that the law of *karma* (N.S. 3,2,5 ff.), never fails, but now he admits that there is occasional fruitlessness of *karma* (Sūtra, 19). Thus Ruben suggests that Vātsyāyana interprets *karma* as *samīhā*, striving after, in order to avoid this contradiction. However, there seems to be no need to see a contradiction here, in spite of the opinions of Ruben and others; we can as well accept the interpretation of Vātsyāyana according to whom *karma* here is to be understood as *samīhā*.

Now, let us examine individually the three theistic sūtra-s themselves. They have been quoted in full in the beginning of this study. The first aphorism is interpreted as follows by Pakṣilasvāmin: when an individual soul acts with the intention of bringing about a particular result, it is not the case that invariably the result in view is achieved. Hence we can conclude that an individual soul is not always able to get the result desired, but that it depends on somebody else for this. As for example a farmer does not invariably get the good harvest he always desires, and works for. Sometimes his efforts do not produce the corresponding result and he gets a poor harvest. Similar is the case of many other activities of man. Hence it is to be inferred that the fruits of the actions of man do not depend upon himself but on somebody else. And the one on whom man depends for the fruit of his actions is God.

Uddyotakara takes up the same interpretation and explains it in detail. If an individual soul were able to confer upon itself the fruit of its actions, not even a single action of it would be unable to bring about the desired result. No one wants to cause sorrow for himself, nor does anyone desire that his actions be without fruit which one desires and for which one acts. But in our experience we see both happening: some actions bring about the desired end and bring us happiness, some other actions do not bring about the desired end and thus cause us sorrow. This shows that our actions depend upon somebody else in order to confer their appropriate results. And this some one is God who actually bestows on individual souls the fruits of their actions.

An objection against this theory is raised in the second aphorism. Technically, the objection is that there is the fault of establishing something that has already been established or that there is the fault of proving something other than what is to be proved. This is explained by Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara as follows: there is no need of taking God as the cause of the universe. It is enough that actions of man himself cause the world. It is admitted by both parties that if there is no action of man and hence no unseen (*adṛṣṭa*), there would also be no result or fruit. If God alone were the cause of the world, then it would naturally follow that even without the actions of man and the consequent unseen, individual souls would be able to experience sorrow or happiness. And if so men would not act at all. Further, it would come about that there would be no final release either. The reason is that God who is impartial acts always in the same way towards everybody. And so the actions he causes in individual souls will last for ever since he himself is eternal and his nature does not change. If the actions of man continue, there would be no time when there is absence of action and the unseen. Hence there would be no final release. But to avoid this fault, if it is proposed that God produces the universe dependent on auxiliary causes, then it would again come about that God does not produce these auxiliary causes; but that he is dependent on them. For all these reasons, the objection states that God is not the cause of the world, but the actions of man and the unseen resulting from them are its true causes.

This objection is answered in the third sūtra in the following way: it is not proposed that God produces the world without the help of the unseen which is the fruit of the actions of individual souls. God actually blesses or directs such merit of individuals. This means that when the particular merit of an individual soul reaches the stage when it is capable of bringing about a result, God makes that merit actually produce the result. Further, God is also the cause of the unseen which produces the results. For these reasons the objection that the action of man and the unseen consequent upon it produce the world cannot be held; further, because of these reasons, such difficulties as the impossibility of final release and so on will not arise. All these objections and difficulties can be raised only if God is not the cause also of the unseen and if he does not make use of it in bringing about the appropriate fruits for the individual souls according to their actions.

Vācaspati Miśra, however, interprets these sūtra-s differently, though he also comes to the same conclusion that the teaching of the sūtra-s is that God is the efficient cause of the universe. The sūtra-s immediatly preceding these sūtra-s discuss the opinion that the world is produced out of nothingness. Probably because of the similarity with this doctrine — in as far as the material cause of the world is discussed in these aphorisms — Vācaspati takes these theistic sūtra-s as rejecting the Vedānta view that Brahman is the material cause of the universe and establishing the Nyāya position that God is the efficient cause of the universe. Accordingly he takes sūtra 19 as expressing the Vedānta view that Brahman is the material cause of the universe. This itself is explained according to the two theories of actual transformation (*pariṇāma*) and apparent transformation (*vivarta*) of Brahman. According to the former theory Brahman himself becomes the universe just as a jar, a pot and so on are simply different transformations of clay.

Quoting Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*[1] it is pointed out that such a transformation of Brahman does not militate against his eternity since the same thing is recognized also in the thing produced. According to *vivartavāda*, Brahman himself, because of his connection with the indescribable and eternal nescience (*avidyā*) transforms himself into the world with its various objects, just as one and the same face is reflected in different ways in mirror, water and so on. Thus the first sūtra is taken to mean that in either of these ways, God is to be considered the material cause of the universe. The word *īśvara* is interpreted as meaning Brahman because *īśvara* means one who has *īśanā*, power, i. e. power of knowledge (*jñānaśakti*) and power of action (*kriyāśakti*). Now the rest of the first sūtra shows that individual souls cannot be considered the material cause of the universe either by really transforming (*pariṇāma*) themselves into it or by transforming themselves apparently (*vivarta*) into it. The reason is that if an individual soul is really capable of deciding which action is fruitful and which action is not fruitful, then it would not engage itself in actions that are not fruitful. Hence individual souls cannot be the material cause of the universe; therefore it should be concluded that Brahman is the material cause of the world.

This opinion is denied in sūtra 20. Brahman cannot be considered the material cause of the universe either in the sense of *pariṇāmavāda* or in the sense of *vivartavāda*. This is so because Brahman cannot transform himself into the world just as clay is changed into pot, jar and so on, for, if the whole of Brahman so changes, then he will not anymore be eternal; if a part of Brahman so changes, again he will not be eternal since he has parts. Nor can Brahman transform himself apparently into the world in the sense of *vivartavāda*, for it is impossible that the one, indivisible and self-cognizant Brahman be the object of doubt: how can Brahman whose nature is knowledge itself, be cognized in a general way and not cognized in its particularity?[1] Therefore Brahman does not also apparently transform himself into the world. Therefore it is to be concluded that God is the efficient cause of the universe and not its material cause. But in being the efficient cause of the Universe God makes use of the unseen of individual souls also; for otherwise there would be the possibility of no release at all as pointed out by Uddyotakara.

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[1] *tadapi nityaṃ yasmiṃstattvaṃ na vihanyate.*
That also is eternal in which the characteristic of 'being that' (*tattvam*) is not destroyed: The *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, vol. 1, p.64.

According to Vācaspati, sūtra 21 asserts that God is also the cause of the actions of men and the consequent unseen. God makes use of the unseen of individual souls, but it is he who also causes such merit. Therefore the conclusion is that God is the efficient cause of the universe and not its material cause. From the historical point of view, however, this interpretation of Vācaspati is questionable. Were such Vedantic views prevalent at the time of the Nyāyasūtra-s? And is not Vācaspati reading his own ideas into the Nyāyasūtra-s?

It is interesting to note that Udayana also follows the same interpretation. And Ganganatha Jha informs us that Vardhamāna in his *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa* also follows this interpretation.[2]

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[1] Here the point of the argument is that when conch shell is mistaken for silver, there is a general cognition of silver and of something existing before us but there is no cognition of conch shell as such existing in front of us. Therefore there arises the mistaken notion that the thing in front of us is silver. In the same way when Brahman is mistaken for the world, there should be a general cognition of Brahman and the absence of the knowledge of Brahman as Brahman. However such a general cognition of Brahman and absence of the knowledge of Brahman as Brahman are impossible since Brahman is in the form of knowledge.

[2] I have not been able to consult any manuscript of the *Prakāśa* of Vardhamāna. But Ganganatha Jha has the following remark: "in view, perhaps, of the fact that such an interpretation of the section is inconsistent with the introductory assertion of the previous bhāṣya - 'we now proceed to show up the view of philosophers', - the *tātparya* followed by the *pariśuddhi* and *prakāśa* has taken it as representing the criticism of the Vedānta doctrine that "God is the constituent cause of the universe". By this interpretation sūtra 19 represents the Vedānta view, *sūtra* 20 shows the untenability of that view and sūtra 21 puts forward the final Nyāya-siddhānta that God is the creator, the operative cause, not the constituent cause, of the universe" cf. Gautama's Nyāyasūtra-s with Vātsyāyana's Bhāsya translated by Ganganatha Jha, Poona, Oriental book Agency, 1939, p.420.

In view of these, Vācaspati's interpretation also requires careful consideration. Yet the interpretations of Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara seem more straight forward and to the point. It should be noted further that whatever be the difference in the way of interpreting the individual sūtra-s, all the commentators without exception come to the conclusion that in these three theistic sūtra-s, Gautama holds that God is the cause of the world. Thus there seems to be no reasonable doubt in asserting that the meaning of the sūtra-s is indeed as in the interpretation of Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara.

A question may now be asked: what is the distinct contribution of Gautama? Wherein lies his originality? Although the contribution of Gautama to the problem of the existence of God does not extend beyond a few lines, it has been of decisive importance in the history of Nyāya for in one way or another all the subsequent Nyāya authors speak of God as 'cause'. The intuition of Gautama that God is to be considered the cause of the world has remained the corner stone of Nyāya-theism and for this reason alone Gautama deserves to be called the father of Nyāya-theism. Further, his reference to God as cause has the implied meaning in the context of the sūtra IV. 1.19 that God actually confers to man the fruit of his endeavours. Therefore God stands supreme not only over the world but even over the inexorable law of karma, at least in some sense. This would point out that the God of the Nyāya-system even right at the beginning of the formation of the system is at least by implication a transcendent God. This is further corroborated by the very reasonable supposition that the origin of the idea of God in the Nyāya-system itself is to be sought in religion rather than by an inherent necessity of the philosophical system of Nyāya. Thus it could be concluded with some degree of certainty that the God of the Nyāya system even in its beginning is at least by implication, a transcendent one.[1]

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[1] Here we cannot enter into the problem of God in the *Vaiśeṣika sūtra-s*. There is an interesting treatment of this problem in Gopikamohan Bhattacharya, *Studies in Nyāyavaiśeṣika Theism*, p.160 ff. Indian tradition tends to take the *tad* in the *sūtra*, *tad vacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam* (V. S, 1.1.3.) as meaning God, and in spite of all the sophisticated discussions which give a different sense to this *sūtra*, no sufficiently serious reason has been advanced to reject this tradition.

Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin and his immediate successors

Pakṣilasvāmin's contribution to the interpretation of the Nyāyasūtra-s has already been discussed. He does not go beyond making the sūtra-s intelligible and there is not anything very original in it. There is, however, something new when he speaks about the nature of God which was not explicitly described in the Nyāyasūtra-s. This comes at the end of Pakṣilasvāmin's commentary on the last of the three theistic sūtra-s and runs as follows:

> "God is another soul endowed with qualities. Since he is a being of the same kind as a soul, he cannot be considered as any other kind of being. God is another soul without demerit, false knowledge, erroneous action (*pramāda*), and endowed with merit, right knowledge and perfect concentration (*samādhi*). He has also the eightfold power which is the result of his merit and knowledge. His merit (or nature) following the bent of his will, activates the accumulated merit and demerit inhering in each soul. In this way is to be understood the desire of God to create, which is without loss of the result of the action done by each.
>
> He is like an apt person, just as a Father is to his children, so is God like a Father to beings. There is no other category except that of a soul which could be applied to God. Besides his knowledge, there is no sign which can be pointed out. From scriptures, it is known that God is seer, knower and omniscient. If God were not discernible by the presence of knowledge, etc., then as He is beyond the reach of perception, inference and verbal testimony, how could He be proved? If God acted without taking into account the fruits of the deeds of each one, then all those objections which have been urged against the view that creation is due to karma, could be urged against this view also".[1]

When we examine closely this text certain aspects of the nature of God as given by Pakṣilasvāmin attract our attention. First of all, he considers God as a special kind of soul and this idea has become one of the main concepts of Nyāya-theodicy. Pakṣilasvāmin asserts explicitly that there is no other category to which God could belong. Further, his statement that God activates the *dharma* and *adharma* of ordinary souls also became a basic principle of Nyāya-idea of God.[1] But at the same time we find other characteristics mentioned about God which cannot have originated from Nyāya sources. Thus he ascribes to God *dharma* and *samādhi* and also the eightfold power (*aṣṭavidhaṁ aiśvaryam*) which are the result of his merit and knowledge. Also he considers God's *dharma*, the result of his deeds. Further, it is noteworthy that Pakṣilasvāmin subordinates these characteristics to one another. Thus the eightfold power results from his will (*saṃkalpa*) (cf. *saṃkalpānuvidhāyī ca asya dharmaḥ*). It is to be noted that the later Naiyāyika-s like Vācaspati Miśra, Udayana and Gaṅgeśa ascribe to God only eternal knowlege, will (desire) and effort (*jñāna*, *icchā* and *kṛti*). This shows clearly that Pakṣilasvāmin does not formulate the characteristics which he attributes to God consistent with the developments of Nyāya tenets. But it is unfair to criticize Pakṣilasvāmin for not having foreseen all the later Nyāya developments regarding the nature of God.

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[1] *Nyāyadarśanam*, p.943-5.

It is clear therefore that at the time of Pakṣilasvāmin the concept of God in the Nyāya system was only being formulated and therefore the question naturally arises: from where did Pakṣilasvāmin borrow these ideas? We can safely suppose that the source of these ideas was the other darśanas which were at that time relatively more developed than Nyāya, viz. Sāṃkhya-yoga. In fact when we examine closely the terminology used by Pakṣilasvāmin, we find close relationship with the words used in the Sāṃkhya system. Thus the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* in defining *Buddhi* says: *Buddhi* has (the characteristic of) virtue, knowledge, absence of passion and power.[1] Though Pakṣilasvāmin does not use the term *virāj* but instead he introduces the word *samādhi*, nevertheless, all the other three concepts are mentioned together. In the context of the creative-activity of God, it is seen that Pakṣilasvāmin is not using any words but technical terms to describe the nature and activity of *īśvara*. And the fact that these terms show a clear similarity to the terms in use in the Sāṃkhya system and also the fact that by the time of the beginning of Nyāya school at the time of Pakṣilasvāmin, Sāṃkhya was already a well-established and prestigious system of Philosophy, it is reasonable to conclude that Vātsyāyana is here borrowing from the Sāṃkhya system. This supposition is made stronger by the fact that the term *aiśvarya* which is not to be found in the Nyāyasūtra-s is a common concept in Sāṃkhya and the term *samādhi* also is of frequent occurrence in the Yogasūtra-s of Patañjali.

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[1] In fact the Mīmāṃsaka-s continued to attack this idea of the Naiyāyika-s, pointing out that if a soul cannot direct its own merit and demerit, neither can God who is just another soul direct its merit and demerit. For a discussion of this argument, see Śālīkanātha: *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, edited by A. Subramania Sastri, Benares, 1961, p.306 ff.

On the other hand it is noteworthy that two of the most important commentators, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra corrected certain statements about God in Pakṣilasvāmin, which originated from non-nyāya sources. Thus Uddyotakara clearly states: "*na ca īśvare dharmo'stīti acodyam etat*", i.e. there is no *dharma* in *īśvara*. This cannot be questioned. Vācaspati Miśra commenting on this passage says: In fact, there is no proof to show that there is *dharma* in *īśvara*; creation of all things is by his eternal knowledge and power; it is with this idea that the Vārttikakāra says that there is no *dharma* in *īśvara*.[2] Pakṣilasvāmin, however, is quite in line with most of the later thinkers of the school as regards the description of the manner in which God effects creation. God activates the accumulated *dharma* and *adharma* of individual souls as also the elements like earth, etc. This means that God causes the *dharma* of each soul to bring about the corresponding fruit. He brings about also the movement of the atoms from which the universe is to be created. In this way Pakṣilasvāmin brings a solution for the problem of the conflict between the law of karma and the omnipotence of God. The problem is that if the law of karma is inexorable, if it necessarily brings about the fruit, then what is the place of God? Pakṣilasvāmin subordinates the law of karma to the activity of God; it is only when God activates the *dharmādharmau* of individual souls that each soul gets its due reward. Nevertheless, Pakṣilasvāmin in no way does away with the law of karma; it is only subordinated to God. What, however, is actually meant by the 'activating' of *dharmādharmau* of the individual souls by God, is not elaborated by Pakṣilasvāmin.

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[1] *Sāṃkhyakārikā* by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, 23.

[2] *Nyāyadarśanam*, p.950 ff.

From a religious point of view, it is interesting to note that Pakṣilasvāmin considers God as Father. This idea has been taken up by later Naiyāyika-s also, as for instance by Udayana when in the beginning of his *Ātmatattvaviveka*, he salutes God as Father.[1] However this idea of the Fatherhood of God remains extrinsic to the system and it is not worked into the philosophical system itself. This again would point to the fact that the idea of God took its origin from religion rather than from an inherent necessity of the philosophical system of Nyāya. It may further be noted that neither in the three theistic Nyāyasūtra-s nor in the commentary of Pakṣilasvāmin on them, do we find any attempt to formulate according to the principles of Nyāya logic the proofs for the existence of God. Much less is there any attempt to justify logically these proofs. This is a bit strange since the Nyāyasūtra-s themselves speak of the five members of syllogism and so on.[2] Perhaps this may be explained by supposing that all the Nyāyasūtra-s were not composed at the same time.

The immediate successors of Pakṣilasvāmin

Only a few fragments of the works of Nyāya authors who lived between Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara have come down to us. Certainly there has been a very vigorous development of Nyāya thought before the time of Uddyotakara as can be easily concluded from the fragments of Nyāya authors which are preserved, above all in Buddhist works. Therefore the doctrines about God also must have received considerable attention from the Naiyāyika-s and their opponents of the time. Thus Vasubandhu who lived in the fifth century after Christ attacked the Nyāya ideas on God with the following arguments. If things were brought into existence by only one cause, then everything must come into existence at the same time. Our experience, however, is that things come into existence one after another, and because of this, it could be concluded that things depend upon other causes also; if such is the case, God will not be the only cause of things. Besides, God must have a purpose in creation. This purpose can only be his own satisfaction or the satisfaction of other beings. If it is the first case, then God cannot really be God since he is in need of something else for his satisfaction; if the second is the case, then there cannot have been so much sorrow in this world. Further, if one admits that God is the cause of things, one is actually denying that causes other than God do not produce things. Actually we can only verify the latter, viz. we see that causes other than God produce things and we do not see God producing anything.[1] These attacks of Vasubandhu were directed against the Nyāya view of God and in as far as we can identify them, these views correspond to those found in *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Pakṣilasvāmin, for he tried to save the independence of God, on the one hand and the universality of the law of karma on the other. But then this position gave rise to the attacks of Buddhists. Vasubandhu's objection was in essence taken up by Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā.[2]

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[1] *tasmai pūrvagurūttamāya jagatāmīśāya pitre namaḥ*, *Atmatattvaviveka* by Udayana, p.1

[2] cf. *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.32

All these Buddhist attacks only stimulated Nyāya thinking. In fact, there have been several commentaries on *Nyāyabhāṣya*[3] defending its teachings, but unfortunately all these have been lost and only two fragments of the Naiyāyika, Aviddhakarṇa have come down to us. They are preserved in Kamalaśīla's commentary on Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* and express two proofs for the existence of God. The first is as follows: "What can be cognized by two sense organs and what cannot be cognized by two sense organs which are the objects of discussion are caused by an intelligent agent, because they are constituted by a special arrangement of their parts like a jar for example and unlike an atom for counter example.[1] This complicated formulation of the proof is explained by Kamalaśīla in the following way: the phrase 'what can be cognized by two sense organs' means the earth, water and fire which could be perceived by the two organs of eye and touch; those which cannot be grasped by these organs are air and so on. Thus all the objects in the world would be included in the enunciation of the subject since everything is either capable of being grasped by two sense organs or not. But in fact only those objects which are under discussion need be taken as the subject, as Kamalaśīla expressly mentions, otherwise there would naturally be faults of establishing what has already been established with regard to jars and so on or contradiction (*bādha*) with regard to atoms. The reason for the inference is 'having special arrangement of parts'; this means the particular kind of connection or conjunction of parts which is the cause of the particular thing in question. It may perhaps be interesting to note that this reason of 'having special arrangements of parts' is likely to be of Sāṃkhya origin. For *saṃniveśaviśeṣa* has been used as the definition of effect in Sāṃkhya[2] and in Aviddhakarṇa also, the expression is used in the same sense. Further, in Sāṃkhya too *puruṣa* is established on the ground that the prime matter also needs someone to activate it.[3] In fact, Aviddhakarṇa seems to have taken this proof from Sāṃkhya and instead of *puruṣa* speaks of God taking into account also the *asatkāryavāda* of Nyāyavaiśeṣika.

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[1] cf. E. Lamotte: *Histoire du Buddhisme Indien*, p.436 ff.

[2] Both the Sāṃkhya and the Mīmāṃsā considered the presence of sorrow in this world as an argument against the existence of God. cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 85, 26–28; *ślokavārttikam, saṃbandhākṣepaparihāraḥ*, V.49 ff.

[3] cf. E. Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol.II, p.8.

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[1] cf. TSP. p.52 *dvīndriyagrāhyāgrāhyaṃ vimatyadhikaraṇa - bhāvāpannaṃ buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakaṃ svārambhakāvayavasaṃniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt ghaṭādivat, vaidharmyeṇa paramāṇava iti.*

[2] cf. *Yuktidīpikā*, 57, 8-14, where *kāryatva* is understood as *saṃniveśaviśeṣamātra.*

[3] *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, 17.

The second argument of Aviddhakarṇa is as follows: the instrumental and material causes of bodies and earth bring about their effects in as far as they are led by a spiritual agent; this is our opinion, because they have colour and so on like threads, etc.[1] In this proof Aviddhakarṇa argues from the causes, i.e. atoms, the unseen, etc. that are necessary to produce things and shows that these can be activated only by an intelligent agent, and not by themselves as old Vaiśeṣika-s taught. The reason used is *rūpādimattva* which is taken as the *hetu* because colour is necessary in order to perceive any substance and so it is used practically in the sense of 'being-an-effect'. In general the two proofs, which Aviddhakarṇa brings forward, show quite a developed stage of Nyāya thought. This can be concluded from the technical expressions used in formulating them. It is possible that the influence of Diṅnāga's *trilakṣaṇahetu* is visible here. At any rate, there is here, the remarkable development from common sense arguments to logically formulated proofs.

Uddyotakara

When we turn our attention to Uddyotakara, we see a remarkable progress of thought. The originality of Uddyotakara is seen not so much in the commentary on the Bhāṣya of the three theistic sūtra-s which we have already discussed; but in a long section on *īśvaraprakriyā* appended to the commentary on the third of the theistic sūtra-s.[2] He starts with the statement that since there are different opinions about the *nimittakāraṇa* 'efficient cause' of the universe some say that it is time, some God and still others *prakṛti*, it is necessary to institute an investigation about the *nimittakāraṇa*, 'efficient cause' of the universe. And immediately he states the proposition he is going to prove: the opinion that *īśvara* is the *nimittakāraṇa* 'efficient cause' of the universe is the most reasonable one. Then he gives three proofs one after another for the existence of God. The first is the following: "Prime matter, atoms and fruit of actions become active in as much as they are activated by an intelligent cause because they are not themselves intelligent like an axe. Just as an axe and so on work only when brought into action by an intelligent carpenter, even so prime matter, atoms and fruits of actions being non-intelligent, work only when brought into action by an intelligent agent".[1] In this proof Uddyotakara argues, first of all against the Sāṃkhya school. According to this school the universe comes into existence from non-intelligent prime matter. Uddyotakara argues that since this prime matter is non-intelligent, it cannot act of itself. And therefore, if it has to act, it must be under the influence of an intelligent agent. This intelligent agent is God.

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[1] TSP. 54, *tanubhuvanakarṇopādānāni cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitāni svakāryam ārabhanta iti pratijānīmahe rūpādimatvāt tantvādivad iti.*

[2] cf. *Nyāyadarśanam*, p.945 ff.

But the Sāṃkhya objects that there is no need of postulating a God for this; actually the purpose of the soul (*puruṣārtha*) activates the prime matter. The purpose of the soul is two-fold: perception of sound and so on, i.e. experience of objects in general and the knowledge of the difference between qualities and soul. Such a purpose of the soul and not God activates the prime matter.[2] Uddyotakara refutes this argument showing the inner contradictions contained in it. For on the one hand, it is not possible for the purpose of the soul to exist before the action of the prime matter. The reason is that the objects are transformations of prime matter and hence their experience can be had only after they come into existence. Therefore such a purpose of experience of objects cannot activate prime matter. If, on the other hand, the purpose of the soul exists prior to the activity of the prime matter, then prime matter need not act in order to produce this purpose of the soul. Besides in this case, there must always be the activity of the soul, since there exists always the purpose of the soul. To the objection of those who support Sāṃkhya, that although the purpose of the soul already exists, because of certain obstacles, it does not act, Uddyotakara answers that the prime matter, in that case, cannot at all work since these obstacles cannot be removed according to the Sāṃkhya theory of *satkāryavāda.*[1] Besides because of this theory, it would be impossible to explain why the equilibrium of the qualities is disturbed at the beginning of the creation of the world. If the supporters of Sāṃkhya say that this is due to some qualities becoming preponderant, then the question again remains the same: why do some qualities and not others become thus important.

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[1] Ibid

[2] cf. *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, 57

In this proof Uddyotakara rejects also the opinion of certain theistic Vaiśeṣika-s.[2] According to them, the atoms led by the merit and demerit of individual souls produce the world. Uddyotakara argues that if atoms act, then they should always act as they always exist. But if the opponent argues that the atoms act depending only on a particular time, then time being non-intelligent needs another agent to bring it into action. And this intelligent agent will then be God.

The second argument brought forward by Uddyotakara runs as follows: the manifest viz. the elements etc. are the cause of happiness and sorrow in as far as they are activated by an intelligent being because they have colour etc. like a weaver's brush etc. Merit and demerit in as far as they are activated by an intelligent agent work so that individual soul may enjoy the fruit of its actions since they (merit and demerit) are instruments like an axe etc.[3]

In the first proof Uddyotakara showed that the material cause of the world being non-intelligent must be activated by an intelligent agent, in order that the world be brought into being. In this proof, however, he shows that the bodies of individual souls, which are the indispensable condition to experience the fruit of merit and demerit, also establish the existence of God. The reason is that they are products since they have colour and so on. But in order to prove the existence of God, from the fact that bodies are effects, it is necessary also to show that the bodies are not brought about by the merit and demerit of individual souls. It is inorder to show this that Uddyotakara adds the second part of the proof which asserts that merit and demerit cannot bring about the bodies, because they themselves are instruments and therefore they should also be directed by an intelligent agent.

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[1] According to *satkāryavāda* nothing really new comes into existence. What seems to be produced is actually something that already exists. However it makes its appearance only just now.

[2] Here Uddyotakara may be attacking against a particular Sāṃkhya school around the time of Vindhyāvāsin or Mādhava (first half of 5th cent. A.D.). This school seems actually to have taken up the doctrine of atoms from Vaiśeṣika and explained the whole process of the world through the power of merit and demerit. However similar are the views of the Mīmāṃsaka-s also.

[3] *Nyāyadarśanam* p. 947.

In the discussion that follows Uddyotakara shows that the individual souls cannot activate the merit and demerit. The reason is that before the soul is conjoined with the senses, it is not capable of perceiving anything; and even when it is conjoined with the senses, it is not capable of perceiving merit and demerit because they are invisible. Besides, if the individual souls themselves activated their merit and demerit, it is natural that they will not bring about sorrow to them: nobody causes sorrow to himself. Uddyotakara continues his discussion on how God can act at all. And his answer to this question is that God makes use of merit and demerit of individual souls in creating the universe. Since this part of the discussion is not about logical proof to establish the existence of God, we shall go into its details, when we examine Uddyotakara's idea of God.

From these explanations, it is clear that the second part of the proof, namely that the bodies are not brought about by merit and demerit forms an integral part of the whole proof. Therefore, this part of the proof falls here in its proper place and for this reason it is not an interpolation as put forward by Jacobi.[1] Besides, Jacobi's position becomes quite untenable, when we see that precisely the passage that is considered an interpolation by him is quoted by the Buddhist logician Kamalaśīla in his commentary on *Tattvasaṃgraha*,[2] and is there ascribed to Uddyotakara. However, the abruptness, lack of clarity, and absence of any further explanation suggest that Uddyotakara is here referring to ideas which he has already explained elsewhere or making use of the ideas of others current at that time which he need not therefore explain much. And in fact there is a parallel passage in the *Nyāyavārttika*, where he shows that the elements build up the bodies only in dependence on their merit and demerit. This passage is as follows: "the bodies consist of elements which are activated by a special quality of individual souls, because they are effects; they are also capable of (helping them) in their purposeful actions. That which is useful for the purpose of individuals is observed as consisting of elements, which are activated by a special quality of individual souls. This is like a cart and so on which are fit for helping the purposeful actions of individual souls; they are observed as consisting of elements and they are activated by effort which is a special quality of individua souls. Similar is the case of the bodies of individual souls. Therefore these also consist of elements, since these are the cause of happiness and sorrow like a pot. These are also products like a cart and so on since they can be known through external sense organs and since they have colour and so on just like a pot".[1]

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[1] H. Jacobi, *Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern* p.50.

[2] cf. TSP. p. 55.

A comparison of the present proof of Uddyotakara which we are discussing with this passage just quoted shows what the line of thought that underlies this proof is. Here the process of the origin of bodies is explained: they arise from the elements and once they come into existence, they are used by the respective individual souls for their own purposes. In the proof for the existence of God, however, the question is: what is the actual cause that brings about the origin of the bodies from the elements? And the answer is that it is God who does so. Hence naturally Uddyotakara had to answer a likely objection that it is not God Himself who brings about the bodies, but the merit of each individual soul. Therefore he had to add the second part showing that merit and demerit cannot produce these bodies independently since they themselves are instruments and need to be used by an intelligent agent. However, Uddyotakara seems to have created some confusion here: in the passage quoted above 'having-colour' is used as the reason to show that the body is an effect; in the proof for the existence of God which he brings forward, 'having-colour' is used as the reason that the elements are activated by an intelligent agent. Though in the proof 'having-colour' may be taken grammatically as the reason for the experience of happiness or sorrow, still it cannot be done so, because in that case there would be no reason to establish that elements are activated by an intelligent agent. Hence 'having-colour' should be taken as the reason for establishing that the elements are activated by an intelligent agent. But then 'having-colour' is not in itself a sufficient reason to establish that the elements are activated by an intelligent agent. These considerations also lead us to the conclusion that here Uddyotakara is giving the thought of another earlier author, because if it was his own proof, there could not have been such a lack of clarity in the formulation of the proof, nor could he have used 'having-colour' as the reason for proving that the elements are activated by an intelligent agent.

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[1] *Nyāyavārttika* 439.

At the end of his discussion on God, Uddyotakara gives another proof also for the existence of God. This is as follows: 'Likewise one should bring *kāryatva* 'being an effect' as the reason, when grass etc. are the subject, since these are objects of sight and touch. Likewise whenever a difference of opinion is given and 'being an effect' is also seen, one should prove the existence of God with the same argument, with the same example, after something has been taken as the subject'.[1] Here we find for the first time the inferential reason of *kāryatva*, being an effect, used in the proof to establish the existence of God. The full form of the proof must have been something like this: the different things in nature like grass, shoots etc. must have an agent just as things like a pot etc. have an agent viz. potter. And the cause of the effects like grass, earth etc. is

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[1] *Nyāyadarśanam* p. 957, *evaṃ kāryatvāt tṛṇādīni pakṣīkṛtya darśana-sparśana viṣayatvād iti vaktavyam. evaṃ yatra yatra vipratipattiḥ kāryatvam ca tat tad anenaiva nyāyenānena dṛṣṭāntena vāsyādinā pakṣayitvā sādhayitavyam.*

God. About the origin of this proof, the following considerations may be proposed. The proof is practically the last sentence in Uddyotakara's treatment of God. Besides, he does not at all explain it unlike the other proofs. If this was his original contribution, he would certainly have dealt with it together with the other proofs and not after he discussed about the nature of God and placed it at the end of his whole treatment on God. Hence it is right to conclude that this proof must have been current at the time of Uddyotakara in the Nyāya school and he just mentioned it as if it were known to all. In any case, it cannot be considered an interpolation as Jacobi thought because this inferential reason has expressly been attributed to Uddyotakara by Kamalaśīla.[1] Further, it may be pointed out that in the Buddhist works, we find the fragments attributed to Aviddhakarṇa, the Naiyāyika, who lived before Uddyotakara and in these fragments, we find such reasons as *rūpādimattva, sanniveśaviśiṣṭatva*, which may be broadly identified with *kāryatva* and so the inferential reason of *kāryatva* itself may be the original contribution of Aviddhakarṇa himself.

Uddyotakara gives also another proof for the existence of God. This proof does not occur in the *Nyāyavārttika*, but in a passsage quoted by Kamalaśīla in his commentary on the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and attributed to Uddyotakara. The argument runs as follows: "Prime matter, atoms and *adṛṣṭa* which are the cause of the world depend on an exceedingly intelligent agent since they work after some time of rest like thread and the weaver's brush".[2] This proof shows some similarity with the first proof. Here as in the first proof, prime matter, atoms and the unseen are taken as the *pakṣa*. And even the idea of the inferential reason 'since they work after some time of rest' is found in the first proof, though as a part of the formulation of the thesis to be proved, by means of the quailfication of 'before action' (*prāk pravṛtteḥ*). What is however, new in this proof is the use of inferential reason. This reason is 'because they work after some time of rest' and the idea behind this is that after 'dissolution' (pralaya), the universe is at rest and it needs an agent, who is not a part of the universe to start the whole cosmic process again. It may be noted that this inferential reason 'since they work after some time of rest' (*sthitvāpravṛtteḥ*) is to be found in Buddhist authors in their *pūrvapakṣa* where they attribute such a reason to Naiyāyika-s; but it is strange that such a formulation of the reason cannot be found in the works of any standard Nyāya author. This raises the important question, whether the Buddhists really understood the Nyāya position and whether they twisted the meaning of the arguments of the Naiyāyika-s, a question to which we shall return later on.

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[1] H. Jacobi (*Gottesidee bei den Indern* p. 92) thinks that this passage here is an interpolation. He thinks that there was no mention of *kāryatva* here and that *kāryatva* as a reason for the proof for the existence of God was first given only by Vācaspati Miśra. But there is no reason to doubt that the passage here is an interpolation. It is likely that *kāryatva* as a logical reason has been used even before Uddyotakara and that he mentions it here without developing it because it was known well at that time. Further Kamalaśīla expressly attributes this reason to Uddyotakara (TSP. p. 55, *l*. 11). This shows clearly that the passage is not an interpolation.

[2] TSP. p. 54.

It is now appropriate to discuss another question which Uddyotakara raises in connection with all the proofs for the existence of God, which he has given. The question is that although these proofs establish God as the cause of this world and therefore establish also his existence, it only follows that God exists at the beginning of the world, and not that He exists afterwards also. Uddyotakara answers this question as follows: "the same argument holds good here also: the merit and demerit of the dead people need to be activated by an intelligent agent. Only being activated by an intelligent agent, do the elements up to air[1] operate in their respective functions like holding and so on".[2] Uddyotakara brings here two arguments in order to show that God is the cause also at present. In the first argument, the idea expressed is that God activates the unseen of men also in the present, because the merit of men dying at present is also to be activated, i.e. he has to join the soul of the individual who has just died with a body corresponding to his merit. This shows that God as the cause of the cosmic process has to exist not only at the beginning of creation, but also at present. The second argument shows that God not only creates the objects of the material universe but also his activity is required in order that these objects may carry on their specific functions; in the case of earth, the fact that it continues to hold things on it, shows that God continually enables it to perform its natural functions. In other words, the proof means God's action is needed not only for the creation of the thing, but also for its existence and specific functions.

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[1] These elements are earth, water, fire and air.

[2] *mṛtaśarīriṇām yau dharmādharmau tau buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitav iti samāno nyāyaḥ buddhimatkāraṇādhitāni svāsu svāsu dhāraṇādikriyāsu mahābhūtāni vāyvantāni pravartante acetanatvāt vāsyādivat.*
Nyāyadarśanam, p. 957, *l.* 8 ff.

Another question may be raised here: what exactly is the contribution of Uddyotakara as far as the logic of the proof for the existence of God is concerned? We had already indicated that neither in the *Nyāyasūtra-s* nor in *Nyāyabhāṣya*, do we find a strictly logically formulated proof for the existence of God, but from the proofs of Uddyotakara which we have discussed, we see that there is a development in this respect. This progress of logical aspect of the proof was made chiefly under the influence of Diṅnāga's logic. Diṅnāga stipulated that the reason should be in the *pakṣa*, it should be present in all *sapakṣa* and that it should be absent from all *vipakṣa*. At the time of Uddyotakara, this principle of Diṅnāga was widely acknowledged in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. And in fact Uddyotakara also takes into account this theory of inference in formulating his own proof for the existence of God.

However in discussing inference itself Uddyotakara holds that the reason need not always have the three characteristics demanded by Diṅnāga; he recognizes as valid also those reasons which have only two of such characteristics, i.e. he recognizes as valid those reasons also which are present in the *pakṣa* but which are only either present in all *sapakṣa* or which are only absent in all *vipakṣa.*[1] A reason of the last kind will be the one establishing the existence of a soul. In a quite similar way, the reason to establish the existence of God would be a *kevalavyatireki*. But there is nothing in the treatment of the problem by Uddyotakara which suggests that he was cognizant of the fact that in the proof for the existence of God, the reason is *kevalavyatireki*, for he seems to think that the *sādhya* of being-activated-by-an-intelligent agent (*buddhimadadhiṣṭhātṛtva*) is present both in the *pakṣa* and also in the example of axe and so on. Therefore Uddyotakara considered all these also as *sapakṣa*: he did not quite recognize the fact that different kinds of agents are meant in the *pakṣa*, and in the example. For the activating of the *pakṣa*, God is required and for producing the example man only is needed. In fact the Naiyāyika-s came to appreciate the full implications of this objection only when the Buddhists began to attack them.

Besides the proofs for the existence of God, Uddyotakara has discussed various problems concerning the nature and activity of God. Most of these problems have also been touched upon by different Naiyāyika-s in later times and so it would be worthwhile to refer to them also. First of all regarding the nature of God, Uddyotakara seems to differ from Pakṣilasvāmin according to whom God is a soul of a special kind. Uddyotakara rather considered God as a special kind of substance.[2] He argues that the soul must be a substance because he has knowledge.[3] Though he has knowledge, according to Uddyotakara, God cannot be another soul, because the qualities that should be attributed to God are different from those attributed to an ordinary soul. And so just as the earth and so on are different from soul since they possess different characteristics, even so God must be different from soul, since He possesses characteristics different from souls. Thus the real difference between God and ordinary souls is, first of all, that in

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[1] cf. *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 46, *l.* 2 ff.

[2] cf. *Nyāyadarśanam*, p. 951, *l.* 1 ff.

[3] Ibid: *dravyam buddhiguṇatvād dravyāntaravat.*

God there is no *dharma* or *adharma*.[1] This means that God is above the law of karma which determines the kind of existence of ordinary souls; God, therefore, is neither bound (*baddha*) by the law of karma, nor is He released from it,[2] because He was never bound. Another important difference between God and souls is that the qualities of God like knowledge and so on are eternal. These characteristics of individual souls are lost when they are liberated. It is to be further noted that God has no indirect or mediate forms of knowledge such as inference, verbal cognition and memory.[3] God's knowledge is always direct and extends to all things.

It is because of these differences that Uddyotakara denies that God is a soul and asserts that He is a substance of a special kind. It is interesting to note that these two opinions of Pakṣilasvāmin who envisages God as a special kind of soul and that of Uddyotakara according to whom God is a special kind of substance, are referred to by Kamalaśīla in his *Tattvasaṃgraha*. The passage there is as follows: "Some say that *īśvara*, the all-knowing cause of the whole world is only another soul, which has special characteristics. Others, however, consider that He is another substance which is different from soul since it has knowledge which is eternal and which has everything as object".[4] It can easily be noticed that the first opinion is that of Pakṣilasvāmin and the second that of Uddyotakara. It is also striking that in the case of Uddyotakara the agreement extends even to details; for what Kamalaśīla refers by *sarvārthaviṣayabuddhi* is the same as what Uddyotakara expresses by *pratyarthaniyamāsaṃbhavāt*, both meaning in effect that the knowledge of God has everything as object. We cannot however be certain if Kamalaśīla is referring here to the opinion of another Naiyāyika whose ideas were taken up by Uddyotakara also. Further, we cannot be all too sure if Uddyotakara himself was the first Naiyāyika to consider God as a special kind of substance.

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[1] *Nyāyadarśanam*, p. 950, *l*. 19.

[2] Ibid, p. 952, *l*. 14 ff.

[3] Ibid. *l*, 9 ff.

[4] cf. TSP. p. 51, 16 ff: *tatra viśiṣṭaguṇam ātmāntaram eva sarvasya jagataḥ kartṛ sarvajñam īśvaram iti kecit. ātmavyatiriktaṃ nityaikasarvārthaviṣayabuddhyupetatayā bhinnaguṇatvād dravyāntaram evetyapare.*

The qualities of īśvara: The most important quality that Uddyotakara ascribes to God is knowledge; but this knowledge of God is thoroughly different from the knowledge of an individual soul. Since God is the creator of the universe, his knowledge should be eternal. The reason is that God should know the past, present and the future and also He should know many things at the same time; otherwise, it is difficult to understand how many things can come into existence at the same time[1]. Further his knowledge is just one and continuous[2]. If his knowledge were many and momentary and follows one after the other, it would be very difficult to explain how many things come into existence at the same time.[3] Again, he cannot have any mediate knowledge, i.e. he cannot have any inferential knowledge or verbal cognition. The only kind of knowledge that God can have is perception. Therefore, the knowledge of God is one, eternal, and it extends to all things. Because of these characteristics of his knowledge, it follows that he does not have any memory since his knowledge is eternal.

Unlike Pakṣilasvāmin, Uddyotakara does not admit that there is *dharma* in God. This means that according to Uddyotakara, God is not bound by the law of karma; he is neither bound nor liberated. Since he has no *dharma* and obviously no *adharma*, he has neither happiness nor sorrow which are the fruit of karma. Uddyotakara's denial of *dharma* and *adharma* in God leads him quite logically to deny any body for God, for individual souls possess a body because of their *dharma* and *adharma*. When, therefore, God does not have any *dharma* or *adharma*, naturally he does not have also a body, fruit of these *dharma* and *adharma*. Nor can He have an eternal body since the very concept of an eternal body is contradictory. Further, since God is the creator of the world, besides intellect and knowledge, he must have also will. In fact Uddyotakara writes, 'there is desire in him which is untroubled and which is not hindered with regard to anything, just like his knowledge'.[1] Besides, God has five qualities which are common to all other substances viz. number (in the case of God number one) extension, omnipresence, separateness, conjunction and disjunction.[2] God has these qualities in common with individual souls.

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[1] *Nyāyadarśanam*, p. 951, *l.* 12 ff.

[2] Ibid. p. 952, *l.* 1 ff.

[3] Ibid.

How does God whose nature and qualities we have described, produce this world? Uddyotakara answers this question describing God, first of all, as the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) of the universe, making use of the unseen of individual souls.[3] In this he agrees with Pakṣilasvāmin, but in explaining the process of the action of God, Uddyotakara brings in many new elements. First of all, he raises the question whether God depends upon something or not in producing this world. This dependence, of course, is not thought of as dependence on material cause, for such a dependence is taken for granted in Indian philosophical systems in general, but a dependence on something else in exercising his efficient causality. If God has such a dependence in the creation of the world, then it is obvious that he is not the producer of the thing on which he depends. If, however, he produces certain things without depending on something else, then it must be admitted that he can produce everything without depending on anything else. If, thus he does not depend even on the merit of individual souls, then man would not make any attempt for his liberation since it will depend only upon the free will of God. Further, there would be no reason why some experience more happiness or sorrow, others less. Uddyotakara holds that God brings about the universe in dependence on the merit of individual souls. However, he points out that at the end, even the merit and demerit of individual souls is subordinated to God; with the help of the merit and demerit of the respective souls, God brings about their rebirth in appropriate bodies.

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[1] cf. *Nyāyadarśanam*, p. 952, *l*. 14
[2] cf. *Nyāyadarśanam*, p. 951, *l*. 8
[3] cf. *Nyāyadarśanam*, p. 949, *l*. 1 ff.

In order that God may so act, it is also necessary that there should be some connection between God and individual souls. At the time of Uddyotakara, there were two kinds of attempts to solve this problem: one postulated the so called *'ajaḥ saṃbandhaḥ'* between God and the soul. This was proved from the fact that God is connected with those things which have a form such as a jar. When one jar is connected with a second jar, a third jar which is connected with the first jar is also connected with the second jar. In the same way when God is connected with anything that has a form, he is also connected with individual souls which are omnipresent and so connected also with anything that has a form.[1] This proof is necessary because a direct connection between all-extensive substances is not admitted and the proof tries to show that these substances must come in connection, at least in substances which are limited in extension, with which they are also in contact. Those who do not admit this kind of *ajaḥ saṃbandhaḥ* between God and souls argue for a mediate connection between them. This was explained as follows: God is indeed not directly in contact with the individual souls but He is in contact with their minds which is indeed limited in extension and with this mind the individual soul also is in contact and in this way God is also in contact with individual souls, just as pincers are in touch with the hand and the hand with the soul and so the soul could be said to be in contact with the pincers.[2]

What is the purpose of the activity of God according to Uddyotakara? He discusses various theories regarding this point, which were held by theistic schools of his times. One of such theories held that God works for the sake of play (*krīḍārtham*).[3] Others held that it was for the sake of proclaiming his glory (*vibhūtikhyāpanārtham*). Uddyotakara rejects both these views: it is only those who have sorrows that play inorder to have joy and God has no sorrows; similarly, there is nothing that God is going to gain because of the proclamation of His glory, nor is He going to lose anything, if He does not proclaim it. Therefore he brings forward his own theory: God acts because of His nature itself (*tatsvābhāvyāt*), just as any other thing in this world acts, as for example the earth holds the things on it by its very nature, even so God acts by his very nature[1]. Uddyotakara, notes also a possible objection to this position: if God acts by his nature, then there should be activity always; no cessation of activity can be attributed to God nor can there be successive creation. Uddyotakara answers this objection pointing out that God has knowledge and He acts when the other auxiliary causes like merit and demerit are present. He does not act without taking these also into consideration.[2]

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[1] cf. *Nyāyadarśanam* p. 952, *l.* 19 ff.

[2] cf. *Nyāyadarśanam* p. 957, *l.* 4 ff.

[3] cf. *Nyāyadarśanam* p. 949, *l.* 19 ff.

We may now conclude this description of the teaching of Uddyotakara on the nature and activity of God with the following remarks: when we compare the contribution of Uddyotakara with that of his predecessors, we see a remarkable progress of thought. Naturally, however, the question arises, if this is Uddyotakara's own contribution or is this the result of the slow development of the Nyāya thought during the two hundred years that separate Uddyotakara from Pakṣilasvāmin? This question cannot be answered by a simple yes or no. The passages which we have discussed already show on the one hand a considerable dependence of Uddyotakara on his predecessors. But we do not know who these predecessors of Uddyotakara were. The only one who could be mentioned with some degree of certainty is Aviddhakarṇa. When we examine the fragment which is attributed to him by Buddhist authors, we can conclude that Uddyotakara was influenced by him. This kind of dependence may be concluded from the abruptness of some of his proofs to which we have already drawn attention or from the way in which he mentions the proof with *kāryatva* as the reason, as if this was already well known and he need not discuss it in detail. This dependence on early Naiyāyika-s can also be concluded from certain contradictions in his statements. Thus he ascribes *aiśvarya* to God but a little later denies it to him on the ground that there is no proof for it.[1]

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[1] cf. *Nyāyadarśanam* p. 949, *l*. 25.

[2] cf. *Nyāyadarśanam* p. 950, *l*. 10 ff.

But on the other hand, there are unmistakably new elements in Uddyotakara's teaching on the existence and nature of God. Thus one of the most important contributions of Uddyotakara is to consider God as the efficient cause of the world. The sūtra-s never mention it, but speak of God only as cause in general. Nor does the Bhāṣya speak of it expressly, nor does Aviddhakarṇa in the fragment attributed to him. Further, the teaching that God is a special kind of substance is different from that of the Bhāṣya. It has, therefore, to be considered as an original contribution of Uddyotakara. Further it is he who, for the first time works out in detail the qualities of God, using Vaiśeṣika categories. It is also his merit that he points out that the action of God is continuous. From these considerations, it can safely be concluded that Uddyotakara was no mere teacher who repeated the ideas of his forerunners, nor is he one who simply collected the ideas of the time on the different topics of Nyāya and put them together. His is really a much more creative contribution and, in fact, most of the problems he has raised regarding the existence and nature of God and the answers he gave to them have been of far-reaching consequence and influence in the history of Nyāya theism.

Buddhist attack: Dharmakīrti

The ideas concerning God, above all the proofs for his existence, as brought forward by the Naiyāyika-s, were severely criticised by the Buddhists. Dharmakīrti led this attack and later Buddhists explained or developed his thought and continued to oppose the Naiyāyika-s. Hence it is worthwhile to determine exactly the nature of his arguments against the Nyāya position. First of all, we give a translation of the verses in which Dharmakīrti summarizes his attack on the Nyāya position.

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[1] *Nyāyadarśanam*, p. 950, *l.* 16 ff. and p. 951, *l.* 5

12. In the case (of different reasons to establish the existence of God) like 'activity after a period of rest', 'a particular conjunction (of parts) and 'purposeful action', there is either (the fault of) establishing that which is acceptable (to us also) or of non-establishment (of *sādhya*) in the example, or of doubt (if the subject has such a *sādhya* or not).

13. From that kind of conjunction (of parts) which is activated by an intelligent agent, or not so activated, (if that kind of conjunction of parts is present) if an (intelligent agent) is inferred, it is proper.

14. But the inference from something that is known to be identical (only) in words with something that is known in some (other) definite object, is not proper, (as for instance, inference of) fire from some white object.

15. Otherwise, since a potter is the cause of a pot which is a kind of transformation of clay, it could be established that he brings about also an anthill.

16. When a *sādhya* is established by means of a reason which is accompained by a (particular) *sādhya* because of the differences of the relata (i.e. of subject, and example), if different things are mentioned (as reason), it involves the fault of *kāryasamaḥ*.[1]

17. An inference of something in another class (of things) only by means of similarity of words is not correct like the inference of horns for speech from the word '*go*'.[2]

18. Since the words depend on the desire (of the speaker), where will not be words? If (things) are established, because of words, then any thing could be established from anything else.[3]

Besides these verses in which Dharmakīrti attacks Nyāya arguments for the existence of God, he has also pointed out reasons why there is no God at all. We translate these verses also.

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[1] *kāryasama* is one of the false rejoinders. cf. NS 5, 1, 37.

[2] In Sanskrit, the word '*go*' means both speech and cow.

[3] PV p.11-15, kārikā-s 12-18

23. When one and the same thing is cause and not cause, why is it considered cause and not as non-cause?

24. Wound or healing of Caitra occurs because of his connection (respectively) with a weapon or medicine. A post which does not at all stand in any connection with (him) may also be considered the cause (if God is considered the cause).

25. Without a change of nature, no activity is possible. Since no change can happen to an eternal being, it cannot have capacity (to act).

26. If one accepts as cause something different from that which when present something else comes into existence, then there would be no determination of causes.

27. Earth and so on are the cause of the origin of sprout, through the change of their nature, for by their change a particular (form of sprout) is seen.

28. Just as the contact of senses with the object produces knowledge without any particular thing further, in the same way, this one (God) is cause; this is not true, for there is some particular thing further.

29. Things which are incapable of producing (something) when alone, are also incapable of producing something when together without their nature undergoing a change. Therefore a change is established.

30. Therefore in those things which are incapable (of producing something) separately a (new) quality is assumed, when they are joined together; such things have causality and not for God who does not change.[1]

In these verses Dharmakīrti, first of all raises an important objection against Nyāya proofs for the existence of God, questioning the very possibility of the proof for the existence of God. And in the second part he tries to show that the idea of God proposed by the Naiyāyika-s is contradictory in itself. These objections have remained, as we have already noted, very basic to all forms of subsequent attacks of Buddhist authors against the Nyāya proofs for the existence of God. Dharmakīrti, first of all points out that if the Naiyāyikā-s wanted only to establish an intelligent agent for the world, then he would have no objection, for he is also of the opinion that the world is produced by the unseen which according to the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhists, has the nature of knowledge. But if the Naiyāyika-s want to establish one eternal and omniscient being as the cause of the universe, it is not possible, since the reason in that case, will be fallacious, i.e. in the example there will be no such *sādhya*. No example can be given which has been brought about by an omniscient being. This means that there is no invariable concomitance of the *sādhya* in the reason and hence the reason has the fault of deviation. Therefore the whole inference is invalid. Dharmakīrti points out another fault also: there is doubt if the subject has such a *sādhya* or not. Therefore he argues that from the fact that a particular form of conjunction of parts which has been proved to be brought about by an intelligent agent, one can only establish that another instance of a similar kind of conjunction of parts has been also brought about by an intelligent agent. As for example we know that a jar has been produced by a potter. When we see a similar kind of conjunction of parts in another jar, we can infer validly that that jar has also been produced by an intelligent agent. This is a valid inference. But if we infer from the particular kind of conjunction of parts existing in a tree that it also is brought about by an intelligent agent, it is not correct because we have never seen any instance of such a kind of conjunction of parts to have been brought about by an intelligent agent. If one makes such an inference because in both cases, there is just 'conjunction of parts', it would be like inferring fire because of some white substance since smoke is also white, or like inferring that an anthill is also produced by a potter since both the anthill and the pot are just transformations of clay.

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[1] PV p.16-18, kārikā-s 23-30

Further, it is not the case that by this way of arguing every possibility of inference is destroyed; such would be the case if there is the fault of *kāryasama*. According to Dharmakīrti, *kāryasama*

so that framework [illegible] has been established.

occurs when it is stated that the instances of reason in the subject and example are different. As for example, when non-eternity is established by means of the reason of 'being-produced', if it is argued that the instance of reason in the subject is different from the instance of reason in the example and so the inference is invalid, it would entail the fault of *kāryasama*. It would also imply that no inference at all is possible since there is no identity of two instances of reason and so the reason in the subject will have no invariable concomitance of the *sādhya* and the reason in the example is not found in the subject either. But such a *kāryasama*, Dharmakīrti points out, is not to be attributed in the case of his argument where he asserts only that conjunction of parts in general does not have the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent'. But from the fact that a particular kind of conjunction of parts which is known to have an intelligent agent, Dharmakīrti agrees that one can legitimately conclude that all instances of such a kind of conjunction of parts have an intelligent agent. Hence there is no question of the impossibility of all inferences.

But it may further be argued that 'conjunction-of-parts' as such has the invariable concomitance of 'having–an–intelligent–agent' and conjunction of parts in this sense can be found also in bodies and so on. Therefore such conjunctions of parts are also brought about by an intelligent agent. According to Dharmakīrti this argument cannot be admitted. If one establishes by means of something that is similar in words only with something else something in another class of things it is not proper. It would be like inferring horns for words since both cows and words are expressed by the word '*go*' in Sanskrit. If such kind of inferences is considered valid, then there could be any inference which one wants, because one can have words of one's choice, meaning different things.

Dharmakīrti's criticism, however, goes much further: he tries to show the inner contradiction of the idea of God in Nyāya. According to Nyāya, God is an eternal being which is the cause of this world. This implies, according to him, that God is not the cause of the world before it was created; but at the moment of the creation of the world, God is its cause. This means that a change occurs in the nature of God; and what changes cannot be eternal. But if Nyāya wants to save the eternity of God, it must deny that God is the cause of the world. If, however, God is to be considered as creating the universe, even while he is not its cause, it would be like asserting that a post which has nothing to do with Caitra, is the cause of his wound and its healing and that the knife which caused the wound and the medicine which caused its healing, are not the causes of his wound and its healing respectively.[1] And if God is to be considered the cause of the world, a change has to be admitted in his nature, for, without a change of nature, it is impossible that an action is done by any being. Hence if God is the cause of the universe, He changes from the state of being non-cause into the state of being cause. God is eternal and no eternal being can have such a change. Hence it is impossible that God be considered the cause of the universe.[2]

Dharmakīrti further points out that the universe—trees, sprouts, bodies etc.—could come into existence without any God at all. And, in fact, if things could be explained by causes which can be actually perceived, there is no need of postulating a God who is not seen. Therefore when something is present, another thing occurs, then the former is to be considered the cause of the latter. If something other than that is considered the cause, then there would be no determination at all of the cause. And in fact the cause of a sprout is the earth and so on in which the seed is placed. The earth and other auxiliary causes coming together, by means of the transformation they undergo, acquire a potency which they do not possess when alone and thus produce the sprout.[3] This potency is to be inferred because we see different kinds of sprout, strong or weak, according to the kind of earth and the auxiliary causes. Since these effects like the sprout and so on could be explained like this, there is no need of postulating a God.

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[1] PV p. 16, *l*. 6 ff

[2] PV p. 18, *l*. 5-6

[3] This potency is called *atiśaya* in Buddhist authors (PV. p. 17, *l*. 21) but in Nyāya authors (describing Buddhist theories it is named *kurvadrūpa* (cf. *Ātmatattvaviveka*, passim)

Now an opponent objects that it is not the case that always the auxiliary causes when joined together acquire a potency to produce an effect. An example for this is the case of knowledge which according to the opponent is brought about by the sense organ and the object, without these in any way acquiring a new potency. To this Dharmakīrti answers that this is not the case; even in the example brought forward by the opponent, the auxiliary causes acquire a new potency. The nature of such a potency is further explained by the commentator Manorathanandin as the *prajñā* (knowledge) in the form of capable moment that produces knowledge.[1] Hence Dharmakīrti concludes that things which are individually unable to produce an effect are unable collectively also to produce an effect. Therefore, if they produce an effect collectively, it should be understood that they acquire a potency to produce an effect when they come together. Hence this potency in things when they come together causes the effect; and it is not the case that God is the cause since he is considered to be eternal and so cannot change in any way.

Such is Dharamakīrti's attack on Nyāya proofs for the existence of God. As we noted earlier, the influence of Dharmakīrti on subsequent Buddhist thought in general and on the Buddhist attacks against Nyāya proofs for the existence of God in particular has been decisive. In fact basically later Buddhist authors like Śāntarakṣita, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti repeat the arguments of Dharmakīrti and develop them in their details without contributing much to the development of the essential points of the thought. On the other hand, the Nyāya authors begin to concentrate more and more on the logical aspects of their proofs. They are no more interested in other aspects of the philosophy of God, and even when they treat the proofs, they are at pains to show the logical validity of their basic inference, with 'being-an-effect' (*kāryatva*) as the reason. This tendency reaches its culmination in the *īśvaravāda* of Gaṅgeśa.

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[1] *vijñānajananaśaktakṣaṇaprajñālakṣaṇāt viśeṣāt*, PV p. 18, *l.* 14.

Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla

Śāntarakṣita develops the ideas of Dharmakīrti. His arguments against the Nyāya proofs for the existence of God are basically the same as those of Dharmakīrti, but he adds some details which are worth noting. Śāntarakṣita first of all presents in his *pūrvapakṣa* certain arguments purporting to establish the existence of God and he attributes these to Aviddhakarṇa, the Naiyāyika; he also summarizes the arguments of Uddyotakara and Praśastamati (Praśastapāda). Further, he gives another argument which he does not ascribe to anybody, to establish the existence of God. We have discussed the proofs of Aviddhakarṇa in dealing with the Naiyāyika-s immediately after Pakṣilasvāmin. We shall therefore examine how Śāntarakṣita refutes them.

Śāntarakṣita, first of all, points out that the reason of the inference is unestablished because of two reasons: first because the conjunction of parts which is the qualification in the reason of *sanniveśaviśiṣṭatva* is not accepted by the Buddhist; secondly the 'whole' (*avayavin*) which is the qualified is also not accepted by them. Therefore the qualified (i.e. *sanniveśaviśiṣṭa*) is not established because both the qualification, and the qualificand are not established. Although the Naiyāyika-s admit both 'conjunction' and 'whole' on the basis of perception, the Buddhists do not admit them precisely because, according to them, these are not objects of perception. They assert that the objects of perception are only colour and so on, and that there is nothing which is the object of perception, besides colour and so on.[1] Therefore the example of the jar in the inference brought by the Naiyāyika-s does not have the reason of *sanniveśaviśiṣṭatva* as explained.

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[1] '*na ca rūpādivyatirekeṇāparaḥ saṃyogo'vayavī ca dṛśyatveneṣṭo buddhau pratibhāsata iti. ata upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdheḥ śaśaviṣāṇavadasadvyavahāraviṣayatā*. TS. p. 57, *l.* 17 ff. For this whole section on Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla cf. TS. p. 57 ff.

Further, there is also the fault of partial non-establishment of the subject. The reason is that the subject is enunciated in a twofold way: that which could be grasped by two senses and that which cannot be so grasped. Now, according to the Buddhists, there is nothing which can be cognized by two senses. The reason is that different kinds of knowledge which have different forms do not have the same object, and ocular perception and tactual perception have different forms. Therefore they do not have the same object.[1] But here the Naiyāyika-s can object that because of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), it is possible to establish that ocular and tactual perceptions have the same object, for we have the knowledge in the following form, 'that jar which has been seen by me in light, has been touched by me in darkness'. In answer to this objection Śāntarakṣita points out that there is no such recognition. We have only ocular perception, tactual perception and so on. These have a particular capacity (*sāmarthya*) from which arises determination (*kalpanā*). Recognition which is in the form of such a determinate knowledge, has as object only a collection of parts and not a whole.[2] Therefore recognition is not perception, nor is it any other means of valid knowledge, as it is neither inference.[3] Therefore it cannot be used as a valid reason to establish that ocular and tactual perceptions have the same object. If only the objects of these perceptions are same, can the Naiyāyika establish a 'whole' (*avayavin*) and not merely a 'collection' (*samudāya*). Since such a whole which is the qualificand in the reason of the inference of the Naiyāyika proving the existence of

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[1] cf. TS p. 58. *l.* 5 ff; see also Gopikamohan Bhattacharya, *Studies in Nyāyavaiśeṣika Theism* p.47 ff.

[2] cf. TS p. 58, kārikā, 59.

[3] This school of Buddhism admits only two means of valid knowledge: perception and inference.

God, cannot be established, the reason itself is unestablished and so the whole inference is invalid.[1]

In these criticisms of Nyāya arguments trying to establish the existence of God, Śāntarakṣita has shown a certain amount of originality. Dharmakīrti does not discuss the twofold manner (by denying 'conjunction of parts' and 'whole') in which it may be shown from the Buddhist point of view, that the reason is unestablished. However, this originality should not be exaggerated. Dharmakīrti, of course, brought forward arguments against the doctrine of the 'whole' of the Naiyāyika-s, and Kamalaśīla is only applying the doctrine of Dharmakīrti on this point to the proofs for the existence of God. Further, Śāntarakṣita's opinion that the example has no reason and his arguments pointing out the absence of subject in the Nyāya inference establishing the existence of God are his own.

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[1] Kamalaśīla here gives a clear picture of the controversy between the Naiyāyika-s and the Buddhists on the question of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). Such a kind of knowledge according to him is determinate (*savikalpaka*) and therefore essentially false. He explains this as follows. We have first of all knowledge of the objects of respective sense organs, colour, touch and so on. Then according to the impressions of the objects which have already been experienced, there comes about a kind of knowledge in the form of memory. This is recognition, but this is essentially false. And certainly the object of ocular perception is not the object of tactual perception, as Dharmakīrti points out. To this the Naiyāyika can raise an objection: there is no experience of a collection (*samudāya*) in order to have its impression. The Buddhist answer to this objection is that certainly no collection apart from colour and so on is experienced; but these collections of colour and so on which are useful for such purposes as carrying water and so on are called jars and so on and they are indeed collections *te eva rūpādayaḥ salilādidhāraṇārthakriyākāriṇaḥ samudāyo ghaṭa iti vyapadiśyante* (TS. p.59. *ll.* 14-15). Another possible answer from the point of view of pure Vijñānavādin-s is that the collection is not different from determinate knowledge and therefore there is no difficulty in having its memory. (For the whole discussion, see TS, p. 58, *l*, 5 - p.59, *l*. 22).

Śāntarakṣita, however, develops the argument advanced already by Dharmakīrti to show that the example in the Nyāya syllogism proving the existence of God does not have the *sādhya;* like Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita also makes this actually the most important objection against the Nyāya position; the basic arguments in Śāntarakṣita remain the same as in Dharmakīrti. However, he develops certain details and draws the logical conclusions from the principles advanced by Dharmakīrti. Thus Śāntarakṣita, like Dharmakīrti, points out that if from a particular conjunction of parts which belongs to a class of conjunction of parts which have the invariable concomitance of an intelligent agent, it is concluded that, that which possesses such a particular conjunction of parts, has an intelligent agent, it is quite valid. But if the particular conjunction of parts does not belong to the class of conjunction of parts which has the invariable concomitance of an intelligent agent, such an inference would be invalid. To explain: we see that houses, temples and so on are built by men; therefore when we see another house or temple which we did not actually see being built by masons, we can validly conclude that such houses or temples have also been built by men because these kinds of buildings have a particular form or conjunction of parts which are invariably preceded by men who brought it about. Hence such an inference is valid. On the other hand, Śāntarakṣita, points out that although such an inference as described above is valid, the earth, the hill and so on do not have such a kind of conjunction of parts which will warrant the inference of an intelligent agent. The arrangement of parts which we see in a house, a jar and so on differ in kind from that which is in the earth and so on and so from the latter, one cannot validly infer the existence of an intelligent agent. And if one infers an intelligent agent from such a conjunction of parts, it would be like inferring a potter as the maker of anthill because he is the maker of pot, since both anthill and pot are just different conjunctions of clay. This obviously is an invalid inference; similarly the inference of an intelligent agent for the earth and so on is also invalid.[1]

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[1] cf TS pp 59–61, kārikā-s 61–65.

At this point Śāntarakṣita deals with an objection, possibly from the Naiyāyika. This objection asserts that the argument just brought forward by the Buddhist is actually a 'false rejoinder' (*jātyuttara*) because, while 'being-an-effect' is used as the reason as a universal, a distinction of characteristics is made in it. As for example, when it is argued that sound is non-eternal because it is produced, one may ask if 'being-produced' (*kṛtakatva*) in the subject is the same as 'being-produced' in jar and so on or if it is the same as in sound, or if it is the same as in both. If it is the first case, then there is the fault of the absence of the reason in the subject, since the individual instance of 'being-produced' in jar will only be in jar and not in sound. In the second case, the example will not have reason, for the individual instance of 'being-produced' that is in sound, will only be in sound and not in jar. In the third case also, the faults are the same. This way of arguing is called a 'false rejoinder'. And such a false rejoinder is at hand in the present instance also, since 'being-produced' in general is used as the reason and the Buddhist makes a distinction between 'being-produced' in the example and 'being-produced' in general.[1] And therefore the Buddhist objection, the Naiyāyika points out, is a false rejoinder.

To this Śāntarakṣita answers basically in the same way as Dharmakīrti. But he develops the details of the answer. Śāntarakṣita first of all points out that the example of false rejoinder as brought forward by the Naiyāyika is correct since 'being-produced' in general has the invariable concomitance of non-eternity. But such is not the case in the present instance, since the reason is only 'the particular conjunction of parts' of the thing in question. And it has not been shown that 'conjunction of parts' in general has the invariable concomitance of having an intelligent agent. If such an invariable concomitance were certain, then there would indeed be deviation just as there would be deviation if one infers fire from any white substance because one can validly infer fire from smoke. A false rejoinder is given when, while there is invariable concomitance of the *sādhya* for the reason in general, one distinguishes the individual instances of the reason in the example, in the subject and so on. And if the reason in general is used in the inference, even while it has no invariable concomitance, then naturally, there is deviation. But if there is invariable concomitance of having-an-agent with 'conjunction of parts' in general, the Buddhist admits that he has no difficulty at all. But such an invariable concomitance does not exist, because the Naiyāyika wants to establish not merely an intelligent agent, but an agent who is eternal and one whose knowledge extends to all objects. Such an agent is not at all known, i.e. in the positive examples of jar and so on such an eternal agent is not at all seen; no instance at all of an example having such an agent could be given. Hence the reason does not have invariable concomitance. And in fact in the examples of palace and so on not only we do not see any eternal intelligent agent, but we even see many intelligent agents with non-eternal knowledge and so on. And therefore the reason as advanced by the Naiyāyika has the fault of contradiction (*virodha*), since, while the Naiyāyika-s want to establish one eternal agent, what can actually be inferred are many non-eternal agents. But then the question arises: how can the invariable concomitance of many non-eternal agents be cognized in the reason of 'conjunction of parts'? The answer is that an eternal object does not have any succession and so it cannot effect anything; therefore only non-eternal beings can have purposeful actions and these beings are of different nature at every moment and in this way their non-eternity is established. Therefore the invariable concomitance in question can be only that of non-eternal beings. Besides, the very concept of someone having eternal knowledge to be established by the Naiyāyika-s is a self-contradiction. Knowledge which has as object, things which are successive, must also be successive, just as the knowledge of Devadatta which has as object a burning flame. Here it should be noted that the inference is hypothetical (*prasaṅga*) and so it cannot be urged that there is the fault of absence of the subject. Knowledge of burning flame is taken as the example because if the knowledge of universals which are considered eternal by the Naiyāyika-s are shown as example, it would follow that the example does not have the reason since a universal, being eternal, does not have succession. Further, if the knowledge of God does not have as object that which is successive, it would follow that he is not omniscient.

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[1] Although *kāryatva* is the reason mentioned here, *sanniveśaviśiṣṭatva* is the reason of the inference of the Naiyāyika as quoted by Śāntarakṣita. This shows that the two terms are used practically in the same sense.

Śāntarakṣita now points out that the negative example in the inference of Aviddhakarṇa establishing the existence of God, does not have the absence of the *sādhya* and therefore it is not correct. According to the Buddhists, jar and so on are only just a collection of atoms, and therefore potter is also the agent of the collection of atoms and so of atoms also and hence it is not true that the atoms have no agent. Therefore the negative example is not valid. Finally, Śāntarakṣita admits that if the Naiyāyika wanted to establish only that the world has an intelligent agent, he would have no quarrel with him, for he also holds that the world is brought about by the merit and demerit of human beings. Therefore he concludes that if the Naiyāyika wants to establish an intelligent agent whose knowledge is eternal and one, there is absence of *sādhya* in the positive example; there is also deviation of the *sādhya* in the reason, as in the case of palaces and so on which are brought about by many agents whose knowledge is not eternal.

Śāntarakṣita discusses also another inference brought forward by Aviddhakarṇa in order to establish the existence of God, and points out its drawbacks. The inference in question is as follows: the material cause of bodies and so on are activated by a conscious agent because it has colour and so on just like thread and so on. Now Śāntarakṣita points out that all those faults which were brought forward against the previous syllogism of Aviddhakarṇa may be urged against this also. Kamalaśīla explains this as follows: there is the fault of the reason not existing in the subject since the kind of colour and so on which are actually found activated by an intelligent agent are not to be found in the body and so on which are considered the subject. There is deviation because there is no invariable concomitance of an intelligent agent in 'having-colour and so on' as such. And if invariable concomitance is accepted, there is contradiction since what is actually established is contradictory to what is desired to be established, for what is actually established is many agents having non-eternal knowledge and so on and what is desired to be established is one agent having eternal knowledge. Hence the contradiction. Further the positive example has no *sādhya*: no example can be given which is activated by one eternal agent having eternal knowledge. If only any sort of intelligent agent is to be established for the bodies and so on, there is the fault of establishing what has already been established, for the Buddhist also admits that the bodies, the earth and so on are produced by the merit of ordinary intelligent agents.[1]

Śāntarakṣita criticizes also the arguments brought forward by Uddyotakara to prove the existence of God. The proofs of Uddyotakara are summarized by Śāntarakṣita. But we should note that this summary is not strictly accurate. Thus Uddyotakara never formulates the reason in the inference as '*sthitvā pravṛtteḥ*'. And in the second proof which Śāntarakṣita ascribes to Uddyotakara the reason given is '*acetanatva*' and so on, whereas Uddyotakara uses *rūpādimattva* as the reason.[2] Śāntarakṣita says that all the faults which have been urged against the proofs of Aviddhakarṇa could also be urged against the proofs of Uddyotakara too. But the following faults may further be pointed out. Since, according to the Buddhist, everything is momentary, it follows that there is no possibility of action for anything after a period of rest. Further, this reason has deviation with reference to God himself, who acts after a period of rest, but who, in turn is not activated by another intelligent agent.

Śāntarakṣita mentions also the proof of Praśastamati who is usually identified with Praśastapāda, the author of *Padārthatattvasamgraha*. According to Praśastamati the conversational usage of men, which practically means the words they use, should be taught by someone. The knowledge of men after creation is restricted to particular objects; none of them has knowledge which extends to all objects and to all words and their meanings. Therefore none of them could have taught all these; hence the one who taught them must be God whose knowledge is not destroyed even at the time of the dissolution of the world.[1] Śāntarakṣita objects to this proof asserting that in the Buddhist view of the world, there are at the time of creation omniscient beings who are not God.[2] It is from these that men have learnt the usage of words. Further, if Praśastamati wants to establish only that there is someone who instructs others in these usages, there is the fault of establishing what has been established, for since creation is without beginning, everybody is preceded by someone who teaches the usages of words and so on; but if God as the one who instructs others in these usages is to be established, then the reason has deviation from the *sādhya*. As in the case of the other inferences, there are also such faults as the absence of *sādhya* in the example, and so on. Further, according to Śāntarakṣita, the reason has also the fault of contradiction, for God having no body, since he has no merit or demerit, cannot give any instruction to anyone.

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[1] cf. TS p.66, kārikā 82 and commentary on it by Kamalaśīla.

[2] For further details see the earlier discussion on Uddyotakara's contribution in this book.

Now Śāntarakṣita like Dharmakīrti brings arguments to show that the very idea of God as the creator of the world is contradictory. As in the case of the criticism of other aspects of Nyāya proofs for the existence of God, Śāntarakṣita develops only the objections as advanced by Dharmakīrti. Though Śāntarakṣita does not show much originality, he develops certain details which are worth noting. First of all he points out that the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent with all the reasons as advanced by the Naiyāyika, stands in contradiction with another inference. Such an inference is the following: God cannot be the cause of anything, because that which has no beginning cannot be the cause of anything just as a sky–flower cannot be the cause of anything. And God has no beginning and therefore he cannot be the cause of anything. Further, if God were the cause of the universe, then everything would come into existence at once, since the capacity of God to create things, is unhindered. But the Naiyāyika may object here: although God is able to create at any time, still, because the accessory causes like the unseen are not present, he does not create at a particular time. Kamalaśīla points out that this objection cannot be accepted because God has absolutely no need of any auxiliary cause and therefore his creative activity does not at all depend upon them, since he cannot in any way be given a capacity which he does not already possess. And if God, whose causality with regard to any and every creature is totally perfect, does not create at a particular time, it would follow that he will not create at any time.

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[1] cf. TS p. 54, kārikā, 51 and commentary on it by Kamalaśīla.

[2] cf. TS p. 67, kārikā-s 84 and 85.

Kamalaśīla points out an answer which Uddyotakara gives to such a difficulty and rejects it. According to Uddyotakara, although God is perfect and his capacity to create anything is perfectly unhindered, still God creates by means of his knowledge and therefore there is no creation of everything all at once. If God were to create, merely by his existence, the objection would have been right; but this is not the case. God creates by means of his knowledge and out of his free will; hence it is not necessary that he should create everything all at once. But Kamalaśīla rejects this answer: it is not the case that effects are brought into existence by the desire of the cause, so that it could be held that, though God is perfectly capable of producing things, still, because he has no desire to create at a particular time, he does not create. Actually, Kamalaśīla points out, that effects are brought about by the capacity that is inherent in the causes; if such a capacity does not exist, effects are not produced. As for example if an agent is not capable of producing an effect, even if he has desire of doing so, he cannot produce it; but if an agent has the capacity to produce a particular effect, even if he has no desire to do so, he brings about the effect as for instance if a seed is able to produce a sprout, it produces the sprout without in any way desiring to produce it. Therefore it is totally useless to postulate desire for God who is supposed to be the cause having unimpeded capacity to produce anything at any time. Kamalaśīla argues also that in God knowledge and will are identical and since his knowledge, according to the Naiyāyika-s is eternal, his will also should be eternal and so there could be no absence of creation because of the absence of will. Nor can non-eternal knowledge be ascribed to God since his knowledge exists by reason of his very existence.

Kamalaśīla brings another inference also to show that God cannot be the cause of anything: whatever occurs in succession cannot be caused by God just as the knowledge of foolish people about the existence of God, arising from the reasons which have been brought forward by the Naiyāyika-s, is not caused by God. Neither can it be objected that from these reasons no real knowledge of God's existence arises; it is true that no real knowledge of the existence of God arises from these reasons and that is precisely the reason why it was stated 'the knowledge of foolish people' which arises also from false reasons. Nor can it again be objected that even the knowledge of the foolish people are produced by God, for in that case, the mention of the reasons by the Naiyāyika-s, would be quite useless. But it may be urged that God produces this knowledge also with the help of the reasons adduced. To this, the answer is that an eternal being is not in need of any auxiliary causes. Besides when we can explain an effect by means of the reasons which we can actually see, if we resort to reasons which are invisible, then there would be infinite regress since one can as well say that one invisible cause would be in need of another invisible cause and so on.

Śāntarakṣita finally rejects the omniscience of God on the ground that he has already rejected that God is the cause of everything. Similarly he further points out that even if the reasons advanced by the Naiyāyika-s establish an agent for the earth and so on it does not at all follow that the agent is only one. There could be many agents, as we see in the case of palaces and so on which are actually produced by many people. Such in short is the development of Dharmakīrti's arguments against the Nyāya proofs for the existence of God in the works of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. As we have noted earlier Dharmakīrti's is the most original contribution; others developed only certain aspects of his arguments with more details.

Reaction of Naiyāyika-s: Vācaspati Miśra

Among the Naiyāyika-s whose works have come down to us, it is Vācaspati Miśra who subjected these Buddhist attacks to a severe criticism. In fact when one analyses carefully his answer to the Buddhist objections to the Nyāya proofs for the existence of God, one is struck by the subtelty and profundity which he shows with such ease and grace.[1] As with Uddyotakara, the most valuable part of Vācaspati's commentary comes at the end of his explanations of the third of the theistic sūtra-s.[2] First of all Vācaspati tries to indicate clearly the subject of the syllogism which the Naiyāyika-s bring forward to establish the existence of God. That is the reason why he divides at the very outset, the beings of this world into three categories: Things which are definitely known to have a maker like palace and so on; secondly, things which are accepted by both parties as not having a maker like atoms and so on. It is evident that things in these two categories cannot be taken as the subject, for in the first case there would be the fault of establishing what has already been established and in the second case there would be the fault of contradiction. However by this Vācaspati may have intended only to give examples of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* respectively. The third category of things are those which are under discussion, namely, the elements like the earth etc. and their products like the bodies and so on. It is doubted if these have a maker or not. Therefore these things are taken to be the subject, and the syllogism would be as follows: Trees, earth and so on which are under discussion are caused by someone who knows their material causes just as palaces and so on are caused by someone who knows their material causes, because they have a beginning or because their material cause is unconscious. Vācaspati points out that those things which are included in the enunciation of the *pakṣa* have a beginning because they have constituent parts or because they have action while they have medium magnitude (*mahattva*).[1] But the Buddhists may argue against this thus: There is the fault of establishing what is already established because according to them the world is brought about by the unseen and they consider it to be a conscious agent. Or the Mīmāṃsaka-s may object that the world is produced by the unseen of individual souls and so when the Naiyāyika establishes that the world is caused by an intelligent agent, he is only establishing what is already established. Vācaspati answers to both the objections that the Naiyāyika is establishing that the world is not merely caused by an intelligent agent, but that this intelligent agent actually knows directly the material cause of the world and so on. Such a knowledge is needed in order that someone may produce something and neither the Buddhist nor the Mīmāṃsaka admits that there is such an agent so that they could accuse the Naiyāyika of establishing what has already been established.[2]

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[1] This of course goes against the opinion of certain Indologists according to whom Vācaspati is not of much importance. On the basis of my studies on the development of this conflict between the Naiyāyika-s and the Buddhists, I came to the conclusion that the contribution of Vācaspati is quite remarkable for its subtlety and profundity and for its linguistic gracefulness. Here again, I do not deny the fact that some of the answers furnished by Vācaspati may have already been pointed out by earlier Naiyāyika-s. But this is pure conjecture because we cannot form an idea of their contribution on these points since their works have been lost; and the fragments of their works preserved in Buddhist works are not enough for the purpose of evaluating their contribution to the subject we have been discussing.

[2] *Nyāyadarśanam*, pp. 953-957.

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[1] *mahattve sati kriyāvatvam;* though the mind (*manas*) which has no beginning has action, it has no medium magnitude (*mahattvam*) and so to exclude it the qualification of *mahattve sati* is used; ether which has no beginning has *paramamahattvam* (absolute magnitude) but it has no action and so to exclude it *kriyāvatva* is added.

[2] *Nyāyadarśanam*, p. 953.

Now Vācaspati discusses an objection which is not found in Dharmakīrti or Kamalaśīla in the exact form in which it is given by him. But it is an immediate conclusion from the opinion of Dharmakīrti according to whom only in case of an instance of 'having a particular conjunction of parts' which belongs to that class of 'conjunction of parts' which have an agent, can one infer the existence of an agent. An immediate conclusion which can be legitimately drawn from such an argument of Dharmakīrti, is that invariably such an agent would have a body since all the kinds of 'conjunction of parts' which we know as produced by an agent are produced by agents with bodies. Now God has no such body and hence God cannot be inferred as the agent of the universe. This is the form of the objection, as we find in Vācaspati. Kamalaśīla refers to the question about the body of God in another context, namely, when he discusses Praśastamati's argument that God's existence could be inferred from the fact that at the beginning of creation, there should be someone who teaches mankind the meaning of words. Kamalaśīla replies that God cannot be such a teacher since he does not have a body. From these, it is clear that the objection that God does not have a body and so he cannot be the maker of the universe is an objection very much in the spirit of Buddhist theories. But the argument itself cannot be found either in Śāntarakṣita or in Kamalaśīla. Therefore it could be concluded that Vācaspati formulated this objection in his own words taking into full account the consequences of the arguments of the Buddhists.

Vācaspati's answer to this objection is also very interesting. His basic argument is that 'having-a-body' is not the pervader of 'having-knowledge'. Only instances of non-eternal knowledge which are the instances of our knowledge are invariably connected with a body. When the knowledge in question is eternal, it does not depend on a body in any way. Nor can it be argued that because all instances of knowledge which we know are invariably connected with a body, there cannot be any instance of eternal knowledge, for otherwise we will have to admit that the colour of atoms of water is also non-eternal, since all instances of colour which we know are non-eternal.[1] In other words there is no invariable concomitance or natural relation (*svābhāvikasaṃbandha*) between knowledge and body. Such a relation can exist only when there is no additional condition (*upādhi*). In the case of knowledge to have the invariable concomitance of body, there should be the additional condition of 'being-an-effect', which in non-technical language means that only instances of knowledge which are produced, need a body; non-produced or eternal knowledge does not need a body. And if one insists on arguing that all instances of knowledge are dependent on bodies, since all known instances of knowledge are non-eternal, one would be falling into the error of *utkarṣasama*, just like the one who argues that sound should have also colour like a jar when it is inferred that sound is not eternal because it is produced like a jar.[2]

Now Vācaspati turns his attention to another objection: Even if it is admitted that the world has an agent, why should this agent be eternal and omniscient? Although this difficulty is not explicitly mentioned by Dharmakīrti, it is developed both by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla[3]. Vācaspati summarizes this objection of Buddhist authors and answers them as follows. In our experience the action of cutting and so on establishes an instrument of cutting like a knife. Similarly from the perception of colour and so on, we can establish its instruments viz. sense organs. Here one cannot object, so Vācaspati argues, that because in the example, instruments like knife and so on are established, with regard to perception and so on also, only such instruments can be established and not the sense organs. Arguing like this would obviously be false. Instruments like a knife are not able to produce the perception of colour and therefore by the force of the respective reason being present in the respective subject, it can legitimately be concluded that sense organs are the instrumental causes of perception and so on. Similarly, it could be concluded that so many things of such a different nature on the earth and in the whole universe cannot be produced by anyone having only limited and non-eternal knowledge and hence someone who is eternal and omniscient should be concluded as the agent. And such a knowledge of an omniscient God cannot be produced with the help of a body which itself is a product. If it were the case, before the production of the body, God will not have any knowledge and so in order to produce this body another God would be needed and thus there would be infinite regress. Nor can it be admitted that God has eternal body and eternal sense organs because only those characteristics which are needed to avoid the infinite regress indicated earlier need to be accepted. And for this it is only necessary to postulate that the qualities of God, such as his knowledge and so on are eternal and not that he has an eternal body and sense organs. Nor can many agents whose knowledge is not eternal and does not extend to all things be admitted for the earth and so on. The reason is that such agents will not be able to have direct knowledge of atoms and so on.

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[1] It is the usually accepted Vaiśeṣika doctrine that the colour in the atoms of water is eternal.

[2] cf. *Nyāyadarśanam*, p. 954, *l.* 8 ff.

[3] cf. Śāntarakṣita, TS, p. 61 ff, kārikā 71 ff.

Vācaspati now turns his attention to a Mīmāṃsā objection. According to the Mīmāṃsaka-s the world is produced by the unseen at the time when it reaches its maturity. Then the individual soul which possesses it joins itself with atoms and the whole universe is brought into being. In this theory, there is no place for God.[1] This is the standard position of the Mīmāṃsaka-s and Vācaspati's answer to it is quite perceptive: there is the invariable concomitance of someone having the direct knowledge of the material cause with something having an origin. This has become the standard Nyāya answer to this Mīmāṃsā objection.[2]

Vācaspati apparently answers also to the Sāṃkhya objections against the existence of God. According to the followers of Sāṃkhya, the mind and sense organs need not be activated by an intelligent agent; they by their very nature produce knowledge just as milk and so on when taken by a person automatically work for his health. Nor do we see that trees and so on are produced by an intelligent agent. To this the answer of Vācaspati is that all these are taken by the Naiyāyika as the subject of the inference establishing the existence of God and so it is not correct to speak of a deviation with reference to the very subject itself.

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[1] cf. *Nyāyadarśanam*, p.954, *l.* 26

[2] cf. *ghaṭabhoktā na ghaṭakartā*, TCI, p. 19-20.

Vācaspati rejects also the objection usually attributed to the Cārvāka-s.[1] The objection is based on the assumption that whatever exists can be perceived and conversely whatever cannot be perceived does not exist. An oft repeated example for this in Nyāya works is the horns of a hare. We do not perceive the horns of a hare and therefore we conclude that hares have no horns. Similarly, the Cārvāka argues that God does not exist since we do not perceive him. Vācaspati's reply to this objection became the standard answer of the Naiyāyika-s who faced such attacks. God is not a proper object of perception and therefore it is not possible to perceive him. From this fact, it is totally invalid to infer that God does not exist at all; otherwise no inference at all would be possible, for it is usual to infer many things which are not the object of perception. The horns on the head of a cow are visible and since such visible horns are absent in a hare, it can be concluded that hares have no horns. This is legitimate, but it is not legitimate to conclude that because God who is invisible, is not perceived, he does not exist.

Vācaspati takes up also the basic objection of Dharmakīrti, which was developed by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.[2] The Buddhists argued that there is no invariable concomitance of 'having-an-intelligent-agent' with everything that has an origin, but only with that class of things which although one has not seen being made by someone, but which when seen after having been made, one immediately knows that, that thing has been made by someone. The heart of this Buddhist objection has already been explained when dealing with Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita. In short, it means only that after having seen a jar being made by a potter, when we see a similar jar we can infer that this jar also has been made by a potter, although we have not actually seen this jar being made by a potter. But by the same sort of process we cannot conclude that the earth is produced by someone because we have not perceived another earth produced by someone. And if one infers similarly an agent also for the earth, one could infer fire from any white substance as well, though we have never seen any instance of such a substance produced by fire. Vācaspati's answer to this objection has been seminal in the sense that later Naiyāyika-s like Udayana and Gaṅgeśa developed only the details of the answer, but the basic elements of the reply remained the same. Vācaspati asks the opponent: In order to have the invariable concomitance of having-an-intelligent agent, is it enough that the class of things should actually have an agent or should this agent be actually seen? If it is the first alternative, then the Naiyāyika has no objection: He holds that there is actually an intelligent agent for such things as the earth and so on. But if the Buddhist insists that this agent be visible, which is the second alternative, then the Buddhist is denying his own principle: In no instance at all of an effect would one have the knowledge of an intelligent agent if the agent is not actually seen. Therefore when we see a palace which we did not actually see being built, we cannot conclude that this palace was also built by someone for the simple reason that we did not see someone building it, or to use the example which Vācaspati himself gives, because this cloth which one saw being produced by someone has a maker, one cannot conclude that the piece of cloth in the textile shop is also produced by somebody. This obviously the Buddhist also does not admit.

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[1] This objection and its answer are treated in various Nyāya works; cf, for example, *Nyāyadarśanam*, p.955, *l.* 4; *Nyāyakusumāñjali* p. 311 ff.; *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p.405 ff; NSD, p. 115 ff; TCI., p.33 ff.

[2] cf. PV. p.13, kārikā-s, 13, ff; TS, p.59, kārikā-s 61 ff with Kamalaśīla's commentary on them.

What follows[1] is an extremely vital but succinct series of objections on the part of the Buddhists and equally penetrating series of answers by the Naiyāyika. In fact all the basic questions about the inference to establish the existence of God are raised and answered here by Vācaspati. The Buddhist objects: That class of things which is established to have an intelligent agent will certainly imply that any member belonging to that class and not any other thing will have an intelligent agent. But to this Vācaspati answers that the class of things having a beginning e.g. jars, have an intelligent agent; certainly trees and so on belong to the class of things having a beginning. Therefore they also have an agent. But of course the Buddhist does not admit this answer: He insists that only such a class of things which have been actually perceived as having an agent, does have an agent and not others. As for example we know that individual things in the class of jar have an agent; from this, it does not follow that palaces have agents since they do not belong to the class of jar. Therefore the Buddhist concludes, only such a class of things which is perceived to have an agent, can enable us to infer that a member of that class has an intelligent agent, even though we do not actually perceive the agent. This is the final and definitive position of the Buddhist. It shows clearly the nature and limitation of his epistemology and logic. Whatever details and argumentations may have been developed by subsequent authors, in essence, this is the position of Dharmakīrti. Now Vācaspati definitely destroys this edifice of Buddhist arguments by a decisive blow of his logic; in fact Vācaspati meets his adversary on his own and shows him that the class of things which are effects, are perceived to have an intelligent agent. A palace is an effect and we know from perception that this palace has an agent; therefore whenever we see a thing which has the characteristic of an effect, we can conclude that that thing also has an intelligent agent since that thing also belongs to the class of things which are effects. Thus the earth and so on are also perceived by us as effects. Hence they also have an intelligent agent. As to the Buddhist objection that in that case an anthill should also be produced by a potter, the answer is that we cannot conclude that a potter is the maker of an anthill, since we do not see potters making anthills; but from the fact that the anthill is an effect, we can conclude that it is produced by intelligent agents which are not seen by us. As we have noted already, later Naiyāyika-s, including even Udayana and Gaṅgeśa, have only developed the details of this answer. The basic answer is that of Vācaspati. And to enquire whether these answers were already given by the Naiyāyika-s prior to Vācaspati, but after Uddyotakara, is pretty useless, since only fragments of their works have come down to us and these too in Buddhist authors. And in no way are these fragments sufficient basis to make a judgement on the development of the arguments mentioned in the above discussions. In these circumstances, it would indeed be very rash to minimize the importance of the contribution made by Vācaspati.

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[1] *Nyāyadarśanam*, p.955, *l.* 18- p.956, *l.* 3.

Vācaspati now tries to answer some other objections also of the Buddhists. For instance, there is no invariable concomitance of an intelligent agent with effects in general, but only with those effects whose material causes can possibly be perceived by us. And we cannot perceive the material cause of earth and so on and therefore they are not produced by an intelligent agent. To this the answer is obvious: Once invariable concomitance of 'intelligent agent' is established in the example by means of positive and negative concomitances, then it is not legitimate to doubt about it or restrict it only in the case of those effects whose material causes can possibly be perceived by us. There is no additional condition in the invariable concomitance of 'intelligent agent' with effects in general.

Vācaspati now turns his attention to another objection by the Buddhists: The reason in the inference of the Naiyāyika-s establishing the existence of God has the fault of counter thesis. It could as well be inferred, so the Buddhist argues, that the earth and so on are not produced by an omniscient being because they are knowable like a jar. We do not find such a counter thesis in Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita or Kamalaśīla. Therefore in all probability this might be a *pūrvapakṣa* which Vācaspati formulates on his own. It may further be noted that later Naiyāyika-s like Udayana, Śaśadhara and Gaṅgeśa propose the objection of counter thesis much more cogently and strongly.[1] Vācaspati's answer to this objection is that if by this only someone having the knowledge of everything is denied, then this is a strange doctrine (*apasiddhānta*) since someone having a knowledge only of a few things cannot produce so many diverse things as the earth, the mountains and so on. But if the objection intends to deny any intelligent agent at all for things that are effects, then there is deviation in jars and so on which are produced by such intelligent agents as the potter and so on. Such an answer, however, lacks subtlety; this may be attributed to the fact that the Buddhists themselves did not propose the difficulty at that time in a significant manner.

There are two further difficulties which Vācaspati treats together. They are: God cannot activate the atoms since he has no body; God's knowledge is not eternal and it does not extend to all objects. These are denied by Vācaspati on the following grounds: In order to propose these inferences, it is first of all necessary to establish God who is the subject of such inferences. But by the very inference by which God is established, it is also established that he has no body and that his knowledge extends to everything. Therefore the inferences of the objection cannot at all arise. This answer was taken up later by Gaṅgeśa and developed further.[2] Vācaspati further points out that the desire and effort have to be considered as eternal in God like his knowledge. 'Being-an-agent' means the inherence of knowledge, desire and effort; when one of them is established as eternal, the rest also are established as eternal. Vācaspati, however, admits that it is enough and possible to establish the eternity of the knowledge and so on of God, by means of a second inference. First of all we establish an intelligent agent for the earth and so on by the reason of 'being-an-effect', and then by means of another inference we can show that someone who has only non-eternal knowledge which does not extend to all the objects cannot produce the earth and so on. Therefore we establish someone whose knowledge is eternal and extending to all things, as the maker of the universe. And this someone is God.[1]

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[1] cf. TCI, p.58 on the objection of counter thesis and commentary on it in this work.

[2] cf. TCI, p.48, *l.* 5 ff and commentary on it in this work.

Finally Vācaspati discusses the problem of the mode of contact of God with the invisible merit and demerit of individual souls. It should be remembered that according to the Nyāyavaiśeṣika system two entities which have supreme magnitude or extension (*paramamahattva*) do not have any direct contact among themselves. Therefore God cannot be in contact with individual souls since both of them have *paramamahattva*. Hence God cannot also have any contact with the unseen which inheres in individual souls and therefore the question is how God can activate the unseen of individual souls. Vācaspati furnishes alternative solutions to this problem which was also discussed by Uddyotakara. First, though the relation cannot be conjunction and inherence, it could be inherence in that which is the counterpositive of the conjunction of something else. This simply means that God is in contact with the atoms which are conjoined with individual souls in whom exist invisible merit and demerit by the relation of inherence. Thus God is also at least indirectly in contact with invisible merit and demerit. If, however, it is accepted that there is no difficulty for the contact of two substances having supreme magnitude and so an eternal contact could be proposed, then the relation of God with the unseen would be inherence in the counterpositive of conjunction. This means that God is directly in contact with individual souls in whom invisible merit and demerit exist by the relation of inherence; and hence God would also be in contact with invisible merit and demerit of individual souls. Finally he proposes that it is also possible for God to activate the merit and demerit of individual souls without any direct contact with them just as (in Hindu popular belief) a doctor can eject poison out of a patient without touching him, simply by the force of his *mantra*-s. Vācaspati adds that he has justified the reason of 'having-origin', though the *vārttikakāra* proposed as the reason 'being-not-intelligent' since by suggesting this as the reason he implied also other reasons such as 'having-origin' and so on. Vācaspati finally brings several scriptural passages in support of his reason.

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[1] The reason why a second inference is needed in order to show that the agent of the earth has eternal knowledge is the following: Even with the force of the relation of the reason to the subject, we cannot establish in the subject a *sādhya* with characteristics different from the one in the example. And so in the present instance we have cognized the invariable concomitance of only someone with the knowledge of the material cause in things that have an origin. Hence it is not possible to cognize that this knowledge is also eternal. And besides the *sādhya* characterised by such eternal knowledge has nowhere been previously cognized and so there could be the fault of the absence of *sādhya*. This is also the point of the objections of the Buddhists. Hence first of all a *sādhya* with the same characteristics as in the example is established and then taking this *sādhya* as the subject other desired characteristics are established in the *sādhya*. This is the purpose of the second inference. I owe this explanation to Paṇḍitarāja D. Pishārodi.

It was already pointed out that Vācaspati's contribution to the problems connected with the proofs for the existence of God is quite remarkable; in fact it would seem that the later Naiyāyika-s like Udayana and Gaṅgeśa only developed the details of the argumentation while the basic answer itself remained unchanged: Being-an-effect which is seen in earth and so on belongs to that class of being-an-effect which is seen in jars and so on. And the Buddhist himself admits that the latter 'being-an-effect' has the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' and therefore on his own principle, the Buddhist has to admit that the 'being-an-effect' in the earth and so on also has the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-intelligent agent' since both instances of 'being-an-effect' belong to the same class of 'being-an-effect'. Therefore Vācaspati's answer is really the culmination of all Nyāya efforts in this line.

Naiyāyika-s known from quotations preserved in Buddhist works

Several fragments of the works of Nyāya authors can be found in Buddhist works, mostly in Jñānaśrīmitra's *Īśvaravāda* and his disciple Ratnakīrti's *Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa*. The complete works of these Nyāya authors have not come down to us; but the fragments still preserved furnish further material to form a clearer idea of the development of Nyāya thought on the subject of God's existence and so we shall discuss them.

Śaṃkara

Śaṃkara, a Naiyāyika, is mentioned both by Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti.[1] In the fragment attributed to Śaṃkara, first of all the standard objection as in Dharmakīrti is summarized: There is no invariable concomitance of an agent for any kind of thing 'having-an-origin' but only for things having such a kind of 'having-origin' which is perceived to have an agent as in palaces and so on. To this Śaṃkara gives the following answer: By positive and negative concomitance it is established that there is invariable concomitance of 'having-an-intelligent agent' with 'having-origin'. It is such a well established and well-known invariable concomitance that is perceived in the earth and so on. Therefore such people who cognize this well-established invariable concomitance immediately infer that the earth and so on have an agent. So far the argument rests only on the presence or absence of positive and negative concomitances and it is not a much advanced form of reasoning. Śaṃkara however adds a new element when he points out that whiteness and so on do not establish fire, because they inhere in other substances and they occur also in places where there is no fire. Thus there is deviation. Instruments and actions on the other hand, produce effects such as palaces and so on, only when activated by an intelligent agent. There is no question of deviation here.

Ratnakīrti, in his *Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa* quotes another passage from Śaṃkara. This is actually an inference to establish the existence of God. A very good knowledge of Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is needed in order to understand the inference properly. There is a careful attempt on the one hand to limit the *pakṣa* from everything that is made by men and on the other hand from everything that does not have an origin. The proof itself is as follows: "This universe which is different from that which is made by us and which is not qualified by the characteristic of not-having-an-origin, i.e., which is not the substratum of sound, happiness and atomic extension; things which are not inferred by nearness and distance;

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[1] JN, p. 234 *l.* 1, ff,; RN, p. 39, *l.* 1 ff.

things which are not inherence, final particularity, extension, oneness, separate-ness, heaviness and oiliness which inhere in one of the (substances mentioned), colour, taste and touch in so far as these are not the qualities of earth, and fluidity which is natural to water, the conjunction with those things which are not of medium extension and also the mutual absences — this world is produced by an intelligent agent since it has a material cause which is not intelligent."

As noted above in this proof what is most striking is the care with which the subject is determined. The world is actually the subject; the formulation of the subject comes to mean the world by carefully avoiding certain things which cannot be taken as the subject. Thus, first of all, it is pointed out that the world which is actually the subject does not include the substratum of sound, i.e. ether which is eternal. The substratum of happiness (*prīti*) is the soul which is eternal and so it also is excluded from the enunciation of the subject. Similarly the substratum of atomic extension is atoms and mind which are eternal and so these also are excluded from the subject. Those which are to be inferred by means of distance and nearness are time and space; these are also considered eternal and so they too are excluded from the subject. The categories of universal, inherence and final particularity (*antyaviśeṣa*) are also eternal and so they are also excluded. The characteristics of extension, oneness, separateness, heaviness and oiliness which inhere in any of these substances are also considered eternal and hence excluded from the enunciation of the subject. Similarly the characteristics of colour, taste and touch are eternal in atoms except in those of earth, and so they also are excluded from the subject. Again fluidity which is in water, is also eternal and so excluded from the subject. The conjunction of those things which are not of medium extension are also considered eternal and so excluded from the subject. Again the mutual absence in these things are also excluded from the subject. Obviously things which are produced by us and about which there is no discussion if they have an agent or not, are also excluded from the subject. Such an elaborate formulation of the subject cannot be at all found in any of the inferences advanced by the Naiyāyika-s whose works have come down to us. The reason in the inference is a common one in Nyāya tradition beginning from Uddyotakara onwards.

Vittoka

Another Naiyāyika mentioned by Jñānaśrīmitra is Vittoka. The fragments of his works preserved by the Buddhist author, show a certain amount of originality. For Vittoka points out first of all the Buddhist objection that the mere presence of the reason in *sapakṣa* and its absence in *vipakṣa* do not guarantee its non-deviation, but only the relation of identity or the relation of cause and effect can furnish an assurance of such an invariable concomitance. Vittoka gives an appropriate answer to this and in doing so shows some originality. Taking the Buddhist on his own, Vittoka shows that there is invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect' based on the relation of cause and effect. The Buddhist cannot object that only particular effects such as a jar and so on have an agent, because by means of positive and negative concomitance, it can be established that even as there is invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in particular effects, there is such an invariable concomitance in effects in general also. Therefore Vittoka concludes that since effects such as a cloth and so on have a material cause, it is concluded that other effects have also material causes; so also because the same effects like a cloth and so on have an intelligent agent, it is concluded that other effects also have an intelligent agent. Thus just as it is impossible to doubt that something is an effect and at the same time it has no material cause, so also it is impossible to doubt that something is an effect and it has no intelligent agent. Nor can the Buddhist further object that it is another kind of effect that is pervaded by an intelligent agent i.e. only those things which when perceived engenders in us a knowledge that they are made by someone, although they were not actually perceived as being-produced by someone, are pervaded by an intelligent agent. The reason is that if by 'a knowledge that something is made by somebody' it is meant that effects are made by some kind of cause, then this is acceptable even to the Buddhists for they also admit that the world is produced by the unseen. If however, by 'a knowledge that something is made by somebody', it is meant that the 'being-an-effect' that is in the earth and so on is incapable of establishing the *sādhya* in question, but only 'being-an-effect' in another instance of an effect, then it would be impossible to have any inference at all. For, it could then be argued as well that this smoke does not establish fire but only another instance of smoke. If one argues like this, it is evident that no inference at all would be possible. And besides there would clearly be the fault of mutual dependence for in a particular inference as long as it is not established that there is the *sādhya*, it cannot be ascertained that there is the reason and as long as the reason is not established, it cannot be ascertained that there is the *sādhya*.[1]

Jñānaśrīmitra mentions Vittoka in the context of another argument also.[2] Here Vittoka answers to the Buddhist objection that there is something peculiar in 'being-an-effect' which is present in jars and so on which enables the inference of an intelligent agent. Vittoka argues in the following way: Even if there is such a peculiar characteristic, what does it actually mean? Obviously it does not mean that in the earth and so on there is no 'being-effect' in general, because even the Buddhist admits that the world is produced by causes like the unseen and so there is 'being-effect' in it. Nor can it mean that 'being-effect' that is in a particular effect such as a jar is not present in the earth and so on, for there is no harm if such is the case. Nobody uses 'being-effect' in a particular effect other than the subject, as the reason in the inference establishing the existence of God. It cannot be either that 'being-an-effect' in general does not have the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in general, for there is no agent in *vipakṣa* and the earth and so on about which there is doubt, if they have an agent or not, are also included in the subject. Finally the particular characteristic that makes inference impossible cannot be the difference between the *sādhya* in the subject and in the example, for such difference exists in all inferences and so if this difference is said to render inference impossible then no inference at all would be possible.

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[1] This exposition of Vittoka's ideas is based on JN, p. 235, *l.* 6 ff.

[2] cf. JN, p.237, *l*, 11 ff.

Trilocana

Trilocana, the teacher of Vācaspati, seems to have made an important contribution to the development of Nyāya, but none of his works has come down to us. Certain fragments attributed to him, however, can be seen in the works of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. Jñānaśrīmitra has preserved two arguments of Trilocana to establish the existence of God. They are as follows: Every effect should have an intelligent agent because it has the characterstic of 'having-an-origin'. Everything that is eternal and known as not caused by an intelligent agent, e.g. ether, does not have such an origin. That which is taken as the subject (of the inference) is not something produced by us but has the characteristic of origin. Therefore it is produced by an intelligent agent. In this inference, it is interesting, first of all, to note that Trilocana brings a negative reason to establish the existence of God. The reason 'having-origin' is itself brought forward to show that every effect has an intelligent agent. It is established that the earth has an intelligent agent by means of a negative formulation of the reason. The process of the reasoning, therefore, seems to suggest that Trilocana makes use of a reason having positive and negative concomitance to establish the validity of a reason which has only negative concomitance. This is expressed technically as *anvayavyatirekihetumūlakavyatirekī hetuḥ*.

The second inference which Trilocana gives entails a quite different form of argumentation and is as follows: The number two which is under discussion depends for its origin on somebody's knowledge whose object is each one of the two things, since it is number two. Everything that is two is such (i.e. depends on the knowledge of someone) as for instance two things. This number two is also such, which is in a dyad. Therefore it is also such.

He whose knowledge is depended upon, is the Lord God.[1] This proof can be understood properly only in the context of the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics according to which the world is built up of atoms. But the atoms themselves are without any further parts and without medium extension. Therefore the problem arises how the different things in the world can have medium extension. Classical Sāṃkhya solved this problem by the theory that medium extension is brought about by means of the number two in dyads and number three in triads. From these constituent parts which have medium extension, the whole universe of things which have medium extension is built up. Hence the cause of medium extension is number, more precisely numbers two and three. The Vaiśeṣika, soon realized that number itself depends on an intelligent subject who knows this. Therefore in order to explain the origin of number, a knowing subject has to be postulated. This is the thought behind this argument of Trilocana.[2]

In Jñānaśrīmitra, there is another fragment in which Trilocana shows that the Buddhist position that only in jars and so on, and not in earth and so on, there is 'being-produced' which is pervaded by 'having-an-agent', is wrong. If his position is to be correct, the Buddhist has to show that there is a particular characteristic in the instance of 'being-produced' which is found in jars and so on but which is not in the earth and so on. This particular characteristic cannot be the perception of a particular action and agent, for some one can have a knowledge that a jar is produced by a potter although he has not seen it being made by a potter. Nor can the medium magnitude of the jar and so on be considered as the particular characteristic in question, for such a feature arising from the complex of causes could be found in earth and so on also. Nor can 'being-made' be considered the particular characteristic, for such a charcteristic existing now but not existing before is present by the relation of inherence in the material cause and this is present in both jars and so on as well as in earth etc. Nor can any particular characteristic in any other form be proposed. Hence the conclusion of Trilocana is that the characteristic of 'being-an-effect' is the same in jars and so on as well as in earth etc. Therefore just as it is valid to conclude that the jars and so on have an agent, it is also valid to conclude that the earth and so on have an agent.

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[1] cf. RN, p.40, *l*, 3 ff.

[2] cf. *Praśastapādabhāṣyam*, p. 90. *tatreśvarabuddhim apekṣyotpannā paramāṇudvyaṇukeṣu bahutvasaṃkhyā tair ārabdhe kāryadravye tryaṇukādi-lakṣaṇe rūpādyutpattisamakālaṃ mahattvaṃ dīrghatvaṃ ca karoti.*

The importance of Trilocana does not seem to lie so much in the inferences he brings forward to establish the existence of God but in trying to establish firmly the logical pre-suppositions that are needed for it. And in establishing these pre-suppositions he deals decisive blows to the logic of Dharmakīrti which denies the possibility of establishing God's existence. How did Trilocana develop and justify the logical pre-suppositions that are necessary to establish the existence of God? The nature of 'reason' in the inferences as expounded by Dharmakīrti was in principle unsuited for establishing non-empirical realities. Therefore the reason of 'being-an-effect' (*kāryatva*) also is not capable of establishing the non-empirical reality of God. In Dharmakīrti's system this inability of the reason to establish the existence of God, comes from the fact that according to him the determinate cognition or generalization (*kalpanā*) is true only in so far as it refers to a concrete individual (*svalakṣaṇa*), but in itself, it has no truth content. Therefore a logic which works only with such kind of concepts will not be able to establish God. Against these theories, Trilocana proposes his concept of 'natural relation' (*svābhāvikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ*). This natural relation, first of all, means relationship between two universals and not between two individuals. And these universals in the Nyāya tradition has a truth content in itself and not merely in so far as it engenders the perception of an individual. Jñānaśrīmitra has preserved a fragment from the works of Trilocana which gives us a clear description of 'natural relation'.[1] This fragment may be translated as follows: "Since perception and non-perception have only particulars as object, how can the knowledge of the relation of the universal be brought about by them? (If it is answered) that the relation between the non-absence of smoke with the non-absence of fire is only cognized, (the reply is) which means of cognition has this as object? Not perception because its object is only the *svalakaṣaṇa*; not inference because it presupposes that (perception). Nor is the relation a separate (entity). Determinate cognition which is preceded by perception has as object non-difference in different individuals perceived; this is considered the universal. In this way determinate perception does not have reality as object, but the form of cognition. This is not an object. Since the object is not directly perceived by them, how can there be a cognition of the relation of them (determinate cognitions) with reality? According to us by means of repeated perceptions, the relation of those belonging to the same category is cognized by means of the mind; therefore smoke does not deviate from fire. And if it deviates, it trespasses the natural relation and hence the means of knowledge which removes the doubt if the reason exists in a sure *vipakṣa*, is perception itself in the form of the non-perception of the reason without additional condition which (the reason) could have been perceived (if it were there). Therefore is established the natural relation."

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[1] cf. JN, p. 161, *ll.* 17-26. This fragment is partly preserved also in Ratnakīrti, p. 46, *ll.* 27-31.

From this passage it is clear that Trilocana means by invariable concomitance a real connection between two realities. This relation is based on the nature of the two realities concerned and not conditioned by any intermediate reality. Only such a relation between two entities that is brought about by an internal necessity, can be the basis of inference. It is also to be noted, that although Trilocana speaks of the relation between two generic attributes, or universals, he explicitly points out that this relation is actually seen in a particular reason with a particular *sādhya* which has the general attribute of the kind of *sādhya* in question. In this way Trilocana has really undermined the very basis of Dharmakīrti's attacks.

Narasiṃha

Ratnakīrti mentions a certain Naiyāyika by name Narasiṃha and his syllogism to establish the existence of God. The syllogism is as follows: The knowable things which are positive entities, which are different from those things which are produced by men and about which there is no discussion (if they have an agent or not), and which are also different from those things which have no origin, have an origin depending on some one having intelligence, because they have an origin; that which has a reason so described is also the substratum of such a *sādhya* just like a house. This (reason) is such. Therefore this (reason has also the *sādhya*).[1]

Here also the point of the long formulation of the *pakṣa* is to distinguish it from *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Whatever is produced by men is excluded from the *pakṣa*; similarly whatever is eternal is also excluded. It is also noteworthy that Narasiṃha mentions as *pakṣa*, that which is knowable, and not simply the world as such. But even here he excludes destruction (*dhvaṃsa*) from the enunciation of the *pakṣa*.

Further Buddhist attacks: Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti

Jñānaśrīmitra and his disciple Ratnakīrti took up the challenge posed by the Naiyāyika-s like Vācaspati Miśra. These Buddhist authors argue basically in the same way as Dharmakīrti, but they develop the arguments of the latter to deny the existence of God with much ingenuity and in greater detail. Of the two, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, the former is much more prolix. He tends also to be rather long-winded and dilatory; Ratnakīrti, on the other hand, takes up the essential arguments of his master and presents them with a certain rigour of logic. In the following presentation we shall rely chiefly on Ratnakīrti, but we will refer to Jñānaśrīmitra, whenever necessary.

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[1] cf. RN, p.39, *l.* 15 ff.

Ratnakīrti first of all gives a faithful summary of the Nyāya arguments for the existence of God, concluding them with the inferences of the Naiyāyika-s, Śaṃkara, Narasiṃha, Trilocana and Vācaspati. We have discussed these in presenting the doctrines of the respective authors. Ratnakīrti, then proceeds to attack the Nyāya arguments and in doing so he concentrates his attention to disprove the invariable concomitance of an intelligent agent with 'being-an-effect' which Nyāya upholds and which lies at the centre of all Nyāya arguments to establish the existence of God.[1] According to Ratnakīrti, there are only four ways in which such an invariable concomitance as proposed by the Naiyāyika-s could be understood: 1) the invariable concomitance in question is like the invariable concomitance of cause with every effect, because it would be contradictory to be an effect, and be without cause; 2) or it is like the invariable concomitance of fire with smoke by means of the perception and non-perception of positive and negative concomitances of the particular things, fire and smoke; 3) or the invariable concomitance is grasped by means of many perceptions and non-perceptions in *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, respectively; 4) or finally, it is to be grasped by just one perception and non-perception in *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Ratnakīrti argues that in none of these ways the invariable concomitance that is envisaged by the Naiyāyika-s can be grasped.

The first way of cognizing the invariable concomitance cannot be accepted, because there is no harm if being-an-effect exists in something that does not have an agent. At this point Ratnakīrti anticipates the objection of the Naiyāyika-s who would show that being-an-effect cannot exist in something that does not have an agent for the following reasons. 'Being-an-effect' is pervaded by 'being-determined by a particular time and place', by 'the presence of the cause at a particular time', (i.e. the effect exists at some time and does not exist at some other time) and by 'being-produced by causal complex'. And all these three 'being-determined to a particular time and place', 'the presence of the cause at a particular time' and 'being-produced by causal complex' are pervaded by an intelligent agent and therefore 'being-an-effect' is also pervaded by an intelligent agent, because if non-intelligent causes produce effects without being activated by an intelligent agent, then they would produce them at any time or place. Nor can it be admitted that the unseen produces the particular conjunction of causes needed to produce a particular effect, because the unseen itself is unconscious and unintelligent and so it cannot direct itself. It needs an intelligent agent to direct it; if it were to act without being activated by an intelligent agent, it would act always.

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[1] What follows is closely based on Ratnakīrti, op. cit, p.40 ff.

Ratnakīrti, however, rejects all these arguments of the Naiyāyika-s and denies that there is any invariable concomitance of an intelligent agent with 'being-determined by a particular time and place' 'the presence of the cause at a particular time' and with 'being-produced by causal complex', because non-intelligent causes produce their effects by their own inherent power. But it does not follow, as the Naiyāyika-s think, that they would act always, for non-intelligent causes themselves acquire the potency to act when conjoined with similar causes needed to produce the effect in question. Hence it should be concluded that it is doubtful if the reason 'being-an-effect' does not occur in a *vipakṣa*.

Ratnakīrti then discusses and rejects the opinion of Vācaspati Miśra according to whom there is no doubt at all if the reason 'being-an-effect' does not exist in a *vipakṣa*. Vācaspati says that even when one looks for it very carefully, it is impossible to perceive the reason in a *vipakṣa* and therefore it should be concluded that the reason does not exist in a *vipakṣa*; and if one goes on to doubt in spite of all this, then normal life itself would be impossible, for in that case, there could always be doubt. Ratnakīrti, of course, rejects this view of Vācaspati, pointing out that because one does not perceive something, it does not at all follow that the thing in question does not exist. To mention the example he himself gives: It does not at all follow that because one does not see the grass growing in the cave of Vindhya mountain, there is no grass there. To the objection of Vācaspati that if one thus goes on doubting, normal life itself would be impossible, Ratnakīrti answers that even when there is a doubt if the desired result will follow or not, people do act. Therefore there is no real end to practical life.

It may be noted here that this way of trying to establish the invariable concomitance of an intelligent agent with 'being-an-effect' has been referred to by Jñānaśrīmitra also. But he also does not mention by name the Naiyāyika who showed this way of establishing the invariable concomitance; but he refers to its author simply as '*apara*' (another).[1] Jñānaśrīmitra, however, presents the opinion of the Naiyāyika in such a way that it is quite easy for him to deny it. Thus the Naiyāyika is said to have argued as follows: If some effect can come into existence without the help of what is usually considered its cause, then it follows that the latter is not the cause of the former. For instance if smoke can be produced even without fire, it follows that fire is not the cause of smoke. But the contradiction is that actually smoke is produced from fire, i.e. it is not the case that there is smoke and there is no fire. Similarly if something is produced without an intelligent cause as for instance a jar, then no jar would be produced by a potter. But actually jars are produced by the potter i.e. it is not the case that there is jar and there is no potter. Hence the obvious conclusion is that there is invariable concomitance of fire in smoke and of an intelligent agent in 'being-an-effect'.

Jñānaśrīmitra answers this objection quite curtly. Only when it is established that there is the relation of cause and effect between fire and smoke, such a kind of argumentation based on contradiction holds good. Similarly only when it is established that the world is produced by an intelligent agent does this argument become valid. But such a relation of cause and effect is not yet established. It is to be noted that it is Ratnakīrti who takes up this important logical argument of the Naiyāyika and refutes it in detail, as was shown above.

[1] Jñānaśrīmitra, op.cit. p.256. But the editor gives a footnote according to which the manuscript on which the edition is based has a note in the margin which says that this *apara* is Śatānanda, but we know nothing of this Śatānanda.

Ratnakīrti then discusses the second possible way in which according to the Naiyāyika the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' may be cognized in 'being-an-effect', i.e. by means of positive and negative concomitance of particulars through perception and non-perception of the particular.[1] Here if the invariable concomitance of an intelligent agent with a body is said to be grasped, then there is deviation with regard to trees and so on which come into being without such an agent, and therefore the reason has the fault of deviation. But then the Naiyāyika might object: It is not correct to speak of a deviation with reference to the subject (*pakṣa*) for in that case there would be no inference at all. To this Ratnakīrti replies that he also does not hold that the fault of deviation is to be pointed out with reference to the subject for even the Buddhists admit that the reason is said to be present in something where it is doubted if there is the *sādhya* or not, and that there is no reason (*hetu*) in something where there is the absence of *sādhya*. But deviation is to be seen, according to Ratnakīrti with reference to such things as grass and so on where it is denied by means of non-perception of something which could be perceived if it were there, that there is an agent with a body. Therefore only the earth and so on are to be taken as the subject; and with reference to what is actually taken as subject, no deviation is spoken of.[2] Jñānaśrīmitra also discusses this way of cognizing invariable concomitance. He attributes this theory explicitly to Vittoka.[3] His treatment of the question has in general been followed by Ratnakīrti.

Jñānaśrīmitra, however answers more simply to the same objection of the Naiyāyika that if one would speak of the fault of deviation with reference to *pakṣa*, there would be no possibility of inference. According to him, there is no justification for the Naiyāyika to make use of something as *pakṣa* which the Buddhist has already shown as a *vipakṣa*. Then follows a series of discussions on various aspects of the problem which have been to a large extent incorporated by Ratnakīrti in his answers. Śaśadhara[1] and Gaṅgeśa[2] discuss the same objection and in the answers they give in the *pūrvapakṣa* they follow the pattern of reply which we find in Ratnakīrti. This shows that both Śaśadhara and Gaṅgeśa have taken the Buddhist views from Ratnakīrti, at least on this point.

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[1] Ratnakīrti, op. cit. p.43 ff.

[2] This is actually the line of argumentation in TCI, p.4.

[3] Jñānaśrīmitra, op. cit. p.243.

Ratnakīrti refers also to the argument of the Naiyāyika that just as it would be impossible that something be an effect and does not have material cause, so would it be impossible that something be an effect and be without an agent. Ratnakīrti admits that effects must have material cause, because of the 'force of denying its negation'[3], but it does not follow that effects should have an intelligent agent because of the arguments already advanced.

Ratnakīrti then discusses the third way in which the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent with being-an-effect, may be cognized according to the opponent. This is the way of many perceptions and non-perceptions, i.e. many times one perceives that smoke is accompanied by fire and many times also one perceives that where there is no fire, there is also no smoke. Therefore it is concluded that smoke has the invariable concomitance of fire. Here Ratnakīrti develops the arguments in the *pūrvapakṣa* and attributes them to Vācaspati.[4] By means of many perceptions and non-perceptions, one understands the natural relation (*svābhāvikasaṃbandha*). And smoke has such a natural relation with fire, but not fire with smoke. The factor that decides whether a relation is natural or not is the presence or absence of additional condition (*upādhi*). Thus smoke has natural relation with fire because there is no additional condition but the relation of fire with smoke is not natural since there is additional condition, for only fire arising from conjunction with wet firewood produces smoke and not fire in red-hot iron ball. Thus absence of additional condition determines that the relation is natural. But the question naturally arises: How do we know whether there is additional condition or not. Here the answer is that if after carefully looking for additional condition, one does not find additional condition, it is to be concluded that there is no additional condition, otherwise there would be constant doubt and no action would be possible. Nor can the Buddhist object that if such is the natural relation, then anything may be naturally related to anything. For if the Buddhist argues like this, the Naiyāyika could as well point out that the Buddhist description of invariable concomitance in the form of cause and effect (*tadutpattilakṣaṇa*) suffers from the same defect. If the Buddhist were to answer that something is a cause and some other thing is an effect because of the very nature of things, the Naiyāyika could as well answer that things have natural relation by their very nature and this state of affairs should not be questioned. So far the *pūrvapakṣa* put forward by Ratnakīrti, is practically quotations from the *Tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati with very little verbal variations. Then he brings in the support of the Mīmāṃsaka-s for the *pūrvapakṣa* and quotes from the *Ślokavārttika*: "invariable concomitance of general characteristics is to be cognized by means of many perceptions"[1]. This is explained as follows: By means of the impressions engendered by many earlier perceptions of fire with smoke, at last there arises in the mind, the knowledge that wherever there is smoke, there is invariably also fire, just as an experienced jeweller finds out after many careful examinations that a particular stone is indeed a jewel.

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[1] Śaśadhara, NSD, p.112.

[2] cf. note 2 on p. 75.

[3] *viparyayabādhapramāṇabalāt.*

[4] Ratnakīrti here is summarizing *Tātparyaṭīkā*, cf. *Nyāyadarśanam*, p.309 ff. edited by Anantalal Takur.

Ratnakīrti then presents the thought of Trilocana on this point. According to Trilocana also invariable concomitance is cognized by the mind from many perceptions and non-perceptions. Therefore smoke does not deviate from fire and if it does deviate, then it would transgress natural relation. The fact that an additional condition which could be perceived if it were there, is not perceived is the argument that supports the existence of natural relation. For instance we do not perceive at all an additional condition in the case of the relation of smoke with fire and so we conclude that smoke has natural relation with fire. But in the case of the relation of fire with smoke, we perceive the additional condition of 'origin-from-wet-fuel' i.e. only when the fire arises from wet fuel, it is accompanied by smoke. Therefore we conclude that the relation of fire with smoke is not natural. Ratnakīrti, further points out that according to Vācaspati Miśra this natural relation is cognized by the respective senses themselves (and not by mind as Trilocana held).[1]

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[1] Ratnakīrti, op.cit. p.46; *Ślokavarttika*, anumānapariccheda, kārikā-12, p. 249.

Ratnakīrti, now turns his attention to a detailed refutation of this position of the Naiyāyika-s, Vācaspati and Trilocana and of the Mīmāṃsaka-s like Kumārila. And the main argument that Ratnakīrti brings forward is that natural relation as a kind of relation free from all additional conditions cannot be determined. The reason is that although one may be sure that there is no invisible additional condition, one cannot at all be sure that there is no invisible additional condition. Although one does not perceive an additional condition when one looks for it, it does not follow that there is no additional condition, for it is possible that one does not perceive it, because some of the causes for such a perception are absent. It does not follow, however, that because of this, there would be always doubt and so no normal course of action would be possible since even when there is doubt, it is possible to act. Therefore it should be concluded that the valid way of deciding if there is fire wherever there is smoke, is to examine if there is the relation of cause and effect between them. Further Vācaspati's contention that the nature of things according to which natural relation is cognized, is not to be questioned, is to be simply rejected, for nothing can be established on the basis of valid means of knowledge, as natural relation. Such being the state of affairs, there can be no question of relying on the nature of natural relation to establish invariable concomitance.

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[1] Vācaspati furnishes the reason for his opinion in his *Tātparyaṭīkā*: *tadidam avadhāraṇam na mānasam, anapekṣya manaso bāhye pravṛttau andhabadhirādyabhāvaprasaṅgāt*, i.e. this cognition of natural relation is not by means of mind; if the mind is capable of cognizing external objects without the help of the senses, it would follow that there would be none who is blind or deaf. - *Nyāyadarśanam*, edited by Anantalal Takur, p.309 ff.

The same conclusion may be reached according to Ratnakīrti in another way. What is the meaning of natural relation? Does it mean that something is produced by itself? Or does it mean that something is produced by its causes? Or finally does it mean that something is produced without any cause? It cannot be the first alternative since nothing can be the cause of itself. The second alternative is simply the Buddhist position that invariable concomitance is cognized by means of the cognition of the relation of cause and effect, described in other words. The third opinion cannot be accepted since it would come about that things will not be bound by the rules of place and time. Therefore it should be concluded that the idea of 'natural relation' is simply a fabrication of the Naiyāyika-s without any foundation in reality.

This way of cognizing invariable concomitance has been developed by Vācaspati Miśra and his teacher Trilocana. And Ratnakīrti has been quite fair to both of them in presenting their viewpoints. The Mimāṃsaka-s also hold such views. Jñānaśrīmitra, however, does not discuss these views in his *īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa*, but in his *vyāpticarcā*[1] he does and there he does not contribute anything new to the discussion.

Ratnakīrti then discusses the fourth possible way of cognizing invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' with 'being-an-effect'. By means of one perception of reason and *sādhya* in a *sapakṣa* and absence of such a perception in a *vipakṣa*; invariable concomitance could be grasped. As for instance in a jar and so on, we see the positive concomitance of an intelligent agent and in ether and so on there is the negative concomitance of an intelligent agent and so we conclude that ether and so on have the absence of the characteristic of 'being-an-effect'. Hence the Naiyāyika concludes that there is the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect'.

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[1] Jñānaśrīmitra, op.cit. p.162 ff.

To this Ratnakīrti answers as follows: This argument of the Naiyāyika-s would have been correct, if the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' with 'being-an-effect' could be established somewhere; but this is not possible as has been shown when discussing the third way in which invariable concomitance could be grasped. And therefore there could be no harm if there is no absence of 'being-an-effect' in ether, although there is the absence of 'having-an-agent'. Hence the reason of 'being-an-effect' has the fault of doubtful inconclusiveness. But the Naiyāyika may further urge the argument in the following way: According to the Naiyāyika-s ether is eternal and according to the Buddhists, it is unreal (*alīka*). Hence it follows that in both systems ether is eternal and so 'being-an-effect', should be absent from it. To this Ratnakīrti answers: The negative concomitance in question is not merely the absence of 'being-an-effect' in ether and so on, but it should be shown that such an absence of 'being-an-effect' has been brought about by the absence of an intelligent agent which is the *sādhya* in the present inference. And it is impossible to show that the absence of 'being-an-effect' in ether is actually brought about by the absence of an intelligent agent, for in ether just as there is the absence of an intelligent agent, there is also the absence of all other causes and therefore it is just impossible to decide if the absence of 'being-an-effect' in ether is dependent on the absence of an intelligent agent or on the absence of any other cause.

Here the Naiyāyika might urge the difficulty in another way: Although in ether it is impossible to determine if the absence of being-an-effect is brought about by the absence of an intelligent agent, yet in a jar and so on it is clear that the 'absence of being an effect' is brought about by the absence of an intelligent agent. Ratnakīrti answers, this is not the case even here. In the case of jar and so on also the mere presence of 'being-an-effect' is not positive concomitance but the fact that 'being-an-effect' is actually brought about by the presence of *sādhya*, here, an intelligent agent. And it is imposible to know even in the case of jar and so on if 'being-an-effect' has been brought about by the presence of the *sādhya* itself or by the presence of other things, such as a wall and so on which are also present when the jar is actually made. Therefore Ratnakīrti concludes that the only way to cognize invariable concomitance is by means of the positive and negative concomitance of particular things through the perception and non-perception of particular things. This is the typical Buddhist position. Thus according to Ratnakīrti, it is simply impossible to establish the existence of an omniscient God because the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' with 'being-an-effect' cannot be established. It may be pointed out here that this fourth way of cognizing invariable concomitance has not been discussed by Jñānaśrīmitra and this shows that Ratnakīrti was not merely summarizing what his master wrote.

Ratnakīrti next discusses the reason in the inference but does not bring in any new arguments in the process. He mainly repeats what he has already stated: There is no invariable concomitance of an intelligent agent with 'being-an-effect'. He points out that this is so because it is impossible to cognize the negative concomitance of 'being-an-effect', for even when a potter is absent, there is no absence of every effect in clay since there are such effects as drying up and breaking up in clay. If it is urged that such effects are also included in the *pakṣa*, the answer is that the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' should be cognized at least in one place and this is not possible. Nor can something that is cognized as produced without the help of another thing, be considered as the effect of the latter. Hence Ratnakīrti concludes that in jar and so on, there is something which is qualified by jar-ness by which it could be inferred that other jars are also produced by a potter. In the same way, it cannot be affirmed that there is 'being-an-effect' in a jar which is brought about by an intelligent agent and therefore every other effect is brought about by an intelligent agent.

At this the *Naiyāyika* might put forward another objection: If the Buddhist insists that the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' cannot be cognized in 'being-an-effect', then how can he establish the invariable concomitance of 'being-non-eternal' with 'being-produced', which he also admits. Ratnakīrti answers that the cognition of such an invariable concomitance is possible by means of the force of the absence of contradiction in a *vipakṣa* i.e. if 'being-eternal' exists also in something that is produced, 'being-eternal' cannot any more be said to be not dependent on anything. And no such absence of contradiction in a *vipakṣa* can be pointed out in the case of 'being-an-effect'. Therefore it should be concluded that 'being-an-effect' as a reason has the fault of doubtful deviation. The Buddhist does not admit as the Naiyāyika seems to imply that there are two kinds of 'being-an-effect', a particular kind of 'being-an-effect' which can be found in the jars and so on which has the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent', and 'being-an-effect' in general which is to be found in all effects, which does not have the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent'. Ratnakīrti says that he also admits only one kind of 'being-an-effect' viz. being-an-effect in general which the Naiyāyika says has the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent and which he has shown to have no such invariable concomitance.

Ratnakīrti now gives in detail the views of Śaṃkara, Vācaspati and Vittoka, trying to establish the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' with 'being-an-effect', and then subjects them to criticism. Here it may be noted that since Ratnakīrti quotes verbatim from the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati in order to present his views, it is likely that the Buddhist philosopher is similarly quoting directly from the works of Śaṃkara and Vittoka (or at any rate he is quite faithful to their ideas) which were available to him but which are now not extant. We have already discussed the opinions of Vācaspati and Vittoka. Śaṃkara's position may be summarized as follows: He takes up the following Buddhist objection. One can infer the existence of an intelligent agent only when there is the notion that something is produced (*kṛtabuddhi*). Now Śaṃkara asks: What is this notion of 'being-produced'. Does it mean that something has a maker or that something has a cause? If the former is the case, then certainly there arises the knowledge of an intelligent agent, if the invariable concomitance of an intelligent agent with 'being-an-effect' is grasped. And no one can have an inference, if the invariable concomitance has not been grasped. If the notion of 'being-produced' means only that something has a cause, then the Buddhist also admits that everything has a cause since everything comes into existence by means of the unseen. Hence the conclusion of Śaṃkara is that the Buddhist cannot deny the inference of an intelligent agent for the earth and so on since about them also one can have the notion of 'being-produced'.[1]

Ratnakīrti rejects the arguments of all these authors, and the basic reason to do so is that there is no invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect', as he has already shown. Nor does he admit two kinds of 'being-an-effect', one 'being-an-effect' in particular things such as a jar which have an agent, and another in all effects. Ratnakīrti points out that the Buddhists also accept only one kind of 'being-an-effect' which, he has shown, has no invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent'. Only those kinds of generic characteristics such as 'being-a-jar' and so on which have the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' can establish an agent. Thus quoting Dharmakīrti, Ratnakīrti also points out that if one perceives that a particular thing has an agent, it would be correct to infer that a thing belonging to the same class also has an agent, but not a thing belonging to a different class.

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[1] It may be pointed out here that Jñānaśrīmitra also quotes the same kind of arguments in a little more elaborate way; but he does not explicitly ascribe them to Saṃkara, but Ratnakīrti attributes them explicitly to Śaṃkara. It may perhaps be explained by the fact that these arguments may actually have been found in Śaṃkara's works, but Śaṃkara himself might have taken it from an earlier author from whom Jñānaśrīmitra quotes.

Now he answers the difficulties raised by Śaṃkara and Vācaspati. To Śaṃkara's question what is the notion of 'being produced', he answers that it obviously means that the thing in question has a maker. Indeed such an inference arises only for those who have already grasped the required invariable concomitance. But Ratnakīrti points out that in the present instance, there is no cognition of the required invariable concomitance. To Vācaspati, his answer is as follows: It may be admitted that there is being-an-effect in a jar and a palace; but it does not follow that 'being-an-effect' in general has the invariable concomitance of 'haivng-an-agent', because it is impossible to establish negative concomitance.[1] Therefore Ratnakīrti concludes that we can infer that there is an agent only for such individual class of things like jars and clothes, since here by means of positive and negative concomitances in an example invariable concomitance could be established.

Ratnakīrti finally discusses the *sādhya* in the syllogism which tries to establish the existence of God. He asks first of all whether the Naiyāyika wants only that there is an intelligent agent for the earth and so on or whether he wants to establish an all-knowing, eternal intelligent agent. In the first alternative, there is the fault of establishing what has already been established for the Buddhist also admits that the world is produced by intelligent agents namely, individual human beings, by their unseen. In the second alternative, the reason will have the fault of deviation, since the required invariable concomitance has not been established. At this the Naiyāyika might further object: One can establish the particular (in the present case, an all-knowing eternal agent) by means of the force of the presence of the reason in the subject, when general invariable concomitance has been established. Ratnakīrti in his answer to this objection, admits the principle of the force of the presence of the reason in the subject; but restricts its application. By means of this principle, it cannot be said that any kind of particular *sādhya* could be established, but only that *sādhya* without which the presence of the reason in the subject would be unwarranted. As for example, by means of the presence of smoke on the mountain, one can establish only fire on the mountain, for the absence of this only would be incongruous, if there is smoke on the mountain, but not the absence of fire with five colours, for such a kind of fire need not be on the mountain even if there is smoke there. Thus in the present case one may establish an intelligent agent for the earth and so on, but not an agent endowed with eternity and omniscience.

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[1] What is meant here is the example of ether already discussed. Although there is the absence of 'being-an-effect' in ether, it cannot be established that this absence of 'being-an-effect' in ether is brought about by the absence of an agent or simply by the absence of a cause. Udayana also discusses this problem and gives his own answer to it. cf. *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p.396 ff.

At this the Naiyāyika can object and in fact, Ratnakīrti quotes the objections of Vācaspati as follows.: The Naiyāyika does not establish just any kind of intelligent agent but an agent who knows directly the effect in question, its material cause, the instrumental causes, the beneficiaries of the action, and the benefit or the purpose of the action. In the present instance, the effect is the dyad, its material cause is the atoms, the instrumental causes are the merit and demerit, the beneficiaries are the individual souls, the purpose is the experience of happiness or unhappiness of individual souls. In inferring such a *sādhya*, there cannot be any fault of establishing what has already been established, nor is there the absence of the requisite invariable concomitance. Such an invariable concomitance can indeed be cognized by means of the example of jar and a potter who produces it and who has the knowledge of its material cause and so on. Vācaspati puts these arguments in syllogistic form as follows:

Bodies, mountains, oceans and so on which are the object of discussion are produced by agents who have knowledge of their material causes, since they are effects.

Whatever is an effect is produced by someone who knows its material cause, as for example palaces and so on.

Bodies and so on which are the object of discussion are such.

Therefore they are so (i.e. produced by someone having the knowledge of their material causes).

By this inference Vācaspati establishes for the earth and so on an intelligent agent who knows the respective material causes. Then by another inference in the negative form (*vyatireki*) he establishes that this agent should be omniscient and eternal. This second syllogism is as follows:

An agent who knows the material cause of things such as earth and so on cannot be non-eternal and non-omniscient;

because an agent of a thing cannot be ignorant of its material cause.

Agents like us cannot know the material cause of such things.

This one knows the material cause of things such as earth and so on.

Therefore this one is such (i.e. eternal and omniscient). Indeed only God can know all the atoms, the merit and demerit which inhere in individual souls.

Ratnakīrti rejects all these arguments of Vācaspati. He asks: Is there only one agent who produces all the dyads in different places and times, or are there many agents who produce these things, or is each dyad produced by different particular agents who know the material cause and so on of the respective dyad but does not know the material cause of other things? The first position cannot be accepted since it is impossible that one agent alone produces all the dyads in different places and times. 'Being-an-effect' is not a sufficient cause to establish one agent just as 'smoke' is not a sufficient cause to establish one fire. If it is argued that because of the absence of a reason to establish many agents, there is only one agent, one can as well argue that because of the absence of a reason to establish one agent, there are many agents. Further the argument that many people with different opinions cannot produce one thing cannot be accepted, for many people can join together in order to produce one thing. If one agent cannot produce all the dyads, it is clear that many agents also cannot produce them and therefore, the second position also becomes untenable. And if the dyads are produced by different individuals knowing only the material cause of the respective thing, how can there be any one individual who is omniscient? Hence the third position also is to be rejected.

These are the arguments and objections of Ratnakīrti and Jñānaśrīmitra. We see that basically the objection is the same as found in Dharmakīrti: There is no invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect'. However both Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti show considerable ingenuity to bring arguments in support of the fundamental position of the Buddhists. And it is these arguments that the later Naiyāyika-s especially Udayana and Gaṅgeśa confront. We shall now see how these Naiyāyika-s answer the Buddhists.

Further Reaction of the Naiyāyika-s: Udayana–Ātmatattvaviveka

Udayana's philosophy of God could be found almost exclusively in three of his works: *Ātmatattvaviveka, Nyāyakusumāñjali,* and *Kiraṇāvalī* written chronologically in this order.[1] Hence we shall first consider the views which Udayana presents in his *Ātmatattvaviveka*. Udayana discusses the problem of God in *Ātmatattvaviveka* in the context of his defence of the Veda-s as a source of valid knowledge because they are the words of an apt person (*āpta*) who in the present case is God himself.[2] But then the opponent naturally raises the objection: The existence of God is not established, therefore how can his words be considered as a source of valid knowledge? Hence Udayana sets out to establish the existence of God. The syllogism he brings forward to do so is basically the same as the one we found in Vācaspati. It is as follows: That which is the object of discussion if it has an agent or not, has indeed an agent, because it is an effect. Immediately the opponent objects: This cannot be so for there is the fault of the contradiction of the particular. This simply means that normally an agent is with a visible body, with finite knowledge and so on and a particular invisible agent omiscient and without a body is contradictory to the normal notion of an agent,[1] and therefore the reason of 'being-an-effect' does not establish an invisible and omniscient agent. Hence the reason tries to establish a *sādhya*, which is in contradiction with the normal *sādhya*. Udayana answers to this as follows: In order that a contradiction be cognized, it is necessary that the relata of the contradiction be known earlier. In other words, in order to assert that there is a contradiction, one should know what things stand in contradiction to each other. And as long as there is no such knowledge, there cannot be any contradiction either. On the other hand, in the present case, if the knowledge of the relata is already present, there would be no contradiction because the knowledge of an invisible agent arises only by means of the reason of 'being-an-effect'.

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[1] *Ātmatattvaviveka* does not mention any other work of Udayana, but this work is mentioned in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* which does not mention *Kiraṇāvali*. But *Kiraṇāvali* mentions *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. Hence the chronological order of the books seems to be *Ātmatattvaviveka, Nyāyakusumāñjali, Kiraṇāvali.*

[2] *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p.377 ff.

But if an invisible agent is not at all known earlier how can he be even proposed as the object of inference or even of thought in general? When the inference is for the other (*parārthānumāna*), its objects should somehow be known earlier. In the present case, God is not at all known earlier; therefore how can he be proposed as the object of inference? To this the answer is that God is already the object of the inference for oneself and when in this way God is known, he could also be proposed as the object of an inference for another. But then it may further be urged: How can something which is not at all known earlier be the object even of inference for oneself? Only a person who has already cognized the invariable concomitance of fire with the smoke in the kitchen can infer even for himself fire on the mountain, when smoke is there. Thus in the present case too, only if an invisible and omniscient being is already known, can it be made the object of inference. Here the answer is that a means of valid knowledge makes known something that is not known already. There can be no contradiction with an object that is not known already. Hence it is in the nature of valid means of knowledge to make known what is not known earlier and therefore, there is no harm even if an invisible and omniscient agent is not known earlier; he is now made known by inference. Then again the question arises naturally: How does inference acquire this capacity to make known an object which was in no way known earlier? It is by the relation of expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) and incongruity (*anupapatti*) that inference acquires this power.[1] The relation of expectancy operates in the following way. By means of the reason in general, one can establish the *sādhya* in general and after this, by means of the fact that a particular instance of the reason calls for a particular instance of the *sādhya*, a *sādhya* which was not known earlier would be established. As for example, when it is established that the Veda-s have an author because they are sentences, since these sentences describe non-worldly objects, it follows that this author must be an omniscient being who knows all these things. Understood in this way, the notion of expectancy is the same as that of the idea of 'the force of the reason existing in the subject' (*pakṣadharmatābala*). The relation of incongruity occurs when it is known that if the reason cannot exist in a *vipakṣa*, it can be concluded that if the reason exists in the *vipakṣa* it is incongruous. Hence it establishes a *sādhya* which is not known earlier and which is opposed to the *vipakṣa*. As for example, the reason of 'being-the-Veda-s' does not exist in literary works like the *Kumārasambhava* which are produced by a non-omniscient being and if it does exist in these also, it will not any more be 'being-Veda-s'. Hence an author with different qualities namely omniscience and who is not known earlier is established by the reason of 'being-Veda-s'. In our present instance of establishing God, the reason of 'being-an-effect' has the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent', but the agent in the present instance cannot be a non-omniscient being with a body and so on (since such a being cannot have the knowledge of the material cause of earth and so on) and hence an omniscient being without a body who is not known earlier is established.

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[1] This objection occurs also in Gaṅgeśa, TCI, p.38 ff.

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[1] The text here seems to be corrupt since the commentators speak only of two relations while the text explicitly says that the relation is threefold. I have followed the commentators; however, the text itself may be made intelligible by taking *niyama* to mean *vyāpti*, as the third relation. *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p.378.

Then the *pūrvapakṣin* raises another objection against the syllogism: Its reason has according to him the fault of counter-thesis. The earth and so on are not produced by an agent because they are not produced by body. The Buddhists have not formulated the counter-inference in exactly this form, but it is implied in their discussions on the invariable concomitance of a visible agent for particular class of things like jar and so on. Udayana therefore is formulating in his own words the Buddhist objections and arguments and this becomes the stock formulation of counter-inference with reference to the inference of the existence of God for all later Naiyāyika-s including Gaṅgeśa.[1] Udayana's answer to this objection consists in showing that the reasons in the establishing inference and in the counter-inference have no equal force. Equal force (*tulyabala*) of the reasons consists in this that one is able to establish the presence of the *sādhya* and the other is able to establish the absence of the *sādhya*. And both inferences should be valid. Udayana points out that the reason in the counter-inference in the present instance does not have equal force with the reason in the establishing inference because the former has no ability to produce an inference of the absence of the *sādhya* since it has a qualification 'by body' that serves no purpose. Hence the reason does not have the required invariable concomitance. In order to establish the absence of an agent, it would be enough to use 'being-not-produced' as the reason and it is not necessary to use 'being-not-produced-by-body' as the reason. One can take ether as the example where, from the fact that it is not produced, it can validly be inferred that it has no maker; it is not necessary to argue from the fact that it is not produced by a body to arrive at the same conclusion.

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[1] cf. Udayana, *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 379 ff. ; *Kiraṇāvali*, p.37 ff; *Nyāya-līlāvati*, p.245 ff. *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*, p.110, 115, TCI p.58 ff.

But then the Buddhist may argue that the qualification in question is actually useful. Although 'being-not-produced' has the invariable concomitance of the absence of 'having-an-agent', 'being-not-produced' is not found in the earth and so on. Hence the reason has the fault of 'not-occurring-in-the-subject' (*svarūpāsiddhi*). In order to avoid this fault, 'being-not-produced-by-body' is used as the reason and then there is no such fault since neither the Buddhist nor the Naiyāyika would accept that the world is directly produced by some one having a body. Hence the reason of 'being-not-produced-by-body' in the counter-inference does not have any useless qualification. Udayana rejects this argument and shows that the reason used with such a qualification does not have the required invariable concomitance. If the Buddhist does not admit this, he will have to renounce his position that the world is produced through the unseen, for the Naiyāyika can argue as well that the world is not produced by means of the unseen because it is not produced by body. Later Naiyāyika-s also use this argument against the Buddhist position.

Now the *pūrvapakṣin* raises another objection: The supporting arguments in favour of the establishing inference are wrong because there are arguments to show the validity of the opposite inference. The object of the establishing inference is to show that the earth and so on have an omniscient and eternal agent who does not have a body. Such an inference cannot have a valid supporting argument (*tarka*) since there are arguments to show that the opposite position is correct. These arguments, according to the opponent, are the following: If the agent does not have a body, he will not have knowledge, since in our experience body and the senses are the causes of knowledge. If the knowledge is eternal, there is no need of the body. In the same way, if the effort is eternal, it will not be produced by anything, and therefore, there is no need for postulating in God any kind of knowledge and desire as the cause of effort. Therefore it would come about that God is without knowledge and desire. This will imply that agency in the form of the inherence of knowledge, desire and effort does not exist in God.

Udayana rejects this objection on the following grounds. Effort has two characteristics: One, it is effected by knowledge, the other, it has the same object as knowledge, i. e. only those things which have become the object of knowledge, become the object of effort. The effort of God is indeed not an effect and therefore it does not need the knowledge of God in order that it be produced; but it needs the knowledge of God in order that it may have an object, for the object of knowledge can only be the object of effort. And if it is said that the effort need not depend upon knowledge in order that it (effort) may have an object, it would lead to the wrong conclusion that knowledge and effort are not different. Nor can it be said that the effort be without any object, for in that case effort will not be the cause of anything, nor can even its existence in God be inferred. But it cannot be affirmed that there is no effort in God, for the reason of 'being-an-effect' is valid to establish the existence of such an effort. But it may be objected that the effort of God has everything as object and so it is not necessary that its object be dependent upon knowledge. This is to be rejected on the ground of what has already been said: The object of effort can only be the object of knowledge, otherwise there will be no difference between knowledge and effort. A further objection can be as follows: There is in every living being an effort conducive to the movement of air in activities such as inhaling and exhaling and so on, which continue even in deep sleep, when there is no knowledge. Hence it can be concluded that the object of effort is not dependent on knowledge and its object. The answer to this objection is simple: This kind of effort is of a different kind from the effort which is under discussion.

Udayana now turns his attention to another basic objection of the Buddhists: There is no invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' with 'being-an-effect'. He summarizes the objections of the Buddhists who first of all try to disprove the nature of invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect', as understood by the Naiyāyika-s and then conclude that it is not possible to establish the existence of God. The Buddhist states that although a hundred times one has seen the reason and *sādhya* in *sapakṣa* and their absence in *vipakṣa*, it cannot at all be sure that in all instances, there would be such agreement. There is no certainty that there is no deviation.[1] Hence there should be some means of cognizing the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect', other than the non-perception of deviation. Such means according to the Naiyāyika-s can only be the following: Absence of additional condition, (*upādhi*) the relation of the origin of one thing from the other, and contradiction of the *sādhya* in a *vipakṣa*.

The Buddhist now argues that none of the three means is sufficient to cognize the required invariable concomitance. Not the first possibility, since, although there may not be visible additional condition, one cannot at all be sure that there are not any invisible additional conditions. Hence absence of additional condition cannot be considered a sure criterion of the cognition of invariable concomitance in question. This is in effect the rejection of Vācaspati's opinion.[2] Nor can the relation of cause and effect be sufficient means to cognize the required invariable concomitance. It is by positive and negative concomitance that such an invariable relation is cognized; but now the question is whether such positive and negative concomitances are cognized with respect to an agent having a body or with respect to an agent without a body. It cannot be the first case, since with respect to trees and so on which are effects one cannot perceive an agent having a body; it cannot be the second alternative since it is not at all possible to determine if the absence of the pot is brought about by the absence of an agent without a body just as it is possible to determine the absence of a pot by the absence of a potter who has a body. Nor can it be said that because a potter is absent, an agent without a body is also absent, for in that case it would come about that the earth and so on have no agent without a body since they have no agent having a body. This obviously is unacceptable to the Naiyāyika. Here the opinion of Vittoka seems to be rejected by the Buddhist.[1]

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[1] The oft repeated example of such a deviation is that all instances of earth which we normally know can be broken by a metal; but a jewel (which according to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika is only a kind of earth) cannot be thus pierced.

[2] cf. Jñanaśrīmitra, op.cit. p.162 ff.

At this the Naiyāyika can make a very valid objection: If an invisible agent cannot be established, then it would be impossible to establish the succession of knowledge of others, from their bodily actions, since knowledge is also invisible. To this the Buddhist answer is that it is not merely invisible knowledge that is established, but succession of instances of knowledge which are invariably connected with a body and this is what is inferred. Therefore there is no parallelism with the inference of an invisible God. It may be observed here that Ratnakīrti goes in some length to answer this objection practically in the way in which Udayana has described it.[2] This shows quite clearly that Udayana here has as his *pūrvapakṣin*, Ratnakīrti.

Nor does the third way, viz. absence of contradiction in a *vipakṣa* (which means that it cannot be the case that there is being-an-effect and there is no agent) establishes the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent with being-an-effect. The reason is that there is no harm even if there is no agent where there is 'being-an-effect'. In other words, there is no supporting argument (*tarka*) for the invariable concomitance proposed by the Naiyāyika. Therefore the Buddhist concludes that there is no invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect'.

Udayana naturally rejects all these and asserts that all the three ways rejected by the Buddhists to cognize the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' with 'being-an-effect' are valid ways of establishing such a relation.[3] He first of all shows

[1] ibid. p.235 & p.255.

[2] Ratnakīrti, op. cit. p.45.

[3] *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p.385 ff.

that the reason of 'being-an-effect' does not need any additional condition at all in order to have the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent'. An additional condition can occur only in the four following ways: As opposed (*virodhi*) to the reason, as the pervader (*bahirvṛtti*) of the reason, as the pervaded (*antarvṛtti*) of the reason or as co-existent (*sahavṛtti*) of the reason and in none of these ways there could be any additional condition for the reason of 'being-an-effect'. Something opposed to the reason cannot be considered as its additional condition, for in that case, it would follow that only something which is not an effect would have an agent. This obviously is false since it is admitted by both parties that effects such as a jar and so on have an agent. Nor can a pervader of the reason be considered an additional condition for in that case again something which is not an effect could have an agent, which again is obviously false. Nor can something which is co-existent with the reason be taken as an additional condition since in that case the reason itself could be considered the additional condition and further since there would be doubt about deviation.[1]

But it may be that something which is pervaded by reason can be an additional condition for that reason. However, in the case of the present reason of 'being-an-effect' nothing which is pervaded by it can be an additional condition. Things which are pervaded by 'being-an-effect' can only be one of the following: Something pervaded by body, something coexistent with the body, or something which is the pervader of the body. None of these can be an additional condition of the reason of 'being-an-effect'. If something pervaded by body be an additional condition, it would come about that something which is produced by body but without the assistance of the particular kind of additional condition will be without an agent. This means simply that something produced by body will be without an agent, a position which the Buddhists themselves do not admit. Similarly something which is co-existent with the body cannot be an additional condition, for if the body cannot be an additional condition it follows that something which is co-existent with it also cannot be an additional condition, and if such is not the case, the very notion of co-existence will be contradicted.[1] Nor can it be urged that 'body' is an additional condition since it does not pervade the agent. The reason is that being-an-agent means the inherence of knowledge, desire and action and only where the knowledge is produced, does it need a body. When the knowledge is not produced, as is the case with the knowledge of God, it is not in need of a body. Hence it follows that body is not necessary in order that there be an agent. Therefore body is not an additional condition for the reason establishing an agent. Further every agent need not have a body as his limitor, for a body is an instrument of experience and God has no such experience and hence he does not stand in need of a body.[2] Further, God does not need a body in order to make use of the instruments for creating the universe, since his effort directly produces the effect in question, though ordinary agents like a potter and so on, on the other hand, do need the help of the body to make use of the instruments to produce the effects. Thus body cannot in any way be considered an additional condition for the reason that establishes an agent.

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[1] The point of the argument is that if something which is co-existent with the reason is taken as additional condition, it would be present wherever the reason is present and so it will not be possible to show that the *sādhya* is not present where the reason is present. And so there will be no doubt about deviation and consequently no doubt about additional condition either.

Having thus rejected any sure additional condition for the reason of 'being-an-effect', Udayana now rejects doubtful additional conditions. Since the Naiyāyika admits an agent without a body and the Buddhist rejects such an agent, it is not yet certain that the reason of being-an-effect invariably establishes the existence of an agent. This implies that at least a doubtful additional condition could exist in the subject. Udayana answers that the doubt is whether the reason of 'being-an-effect' by itself or the reason together with an additional condition establishes the existence of an invisible agent. This doubt can be removed by showing that it is the reason of 'being-an-effect' by itself that establishes an agent without a body. Body is the cause of non-eternal knowledge and there can be no non-eternal knowledge without a body. But since God has no body, the knowledge that is established here cannot be non-eternal; hence it must be eternal; being eternal, it must extend to all objects since it is the characteristic of non-eternal knowledge to extend to some objects only. This is so because non-eternal knowledge is produced by its own causes, but eternal knowledge does not depend on any cause. Since desire and effort have as objects, the same objects as knowledge, it follows that the desire and effort of God are also eternal. Thus it is clear that the reason of being-an-effect by itself, without the help of any additional condition establishes an invisible agent. Udayana points out further that since 'being-an-effect' establishes 'having-an-agent', it is clear that the absence of an agent is brought about by the absence of 'being-an-effect'. This is in answer to Ratnakīrti who says that it is not clear if the absence of agent is brought about by the absence of being-an-effect.[1]

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[1] Being co-existent, *sahavṛtti*, means wherever one thing is present, the other thing also is present and vice versa.

[2] According to tne Nyāya theory souls are present everywhere but when they take a body, that particular body becomes the place where they enjoy the fruits of their actions. God obviously does not have such fruits of actions and so for the enjoyment of these he does not need a body either.

Udayana's rejection of additional condition for the reason of being-an-effect should be convincing for any one who views impartially the state of affairs. The reason is that the point of all Buddhist arguments is that although in our sense-experience all the agents have body, it does not at all warrant the conclusion that every agent (*kartṛ*) should have a body. It is only those who have decided *a priori* that there is nothing beyond the sense experience would support the Buddhist arguments. If the Buddhist always argues against the Naiyāyika that there could be invisible additional conditions, why could he not admit that there could be invisible agents also.

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[1] Ratnakīrti, op. cit. p.49.

Udayana then tries to show that the relation of the origin of one thing from another also serves as a means of cognizing the invariable concomitance of that which produces with that which is produced. He first of all asks the opponent to consider the following situation: All the instruments conducive to the production of a jar are inactive; at that time is there or is there not an agent who activates the instruments? If such an agent is present why do the instruments remain inactive? On the other hand, if one asserts that such an agent with a body is absent, then because of this, the existence of an invisible agent cannot be denied or doubted. The opponent could urge that it is only an agent with a body that activates the instruments and the absence of such an agent could be determined. Does this however mean that the agent does not activate the instruments directly but only indirectly i. e. does he first activate the body and then through the body activate the instruments? Or does it mean that the agent activates the instruments directly indeed, but he makes use of the body also. It cannot be the first alternative, for in order to activate the body he will need another body and so on. Thus there will be infinite regress. Nor is the second alternative acceptable, since in the case of ejecting out poison, the help of the body is not required as the person skilled in such practices gets the poison removed by means of meditation only. But then the opponent might still urge: The person who removes the poison by means of meditation can do so only if he has or only if he puts on (*dhārayan*) the body and so even in the case of the removal of poison, assistance of the body is required. But then the question is what does this 'putting on the body' mean? Does it mean that the body is used for the sake of producing an action, or for the sake of activating another instrument, or that the body is used just because it has been produced by the fruits of one's own action. There is no difference of opinion with regard to the first position: Body also can sometimes produce an action. With regard to the second opinion, it may be pointed out that there is no harm if the body is used in order to activate other instruments which cannot be directly activated. Finally there is no use of a body for action, if it exists only because it has been produced by the merit, the fruit of one's actions. In order to establish fire from smoke, it is enough to know that smoke is pervaded by fire, and it is not necessary to know also that fire is pervaded by brightness. Therefore it could be concluded that individual souls make use of their bodies for their actions, just as an ironsmith makes use of pincers to take out a red-hot iron piece from fire. But this does not mean that the supreme soul is in need of a body to produce effects.

Udayana, then proceeds to show that the third way i.e. absence of contradiction in a *vipakṣa* is capable of establishing the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect'. Here the main argument is that all that produce action (*kāraka*-s) depend upon an agent in order that they be activated. There is no instrument or operator of an action which can act independently of an agent[1]. Hence it is impossible that there be an effect and that it be without an agent. Udayana now concludes this section explaining once more the true nature of invariable concomitance. Invariable concomitance is natural relation and it consists in the absence of additional condition. Additional condition is something different from the reason, but it enables us to infer the existence of *sādhya*. Its nature is to pervade the *sādhya* while not pervading the reason. Such an additional condition can be cognized if the *sādhya* exists in something where there is no reason. The absence of such an additional condition could be cognized in a valid reason, by the uncontradicted fact that when people want to have the reason they try to acquire the *sādhya*: If some one wants to have smoke, he invariably seeks fire; this cannot be explained if fire deviates from smoke.

Udayana now turns his attention to some other objections of the opponents which he calls invalid rejoinders (*pratibandi*). Thus for instance the opponent argues that if an invisible agent could be established by the reason of 'being-an-effect', one could as well infer the existence of such invisible things as the horns of a hare, since hare is an animal, because the only reason which the Naiyāyika has in order to assert that there are no horns for a hare is that he does not see horns in a hare. And this is exactly the kind of reason which the Buddhists advance to deny the existence of God; an invisible agent is not the object of perception and what is not perceived does not exist. But the Naiyāyika does not admit this argument. Hence he cannot deny that there are no horns in a hare though he does not see them. Udayana's answer to this is that by horn, we all understand a substance which has a particular arrangement of parts. Buddhists hold that a whole thing just consists of a heap of atoms. If these collections of atoms do not have the particular arrangement of horns, how can it be said that there is horn. If it is said that there is horn even where there is not the particular arrangement of parts associated with horn, there is no reason not to say that the same thing is a jar. And if it can be said that it is also a jar, there would be the end of all relation of cause and effect. Therefore it should be concluded that there is no invisible or eternal horn.

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[1] Udayana here enters into a detailed examination of all the *kāraka-s* and shows that every *kāraka* depends on an agent; cf. *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p.396 ff.

Again, the opponent points out that the notion of eternal knowledge is contradictory, since knowledge according to him is just a transformation of the senses. This argument also is rejected by Udayana, on the ground that knowledge is not the absence of eternity. If that were so, then such objects as a jar and so on would be knowledge. This is simply absurd. Nor does 'being-eternal' establish the absence of knowledge. It cannot be urged either that in ether which is eternal, there is no knowledge-ness, but in human knowledge which is non-eternal, there is knowledge-ness and therefore 'being-eternal' establishes absence of knowledge. The reason is that the characteristic of knowledge is that it must have an object and so ether and so on which have no object cannot be considered knowledge. Further, knowledge is not mere transformation of the senses; 'having-an-object' is the characteristic that is invariably found in knowledge.

Udayana, now answers to various minor objections of the opponents. These objections are the following: If God alone is the creator of the universe, the universe will not have any diversity since God who is the cause does not have any diversity. Further, it would come about that if God alone creates the universe, the universe should exist always since God exists always. And if one tries to establish a beginning for the universe by means of the unseen, then there is the fault of too many assumptions for in that case, it would be enough to hold that everything is brought about by the operation of the unseen, and there would be no need for postulating the existence of God. And even if there is a God, he cannot create the universe either for himself or for others. If he acts for himself, it would come about that he has happiness and if he has happiness, he would not be God. He cannot act for others, since in that case he should create not a world full of sorrows, but a world without sorrows. Thus if God cannot act either for himself or for others, and if he still acts without any advantage to any one, it would follow that he is not God, since even a fool acts for some purpose. Further there is no reason to assert that there is only one God and if there are many gods none of them would be omniscient, since each one need know only the means to produce the things which he himself creates.

Udayana answers all these objections as follows: If among the complex of causes that are needed to produce a thing, one cause is simply said to be unnecessary just at one's own will, it can be asked why just this cause is unnecessary and not another. If no appropriate reason is given, it can equally be asserted that another individual of the complex of reasons is unnecessary. Thus one cannot just assert that God is not necessary and that individual unseen alone is sufficient to explain the universe. One may further object that causes other than God is established by means of positive and negative concomitances through perception and so what is thus established cannot be denied, but God who is not thus established may be denied. This argument is wrong since God is established through inference which is a valid means of knowledge. Further if everything is explained by means of the unseen, then there would be no need of postulating any visible causes at all.

The objection that if God is kind he should not create a world full of sorrows is not valid. It is a matter of common experience that fathers, teachers and so on give pain to their subordinates for their own good, when they train them properly. Nor does God create out of ill will, since he has no hatred or blemish. He is omniscient and so he has no fault. But how can it be shown that he is omniscient? To this Udayana answers in the following way: God who produces the dyads should know the atoms which are their material causes; he should know all the things beginning with triads; further he should know the unseen of individual souls who enjoy these things. Universals, inherence and particularities are known as the limitors of cause-ness (*kāraṇatā*). Thus he should know all the six substances.[1] One who is able to know and produce one individual of a class is also able to know and produce all the individuals of the class. Thus God knows everything. From this omniscience of God, it does not, however, follow that he should be always creating. Even though God is capable of creating always, he does not do so because the auxiliary causes are not present, and not because he does not have sufficient knowledge. It is only non-eternal knowledge that does not extend to everything because such a knowledge depends on its causes whereas the knowledge of God does not have any cause. Therefore it is eternal and so it extends to everything. The question may then be asked: How is the knowledge of God eternal? God does not have a body and therefore he does not have also the senses which depend on the bodies and which are the causes of all instances of non-eternal knowledge. Nor can it be held that there could be non-eternal knowledge without the operation of senses, for in that case, it would come about that knowledge would not be caused by anything; if a thing were to happen without something which has been established by means of positive and negative concomitance as its cause, then it is equivalent to saying that, that thing comes into being even without any causes. This cannot at all be admitted. Hence it must be concluded that God's knowledge has no causes and so it is eternal and eternal knowledge extends to everything. It may then be asked why God does not have a body, the cause of all the senses which in turn are the causes of all instances of non-eternal knowledge. It is obvious that God does not have a visible body because we do not perceive such a body of God. If the body of God is invisible, it may be asked whether it has parts and whether it has only medium extension? If the body of God has such characteristics, then clearly it will not be able to come in contact with all objects that it creates. Nor can the body of God be in the form of an atom, for in such a body which is so compact, mind which is also in the form of an atom cannot be the substratum of the senses. If, however, the mind were said to exist outside the body in the form of an atom, then such a mind would not be able to produce any knowledge. Further, if such a mind were to produce knowledge, then it could produce knowledge, even for a soul having no body. Nor can it be said that God who has a body, can activate other bodies even from a distance like the sun who though far away, activates things from a distance, for if God has a body he cannot activate the instruments needed for the production of a thing from a distance. The effort of God will then be limited by body i. e. it will pervade only his body; it will not pervade everything. And if his effort extends to everything, even though he has a body, it will follow that the effort that extends beyond his body will not have a non-inherent cause and therefore it will be eternal.[1] Further it is not possible to hold that God who has a body activates other things by his intention. If that were the case, it will hold good in our case too, i.e. we also who have our own bodies, would be able to activate things existing far away. Again it cannot be said that God is not in contact with all things directly but only indirectly through other things with which he comes in contact directly, for in order to activate instruments, direct contact is necessary. In the case of the removal of poison, although the body of one who recites the *mantra-s* does not come in contact with the body of the patient, the effort of the former produces only the knowledge concerning the patient and not the removal of the poison. The actual removal of the poison is brought about by means of the unseen produced by the recital of the *mantra-s* and the effort of the one who recites the *mantra-s* is only an auxiliary cause. Or it may be that the effort of God which extends also to the body of the patient, brings about the removal of the poison with the help of the unseen.[1] From all these, it follows that God does not have a body of any kind whatever. If he does not have a body it follows that his knowledge has no causes and therefore it is eternal and all-extensive. In the same way, the desire and effort of God are also all-extensive.

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[1] This way of establishing God's omniscience has also been referred to by Gaṅgeśa, TCI, p.81; but he himself does not seem to accept this theory.

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[1] Here the argument is based on the principle that every positive effect has a non-inherent cause. If God has a body, the non-inherent cause of his effort is the conjunction of his body and soul. Therefore if his effort exists also outside his body, that effort will not have any non-inherent cause. Therefore it will be eternal. This is the argument.

Udayana - Nyāyakusumāñjali

When we turn our attention to the other important work of Udayana, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, we find that most of the arguments are taken from *Ātmatattvaviveka*, but there are developments in details. There are also certain new arguments. We shall consider these developments. In order to establish the existence of God, Udayana gives more than twenty inferences which are not to be found in his other works nor even in other Nyāya works. Undoubtedly the most important of these is the one in which *kāryatva*, 'being an effect', is used as the reason. From a logical point of view this is also the most important one; the other inferences are very much based on the peculiar presuppositions of Nyāyavaiśeṣika system, and as such they are not of much importance from a philosophical and logical point of view. Hence we will concentrate here on the inference which takes *kāryatva*, 'being an effect', as the reason. It is in discussing the validity of this inference that Udayana shows his logical profundity and subtlety.

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[1] All these arguments are based on the popular belief that poison from snake bite could be removed by means of the recital of certain incantations.

Udayana first of all points out that the reason of 'being-an-effect' has no fault of contradiction.[1] Here the contradiction is understood as the contradiction of inference which may be described as follows: It is possible to infer that the existence of God cannot be established by means of inference since empirical agents have bodies and God does not have a body. Udayana naturally denies this showing that the reason of the opponent is false since only after establishing that there is an agent by the reason of 'being-an-effect', it could be shown that this agent has no body. Hence the opponent has to admit first of all that 'the reason of 'being an effect' is valid, and if it is already valid, how can it be considered invalid afterwards? Further, it cannot be said that the reason is false because of a counter-thesis, for in order to have a counter-thesis, the reasons in the establishing inference and in the counter-inference should be of equal force. In the present case the reason of the opponent is weak. The opponent cannot establish that the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent with being-an-effect is false since it is admitted by both parties that such an invariable concomitance can be seen in a jar and so on. Nor can it be argued that the particular instance of 'being-an-effect' that is seen in the earth and so on is intended to establish an agent without a body and therefore it contradicts the characteristics of normal agents established by other instances of 'being-an-effect' in a jar and so on, because the agent without a body is not yet established and if such an agent is established by the force of the relation of the reason to the subject, there is no more any contradiction.[2] Further the reason in the establishing inference has no faults of doubtful negative concomitance (*saṃdigdhavyatirekitvā-siddhi*) or of unestablished invariable concomitance or of the presence of an additional condition. The reasons for these statements will be clear from the following discussions.

The basic argument of the opponent here is that an agent needs a body in order to produce an effect and so if God is the agent of the universe then he also must have a body. Udayana's answer to this objection, here in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, is much more logical and subtle than in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*. He first of all tries to determine the meaning of the argument. Can the objection be interpreted in any one of the following ways, he asks: 1) God has a body because he is an agent like a potter. 2) God is not the agent of the universe because he does not have a body. 3) The universe has an agent with a body because it is an effect like a jar. 4) The universe is not an effect because it is not produced by a body like ether. 5) The universe does not have an agent because it is not produced by a body like ether. 6) There is the invariable concomitance of 'not-being-produced-by-an-agent' in 'not-being-produced-by-body' as in ether. Hence the invariable concomitance as proposed by the *siddhāntin* is to be rejected. Udayana now answers that if the meaning of the objections is as in the first and second propositions, it cannot be accepted because in both these inferences God is taken as the subject. Therefore since God is not yet established, there would be the fault of the absence of the subject (*pakṣāsiddhi*). Further there would be the fault of contradiction (*virodha*) since the reason of 'being-an-effect' establishes God who has no body. Besides there is the fault of 'false-doctrine' (*apasiddhānta*) in both cases, since the opponent who does not admit God argues that God has no body. Again the statements imply contradiction since by definition God is an agent without body. Therefore the first proposition would imply that God who is an agent without a body has a body. This obviously is a contradiction. The second proposition would mean that God who is an agent without a body is not agent. This also is a contradiction.

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[1] cf. *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, p.485 ff.

[2] The same difficulty is treated by Gaṅgeśa, TCI. p.51.

The third meaning of the objection cannot also be accepted, for in the earth and so on an agent with a body is contradicted by non-perception (of something that could be perceived). This means that if an agent with a body is present there, he could be perceived and since he is not perceived, it could be concluded that he does not exist. And if for the earth and so on there is no agent having a body, the reason of 'being-an-effect' has the fault of deviation since it is present in the subject. The fourth sense of the objection has the faults of contradiction and deviation. If the whole universe is taken as the subject the dyads which are effects are also included and since they are not produced by body there is deviation (*vyabhicāra*). And if the sprout and so on are not included in the subject, there is deviation with regard to them. The fifth meaning of the objection suffers from the fault that the reason of the inference involved in the objection has a useless qualification. 'Being-not-produced' alone would be a sufficient reason to establish the absence of an agent; hence to adduce 'being-not-produced-by-body' as the reason is superfluous. If it is argued that the absence of 'being-produced' and the absence of 'being-produced-by-body' are different entities since their counterpositives are different, and so 'being-not-produced-by-body' is a valid reason, it cannot be admitted since 'being-not-produced' will be its additional condition. Therefore the reason will not be pervaded by the *sādhya*.

If the objection is taken in the sixth meaning, does it signify that the opponent is trying to show that the *sādhya* is contradicted or that there is a counter-thesis? It cannot be the first alternative since the reason of the opponent viz. 'being-produced-by-body', does not exist in the subject of earth. Hence it is impossible to establish the absence of the *sādhya* and so its contradiction also cannot be established. Further, because the reason of the opponent does not exist in the subject, the reason of the establishing inference cannot be considered to have a counter-thesis. Thus the second alternative is also not true. But the opponent may urge that his reason does exist in the subject when it is taken negatively: 'The earth and so on have no agent because they are not produced by body'; such a reason formulated negatively exists in the subject and hence the contention is that it is valid. Udayana's answer to this objection is as follows: The negative reason cannot be a purely negative reason (*kevalavyatirekin*) since ether and so on are also not produced by body. So the reason has *sapakṣa*; it is only a reason without a *sapakṣa* which is to be considered as a purely negative reason. But if the reason is considered both as positive and negative (*anvayavyatirekin*) then it has superfluous qualification and so it has no invariable concomitance.

The opponent may propose another counter-inference: The earth and so on have no agent because they do not have that which pervades the agent. It is true that if something does not have that which pervades an agent, it will not have an agent just as, if something is not a substance, it is not earth also. Hence the opponent thinks that his present reason exists in the subject and that it has the required invariable concomitance. This is not true because the opponent considers 'being-produced-by-body' as the pervader of 'being-an-agent'. The absence of such a pervader occurs indeed in the subject. But here again the qualification 'by body' is useless. Nor does the absence of all kinds of instances of the pervader of being-an-agent, occur in the subject: knowability (*prameyatva*) which is a pervader of 'being-an-agent' occurs in the subject. Hence the reason of the proposed counter-inference is unestablished. If the absence of something brings about the absence of something else, the former is the pervader of the latter, as for example absence of fire brings about the absence of smoke and so fire is the pervader of smoke. In the present instance of the counter reason, the 'absence-of-being-produced' alone brings about the absence of an agent and hence the formulation of the reason as 'absence-of-being-produced-by-body' has superfluous qualification. Hence it cannot be considered a proper pervader. Thus also this counter-inference which the opponent adduces is false. Further there cannot be the fault of the contradiction of the particular in the sense that 'being-an-effect' in earth and so on establishes an agent without a body. But an agent without a body contradicts our normal experience of an agent with a body in the case of a jar and so on. This contradiction is not real and so the objection should be rejected because an agent without a body is not yet established. But when such an agent is established by means of the force of the relation of the reason to the subject, there is no contradiction at all. This has been already discussed.

Now, Udayana turns his attention to the problem of additional condition in the reason of the establishing inference. It is possible to establish the existence of an agent with a body when particular instances of 'being-an-effect' such as in jar and so on are taken as the reason. This kind of 'being-an-effect' establishes an agent with a body and so it pervades such a *sādhya* and it in turn is pervaded by 'being-an-effect' in general, the reason as used by the *siddhāntin*. Hence the particular instances of 'being-an-effect' in jar and so on should be considered an additional condition. Or at least such characteristics as 'being-a-jar' and so on should be considered as the limitors of 'being-produced-by-an-agent' (*kartṛjanyatāvacchedaka*).

Udayana's answer to this objection is quite to the point: From the fact that a particular characteristic establishes a particular cause, it does not at all follow that a general characteristic also does not establish a general cause, as for instance, we can also infer qualities from the fact that something is earth. But we can also infer qualities because something is a substance. Another example will be the following: We can infer fire from a particular kind of blue smoke, we can also infer fire from smoke in general. One does not invalidate the other. If this is not admitted, it could as well be argued that only the particular instances of 'being-an-effect' in blue jars, in red jars and so on are valid reasons to establish an agent and not 'being-an-effect' in jars in general.

Here an objection may be raised. In the case of jars and so on, although one sees at the moment that a blue jar is produced by a potter, one has seen jars other than blue jars made by a potter and so it could be concluded that jars in general have an agent. But in the case of being-an-effect, we do not see that being-an-effect in general enables us to infer an agent, but only such particular instances of being-an-effect, as to be found in jars and so on, enable us to do so. Hence it should be concluded that being-an-effect in general is not a valid reason to establish an agent. Udayana answers to this objection as follows: Jars and so on are brought about not only by an agent but by a body also. In the earth and so on there is no characteristic that needs to be brought about by a body. Hence it follows that the earth and so on are produced only by an agent and not also by a body. If this is not admitted the characteristic of being-an-effect would be left without any sufficient explanation.

Buddhists especially Ratnakīrti[1] had questioned the validity of the negative example in the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' with 'being-an-effect'. The Naiyāyika took ether and so on as the negative example where there is the absence of being-an-effect, but where there is also the absence of an agent. Now the Buddhist's doubt whether the absence of an agent in ether is brought about by the absence of an agent or merely by the absence of its causes. Therefore it is not possible to determine that the absence of being-an-effect in ether is definitely brought about by the absence of an agent and hence it cannot be taken as a negative example. Udayana answers that this objection is invalid since the agent is also a kind of cause. Further, even if one admits that the absence of being-an-effect in ether is brought about by the absence of cause, one can ask, by the absence of which cause, there is the absence of 'being-an-effect'. This cannot be determined. Hence it must be concluded that the absence of being-an-effect in ether is brought about by the absence of agent. But the opponent might ask why the agent should be considered a cause. The answer to this is obvious: A potter is not the agent of the pot without being its cause. It means simply that it is impossible that some one who makes something is not one of its causes also. And the Naiyāyika also tries to establish a God who produces the universe and so is its cause. It is clear that by these arguments Udayana really furnishes adequate answers for the Buddhist objections.

Udayana now turns his attention to the objection of counter-thesis in another form. If an effect is to be brought about, the agent must activate the other causes which are inanimate and which are needed for the production of the effect. Now the question is whether God activates these causes directly or indirectly. God does not activate the inanimate causes like atoms and so on directly just as a person activates his body directly, because in that case the atoms and so on will be the body of God. If God has nothing which he activates directly, he cannot activate anything indirectly either. Hence the counter-inference as proposed by the opponent is as follows: The earth and so on are not activated by an intelligent agent because it is caused by something which is not a body.

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[1] cf. Ratnakīrti, op. cit. p.49 ff.

Udayana then paraphrases another objection of the opponent that the establishing inference has the fault of establishing what has already been established. In order to make cloth, the person who produces the cloth need not activate the material out of which the cloth is made, since according to the Naiyāyika-s the knowledge, desire and activity of God extend to all things. So if another person also activates these things, it would come about that there would be an infinite regress. If the one who makes the cloth is required only as a cause and not as an agent also, then it would come about that the cloth and so on are without the *sādhya*. Clothes and so on are taken as the example in the establishing inference and so the point of the argument is that the example will not have the *sādhya* and so the inference becomes invalid. But if the one who makes the cloth is taken only as a cause and not as an agent, then the establishing inference would be valid, if it establishes only that the earth and so on have a cause but not that they have an agent. This is acceptable to the opponent also since he admits that the universe is produced through the merit of individual souls and so they are causes of the universe but not agents (*kartṛ*). Therefore the inference has the fault of establishing what has already been established.

The opponent further tries to show that the reason of 'being-an-effect' has the additional condition of 'being-preceded-by-a-non-eternal-effort'. But the opponent does not bring forward any new argument in support of his contention; according to him our experience shows that wherever there is an effect, it is also clear that this effect is brought about by a non-eternal effort. But the answer to this is clear: Non-eternal effort is not invariably required in order that an effect be brought into existence; if there was such a requirement it would be correct to say that wherever there is no such effort, there would be no effect. But there is no such requirement and therefore it does not follow that when there is no non-eternal effort, there should be no effect. The implication is that the eternal effort of God can also produce effects.

All the other objections trying to show the presence of such faults as counter-thesis, establishing what has already been established etc., have been rejected when it was pointed out earlier that from the fact that a particular characteristic establishes a particular cause it does not follow that a general characteristic does not establish a cause in general. But a more detailed answer is also given by Udayana. The opponents contend that if God activates the atoms directly, they become his body; if so, the question is what is the meaning of body? If it merely means 'being-directly-activated', then it is acceptable also to the Naiyāyika-s. Besides, that which is to be imputed (*āpādya*) and the cause for such an imputation (*āpādaka*) are the same, i. e. 'being-directly-activated'. Nor can it be taken that 'being-substratum-of-senses' be considered the definition of 'being-body' for only individual souls need have a body in order that they may have knowledge, desire and effort. God whose knowledge is eternal does not need a body nor does he need any senses for the sake of acquiring knowledge. Therefore there is no reason to assert that God has a body. Even if body is taken as the substratum of the knowledge of the objects which causes happiness or sorrow, God does not have such a body either. Hence there is no room for any such imputation (*āpatti*) of a body for God. Further, the reason in the counter-thesis is 'not-being-directly-activated'. This is also the *sādhya*, according to the opponent. Hence there is the fault that the reason and the *sādhya* are the same. And if the reason in the counter-thesis is 'being-produced-by-something-other-than-the-substratum-of-senses' or 'being-produced-by-something-other-than-the-substratum-of-experience',there is the fault of the absence of invariable concomitance. The earth and so on are not produced by a knowledge which is an effect and which in turn needs a body. Further, the *sādhya* of the counter-inference is established nowhere in the universe, because in our experience all the effects are produced by an intelligent agent. There is no effect which is not produced by an intelligent agent. Hence the *sādhya* is unestablished. But the opponent may argue that he is only arguing for the absence of the *sādhya* as seen in jars and so on which are produced by an intelligent agent. This also is not true because the reason in that case would be 'produced-by-something-other-than-body' and such a reason is not to be found in any *sapakṣa* nor in any *vipakṣa* (e. g. ether which is not produced at all and therefore also not produced by something other than body). Hence the reason has the fault of 'being-uncommon' (*asādhāraṇa*) i. e. the reason can be found only in the *pakṣa* and so it is not valid. Thus the establishing inference cannot be said to have any counter-inference.

Udayana then rejects the arguments of the opponent to show that the inference attempting to prove the existence of God, in fact establishes only what has already been established. In order to make a cloth, a weaver is needed as a cause, but his causality consists in this that by his knowledge, desire and effort, he activates all the instruments needed for the production of the cloth. It is true that God also knows all these instruments but his knowledge does not render the weaver not the maker of the cloth. God is established as the one needed to activate the atoms and so on, and he is not established as the one required to activate the instruments needed for the production of cloth and so on. He knows them also because his knowledge extends to all things. There is no harm even if two individuals know the material cause and so on of certain effects. Further there is no infinite regress because God also activates the causes of the effects, since no other God is again needed to activate the causes or to activate God himself, who is established already. Thus there is no fault of establishing what has already been established.

Udayana finally answers the objection that the reason in his inference has the additional condition of 'being-preceded-by-non-eternal effort. Knowledge is not pervaded by non-eternal effort as it is clear that a person who has knowledge need not always have an effort. Such knowledge need not be the cause of anything in particular. If it is argued that knowledge which is a cause is a part of the *sādhya*, then it may be pointed out that the knowledge which does not cause effort, may still cause something else, e. g.

the impression (*bhāvanā*). Nor can it be said that without effort, there will not be any knowledge of the various causes which go to produce an effect, since it is perfectly possible that although some one does not produce an effect, he can have knowledge of the causes which will produce the same effect. Further, it is not the case that without effort, there will not be knowledge which is the actual cause of an effect, for we have the knowledge that thorns have struck us and cause us pain and this knowledge is without any effort from us. Again, it is not true that if there is no effort, there would be no knowledge which is the cause of desire for there is no harm if a person who does not have any effort, has knowledge which is the cause of desire. When the causal complex except knowledge needed for effort, is present, it can be admitted that knowledge is absent if there is no effort. But because of this it does not follow, however, that all other kinds of knowledge are absent. From all this it follows that knowledge as such is not pervaded by effort. Therefore it will follow only that if there is no non-eternal effort, non-eternal knowledge which is its cause will be absent, but not also eternal knowledge. Thus the reason in the establishing inference does not have the additional condition which the opponent thinks it has.

Udayana then answers the objection that the supporting arguments are invalid.[1] This could mean that the opponent has his own supporting arguments which render the establishing inference invalid. Thus he argues that if God is an agent, he must have a body. Such arguments are obviously false for if God is already established, then this argument does not contradict what has already been established. If, on the other hand, God is not already established such an argument cannot even be raised. However the objection may mean that the establishing inference has no supporting argument. This also is not true, for when the agent is absent, all other inanimate causes remain inactive and will not produce the effect in question, for the agent has to activate other causes. This is the argument supporting the establishing inference. Here

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[1] cf. *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, p.500, kārikā, 3.

Udayana quotes the objection of Jñānaśrīmitra[1] that by this argument only a visible agent could be established. Udayana naturally rejects it pointing out that although there is the relation of cause and effect between visible things, it does not follow that there is no relation of cause and effect between causes in general and effects in general. In fact when we establish the relation of cause and effect between visible things, we establish also the invariable concomitance between all that belong to that class whether visible or not[2]. Therefore we can conclude that there is the invariable concomitance of an agent with 'being-an-effect' in general; i. e. all instances of effects are produced by an intelligent agent.

Udayana - Kiraṇāvalī

This work was written by Udayana after *Ātmatattvaviveka* and *Kusumāñjali* since reference to both these treatises can be found in the *Kiraṇāvalī*.[3] In general with regard to the discussions on the existence of God, he follows what he has described in the two earlier works. Yet there are in *Kiraṇāvalī* interesting details which we do not find in the two earlier works of Udayana. We shall examine these new elements which are to be found in *Kiraṇāvalī*. First of all the inference which Udayana brings forward in this work to prove the existence of God may be noted: What is not produced by body is caused by an intelligent agent, because it has a cause; that which has a cause has an intelligent being as cause, like a chariot. Here the subject (*pakṣa*) is more precisely formulated than in *Nyāyakusumāñjali* or in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, i. e, the subject is everything which is produced independently of a body. This means naturally the earth, the trees and so on. And immediately Udayana shows that this inference is free from all logical fallacies. First of all it may be objected that the reason in the syllogism is partially unestablished, i. e. one is not sure if the mountains, the earth and so on do really have a cause. This objection is to be rejected because a substance can be shown to have a cause if it has parts. But a more important objection which has been mentioned both in *Ātmatattvaviveka* and in *Nyāyakusumāñjali* is that the inference tries to establish an agent with omniscience and such an agent is opposed to the agent with limited knowledge in the example. In other words, God who is the agent of universe is established as omniscient, whereas the agent of a pot which is the example in the syllogism has only limited knowledge. In technical language, this fault is called contradiction of the particular (*viśeṣaviruddhatva*). Although in the formulation of the objection Udayana does not show any originality in comparison with what he stated in *Ātmatattvaviveka* and *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, still when he answers the objection, there is a certain progress in his thought. Here his answer to the objection is that there is no contradiction if a particular instance of an effect is caused by an omniscient being. As for example, by means of the reason of 'being-an-effect' one establishes 'non-eternity' in a jar which has colour; this, however, does not mean that if by the same reason, when one establishes 'non-eternity' in sound, sound also should have colour. In the same way, by the reason of 'being-an-effect', an agent with finite knowledge is established in a jar and so on; by the same reason an omniscient agent is established in the earth and so on. Thus there is no contradiction. Further, if an omniscient agent is not yet known, there cannot be any contradiction; but if an omniscient agent is already known as the cause of an effect, then also there cannot be any contradiction.

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[1] cf. *Jñānaśrīmitra*, op. cit. p.244.

[2] Udayana here gives several examples of inferences of things that are nvisible according to the presuppositions of Nyāya and Buddhism. As for example inherence (*samavāya*) is invisible according to Nyāya, and its existence is established by means of inference.

[3] cf. *Kiraṇāvalī*, p.69, *vistarastu nyāyakusumañjalāvātmatattvaviveke ca.*

The opponent proposes the same fault of the contradiction of the particular in another way: There is contradiction between the *sādhya* which can be established by means of the invariable concomitance and the *sādhya* which can be established by the force of the relation of the reason to the subject. The reason for this contradiction is that while the *sādhya* which can be established by means of the invariable concomitance is an agent with limited knowledge and so on, the *sādhya* which can be established by means of the relation of the reason to the subject is an agent with infinite knowledge and so on. Obviously there is contradiction between these two kinds of *sādhya*-s. Udayana's answer to the objection formulated in this way contains certain new elements which are not to be found either in *Ātmatattvaviveka* or in *Nyāyakusumāñjali.* The agents established by means of the invariable concomitance and by the force of the relation of the reason to the subject are not contradictory in as much as they are agents. Further, the contradiction that is pointed out will not occur as long as the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) and the relation of reason to the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*) do not come together in a particular instance of inference. This simply means that any one of the two elements when remaining alone separately without the help of the other, is unable to produce the inference of a particular *sādhya*. Merely because of the invariable concomitance of fire in smoke, no inference can be made, for in that case the other element (i. e. *pakṣadharmatā*) would be useless. Nor is anything inferred by mere *pakṣadharmatā*, e. g. from the mere fact that this mountain has smoke, none can infer that there is fire, for in that case, invariable concomitance would be rendered useless. Therefore when the two elements stand apart, there is no contradiction. But if they come together, they really co-operate with one another, in order to produce the inference of a particular *sādhya*. And in the present instance too these two elements coming together produce the particular inference of the *sādhya* of an agent, with infinite knowledge and so on. Hence there is no contradiction at all. Further, if such an inference is not possible, then it would come about that 'being-an-effect' would be without any sufficient explanation. It should further be noted that all these arguments with such details are not to be found either in *Ātmatattvaviveka* or in *Nyāyakusumāñjali*.

The same fault is proposed in another way: Contradiction of the particular means contradiction between the elements of the *sādhya* itself. In the present instance the *sādhya* is an agent with eternal knowledge and so on, but without a body, and so the *sādhya* involves both elements of 'being-eternal' and 'being-knowledge'. These elements are contradictory to each other. Similarly, 'being-an-agent' and 'being-without-a-body' are elements of the *sādhya.* These elements are also contradictory to each other. It is these contradictions which constitute the fault of the contradiction of the particular according to the *pūrvapakṣin.* Udayana answers that these objections are not valid, since so long as these characteristics do not come together in a particular thing, there is no contradiction. Nor can it be urged that these characteristics become contradictory in God and his knowledge, because by the very argument by which the existence of God is established, the contradiction as proposed by the opponent is also removed. This simply means that the inference which Udayana has proposed to establish the existence of God, establishes at the same time God as omniscient and as an agent without a body.

Now the same fault of contradiction of the particular is given another interpretation: It is the contradiction in the form of the absence of the pervader of the *sādhya*. Thus 'having-body' is the pervader of 'being-agent' and so since God does not have a body, he is not an agent either. Here the answer of course is that since God is not yet established, there is the fault of the absence of the subject. Nor can it be held that all effects are caused by an agent with body for we do not see the earth, trees and so on being produced by an agent with a body. Hence there is deviation and therefore it is not the case that every effect is caused by an agent with a body. Further, the counter-inference that the earth and so on have no agent since they are not produced by body cannot be admitted since the reason in the inference will have the fault of 'being-uncommon', i. e. the reason will exist only in the subject. Udayana now discusses the objection that the supporting arguments are false; but his answers are the same as in his earlier works especially in *Ātmatattvaviveka.*

From all this it is clear that the contribution of Udayana to the philosophy of God in the Nyāyavaiśeṣika tradition is considerable. He has touched on every aspect of the problem. Basically the objections of the later Buddhists remained the same as those raised by Dharmakīrti. Yet Jñānaśrīmitra and his disciple Ratnakīrti developed the details of the objections as proposed by Dharmakīrti and brought in new arguments in support of them. Udayana, in his turn, replies to these arguments with clarity and depth, though of course the basic answer remains the same as in Vācaspati. However, as we have seen, Udayana develops the answers of Vācaspati and brings in new arguments in support of the Nyāya position.

Vallabha

Although the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Vallabha is a small work, yet it has a reputation for originality. In the section where Vallabha discusses his philosophy of God, it could be seen that this reputation for originality is well-founded. His inference to establish the existence of God is practically the same as in the earlier Nyāya authors: That which is the object of discussion has an agent because it is an effect like a jar. Being-an-agent means, to have direct knowledge of the material cause, as well as desire and effort. Individual souls do not have direct knowledge of the material cause of earth and so on and so they cannot be their makers. Therefore there is no fault of establishing what has already been established. Individual souls cannot be the agents of the earth and so on through their unseen merit and demerit, since 'being-an-agent' means to have direct knowledge of the material cause and so on, and they do not have such a knowledge with regard to earth and so on.

Vallabha then takes up the objection of contradiction. An agent has invariably a body and so because an agent with a body is not perceived, it is also clear that there is no agent either. This objection has been treated by earlier Naiyāyika-s like Vācaspati and Udayana. But Vallabha shows a certain originality in his answer: External senses are not capable of cognizing knowledge and therefore they are not able to cognize an agent with knowledge. The mind is capable of cognizing the knowledge only of the particular individual soul to whom that particular mind belongs.

Therefore it follows that no individual can cognize the knowledge of God who is the agent of the universe. Thus God and his knowledge are not the proper objects of the sensible perception of any individual soul and so the objection does not stand. But it may be urged that body pervades agent, and so when the pervader is absent, the pervaded is also absent; so when there is no agent with a body, there is no agent at all. This is actually a counter-thesis and it will be treated in its proper place. Further, it is not established that body actually pervades agents.

Vallabha then takes up the objection of contradiction of the particular. The objection itself is not new. Its basis is to be found in Dharmakīrti; later Buddhists developed its details. Many of the earlier Naiyāyika-s also dealt with the problem. Yet Vallabha shows a certain originality both in the presentation of the difficulty and in the answers given for it. First of all he points out that there is the fault of the contradiction of the particular in the sense that in the jars and so on which are the example, an agent with a body is established by the reason of 'being-an-effect'; by the same reason an agent without a body is established in the earth and so on which are the subject. Thus there is contradiction between the *sādhya* in the example and the *sādhya* in the subject based on the contradiction of the invariable concomitances in the example and in the subject. In his answer to this difficulty, Vallabha asks if this difficulty arises because of the general invariable concomitance of an intelligent agent with 'being-an-effect' or because of particular invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent-with-body' in 'being-an-effect'. It cannot be the first possibility because if one says that the *sādhya* with the same characteristics should be present in the example and in the subject, then there is the fault of *utkarṣasama*. Because the fire in the kitchen is produced by a person, it does not follow that by means of smoke, one has to infer fire produced by a person on the mountain. If it is said that an agent without a body is inferred in the earth and so on by means of the particular invariable concomitance of an agent with a body in 'being-an-effect', this would be indeed a strange doctrine (*apasiddhānta*). Nor does the Naiyāyika admit the invariable concomitance of an agent with a body in 'being-an-effect'. The Buddhist is simply unable to make the Naiyāyika accept such an invariable concomitance since there are no valid arguments in support of such a position.

The contradiction is proposed in another way. The relation of the reason to the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*) establishes an agent without a body; but in our experience, body pervades agents and therefore there arises contradiction. The answer to the objection put in this way is that it cannot be admitted that body pervades agent. There is no contradiction between invariable concomitance and the relation of the reason to the subject. And for an inference, it is essential that there be no contradiction between the invariable concomitance and the relation of the reason to the subject; otherwise it may as well be argued that the earth and so on have an agent with body; this is a position which the opponent also does not admit.

Now the contradiction is proposed in yet another way. There is contradiction between the invariable concomitance and the relation of the reason to the subject. The invariable concomitance establishes an agent with a body. The relation of the reason to the subject, establishes an agent without a body. Hence the contradiction. This also cannot be admitted, because absence of contradiction between the invariable concomitance and the relation of the reason to the subject is an integral part of any inference. In the present case, there is no difficulty that the invariable concomitance in its general form—wherever there is 'being-an-effect' there is also 'having-an-agent'—be present also in the reason in the subject. The particular invariable concomitance of an agent with a body is not accepted as part of the inference. Thus there is no contradiction between the invariable concomitance understood in this way and the relation of the reason to the subject.

Another way of presenting the same difficulty is that in jars and so on, the reason of 'being-an-effect' invariably establishes an agent with a body. Therefore to say that the same reason establishes an agent without a body will involve the fault of contradiction (*bādha*). Here the answer is that because a potter and agents like him depend on a body for his knowledge, it does not follow that all agents require a body in order to have knowledge. Further in order to speak of a contradiction, some one, having knowledge without a body should already be established. This is not done and so one cannot speak of a contradiction. If it is said that since the agent that is to be established in the subject does not have a body, there is no agent at all in the subject, this can be a counter-thesis and not contradiction.

Vallabha then turns his attention to the objection that there is no invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect'. There is no invariable concomitance of a visible agent, since there is deviation with regard to trees and so on, (i.e. the trees and so on do not have a visible agent). There is no invariable concomitance of an agent as such, whether he is visible or not for the absence of an invisible agent cannot be cognized by perception and such a cognition is necessary to ascertain the required invariable concomitance. Further even if the invariable concomitance is cognized in a general form we can cognize such an invariable concomitance only with reference to those *sādhya*-s which are directly perceived or at least capable of being perceived, but not with reference to those which by their nature cannot be perceived. Otherwise, it would come about that we will be able to establish even invisible fire from smoke. All this is standard Buddhist objections as we have already noted. Vallabha's answer to this objection follows the usual Nyāya line of thought. There is no difficulty to perceive the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect' just as there is no obstacle to cognize the invariable concomitance of 'having-a-cause' with 'being-an-effect'. This latter kind of invariable concomitance is acceptable to the Buddhists also and therefore the former type of invariable concomitance should also be accepted. But the Buddhist might urge: There is invariable concomitance of 'having-a-cause' in 'being-an-effect' because if an effect is without a cause, then the effect will not be contingent i.e. existing at one time and not existing at another time, and not because of positive and negative concomitances. Vallabha denies this and says that such an invariable concomitance of 'having-a-cause' in 'being-an-effect' is not established in this way and if one accepts such an invariable concomitance, one has to accept also the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect'.

Śaśadhara

One of the authors on whom Gaṅgeśa depends very considerably is Śaśadhara. His work *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* shows such striking similarities with Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* that the fact requires closer examination. It is usually admitted that Śaśadhara preceded Gaṅgeśa and there is no valid reason to question this supposition.[1] Hence it can be concluded with reasonable certainty that Gaṅgeśa made use of Śaśadhara's *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* as a source for his work.[2] In fact the general structure of both the treatises is exactly the same in the *pūrvapakṣa* and to a large extent also in the *uttarapakṣa*. In the *pūrvapakṣa* both the authors discuss the various possible formulations of the *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu*. In the *uttarapakṣa* Śasadhara gives successively his own formulation of the *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu*, while Gaṅgeśa gives a full syllogism establishing the existence of God and then answers various objections raised against the *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu*. When we analyse the various sections in detail, we find striking similarities between the two authors. Thus in the *pūrvapakṣa* section on *pakṣa*, Gaṅgeśa gives us seven formulations of the *pakṣa* while Śaśadhara gives six. The following table and the explanations show their similarities and dissimilarities.

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[1] B. K. Matilal in the Introduction to his edition of *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadhara remarks: "A comparative study of both texts reveals that Gaṅgeśa's treatment is often more advanced and comprehensive besides being sometimes an improvement on that of Śaśadhara. Thus we should have no doubt about the fact that Śaśadhara preceded Gaṅgeśa". (Śaśadhara's *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* with Ṭippaṇa by Guṇaratnasūri, edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal, L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1976, pp.10-11). My own study of the *Īśvaravāda* of both the authors supports strongly this conclusion of Matilal.

[2] cf. J. Vattanky, Śaśadhara's *Īśvaravāda:* an important source of Gaṅgeśa's *Īśvaravāda*, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1979, pp. 257–266.

TCI	NSD
1. *Kṣityādi* (1, 6)[1]	1. *Kṣityādikatvam* (108, 5)
2. *Samśayaviṣayaḥ....vivādaviṣayo vā* (2, 3)	2. *Vivādādhyāsitatvam* (108, 4) and *saṃdigdhakartṛkatvam* (108, 5)
3. *Śarīrāpekṣeṇa kartrā yanna kṛtam śarīrājanyam janyam vā* (2, 9-10)	3. *Śarīrānapekṣotpattikatvam* (108, 4-5)
4. *Janyakṛtyajanyam ubhayasiddhakṛtijanyānyad vājanyam* (3, 2-3)	4. *Nityavargaprasiddhasakartṛkabhāvobhayabhinnatvam* (108, 4-5)

Of the remaining formulations of the *pakṣa*, two of them found in Gaṅgeśa, viz. '*kṣitiḥ*' and '*dvyaṇukam*', seem to have been discussed by Śaśadhara in places other than the *pūrvapakṣa* section on *pakṣa*. Thus in Gaṅgeśa '*kṣitir eva*' 'earth alone' is given by the *pūrvapakṣin* as a possible *pakṣa* (4, 1). In Śaśadhara too, in the context of the discussion on the fault of doubtful inconclusive reason (*saṃdigdhānaikāntika*), it is mentioned that even a single thing under discussion may be taken as *pakṣa*. Certainly one of the things under discussion is earth since one can discuss whether the earth has a maker or not. This shows clearly that both Gaṅgeśa and Śaśadhara considered the possibility of taking the earth alone as the *pakṣa*.

Another formulation of the *pakṣa* in Gaṅgeśa is '*sargādyakālīnam dvyaṇukam*', the dyad at the beginning of creation. We do not find this formulation in the *pūrvapakṣa* section of the discussion on *pakṣa* in Śaśadhara, but in another part of the *pūrvapakṣa* where Śaśadhara discusses the objections against invariable concomitance of having-an-agent in being-an-effect. Here Śaśadhara points out that if the dyad at the beginning of creation is taken as the *pakṣa,* the agent in question has to be God. Though this argument is not accepted by the *pūrvapakṣin*, it shows that Śaśadhara was quite familiar with the idea that the dyad at the beginning of creation may be considered a *pakṣa.* There remains only one formulation of the *pakṣa* in Gaṅgeśa which is not to be found in Śaśadhara, viz, the *pakṣa* is something produced but not produced by an action which produces the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*) or something produced but not directly produced by an action which is produced. But the concepts made use of in this formulation of the *pakṣa* could be found here and there in Śaśadhara. This consideration of the formulations of the *pakṣa* in the *pūrvapakṣa*-s of Gaṅgeśa and Śaśadhara show such close similarities that it is impossible to account for it in any other way than to conclude that Gaṅgeśa depends upon Śaśadhara to a very considerable extent for the composition of his *īśvaravāda.* And since the discussions of Gaṅgeśa are much more sophisticated and elaborate, it is also inferred that Gaṅgeśa lived later than Śaśadhara. These conclusions of ours will be more and more strengthened as we proceed to analyse the other sections of the works of Gaṅgeśa and Śaśadhara.

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[1] Numbers with the sign TCI refer to the page and line of Gaṅgeśa's *Īśvarānumāna: The Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Part II, Anumānakhaṇḍa, Volume II *Īśvarānumāna* with the commentary of Jayadeva Misra, ed. by Pandit Kāmākhyanātha Tarkavāgīśa, Calcutta, 1897. The numbers with NSD refer to the page and line in Śaśadhara's *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* with Ṭippaṇa by Guṇaratnasūri, edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal, L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1976. Where from the context, it is quite clear which work is referred to, the sign TCI or NSD is omitted.

There are also close similarities between the two authors in their discussion on *sādhya* though there is a difference in the arrangement of the material. In Gaṅgeśa, first of all *sakartṛkatva* is given as the *sādhya* and then the two senses in which the concept of *sakartṛkatva* is to be understood are given. These two senses also bear different interpretations and these also are mentioned. Then Gaṅgeśa discusses the two *sādhya*-s in the two syllogisms which are brought forward to prove the existence of God. Śaśadhara follows a different procedure: He first gives six kinds of formulations of the *sādhya* and the reasons for their rejection. Yet behind the difference in the procedure of these two authors, we find an underlying basic similarity. Thus the definitions of *sakartṛkatva* and its explanations in Gaṅgeśa are similar to the formulations of *sādhya* in Śaśadhara. The table below shows the similarity.

TCI	NSD
1. *sakartṛkatvam* (the fact of having an agent) 5, 3	1. *sakartṛkatvam* (the fact of having an agent) 109, 6
2. *kṛtimajjanyatvam* (the fact of being produced by some one having effort) 5, 4	2. *kartṛjanyatvam* (the fact of being produced by an agent) 109, 6
3. *upādānagocarāparokṣajñānacikīrṣākṛtimajjanyatvam* (the fact of being produced by some one having effort, desire and direct knowledge of the material cause) 5, 5	3. *upādānādigocarāparokṣajñānādimajjanyatvam* (the fact of being produced by some one having direct knowledge etc. of the material cause etc.) 109, 7–8
4. *sākṣāt-tad(jñānādi)janyatvam* (the fact of being directly produced by knowledge etc.) 6, 1	4. *kartṛsākṣājjanyatvam* (the fact of being directly produced by an agent) 109, 7

Thus we see that Gaṅgeśa does not take up explicitly the formulations of Śaśadhara, viz, "*buddhimatpūrvakatvam*" (having an agent who has knowledge 109, 7) and *sākṣādbuddhimatpūrvakatvam* (having an agent who has direct knowledge); but on closer examination, it is clear that the ideas in these formulations of Śaśadhara are contained in the formulations of Gaṅgeśa (cf. number three and number four in the table above). These facts also support the view expressed that Gaṅgeśa depends upon Śaśadhara. This view is confirmed when we examine the treatment of the *hetu*, reason, in the *pūrvapakṣa*.

Both Gaṅgeśa and Śaśadhara take, though not always in words, but actually in fact, *kāryatva*, being-an-effect, as the reason in the syllogism proving the existence of God. Two of the definitions of *kāryatva* in Gaṅgeśa are the same as in Śaśadhara. Thus *prāgabhāvapratiyogitva* (the fact of being the counterpositive of a prior absence) as the definition of *kāryatva* is common to both. Further, Gaṅgeśa accepts *utpattimattva* (the fact of having an origin) as a definition of *kāryatva* in his *uttarapakṣa*, though such a definition is not to be found in his *pūrvapakṣa.* This definition of *kāryatva* as *utpattimattva* can be found also in Śaśadhara in his *pūrvapakṣa* as well as in his *uttarapakṣa.* Gaṅgeśa brings four further definitions of *kāryatva.* This can be explained on the assumption that there must have been a development of thought in the Nyāya tradition which naturally was not known to Śaśadhara but which Gaṅgeśa incorporates in his treatment. This theory holds good also in the case of the two syllogisms which follow this discussion of *kāryatva* in Gaṅgeśa.

There is a difference in the structure of the treatises from here on. Gaṅgeśa begins his *uttarapakṣa,* giving his own syllogism proving the existence of God and then answers various objections that are brought forward against it. Śaśadhara, on the other hand, does not give a full syllogism all at once, to prove the existence of God, but enumerates various objections against possible proofs. However, the difference in the structure of the treatises from this point onwards should not lead us to think that there is no similarity between these authors. In fact Gaṅgeśa depends in this section of the work also, on Śaśadhara. Thus the syllogism itself of Gaṅgeśa proving the existence of God, does not seem to be altogether new. The *pakṣa* of Gaṅgeśa's syllogism, things produced, but not through the unseen and existing by the relation of inherence, which are not produced by an effort which is produced and whose object is the material cause (TCI, 16, 3-4) – bears resemblance to one of the formulations of the *pakṣa* in Śaśadhara, namely something which is produced but not produced by an effort which produces the unseen which produces the thing in question (NSD, 112, 7-8). Similarly the *sādhya* is formulated by Gaṅgeśa as follows: (These things) are produced by some one having effort, desire to do and direct knowledge of the material cause, and which (effort, knowledge and desire to do) are not the counterpositive of a prior absence which is pervaded by the prior absence of the unseen (TCI, 16, 4–17, 1). This is similar to the formulation of the *sādhya* by Śaśadhara, namely (these things) are caused by some one having direct-knowledge etc. (i. e. desire to do and effort) of the material cause and so on (NSD, 113, 10). So too the reason in the syllogism of Gaṅgeśa, - these things being brought together by the relation of inherence, are counterpositive of prior absence - (TCI, 18, 2–3) is a refinement of the reason given by Śaśadhara - 'having-an-origin' which can be defined as being related to the moment which immediately follows the complex of reasons (NSD, 116, 6). Further, certain difficulties against the inference establishing the existence of God which Śaśadhara discusses are developed at length by Gaṅgeśa. The answer to these difficulties are also treated more in detail by Gaṅgeśa. The following passages deal with these difficulties and are similar in Gaṅgeśa and Śaśadhara.

	TCI	NSD
1.	33, 1–14	111, 3–5; 115, 14 ff
2.	40, 9–43, 4	110, 6–22; 114, 10–115, 2
3.	45, 1–49, 7	110, 22–111, 1

In the first passage, Gaṅgeśa is answering the objection that since God is not perceived, he does not exist, just as we can conclude that the horns of a hare do not exist from the fact that we do not perceive them. In the parallel passage, Śaśadhara is treating the same difficulty but in a few sentences and without going into details. Similarly, in the second passage, Gaṅgeśa is discussing at length one of the basic objections against the proof for the existence of God, namely 'having-a-body' is an additional condition (*upādhi*) when an agent is to be established. In non-technical language, it simply means that an agent must necessarily have a body. In the parallel section, Śaśadhara discusses the same difficulty; but here again Gaṅgeśa's answer is more elaborate and adequate. In the third passage, the objection is that the invariable concomitance which we normally cognize is that an agent has a body and that knowledge is non-eternal and on these principles, it would be contradictory to establish the existence of an agent without a body and with eternal knowledge. Gaṅgeśa's answer to this difficulty is again much more adequate than the answer of Śaśadhara in the parallel passage.

From this detailed analysis, comparison and study of the treatises of Gaṅgeśa and Śaśadhara, we can arrive at certain conclusions. The similarity between the treatises of Gaṅgeśa and Śaśadhara is so close, both in structure and content, that we cannot explain it in any other way except to conclude that Gaṅgeśa depends on Śaśadhara. It is quite true that both the thinkers were much obliged to earlier Nyāya writers, especially Udayana. But Śaśadhara seems to be the first one to discuss only the inference with 'being-an-effect' as the reason to establish the existence of God to the exclusion of all other reasons to do so. And in doing so, he exhibits certain characteristics such as discussing systematically the *pakṣa*, *sādhya*, and *hetu* of the syllogism establishing the existence of God, that it can be asserted with a fair amount of certainty that Gaṅgeśa depends directly on Śaśadhara for the composition of his work.

Gaṅgeśa

Gaṅgeśa's contribution to the doctrine of God in Indian Philosophy in general and in Nyāya system in particular is indeed considerable. Some scholars like Jacobi[1] have argued that there is nothing new in Gaṅgeśa's *īśvaravāda* and everything that could be said about the topic in the Nyāyavaiśeṣika tradition has already been stated by Udayana, especially in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. Jacobi must have come to this conclusion without really analysing and interpreting in detail the text of Gaṅgeśa. In the context of such a study which has been undertaken in this book, it is no longer possible to hold the view of Jacobi. In fact, our studies lead us towards a view opposed to that of Jacobi. Gaṅgeśa shows considerable originality not only in the organization of matter that was available to him in the Nyāyavaiśeṣika tradition, but in some respects, even in the development of thought itself. Most of this is noted in the translation and commentary on Gaṅgeśa's *īśvaravāda.* Here we will only bring together all these various elements of the thought of Gaṅgeśa.

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[1] cf. 'Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern', by H. Jacobi, Kurt Schroeder Verlag, Bonn und Leipzig, 1923, p.63. It may further be noted that Gaṅgeśa shows greater originality in the later sections of his work where he rejects that the reason he employs in his inference to establish the existence of God has additional condition (*upādhi*) and *satpratipakṣatva* (counter-thesis).

We have already noticed that Gaṅgeśa follows Śaśadhara especially in the *pūrvapakṣa,* where both authors systematically discuss the *pakṣa, sādhya* and *hetu* of possible inferences to establish the existence of God. Thus Gaṅgeśa discusses seven formulations of the *pakṣa.* No other Nyāya thinker except Śaśadhara gives the *pūrvapakṣa* formulations in such a systematic way and rejects them showing thereby an originality and advance over the works of Udayana himself. It should be also noted that some of the enunciations of the *pakṣa,* though rejected in the *pūrvapakṣa* are accepted in the *uttarapakṣa* for other reasons.

What are these formulations of the *pakṣa* and why are they at least at first rejected? First of all, the earth is considered as the *pakṣa.* The earth here means the individual things in the universe or all the things in the world taken as a whole. Gaṅgeśa points out that in neither of the two senses can the earth be taken as the subject of the inference. There are innumerable things upon the earth and it would be simply impossible to enumerate them at the time of inference and so the earth in the sense of the individual things in the universe cannot be taken as the subject. Further, the earth in the sense of all the things in the world cannot be taken as the subject since it lacks a common characteristic which could be taken as the limitor of subjectness. So he gives another formulation of the subject: The object of doubt or dispute may be considered as the subject. The idea is that when the discussion is started, there is doubt if something has a maker or not; let this object of doubt be the subject in the syllogism establishing the existence of God. This also cannot be taken as the subject for in this case it is not at all certain what exactly the subject is. As long as there is no certainty about the subject, there cannot be any inference either. Further, it is clear that none of the parties involved in the discussion has any doubt since they are convinced of their respective positions. And if finally the subject of inference is the object of doubt, then there would be the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established, for what is to be determined is whether the earth and so on have an agent or not. Hence it is this question that has to be answered and not whether the object of doubt or dispute has an agent.

And so something definite is proposed as the subject in the following way: Something produced but not produced by an agent with the help of body or something produced but not produced by a body. The second formulation has the advantage of logical simplicity (*lāghava*) over the first and so the same idea is expressed again using different words. But even these formulations cannot be taken as describing the subject since according to them certain things like the special qualities of the soul which should be taken as the subject are not included. Further, such a formulation of the subject involves also the fault of the absence of the subject since through the unseen, human beings are the cause of the earth and so on. Hence the earth and so on are not something not produced by men and so they cannot be taken as the subject. Therefore another formulation of the subject is proposed: The subject is something produced but not produced by the effort of something that is produced, or something produced but different from something produced by an effort which is accepted by both parties to be the cause of certain things. The purpose of these formulations is to exclude everything that is produced by human beings from the enunciation of the subject. This is achieved by means of the qualifications. What is not produced by an effort that is not produced can only be by implication that which is produced by God. Hence the enunciation of the subject excludes everything that is produced by human beings but includes everything that is produced by God. But even this formulation of the subject cannot be accepted because the earth and so on are also produced by human beings by means of the unseen. Hence another formulation of the subject is proposed: It is something produced but not produced by an effort which produces the unseen, or it is something produced but not directly produced by an effort which is produced. By the first alternative all those things which are produced through the unseen are excluded from being the subject. Hence the earth and so on are excluded from being the subject, inasmuch as they are produced by human beings by means of the unseen. They are however taken as the subject inasmuch as they are directly produced by God. But then another difficulty arises: God is also the cause of the unseen and so the earth and so on are produced by an effort that is the cause of the unseen also. Therefore the earth and so on also cannot be included in the subject. In order to avoid this fault, an alternative formulation is adduced: Something produced but not directly produced by an effort which is produced. This may be interpreted as follows: Both jars and so on and earth and so on are produced by human souls, the former directly and the latter through the unseen. Hence the first kind of things that are produced are excluded from being the subject, while the second kind of things are included in the subject. Thus the fault mentioned previously, viz. the earth and so on cannot be taken as the subject since they are produced by an effort that produces the unseen (i. e. in fact by God's effort), is also avoided. But then another fault occurs namely the fault of establishing partially what has already been established, since jars and so on are not produced directly by human souls but through bodily action. Hence it will come about that they are also included in the formulation of the subject. But it is accepted by both parties that they have a maker and so there is the fault of establishing what has already been established.

Hence the earth alone is proposed as the subject. It was pointed out that the object of doubt and so on cannot be taken as the subject because of the fault of proving something other than what is to be proved. Further the other formulations of the subject would cause such faults as establishing something that has already been established. In order to avoid these faults, it is proposed that the earth alone could be taken as the subject. Since it is precisely the earth about which there is discussion, if it has an agent or not, there cannot be any room for the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established. Implied also in the formulation of the subject is that it is produced directly and not through the unseen; hence there is no fault of establishing what has already been established. But even this formulation is not free from faults: There is in fact, the fault of inconclusive reason with reference to a sprout. This is so because the opponent does not admit that the reason 'being-an-effect' has the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent'. Therefore although a sprout and so on may be effects, still it is doubtful whether they have an agent. This is the usual fault of deviation with a slight difference. Gaṅgeśa then discusses at length the nature of this fault and its implications in the present context. This need not detain us here.

Finally, the dyad at the beginning of creation is proposed as the subject. This also cannot be accepted as the *pakṣa* since the opponents like the Mīmāṃsaka-s do not admit creation or a beginning for creation.

After discussing the possible subjects in inferences establishing the existence of God, Gaṅgeśa, turns his attention to the discussions on *sādhya.* First of all, it is suggested that 'having-an-agent' is the *sādhya.* But 'having-an-agent' is defined in two ways: Existing at the same time as some one having an effort(*kṛtimatsahabhāva*) or being produced by some one having an effort (*kṛtimajjanyatva*). Both these explanations of the *sādhya* are rejected because of the fault of establishing what has already been established with reference to us. The earth and so on exist at the same time as ourselves and further it is already admitted that they are produced by our effort through the unseen.

In order to avoid this fault, another formulation of the *sādhya* is proposed: 'Being-produced-by-someone-having-direct-knowledge-of-the-material-cause-desire-to-do-and-effort', (*upādānagocarāparokṣajñānacikīrṣākṛtimajjanyatva*). Since human souls do not have direct knowledge of the material cause of earth and so on, there is no fault of establishing what has already been established. But then another fault arises: The fault of establishing something other than what is to be established. We have also knowledge of some kind of material cause and so what is established is persons like us who have knowledge of certain material causes and not

God. An attempt is then made to avoid this fault by pointing out that the knowledge in question should actually produce the thing whose material cause is known. Hence though we may have knowledge of material causes, of certain things (e.g. jars) which produces them, we do not have the knowledge of the material causes of earth and so on in such a way that this knowledge produces them. But then again another fault occurs: The fault of establishing what has already been established; it is accepted by both parties that we produce the earth and so on through our unseen.

In order to avoid this fault it is suggested that the *sādhya* of 'having-an-agent' should be understood as 'being-directly-produced-by-the-knowledge-of-the-material-cause'. Accordingly, since human souls produce the earth not directly but through the unseen there is no fault of establishing what has already been established. But another fault arises: The example will not have the *sādhya*, for the jar which is the example is not produced directly by the potter, but through his bodily action, and if the *sādhya* is 'being-produced-directly' in the sense explained, the potter will not be the maker of the pot. This position cannot obviously be held. Nor can bodily action itself be taken as example since, in that case, it would come about that jars which are not produced directly by the potter will not have an agent and therefore there would be deviation. In order to avoid all these faults it is pointed out that the *sādhya* of 'having-an-agent' means 'having-direct-knowledge-of-the-material-cause-of-earth-and-so-on'. But then the difficulty is that such direct knowledge of the material causes of earth and so on is not at all established, i.e. we have nowhere experienced even one instance of such a knowledge and therefore it cannot be considered a valid *sādhya*. One may argue that when the expression 'material cause' is stated, one naturally wants to know whose material cause it is and so there comes about the reference to the material cause of earth. This argument cannot be accepted since in inference reasons based on the nature of word are considered invalid. Nor can it be said that the *sādhya* is knowledge of the material cause of the earth by means of the apprehensional connection in the form of universals, for in that case there would be the fault of establishing what has already been established, for, again, by means of the unseen we produce the earth and so on.

Gaṅgeśa now proposes two formulations of the subject and the *sādhya* together in order to avoid this fault. The *sādhya* is formulated as 'being-produced' by some one having an effort, desire to do and direct knowledge of the material cause, which knowledge is not produced by the apprehensional connection in the form of the knowledge of the universals nor by qualificative knowledge nor by merit arising from *yoga*. By this formulation is explicitly rejected the *sādhya* of 'being-produced' by any human being even through the knowledge by means of the apprehensional connections in the form of universals and so on. But this way of the formulations of the subject and the *sādhya* cannot be admitted since the opponent does not accept the apprehensional connections in the form of universals and so on. Hence the subject and *sādhya* as qualified by these do not exist; in other words, there are the faults of absence of the subject and *sādhya*. This fault cannot be avoided even by the argument that the knowledge of the material cause means the material cause of the thing produced, for here the argument is based on the nature of the word and such an argument cannot be admitted when discussing the nature of inference.

Another formulation of the subject and *sādhya* together with the reason also is given. The subject is the dyad at the beginning of creation. The *sādhya* is 'being-produced-by-the-causal-complex', existing at the same time as the knowledge, desire, and action. The implication is that since no human being is present at that time as the substratum of knowledge, God is established as the substratum of such a knowledge. But this also is rejected since the opponents like the Mīmāṃsaka-s do not admit creation, much less a beginning of creation. It may be noted that such an inference is common in Nyāyavaiśeṣika tradition.

Now the discussion is on the reason in the possible inferences establishing the existence of God. The reason is admitted by all as 'being-an-effect', but the difficulty is to define it precisely. The first definition suggested is that it is proper to be produced by the effort of some one. As for instance, a jar is fit to be produced by the effort (*kṛti*) of some one. This also is the meaning of *kāryatva* 'being-an-effect', taken in its etymological sense. However this definition cannot be accepted: God is not yet established and none of the individual souls can produce the earth and so on directly through the knowledge, desire and effort. And so another definition of 'being-an-effect' is given: 'Being-an-effect' means, existing at a later time while not existing at a prior time. In order to exclude eternal things which exist also at a later time, the qualification of 'not-existing-at-a-prior-time' is given. Further, non-existing things like hare's horn do not exist even at a prior time and so in order to exclude them, 'existing at a later time' is added. Even this definition cannot be accepted because the prior times of the reasons in the subject and in the example are different. Therefore there is no consecutive character in these reasons and so it is impossible to determine what exactly the reason is. Hence the required invariable concomitance also cannot be cognized. Since the universe has no beginning, one cannot also speak of the prior times of everything since the universe, in the opinion of the opponent, has no beginning.

In order to avoid all these faults 'being-an-effect' is defined as 'existing-at-some-time'. But then the difficulty is that even prior absence exists at some time, but it is not produced by any one and therefore there is deviation. For the sake of avoiding these faults, the definition is again changed as 'counter-positive of a prior absence'; but even this definition cannot be accepted since destruction also has a counterpositive but it does not have a maker and therefore there is deviation. To overcome this difficulty, the definition is further refined as 'being-the-counterpositive-of-a-prior-absence, while-being-existent'. But since the opponents like the Mīmaṃsaka-s do not accept existence as a separate category, this definition also canot be accepted.

Gaṅgeśa now presents two possible syllogisms trying to establish the existence of God. In the first one, 'being-an-effect' (*kāryatva*) is explicitly the reason. Such things as a jar and so on are the subject. The implication is that these things are certainly produced by their respective agents like potter and so on, but they are at the same time produced by God also since he is the cause of everything. Obviously this argument cannot be accepted since it already presupposes the existence of God. When this presupposition is not there, one can argue as well that this jar is not produced by God like all other jars which are produced by their respective potters. It may be noted that this syllogism is not to be found in any of the pre-Gaṅgeśa writers and so it is likely that Gaṅgeśa is just proposing on his own a syllogism trying to establish the existence of God.

The other inference trying to establish the existence of God is based on the nature of the movement of the mind. The point of the argument is that according to the tenets of Nyāya, conjunction of the mind with the soul is necessary for the production of knowledge and in order that such a conjunction may come about, there should be a movement of the mind. Such a movement of the mind cannot be brought about at the beginning of creation by the individual souls, because at that time, though the individual souls exist, they are unable to produce any activity then since they do not have any body. All the same, there is this first act of knowledge and so the argument is that the one who brings about by his effort the movement of the mind needed for this act of knowledge, is God. But this inference also is rejected because it is pointed out that the movement of the mind during the time of dissolution could also bring about the required conjunction of the mind with the soul.

Gaṅgeśa then gives his own inference to establish the existence of God. We need not go into the details of this syllogism as an explanation touching all its aspects is to be found in the commentary on this section. We should only emphasize here that Gaṅgeśa formulated his inference in such a way as to meet all the objections of the Mīmāṃsaka-s and Buddhists. He does so chiefly by the care with which he formulates the subject and *sādhya* of the inference. All the things existing by the relation of inherence and produced but not through the unseen and also not by an effort which is produced and whose object is the material cause, are considered to be the subject. This simply means all those things which are not directly produced by individual souls. The argument is that since these things are not produced by men, but are nevertheless actually produced, they must be produced by some one. This some one is God. The other qualifications of the subject are used in order to exclude or include instances of things that are produced, from the peculiar standpoint of Nyāyavaiśeṣika world view. We need not go here into the details of these instances as they have been dealt with in all their implications in the commentary to this section. However, it should be emphasized that although some of these instances may not have much philosophical value from a modern point of view, still it would indeed be very wrong to conclude that the whole syllogism of Gaṅgeśa is worthless logically or philosophically. In fact, the main purpose of Gaṅgeśa is to reject the Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka contention that the world is produced by the unseen of individual human beings. This he does by carefully formulating the subject in such a way as to exclude everything that is indirectly (i.e. through the unseen) produced by human beings or directly produced by them, but including everything that is otherwise produced. This therefore includes the universe which is produced directly by some one who knows its material cause. We do not have any knowledge of the materia cause of the universe according to the presuppositions of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika system. And even if according to modern science we have knowledge of the material cause of the universe, still the point of Gaṅgeśa's argument is that the universe is something produced and so it must have a maker. This maker cannot be any individual human being and so he must be God who has to be omniscient and eternal. The heart of this argument is in establishing that there is invariable concomitance of 'having-a-maker' in 'being-an-effect'. In the rest of the *īśvaravāda*, Gaṅgeśa mainly directs his efforts to show that such an invariable concomitance is valid and free from all faults.

In the rest of the *īśvaravāda* Gaṅgeśa justifies every aspect of the syllogism which he has proposed to establish the existence of God. And it is in this section that Gaṅgeśa contributes most to the problem of the proof for the existence of God, chiefly by showing, as already pointed out, that the reason of 'being-an-effect' is free from all faults and that it has truly the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent'. First of all, however, Gaṅgeśa directs his attention to defend the subject of his syllogism against all attacks. Gaṅgeśa points out that if for some reason or other something is omitted in the enunciation of the subject, that also could be included in the form of a conjunct cognition. Nor can it be objected that there is no proper limitor of subjectness for the subject of the establishing inference because 'being-relational-absence' (*saṃsargābhāvatva*) could be taken as the limitor of subjectness.

This kind of universal could be considered as the apprehensional connection and by means of this, there could be knowledge of everything that is subject. Further, sound, qualities of the soul and so on are also included in the enunciation of the subject, because in the case of the former, human individuals do not have any direct knowledge of the material cause of sound and in the case of the latter, we do not intend to produce the special qualities of the soul like knowledge, desire and so on. Hence these things are not produced by a produced action and so they are also included in the subject. Even destruction (*dhvaṃsa*) could be included in the subject and in order to do so the qualification of 'being-inherent' should be omitted in the enunciation of the subject and *sādhya*.

Gaṅgeśa admits that even the earth alone could be taken as the subject. Since the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' is established in an example without any reference to a subject (*pakṣa*) or something like a subject (*pakṣasama*), there is no fault of even doubtful inconclusive reason. Nor can it be objected that there is doubt of the *sādhya* in a *pakṣasama*, and hence invariable concomitance itself cannot be determined. because in that case even in an example invariable concomitance cannot be cognized. So no inference would be possible. Thus the earth itself may be taken as the subject, without any fear of even doubtful inconclusive reason.

Gaṅgeśa then discusses the *sādhya* of the syllogism. It was already rejected that ordinary human beings could be the agents of the universe because they do not have direct knowledge of the material cause of the world. Now it is rejected further that even the yogin-s could produce the world, because though the yogin-s may have knowledge of the material cause of the universe before the creation of the present universe, they do not have such a knowledge before every creation. Therefore they also cannot be the creators of the world.

It may be objected that there is the fault of establishing something already established because it may be said that the very knowledge whose object is jars and so on, could produce the world. This is simply impossible because in order that something may be produced, the person who produces should know the material cause of the thing in question and not of something else. Therefore there is no room for the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established, since human souls do not have the knowledge of the material cause of earth and so on and so they are unable to produce them. Further, it may be objected that God has no direct perception and that he produces the world and so on by means of a knowledge similar to the one arising from the apprehensional connection in the form of universals. This objection has also to be rejected because, in our experience, we do not say that some one is an agent of something because he has the knowledge of the material cause of that thing by means of the apprehensional connection in the form of universals; we affirm that some one is an agent of something only when he has direct perception of the material cause of the thing in question.

Another objection is as follows. It may be said that knowledge and so on produce the effect in question and not the individual who has knowledge and so on, for, according to the opponent, the invariable concomitance is in the form: Wherever there is knowledge and so on there is effect, and not in the form: Wherever there is one who has knowledge and so on there is effect. This objection also cannot be accepted because the cause of effects like jar and so on is the conjunction of soul having effort, with the body. Such a conjunction produces bodily action which in turn produces the effect. It may further be objected that effort itself is the cause since although there is conjunction of soul with the body, without effort, there is no bodily action. This also has to be rejected because without the non-inherent cause, there cannot be any effort and therefore the conjunction of the soul with the body is to be considered a cause of effect like jar and so on. Therefore the soul also has to be considered as a cause. Hence, with regard to the the earth and so on, it should be admitted that it is not merely the knowledge of God, their cause, but God himself, in whom such a knowledge inheres, is the cause.

It is again pointed out that there is the fault of the absence of *sādhya* in the example. Jars and so on which are taken as examples are brought about by a knowledge that such things are both possible and desirable to be produced. Such a knowledge is in the form of inference and not in the form of perception. Hence jars and so on are produced by inferential knowledge and not by perceptual knowledge. Hence the example does not have the proper *sādhya*; technically, there is the fault of the absence of *sādhya*. The answer to this objection is that although we may have inferential knowledge that something is both possible and desirable to be produced, still, without direct perceptual knowledge of the material cause of the thing to be produced, no effect can be brought about. As for example even if we know by inference that a dyad is both possible and desirable to be produced, we cannot produce it since we do not have direct perception of atoms which are the material cause of dyads. But this does not mean either that God produces the world by means of the inference that it is possible and desirable to produce the world, for, in God there is no inference at all. Since God has neither merit nor demerit, he has neither happiness nor sorrow. Therefore any inference which asserts that something brings happiness or sorrow to God is erroneous. From the fact that God has no inference that a particular thing brings him happiness or sorrow, it does not at all follow that God has hatred or that he produces the world out of hatred. Hatred is only indirectly the cause of action. Even when some one destroys one's enemy he does so in order to remove the cause of sorrow that can be caused by the enemy. Hence hatred is the cause of action only indirectly, but desire or will is cause of action directly. And such a will or desire is present in God, but no hatred.

Now Gaṅgeśa turns his attention to one of the oft-repeated objections: What is not directly perceived does not exist. Thus God is not directly perceived by any human being and so he does not exist. The answer to this is obvious: If something is a proper object of perception and if it is not perceived, then it may be concluded that it does not exist. But nobody says that God is a proper object of perception. Therefore even if he is not directly perceived, it cannot be concluded that he does not exist. The further details of this objection and its answer are given in the commentary to this section.

Gaṅgeśa then takes up a fundamental objection which comes up again in different forms. The main point of the objection is that the invariable concomitance of an invisible agent cannot be cognized in 'being-an-effect'. This is the basic objection of the Buddhists. And the heart of the answer is that the Naiyāyika does not affirm an invariable concomitance of an invisible agent in 'being-an-effect', but from the positive and negative concomitances of particular instances of agent and effect, he concludes that all instances of effects are pervaded by agent. This means that we know that individual instances of effects have an agent and from this we can conclude legitimately that all instances of effects have an agent, if there is nothing to prove to the contrary. If this is not admitted no inference is possible; when we infer fire in the mountain, we do not have the cognition of the invariable concomitance of fire in the mountain with smoke in the mountain; we need only to have the cognition of the invariable concomitance of fire with smoke. If this latter form of invariable concomitance is not enough to make an inference, then no inference at all is possible.

Further, it is not correct to object that the *sādhya* of being-produced by knowledge, desire and effort has useless qualifications in the sense that the absence of any one of these–knowledge, desire or effort - brings about the absence of the reason of 'being-an-effect'. Therefore by the general rule that, that which is the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of the absence of *sādhya*, establishes the *sādhya*, one can establish only being-produced-by-knowledge, being-produced-by-desire or being-produced-by--effort, and not all the three together, by the reason of 'being-an-effect'. This argument is not quite true. Although the general principle mentioned is valid, it is equally valid that just as the absence of 'being-an-effect' can be governed by the absence of knowledge, absence of desire or absence of effort, it can also be governed by all the absences together. Therefore it is possible to establish also 'being-produced-by-knowledge-desire-and-effort' by the reason of 'being.an-effect'.

Gaṅgeśa then answers the objection that there is the fault of contradiction of the particular (*viśeṣaviruddhatva*) *sādhya* in the inference establishing the existence of God. The argument implied in the objection is that in the example of a jar and so on, an agent with non-eternal knowledge only is inferred but in the subject, an agent with eternal knowledge is cognised: This is considered to be a contradiction, i.e., it is contradictory to the usual kind of *sādhya* that is established by the reason of 'being-an-effect'. Such an objection is found, as we have seen, also in earlier authors like Vallabha, Śaśadhara and Udayana. Gaṅgeśa's answer to this objection is that there is no such contradiction. The invariable concomitance of an agent as such (and not that of an agent with non-eternal knowledge) is cognized in the reason of 'being-an-effect'. Therefore, there is no contradiction in establishing an agent with eternal knowledge and so on by the force of the relation of the reason to the subject. Further, as long as the existence of God is not established, one cannot speak of a contradiction between 'being-knowledge' and 'being-eternal', and when God's existence is established, by the very proof which establishes his existence, one can also show that there is no contradiction between 'being-knowledge' and 'being-eternal'. It may further be objected that God cannot be the maker of the universe since he has no bodily operation. This objection has also to be rejected because all effects need not be produced by bodily action. A further conclusion from this answer is that a cause should not be defined as that which invariably exists prior to the effect, and at the same time, is perceived as existing together with the effect. The reason is that not all causes need be perceived together with the effect; as for example, sticks and so on which are the causes of pot need not be observed together with the pot. Similarly mental effort (*kṛti*) which is a cause of effect need not be perceived together with the effect. Therefore God's effort (*kṛti*) which is a cause of the universe need not be perceived together with the effect, i.e. the universe.

Gaṅgeśa then tackles the objection that it is not possible to establish an agent whose knowledge is eternal and who has no body because this is against our normal experience that an agent has only non-eternal knowledge and that he has a body. The first answer given to this objection is that of the old Naiyāyikas: There is no invariable concomitance of non-eternity in knowledge-ness, for even in the absence of such an invariable concomitance no normal activity is hindered. Further, it has already been established that there is the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect'. However, the reason of 'being an-effect' which is in the earth and so on is such that it could not have been brought about by any operation of the body. Therefore the knowledge which brings about these things must be eternal. Hence the invariable concomitance of non-eternity cannot be accepted in 'being-knowledge'. If this is not accepted no inference would be possible. Gaṅgeśa then gives his own answer to the objection. There is no difficulty if certain instances of a particular substance are eternal, and some other instances of the same substance are not eternal, as for example the atoms of earth substance are eternal while its dyad is not eternal. Similarly, there is no difficulty if certain instances of knowledge are eternal and certain other instances are non-eternal.

The same objection is again taken up from a different point of view: There is no invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent' in 'being-an-effect' since the limitor of 'being-produced-by-an-agent' is not 'being-produced' but 'being-jar' and so on. This objection is also rejected because there is the relation of cause and effect between agent and effect and so 'being-produced' and not 'being-jar' and so on is the limitor of 'being-produced-that-is-governed-by-an-agent'. And when invariable concomitance is not admitted, even while there is supporting reason and no disproving factor, as for example an additional condition, then it would come about that the *sādhya* is only in something other than the subject. This means that no inference at all would be possible. Gaṅgeśa does not seem to favour the answer of the moderns (*navya-s*) to this difficulty. They assert that just as 'being-an-effect' in a pot establishes a potter who has only non-eternal knowledge and so on, 'being-an-effect' in the earth and so on establishes an agent with eternal knowledge and so on. There is no contradiction before an agent with eternal knowledge and so on is established, and after an agent is established, the very argument which establishes his existence establishes also that his knowledge and so on are eternal and so there is no contradiction either.

In the next section, Gaṅgeśa proceeds to answer the objections against the reason of 'being-an-effect' in the establishing inference. And the two main objections against the reason are that it is vitiated by the presence of an additional condition (*upādhi*) and that it has a counter-thesis (*satpratipakṣa*). The discussions concerning both the objections are very intricate and technical, often involving a series of *pūrvapakṣa*-s and their answers. First of all, the opponent tries to show that there is the additional condition of 'being-produced-by-body' in the reason of 'being-produced'. In the example of jars and so on, which have agent, there is 'being-produced-by-body'. So it pervades the *sādhya*. In the earth and so on, there is the reason of 'being-produced' but no 'being-produced-by-body'. Thus it does not pervade the reason; hence 'being-produced-by-body' is an additional condition. But the *siddhāntin* argues that 'being-produced-by-body' cannot be considered an additional condition because it serves only to differentiate the subject, because it is qualified and because it is not certain that it has the pervasion of *sādhya*. Naturally, the *pūrvapakṣin* rejects all these arguments: In our experience all effects except bodily action are produced by an agent through the operation of the body. Nor can bodily action be brought about by another body because of infinite regress. Therefore 'having-an-agent' is pervaded by 'being-produced-by-body'. Further a qualification that serves only to differentiate the subject, can also be an additional condition, when it is certain that there is no *sādhya* in the subject. Similarly even when the reason is qualified, there could be additional condition.

Gaṅgeśa rejects all these arguments and establishes that 'being-produced-by-body' is not an additional condition. The opponent cannot say that 'being-produced-by-body' is an additional condition only in some instances of effects. This would be acceptable also to the *siddhāntin*, for he also admits that such things as jars and so on are produced through the instrumentality of the body. On the other hand, the opponent cannot admit that 'being-produced-by-body' is an additional condition in all instances of effects; this means that all effects are produced through the operation of the body. This would be against the position of the *pūrvapakṣin* himself who admits that the earth and so on are effects, but does not admit that they are brought about by an agent through the operation of his body. Therefore it is concluded that in no case 'being-produced-by-body' is an additional condition.

Now the same objection is proposed in another way: The *siddhāntin* admits the general principle that when there is the relation of cause and effect between two particulars, there could also be the relation of cause and effect between the corresponding universals, if there is no contradiction; according to this principle it follows that whatever is produced by body only, is produced by an agent since we see that particular things like jars and so on are produced by potters who have body. Hence 'being-produced-by-body' is an additional condition. About this objection also, Gaṅgeśa gives a series of arguments and counter-arguments, but the main answer he gives seems to be the following: It may be that 'being-jar', 'being-produced' and 'being-produced-by-body' are the limitors of 'being-produced-that-is-governed-by-an-agent'. But there is no argument to show that 'having-an-agent' is pervaded only by 'being-produced-by-body' and not also by 'being-jar' and 'being-produced'. This obviously is false and cannot be admitted. Further, in order to cognize that 'being-produced-by-body' is a limitor of 'being-produced-that-is-governed-by-an-agent', one has first of all to cognize 'being-produced' and this is an integral part of 'being-produced-by-body'. After such a cognition, it is impossible to cognize 'being-produced-by-body' also as a limitor, because this would contradict the previous cognition. Hence being-produced-by-body is not a limitor of 'being-produced-that-is-governed-by-an-agent'. Therefore 'being-produced-by-body' is not a pervader of 'having-an-agent'. In other words 'being-produced-by-body' is not an additional condition.

The next important objection which Gaṅgeśa treats is that the reason of the establishing inference has the fault of having-a-counter-reason. The counter-inference itself is as follows: The world and so on are not produced by an agent because they are not produced by body. Gaṅgeśa naturally rejects this inference on the ground that it tries to establish an absence whose counter-positive is not yet cognized. And an absence whose counter-positive is not known is not at all an absence. To this the *pūrvapakṣin* objects that the logical consequence of this is that one cannot any more speak of a fault of counter-thesis, since the *sādhya* is not known before it is established by the inference which establishes it; this however is rejected on the ground that where the *sādhya* is already established, e. g. where the *sādhya* is 'cowness' and so on, there is the possibility of counter-thesis.

Further the *siddhāntin* argues that the reason in the counter-thesis has the fault of the absence of the reason in the subject (*svarūpāsiddhi*), because the earth and so on which are taken as the subject do not have the characteristic of 'not-being-produced-by-body' since through the unseen, the earth and so on are also produced by body. To this the *pūrvapakṣīn* replies that the reason of 'not-being-produced-by-body' means 'not-being-produced-by-a-knowledge-which-is-produced'. Such a reason exists also in the subject and so there is no fault of the absence of the reason in the subject. But the *siddhāntīn* then insists in his objection and points out that, in that case, the qualification of 'produced-by-knowledge-that-is-produced' is useless, since it is not yet established that there is a knowledge which is not produced. Hence the reason has useless qualification and so it does not have the required invariable concomitance.

Now the main objection against the reason of 'not-being-produced-by-body' is proposed: In comparison with this reason, 'being-not-produced' is simpler and so it has the real invariable concomitance of 'not-having-an-agent'. Hence 'not-being-produced-by-body', does not have the invariable concomitance of 'having-no-agent'. The *pūrvapakṣīn* tries to answer this objection trying to show that there is actually no useless qualification since the qualification here is helpful for producing the knowledge that the reason actually exists in the subject. Further, it is objected that only when the limitor of qualificandness is not the limitor of invariable concomitance, is the qualification such a limitor. In the case of instances such as 'not-produced-by-body', 'blue-smoke' and so on, the qualificandness alone could be the limitor of the invariable concomitances in question. The *pūrvapakṣin* rejects this and says that even in the instances mentioned, there is invariable concomitance in the sense of 'having-no-deviation' or 'having-no-additional-condition'.

All these objections of the *pūrvapakṣin* are rejected and the *siddhāntin* establishes that such reasons as 'not-being-produced-by-body' and 'blue-smoke' cannot be used as valid reasons, though they have the invariable concomitance of the respective *sādhya*-s. They cannot be used as valid reason because of the general principle that the limitor of pervasion is itself the limitor of 'being-reason'. Accordingly in reasons such as blue-smoke, the limitor of pervasion is not 'being-blue-smoke', but simply 'smokeness' because of logical complexity and so blue-smoke cannot be used as a valid reason. Similarly, in the reason of 'produced-by-body' the limitor of pervasion is only 'being-produced' and not 'being-produced-by-body'. Therefore 'being-produced-by-body' cannot be used as a valid reason.

Gaṅgeśa finally touches on certain general characteristics of God, which come up often for discussion in this context. Thus he shows that by the law of simplicity the inference is that there is only one God. This law of simplicity operates along with other means of valid knowledge and it is accepted by all authorities as helping the instruments of valid knowledge to produce valid knowledge. Further, it is established that God's knowledge is eternal since he knows the beginningless flow of things. His knowledge extends to all things and therefore he is also the maker of everything. And he creates all things when the secondary causes like the unseen, time and so on are ready.

Conclusions

We have discussed the whole problem of God with particular reference to the arguments for his existence in the Nyāya tradition, taking into account also the criticism levelled against them by the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsaka-s. Beginning from the Nyāyasūtra-s, these thoughts reach their distinctive developments in such stalwarts in the Nyāya tradition like Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, Udayana and Gaṅgeśa. The Buddhist attacks are found chiefly in the works of Dharmakīrti, Jñānaśrīmitra and his disciple Ratnakīrti. From the discussions of these arguments and counter-arguments, we can easily see, if we are objective and unprejudiced, that these philosophers manifest an admirable spirit of rigorous thinking and often scale the very heights of human thought. The Buddhist attacks shorn of their ancient form and technical vocabulary have not since been surpassed by any system of human thought that denies the existence of God. And it could be said without exaggeration that the Nyāya arguments in their spirit and intent have gone as far as human spirit has ever gone in search of an answer to these objections and problems. They have established the existence of God with arguments as exact and as sure as it has been so far possible for ~~human thinking~~. And this should evoke the appreciation and admiration of any objective historian of ideas.

Within this Nyāya tradition of thought on these points, the contribution of Gaṅgeśa has been considerable and in some sense unique. It is true that Gaṅgeśa draws on the works of previous authors, especially on those of Vācaspati Miśra, Udayana and Śaśadhara. But in no sense is the work of Gaṅgeśa a mere compilation of the ideas of earlier thinkers. In the *īśvaravāda*, he perfects the method employed by Śaśadhara by discussing in detail the subject, the *sādhya* and the reason used in the inference establishing the existence of God. Gaṅgeśa surpasses even Udayana in this sense that the former takes up only the philosophically most important inference to establish the existence of God and discusses and defends it thoroughly. Further, he formulates the establishing inference itself so carefully that it meets the objections of the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsaka-s. In the further discussions of the syllogism, Gaṅgeśa touches on all the important objections especially of the Buddhists. This also shows that even during the time of Gaṅgeśa, Buddhist ideas formed the most important *pūrvapakṣa*-s to Nyāya arguments. In particular, Gaṅgeśa's treatment of the faults of the presence of additional condition and counter-thesis in the reason of the establishing inference shows considerable acumen, dialectical skill and even originality. Not even Udayana treats these problems with such thoroughness and skill. It is to be believed that earlier scholars like Jacobi were unaware of these elements in the thought of Gaṅgeśa, when they too easily expressed the opinion that in comparison with Udayana, Gaṅgeśa shows no originality. The foregoing study as well as the commentary on Gaṅgeśa's *īśvaravāda* would make it abundantly clear that Gaṅgeśa was no mere compiler of earlier thought, and that on the contrary, he was original in his own way and that his contribution to Indian thought in general and to Nyāya tradition in particular was considerable and even unique.

PART II

STUDY OF GAṄGEŚA'S ĪŚVARAVĀDA

CHAPTER 1

ANALYSIS OF GAṄGEŚA'S ĪŚVARAVĀDA

1

ANALYSIS OF GAṄGEŚA'S ĪŚVARAVĀDA

Introduction: The connection between the treatise on inference and the treatise on God; introducing *īśvarānumāna* as a special case of inference; general form of the syllogism to prove the existence of God.

A. *Pūrvapakṣa*

I. Determination of the subject is not possible.

(1) The earth and so on neither individually nor as a whole are the subject because individually they cannot be mentioned and as a whole they lack a common characteristic.

(2) The object of doubt or the object of dispute cannot be the subject, because they cannot be ascertained owing to the absence of a common property since neither the disputants nor the judge have any doubt and because of the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established. When there is doubt and dispute with regard to a particular thing like the earth if it has a maker or not, if one establishes that the object of doubt or dispute has a maker, there would indeed be the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established.

(3) Neither something produced, but not produced (by an agent) with the help of a body, nor something not produced by a body is the subject, because certain things created by God are not included.

(4) Neither something produced, but not produced by the action of something produced nor something produced which is different from those things produced by an action which is accepted by both parties to be the cause of certain things, is the subject because the earth and so on are produced by a produced action through the unseen.

(5) Something produced, but not produced by an effort which produces the unseen is not the subject, nor is it something produced but not directly by an action which is produced, because God's action also produces the unseen and hence the first formulation is not applicable in the case of earth and because of the fault of partially establishing what has already been established.

(6) Nor the earth alone is the subject because of the fault of doubtful inconclusive reasoning. The meaning of the fault of inconclusive reasoning is explained.

(7) The dyad at the beginning of creation is also not the subject.

II. The *sādhya* cannot be properly defined.

(1) 'Having-an-agent' is neither 'co-existence with some one having an effort' nor 'being-produced-by-someone-having-an-effort' because of the fault of establishing what is already established.

(2) 'Having-an-agent' is not 'being-produced-by-some one-having direct-knowledge-of-material-cause-desire-and-effort' because of the following reasons.

(a) If the knowledge of material causes in the *sādhya* so described means the knowledge of any material cause, then there is the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established. To avoid this fault, if 'being-produced-by-knowledge' and so on is also meant, there is the fault of establishing what has already been established.

(b) If the *sādhya* so described means 'being-directly-produced-by-knowledge' and so on, then in cases like a jar, there will not be such a *sādhya*; further, the potter will not be the agent of the pot.

(c) If the knowledge of the material cause which is an element of the *sādhya* so described means knowledge of the material cause of earth, then it is not yet established that there is some one having the knowledge of the material cause of earth. Nor can argument be made from the nature of the expression 'material cause', for here word is not the means of valid knowledge. Further there will be the fault of proving something other than what is to be proved; again, there will be no possibility of cognizing invariable concomitance; there will also be the fault of establishing what has already been established.

(3) Discussion of another possible *sādhya*.

(a) Formulations of subject and its *sādhya*: The fact of being produced by some one having an effort, desire and knowledge, but not through the super-normal relations in the form of universals etc.

(b) These formulations are rejected.

(*i*) Because the opponents do not admit these kinds of relations and hence the fault of the absence of *sādhya* and subject.

(*ii*) Even if these are admitted, still the subject is not produced by these, because of the fault of establishing what has been already established, since through the unseen, knowledge etc., individual souls are the cause of the earth etc.

(*iii*) In order to avoid this fault of establishing what has been already established a reasoning based on the nature of invariable concomitance is brought forward; invariable concomitance is in the following form: Wherever there is being-effect there is the knowledge of its material cause and not of any material cause. This also is rejected.

(4) Discussion of another *sādhya* with a syllogism to prove the existence of God: The *sādhya* is being-produced-by-the causal-complex-which-exists-at-the-same-time-as-knowledge-desire-and-effort. This also is rejected.

III. Determination of the reason is not possible.

(1) *Kāryatva* cannot be properly defined.

(a) *kāryatva* is not being-suitable to the effort as the constituent parts of the word *kāryatva* signify.

(b) *kāryatva* is not being-related-to-a-later-time while not-existing-at-a-prior-time.

(c) *kāryatva* is not being-accidental.

(d) *kāryatva* is not being-the-counter-positive of a prior absence.

(e) *kāryatva* is not the counter-positive of a prior absence while being an existant entity.

(2) A syllogism to prove the existence of God with special reference to the reason *kāryatva*; this is rejected because of the absence of supporting reason and because of counter-reason.

(3) Another syllogism with special reference to the nature of the reason (movement of the mind) to prove the existence of God is also rejected because in the beginning of creation, there is no proof for the activity which produces the conjunction of mind that produces knowledge, because of useless qualification of the reason and because of the fault of proving something other than what is to be proved.

B. *Uttarapakṣa.*

I. The syllogism proving the existence of God.

(1) The subject of the syllogism proving the existence of God.

(2) Formulations of the *sādhya* of the syllogism.

(a) The first formulation of the *sādhya* of the syllogism.

(b) The second formulation of the *sādhya.*

(c) The third formulation of the *sādhya.*

(3) The reason and the conclusion of the syllogism.

II. Detailed justification of the inference establishing the existence of God.

(1) Justification of the subject of the inference.

(a) If anything is not included in the enunciation of the subject, it could also be added and thus there would be inference of a complex nature.

(b) An objection that the limitor of subject-ness in the establishing inference is not a common property in all instances of the subject is answered.

(c) The meaning of having-an-agent is clarified.

(d) Certain things which could be also considered as subject are enunciated.

(e) Even earth alone could be considered the subject and in this case there is no fault of inconclusive reason, as was earlier objected.

(f) The way how knowledge which has all things as object is established.

(2) Justification of the *sādhya* of the inference.

(a) How God himself who has really the knowledge of the material cause of earth and so on is established and not an individual soul who may at some time have such a knowledge.

(b) The rejection of the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established in the formulation of the *sādhya*. It is also rejected that the *sādhya* means production by means of knowledge arising from the relations in the form of universals and so on.

(c) It is rejected that in the example, there is the absence of *sādhya*.

(d) The same objection that the example does not have the *sādhya* is again raised because of another reason: Things are brought about not by knowledge in the form of perception, but in the form of inference. This is rejected.

(e) An objection that in God there could be inference is proposed and rejected.

(f) It is objected that there could be aversion and hence bondage also in God. This is rejected.

(g) An objection that an invisible agent cannot be inferred, because it cannot be perceived, is raised and answered.

(h) Similarly it is objected that an invisible agent cannot be inferred, because it is impossible to establish an invariable concomitance needed for such an inference and an answer to this objection is also given.

(i) An objection that reason really does not establish *sādhya*, since absence of part of the reason alone establishes the absence of *sādhya*, is raised and answered.

(j) The fault of *viśeṣaviruddhatva*, i. e. establishing something which has qualities opposed to the *sādhya* in the example, is said to be present here. This also is rejected.

(k) It is objected that there is contradiction between 'being-knowledge' and 'being-eternal' as also between 'being-an-agent' and 'having-no-body'. So it would be contradictory to establish some one having eternal knowledge and who is a maker without having a body. This objection is answered, showing that by the same means of knowledge which establishes God, his eternal knowledge etc. are also established.

(l)(i) One who produces things, does so by means of the operation of the body. God has no such operation and so he cannot be the maker of the world. This is rejected on the ground that everything that is produced need not be produced through the operation of the body.

(ii) Therefore also is rejected the definition of cause which would require that cause should also be seen with the effect.

(m)(i) It is not possible to establish the existence of a maker who has eternal knowledge and who is without a body since it is against the primary knowledge that a maker has only non-eternal knowledge and that he has body.

(ii) Answer of an earlier Naiyāyika to this objection, i.e. there is no such invariable concomitance that knowledge is indeed non-eternal.

(iii) Gaṅgeśa's answer to the objection viz. the establishment of the eternal knowledge because of the reason being the attribute of the subject does not contradict the primary knowledge that knowledge is non-eternal. The reason is that eternal knowledge is different from our knowledge.

(n)(i) The same objection is raised in another way: Even if it is admitted that every effect is produced by a maker since there is no contradiction, it cannot be admitted that a particular effect is produced by some one having eternal knowledge because our experience that knowledge is only non-eternal contradicts the knowledge that some one has eternal knowledge.

(ii) One possible answer to this objection: If this objection were admitted, there would be no inference at all, as it will imply that the *sādhya* is only in a non-subject.

(iii) The answer of the modern Naiyāyika-s. In order that our experience that knowledge is only non-eternal may contradict the knowledge that some one has eternal knowledge, we must already have the knowledge that some one has eternal knowledge. Such a knowledge has not arisen and so there is no contradiction.

(3) Justification of the reason of the inference.

(a) The opponent tries to show in various ways that being-produced-by-body is an additional condition of being-produced which is the reason in the inference establishing the existence of God. These arguments are rejected.

(i) Being-produced-by-body is an additional condition and it cannot be argued that it is not an additional condition because of such reasons as a maker is a cause only through his bodily operation and so on.

(ii) These arguments are rejected, because it cannot be established that being-produced-by-body pervades having-a-maker.

(iii)(a 1) It is again argued by the opponent that being-produced-by-body is an additional condition because there is the general invariable concomitance of being-produced-by-body in having-a-maker since there is the relation of cause and effect between a particular maker and a particular effect; further it is argued that there is no invariable concomitance of 'having-a-maker' in 'being-produced'.

(a 2) These arguments are rejected because being-produced-by-body cannot be the pervader of having-a-maker.

(iv)(a 1) The opponent again tries to show that being-produced-by-body is an additional condition because being-produced-by-an-agent is the limitor of being-produced-by-body. Therefore having-an-agent is pervaded by being-produced-by-body.

(a 2) These arguments are again rejected since in jar, just as being-jar, being-produced could also be considered the limitor of being-produced-by-a-maker. Hence everything produced is produced by a maker, and so being-produced-by-body is not the limitor of being-produced-by-a-maker.

(v)(a) Such other possible additional conditions as not-being-an-atom and so on are rejected.

(b) The opponent argues that being produced which is the reason in the inference establishing the existence of God is vitiated by a counter-reason. This however also is rejected.

(i) The counter-inference is proposed: The earth and so on are not produced by a maker since they are not produced by a body. This is rejected because in order to cognize an absence one should know its counter-positive. The counter-inference tries to establish the absence of God who himself is the counter-positive of the absence; but his existence is not yet established. This cannot be done. This answer is further explained.

(ii) Other counter-inferences of a similar nature are also rejected because of the same reason.

(iii) 'Being-not-produced-by-body', the reason in the first counter-inference, is shown to have various faults.

(a 1) The reason of the counter-inference viz. being-not-produced-by-body' has the fault of not existing in the subject (*svarūpāsiddhi*). This is explained.

(a 2) 'Not-produced-by-body' cannot be used as a valid reason because 'being-produced-by-body' is not the limitor of causeness. The proposal of an objection to this by the *pūrvapakṣin* and its answer by the *siddhāntin* constitute this section. But within it there is a series of objections and counter-objections, and their answers by the *siddhāntin* and *pūrvapakṣin*.

(i) The view of the *pūrvapakṣin* is explained: He tries to show that 'not-produced-by-body' is a valid reason by attempting to answer the objections that may be raised against it by the *siddhāntin* and others.

(a) 'Not-produced-by-body' is not really the pervaded, but only 'not-produced'. It cannot be said that the reason of 'not-produced-by-body' also serves to show the relation of the reason to the subject and so it is useful for inference, because only the reason having a qualification that serves to avoid deviation enables one to cognize invariable concomitance. This argument is rejected because even reasons having no such qualifications are valid, e.g. cowness. Further arguments are brought forward in support of this answer.

(b) Another argument to show that there is useless qualification in the reason of the counter-inference. A reason is that which is the object of consideration which is the cause of the inference. In the case of 'not-produced-by-body', the qualification does not become the object of consideration and hence it is not a part of the reason. This argument is also rejected.

(c) Now another argument to show that 'not-produced-by-body', the reason in the counter-inference, has no invariable concomitance is proposed. Only when the limitor of the qualificandness is not the limitor of the invariable concomitance, is the qualification such a limitor. In the case of 'not-produced-by-body' and in 'blue-smoke', the qualificandness alone could be the limitor of invariable concomitance and so these do not have the invariable concomitance of their respective *sādhya*-s. This argument is rejected because even in the reasons mentioned, there is invariable concomitance in the sense of 'having-no-deviation' or 'having-no-additional-condition'. Further arguments supporting this:

(d) The *pūrvapakṣin* rejects an argument of some one that 'not-produced-by-body', his reason in the counter-inference, has invariable concomitance, because instances of its counter-positive are fewer in comparison with the instances of the counter-positive of 'not-produced'.

(e) Again the opinion that in the reason 'not-produced-by-body,' 'by-body' is a qualification like the qualification of 'knowable' in knowable smoke is rejected.

(f) The *pūrvapakṣin* answers another objection that it is easier to cognize just 'not-produced' rather than 'not-produced-by-body' and hence owing to simplicity 'not-produced' is the valid reason. This also is rejected because even the *siddhāntin* admits certain reasons which are not comparatively simple as valid.

(g) The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that 'not-produced-by-body' is a valid reason and that it has no useless qualification because it is an indivisible reason. Further 'being-produced' which is the reason in the establishing inference, has the additional condition of 'being-produced-by-body'.

(h) The *pūrvapakṣin* answers a final objection: Because the qualification of the reason does not serve to avoid deviation, there is a point of defeat called 'more'. The answer is that such a point of defeat occurs only when two reasons are adduced; this is not the case here. So far the *pūrvapakṣin* tries to establish his position.

(ii) Now the *siddhāntin's* answer to these objections.

(a) There is invariable concomitance (of fire) in blue smoke but 'being-blue' is also not the limitor of pervasion; and the limitor of pervasion should be the limitor of 'being-reason'. Therefore blue smoke cannot be used as a reason (in the inference establishing fire).

(b) In the same way 'not-produced-by-body' cannot be used as a valid reason in the counter-inference; because 'by-body' is not an element of the limitor of pervasion. Justification of other inferences of a similar nature accepted as valid by the *siddhāntin*.

(c) There is no useless qualification in the pervader.

(d) 'Not-produced-by-body' is also no indivisible reason, since 'not-being-produced' and not 'not-produced-by-body' is the reason to establish the absence of a maker.

(e) The *siddhāntin* establishes that 'not-being-produced' is an additional condition of the reason in the counter-inference and answers to the objection of the *pūrvapakṣin* that in that case there would be no counter-inference at all; the *siddhāntin* points out other additional conditions also.

(f) The *siddhāntin* now gives the answer of some other Naiyāyika to the main objection of the *pūrvapakṣin*. This answer consists in showing that 'not-being-produced-by-body' the reason in the counter-inference, has no real limitor of pervadedness and so it cannot be used as a reason.

(4) Answer to various other objections to the inference of the existence of God.

(a) The *pūrvapakṣin* objects that even if there could be an inference of God, that inference does not have validity because it asserts that some one having no body is a maker and so on. This is answered recalling again that there is general invariable concomitance between being-an-effect and having-a-maker.

(b) Another objection viz. that the supporting arguments are not correct, is answered.

(c) It is also established by the law of simplicity that there is only one God. Objections against this position are also answered.

(d) It is further established that God's knowledge is eternal and that it extends to all things and therefore it is pointed out that God also is the maker of such things as jars. It does not follow, however, that because God knows all things, he knows also errors and therefore his knowledge is erroneous.

(e) The purpose of God in creating the universe is discussed; it is shown that when all the causes for creation such as the unseen are ready, then the desire of God is desire to create.

(f) How God teaches the Veda-s and other traditions in the beginning of creation, is explained. There is also no possibility of error in this way of learning from God.

(5) Texts of the scripture in support of the proof for the existence of God.

CHAPTER 2

TEXT AND TRANSLATION
OF
GAṄGEŚA'S ĪŚVARAVĀDA

2

श्रीगणेशाय नमः

तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ ईश्वरानुमानम्

एवमनुमाने निरूपिते तस्माज्जगन्निर्मातृपुरुषधौरेयसिद्धिः, क्षित्यादौ कार्यत्वेन घटवत् सकर्तृकत्वानुमानात् ।।

A. I (1) ननु क्षित्यादि प्रत्येकं न पक्षः, तस्य स्वशब्देनाभिधातुमशक्यत्वात् । नापि मिलितम्, एकरूपाभावात् ।।

TATTVACINTĀMAṆI: INFERENCE OF GOD

Introduction

When inference is thus established, the existence of a supreme person who is the creator of the universe is proved thereby because of the inference of the nature of having-an-agent for the earth and so on, owing to their nature of being-an-effect as (in the case of) a jar.

A. *Pūrvapakṣa*

I (1) But the earth and so on are not individually the subject[1] (of inference) because it is impossible to mention each of them by its individual name, nor collectively since they lack a common property.

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[1] Subject is the term used for *pakṣa*.

(2) अत एव सकर्तृकत्वासकर्तृकत्वविचारारम्भकसंशयविषयः, तथाभूतविवादविषयो वा न पक्षः, एकरूपाभावेन तयोस्तावत् सुग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वाद्, वादिनोर्निश्चितत्वेन संशयाभावात् । न च वाद्यनुमानयोस्तुल्यबलत्वेन मध्यस्थस्य संशयः, अनुमानाभ्यां तस्य संशयः, मध्यस्थप्रश्नानन्तरं चानुमानमित्यन्योन्याश्रयात् । घटेऽपि कदाचित् तयोः सम्भवात्, प्रत्येकं संशये विवादास्पदत्वेनानुमानेऽर्थान्तरतापत्तेश्च ।।

(3) न च शरीरापेक्षेण कर्त्रा यन्न कृतं शरीराजन्यं जन्यं वा पक्षः,जन्यात्मविशेषगुण-शब्द-फूत्कार-सर्गाद्यकालीनवेद-घटादि-लिप्यादि-संप्रदायानामीश्वरमात्रकर्तृकाणामसङ्ग्रहाद्, असिद्धेश्च । अदृष्टद्वारा

(2) For the same reason neither the object of doubt which occasions the discussion whether (the universe) has a creator or not, nor the object of such a dispute can be the subject, because both lack a common property and hence both cannot easily be understood, (and also) because the disputants being certain (of their positions) have no doubt at all. Nor can it be that the judge has doubt owing to the equal force of the inferences of the disputants, because of the fault of mutual dependence, viz. the doubt (of the judge) arises from the inferences (of the proponent and the opponent) and the inferences themselves are (brought forward) after his question. Also because sometimes, in the case of a jar, both (doubt and dispute) may be possible and because when there is doubt about individual things, if the inference is (made with the subject as something which is) the object of discussion, there could be an objection that there would be the fault of proving something other than what is to be proved, (the subject cannot be the object of doubt or dispute).

(3) Further the subject cannot be that which is made by an agent with the help of a body, nor something produced, that is not produced by body; for in this case the created specific qualities of the soul, sound, the act of blowing, and the tradition of Veda-s, of (making) jars and so on, of script and so on, at the beginning

शरीरिणोऽपि क्षित्यादिकर्तृत्वात् ।।

(4) नापि जन्यकृत्यजन्यं जन्यम्, उभयसिद्धकृतिजन्यान्यद्वा जन्यं पक्षः, क्षित्यादीनामदृष्टद्वारा जन्यकृतिजन्यत्वात् ।।

(5) नाप्यदृष्टजनककृत्यजन्यं जन्यकृतिसाक्षादजन्यं वा जन्यं पक्षः, ईश्वरकृतेरदृष्टजनकत्वेन क्षित्यादौ तदभावात् । घटादावप्येवं पक्षत्वेनांशतः सिद्धसाधनात् ।।

(6) न च क्षितिरेव पक्षः, अङ्कुरेण सन्दिग्धानैकान्तिकत्वात् । न च निश्चितविपक्षे हेतुसन्देहात् स इति वाच्यम् । हेतौ साध्या-

of creation whose only maker is God, are not included; also there is (the fault of) the non-establishment of the subject. Through the unseen (in the form of merit and demerit), the individual souls which have a body can be the makers of earth etc.

(4) Further, the subject cannot be something produced but not produced by effort which is itself produced; or something produced but different from something produced by an effort which is accepted by both as such, since the earth and so on are produced through the unseen by the effort which is itself produced.

(5) Again, the subject cannot be something produced but not produced by an effort which produces the unseen, nor can the subject be something produced but not directly produced by an effort which is itself produced, because in the earth etc. there is the absence of that (viz. being not produced by the effort which is the cause of the unseen), because God's effort is the cause of the unseen. In this way jar and so on also would become the subject and there would be the fault of partly establishing what is already established.[1]

(6) Neither the earth alone is the subject because there would be the fault of doubtful inconclusive reason with reference to a

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[1] The fault of establishing what has already been established is *siddhasādhana.*

भाववद्गामित्वसंशयस्य दूषकत्वात् । स च साध्याभाववति हेतुसन्देहाद्, हेतुमति साध्याभावसन्देहाद्वा, उभयथापि दोषः । न चैवं पक्षेऽपि तत् स्यात्, अनुमानमात्रोच्छेदकत्वेनेतरत्र तस्य दूषकत्वात् । अङ्कुरे हेतोरनिश्चये न सन्दिग्धानैकान्तिकत्वम् । तन्निश्चये च साध्यसन्देहवति साध्यानुमितिरेव, पक्षवत्सामग्रीसत्त्वात् । अत एवाङ्कुरः पक्षसमः इति चेत् । न । तस्यापक्षत्वेन हेतोः पक्षधर्मताविरहेण स्थापनानुमानाविषयत्वात् । तदा तस्यापि पक्षत्वे प्रतिज्ञान्तरापत्तिः । अनुमानान्तराधीनतत्साध्यानुमित्यनन्तरं च पक्षेऽनुमितावितरेतराश्रयान्नैकमप्यनुमानं स्यात्, तत्रापि क्षित्यादौ सन्दिग्धानैकान्तात्, क्षितेर्विवाद-

sprout. Nor can we say that this fault occurs on account of our doubt if the reason exists or not in a sure negative instance[1] since the fault occurs if there is doubt about the presence of the reason in something which has the absence of *sādhya*. This (happens) both because of doubt if the reason occurs in something which has the absence of *sādhya* or because of doubt if the *sādhya* is absent in something which has reason. Thus (one cannot, however, argue that) this can occur even in the case of a subject, for in that case it would do away with every inference and hence this (doubt) is a fault only in other places. In the case of a sprout when there is uncertainty whether there is reason present in it or not, there is no fault of doubtful inconclusive reason and when it is certain that the reason is present, it is indeed the case of an inference of *sādhya* in something in which the doubt of the *sādhya* occurs, since all the conditions (of inference) are present as in the case of subject; therefore, if it is (argued) that the sprout is like the subject,[2] it cannot be admitted, since it is not the object of an establishing inference because of the absence of the reason being the attribute of the subject as it is not a subject. If it (sprout) were also the subject, it would then be another proposition that will have to be proved.

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[1] Negative instance is the term used for translating *vipakṣa*.

[2] Like the subject, i. e. *pakṣasama*.

विषयत्वे अङ्कुरे प्रथमं साध्यसाधनेऽर्थान्तराच्च । किं च एवमेकैकोपादानाभिज्ञसिद्धावपि नेश्वरसिद्धिः ।।

(7) नापि सर्गाद्यकालीनं द्व्यणुकं पक्षः, परं प्रति सर्गाद्यसिद्धेः॥

II (1) किं च सकर्तृकत्वं न तावत् कृतिमत्सहभावः, कृतिमज्जन्यत्वं वा, अस्मदादिना सिद्धसाधनात् ।।

(2) (a) उपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञान - चिकीर्षा – कृतिमज्जन्यत्वं तदिति चेत् । न । उपादानगोचरत्वं यदि यत्किंचिदुपादानगोचरत्वम्, तदा अस्मदादिनार्थान्तरत्वम् । ज्ञानादिजन्यत्वमपि विवक्षितम्, न च

There would not be even one inference because of the mutual dependence arising from the fact that there is inference in the subject (i. e. the earth etc.) after the ascertainment of the *sādhya* (in the sprout). Because of the fault of doubtful inconclusive reason even there with reference to earth and so on and also because of the fault of proving something other than what is to be proved (arising) from the fact that while the subject of dispute is the earth, the *sādhya* is first proved to be in the sprout, (it cannot be considered something like subject). Moreover, even if there is the certainty of the existence of some one having knowledge of each material cause, the existence of God is not established.

(7) Nor can the dyad at the beginning of creation be the subject since for the opponent the beginning of creation is not established.

II (1) Moreover the nature of having-an-agent means not existing-together-with-some-one-having-effort or being-produced-by-some one-having-effort, because of the fault of establishing what has been already established, in relation to us.

(2)(a) If it (the nature of having-an-agent) is said to be being-produced-by-some one-having-direct-knowledge-desire-to-do-and-effort of the material cause, it cannot be admitted. For if having the material cause as the object means that the object is any material cause, then there is the fault of establishing something

घटोपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानादीनां क्षितिजनकत्वं सम्भवति, व्यभिचारादिति चेत् । न । क्षितिजनकादृष्टजनकज्ञानादोनामुपादानविषयत्वनियमेनादृष्टद्वारा तैरेव सिद्धसाधनात् ।।

(b) न च साक्षात् तज्जन्यत्वं विवक्षितम्, तद्धि न कृतिजन्याजन्यत्वे सति कृतिजन्यत्वम्, स्वजनककृत्यव्यवहितोत्तरक्षणवर्त्तित्वं वा, घटदृष्टान्तस्य साध्यविकलतापत्तेः । घटादौ कुलालादिकर्तृकत्वाभावप्रसङ्गाच्च । न च शरीरक्रिया दृष्टान्त इति वाच्यम् । घटेनानैकान्तिकत्वात्, चेष्टात्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च ।।

(c) नापि क्षित्याद्युपादानगोचरत्वं विवक्षितम्, अप्रसिद्धेः ।

other than what is to be established in relation to us and so on. (In order to avoid this fault), being-produced-by-knowledge and so on also are meant; (and therefore) the direct knowledge and so on of the material cause of a pot does not produce the earth because of deviation; this cannot be admitted because the knowledge and so on which produce the unseen which brings about the earth, have necessarily the material cause as their object and so through the unseen there is the fault of establishing what has been already established in relation to them (i.e. knowledge of material cause etc.).

(b) Neither does the character of having-an-agent mean being-directly-produced (by such knowledge and so on) for it means neither that something is produced by an effort but at the same time (it is) not produced by a product of the same effort, nor it means existing in the moment immediately after the effort which produces it (the thing in question), because in the example of a pot and so on there would not be the *sādhya*, and also because with reference to a pot and so on there would be the objection that the potter and so on would not be the agents. Nor can action of a body be an example, since there would be the fault of inconclusive reason with reference to a pot and since bodily action would be an additional condition.

(c) Nor having the material cause of earth and so on as object of knowledge is meant because (some one who has the knowledge

न चोपादानशब्दस्य संबन्धिशब्दत्वेन घटक्षित्यादिपदसमभिव्याहारे तत्तदुपादानबोधकत्वं चैत्रो मातृभक्तो मैत्रवदिति वाच्यम् । शाब्दे हि बोधे तथा । न चात्र शब्दः प्रमाणम्, वादिनोरनाप्तत्वात् । अनुमाने त्वनुगतेन व्यापकत्वग्रहे तेन रूपेण व्यापकसिद्धिः । तच्चोपादानत्वमेवेति कथं नार्थान्तरम् । किं चैवं घटादावपि तत्तदुपादानत्वेनैवोपस्थित्या सामान्येन रूपेण कुत्राप्यनुपस्थितेर्व्याप्तिरेव न गृह्येत । अपि च सामान्यलक्षणया ज्ञानलक्षणया योगजधर्मरूपया वा प्रत्यासत्त्या उपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानचिकीर्षा-कृतिमता अस्मदादिना सिद्धसाधनम्,

of the material cause of earth and so on) is unexampled. Nor can it be held that the expression 'material cause' being a relative term, when mentioned together with terms like pot, earth and so on, points out the respective material causes just as when one says Caitra is devoted to his mother like Maitra. This is so in the case of verbal cognition. But here word is not a source of valid knowledge since the disputants are not trustworthy persons. In inference since one cognizes pervasion through the consecutive character, one establishes the pervader in that form (i.e. consecutive character). And since this is in the form of the material cause as material cause, how cannot but there be the fault of proving something other than what is to be proved?

Moreover in this way, with reference to a pot and so on, since there is knowledge only of the respective material causes as such and nowhere there is the knowledge (of material causes) in a universal form, pervasion itself would not be ascertained.

And besides, there would be the fault of establishing what has been already established in relation to us possessing effort, desire to do and direct knowledge of the material cause through the relation of the nature of a universal or the relation of the nature of knowledge or (the relation of) the nature of merit arising from meditation for although these (knowledge and so on) do not exist in the moment immediately preceding the existence of earth, some one having these (attributes of knowledge and so on) exists (even at

तेषां क्षित्यव्यवहितपूर्वसमयासत्त्वेऽपि तद्वतः सत्त्वाद्, अदृष्टद्वारा तेषामपि जनकत्वसंभवात्, ज्ञानादिसाक्षाज्जन्यत्वस्य च निरस्तत्वात् ॥

(3) (a) अथ योगजधर्माजन्यसविकल्पकाजन्यसामान्यलक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्यजन्यजन्योपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञान-चिकीर्षा-कृतिमदजन्यं जन्यं पक्षः; योगजधर्माजन्यसविकल्पकाजन्यसामान्यलक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्यजन्योपादानगोचरज्ञान-चिकीर्षा-कृतिमज्जन्यमिति साध्यम् । यद्वा– अनागतगोचरसाक्षात्कारजनकप्रत्यासत्त्यजन्यजन्यज्ञानादिमदजन्यं जन्यमनागतगोचरसाक्षात्कारजनकप्रत्यासत्त्यजन्योपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानादिमज्जन्यमिति साध्यम् । ज्ञानाव्यवहितोत्तरसमयवर्त्तीच्छातदव्यवहितोत्तर-

that time) and because these attributes (of knowledge and so on) produce (the earth) through the unseen and because being-directly-produced-by-knowledge and so on is rejected.

(3) (a) Now let the subject be something produced but not produced by some one having an effort, desire to do and direct knowledge of the material cause, which knowledge and so on are produced but not produced by the relation of the nature of a universal, (and) not produced by a qualificative cognition (and) also not produced by merit arising from meditation. Let the *sādhya* be that which is produced by some one having an effort, desire to do and direct knowledge of the material cause, which knowledge is not produced by the relation of the nature of a universal (and) not produced by a qualificative cognition and not produced by merit arising from meditation.

Or let the *sādhya* be something produced but not produced by a produced knowledge which is not produced by a relation which produces the direct knowledge of such things as will happen in the future; (or let the *sādhya* be) something produced by some one having direct knowledge and so on of the material cause which knowledge is not produced by the relation which produces the direct perception of such things as will happen in the future. The agenthood (that belongs to the effort etc.) is to be understood (in the following order): the desire exists in the moment immediately following the knowledge and the effort follows in the moment

समयवर्त्तिकृतीनां जनकत्वं विवक्षितम्, न तु ज्ञानादीनां यौगपद्यं पौर्वापर्यं वा । अतो न साध्याप्रसिद्धिः, न वा क्षित्यादौ बाध इति ।।

(b) (i) मैवम् । योगजधर्मसामान्यज्ञानरूपप्रत्यासत्तीनामनागतगोचरसाक्षात्कारस्य तज्जनकप्रत्यासत्तीनां च परस्याप्रसिद्धतया तदजन्यस्य साक्षात्कारस्याप्यप्रसिद्धत्वेन पक्ष-साध्ययोर्विशेषणासिद्ध्या परं प्रत्याश्रयासिद्धेः साध्याप्रसिद्धेश्च ।।

(ii) तत्सिद्धौ वा पक्षे तदजन्यत्वासिद्धेः क्षितिजनकादृष्टजनककृति-चिकीर्षा-साक्षात्काराणां योगजधर्माद्यजन्यानामदृष्टद्वारा क्षितिजनकत्वेन सिद्धसाधनात् । न च तादृशसाक्षाज्जन्यत्वं विवक्षितम्,

immediately following it; neither simultaneity nor succession of knowledge etc, is meant, and therefore there cannot be (the faults of) the absence of *sādhya* or of contradiction with regard to the earth etc.

(b)(i) This is not so, since the opponent does not admit the relations that are brought about by merit arising from meditation or by the knowledge of universals, and since he does not admit direct knowledge of things that are to happen in the future or the relations that produce it. Hence the direct knowledge that is not produced by these not being established, the qualifications of subject and *sādhya* not being existent according to the opponent's point of view, there would be the fallacy of the subject and *sādhya* being unexampled.

(ii) And even when these (relations and the resulting perception) are admitted, it is not the case that the subject is not produced by them, (i.e. by the relations not arising from the unseen and so on) and hence not being produced by these (relations) with reference to the subject would remain unestablished, and hence there would be the fault of establishing what has already been established with reference to the effort, desire to do and perception which produce the unseen conducive to the production of earth because these (relations and the resulting perception) which are not produced by the relation arising from the unseen etc. produce the earth through the unseen. Nor is meant the direct production by these

घटादिदृष्टान्ते तदसम्भवात्, दृष्टान्ते घटादौ जनकेष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्यानुमितित्वेन जन्यसविकल्पकव्याप्तिग्रहजन्यत्वेन च साध्याप्रसिद्धेश्च ।।

(iii) ननु व्याप्तिबलेन साध्यं सिध्यति, व्याप्तिश्च यत्र यत्र कार्यत्वं तत्र तदुपादानाभिज्ञजन्यत्वमितिरूपा, न तु यद्यत्कार्यं तद्यत्किंचिदुपादानाभिज्ञजन्यमिति । एवं च यत्र यत्र कार्यत्वं तत्र तदुपादानाभिज्ञजन्यत्वमिति विशिष्य व्याप्त्या क्षित्यादौ कार्यत्वं क्षित्याद्युपादानाभिज्ञजन्यत्वमेव साधयति, अतो न सिद्धसाधनमिति चेत् । न । घटे पटे च कार्यत्वस्य व्याप्तिग्रहः किं प्रत्येकं घटोपादानाभिज्ञजन्यत्वेन, तत्तदुपा-

(knowledge and so on which are not produced by these relations), since in the example of jar and so on this is absent; and since in the example of jar and so on the knowledge that it serves one's purpose is inferential and since (this inference) is produced by knowledge of the invariable concomitance which proceeds from a qualificative cognition, there is the (fault of) absence of *sādhya*.

(iii) The *sādhya* is established on the strength of invariable concomitance and this is in the following form: Wherever there is 'being-an-effect', there is also 'being-produced-by-an-agent-who-has-the-knowledge-of-its-material-cause'; the invariable concomitance is not (in the following form): Whatever is an effect, is produced by some one who knows some kind of material cause. Thus wherever there is 'being-an-effect', there is also 'being-produced-by-some one-who-has-the-knowledge-of-the-respective-material causes'; through this specific invariable concomitance, 'being-an-effect' in the earth and so on establishes 'being-produced-by-some one-who-knows-the-material-cause-of-earth and so on' and therefore there is no fault of establishing something that has been already established. This is not true. How is the invariable concomitance of 'being-an-effect' in the case of a jar and of a cloth ascertained? Is it cognized because of its being produced by some one having the knowledge of the material cause etc. of each individual thing or because of its being produced by some one having knowledge of the respective material causes, or because of its being produced by some one having the knowledge of material

दानाभिज्ञजन्यत्वेन, उपादानाभिज्ञजन्यत्वेन वा ?। आद्ये घटोपादानाभिज्ञजन्यत्वादौ कार्यत्वस्य व्यभिचार एव । द्वितीये त्वननुगततत्तच्छब्दाभिधेयघटाद्युपादानगतानुगतरूपाभावात् कथं व्यापकताग्रहः ?। तत्तच्छब्दस्य स्वभावात् समभिव्याहृतपरतया नायं दोष इति चेत् । न । अनुमाने शब्दस्वभावोपन्यासस्याप्रयोजकत्वात् । अत एवेदानीं देवदत्तो बहिरस्ति विद्यमानत्वे सति गृहासत्त्वात्, विद्यमानत्वे सति यो यदा यत्र नास्ति स तदा तदतिरिक्ते देशेऽस्ति यथाऽहमेव बहिरसन् गृहमध्ये तिष्ठामीत्यत्र पक्षदृष्टान्तसाधारणयत्त्वतत्त्वयोरनुगतयोरभावान्नान्वयि, किंतु व्यतिरेकीत्युक्तम् । तृतीये सिद्धसाधनमेव ।।

(4) अथ सर्गाद्यकालीनद्व्यणुकं ज्ञानेच्छाकृतिसमानकालीनसामग्रीजन्यं कार्यत्वाद् घटवत् । अदृष्टसामग्रीजन्यत्वेऽदृष्टत्वापत्तिरिति

cause (in general)? In the first case there is indeed the deviation of being the effect in the case of being produced by some one having the knowledge of the material cause of jar. In the second case, how can pervadedness (invariable concomitance) be ascertained since there is no consecutive character in the material causes of the jar etc. which are expressed by their respective words i. e. 'that' 'that' which are themselves not consecutive in character? If it is argued that there is no such fault because of the association arising from the nature of the word 'that' 'that', it is not true because in an inference argument should not be based on the nature of word. Hence it is said that (the inference) Devadatta is now outside since while being alive, he is not at home; whoever being alive is not at a particular place and time, is in a place other than that place just as I, being not outside, am inside the house; since there is no consecutive character in the nature of the word 'which' and 'that' which are common to the subject and the example, it (the inference) is not positive but negative. In the third case, there is indeed the fault of establishing what has been already established.

(4) If it is argued that the dyad at the beginning of creation is produced by the complex of conditions which exist at the same time as the knowledge, desire and effort, because it is an effect

चेत् । न । परं प्रति सर्गाद्यसिद्धेः । ज्ञानादीनां सिद्धावपि द्व्यणुकाजनकत्वाद्, उदासीनसिद्धावप्रयोजकत्वाच्च । एतेन सर्गाद्यकालीनं द्व्यणुकं द्व्यणुकासमवायिकारणसमानकालीनकृतिजन्यमिति निरस्तम्, द्व्यणुकासमवायिकारणसमानकालीनकृतित्वेन गौरवाप्रयोजकत्वाभ्यामजनकत्वात् ।।

III (1) (a) किंच कार्यत्वं न तावद्योगोपस्थितकृत्यर्हत्वम्, असिद्धेः ।

(b) नापि पूर्वकालासत्त्वे सति उत्तरकालसंबन्धित्वम्, तत्तत्पूर्वकालत्वस्याननुगतत्वात् सकलपूर्वकालस्याप्रसिद्धेः ।।

just like jar;(and if it is said that the dyad is) produced by the causal complexes that produce the unseen, (then there would be the objection that the dyad) would also be unseen, it cannot be admitted because the opponent does not admit the beginning of creation. Even if there is the certainty of the existence of the knowledge and so on, they do not produce the dyad and they will not be a support for proving the indifferent (God). By this also is rejected (the argument) that the dyad existing at the beginning of creation is produced by an effort which exists at the same time as the non-inherent cause of the dyad, because owing to logical complexity[1] and lack of supporting argument, the effort etc. which exist at the same time as the non-inherent cause of dyad, cannot be the cause.

III (1)(a) Besides, being-an-effect is not what is suitable to be brought about by effort, which is (the sense) from the etymology (of the word) because it (i. e. earth etc. being suitable to be produced by the effort of some one) is not established.

(b) Nor is it being related to a later time, while not existing at a prior time, because there is no consecutive character in relation to the respective prior time segments and hence the prior time of all things will be unestablished.

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[1] Logical complexity, i. e. *gaurava*; some others translate it as 'heaviness'.

(c) नापि कादाचित्कत्वम्, प्रागभावेनानैकान्तिकत्वात्।।

(d) नापि प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वम्, ध्वंसेनानैकान्तिकत्वात् ।।

(e) नापि सत्त्वे सति तत्त्वम्, सत्ताजातेः परं प्रत्यसिद्धेः, स्वरूपसत्त्वस्य च ध्वंसेऽपि सत्त्वात् ।।

(2) यत्त्वयं घटः एतद्घटजनकानित्यज्ञान-चिकीर्षा-कृत्यतिरिक्तज्ञानादिजन्यः कार्यत्वात् पटवदित्यादि । तन्न । विपक्षबाधकाभावेनाप्रयोजकत्वात् । अन्यथा अयं घटः एतद्घटजनकानित्यादृष्टातिरिक्तादृष्टजन्यः कार्यत्वात् पटवत्, एतौ सुखदुःखसाक्षात्कारौ एतज्जनकानित्यसुखदुःखातिरिक्तमुखदुःखसाध्यौ सुखदुःखसाक्षात्कारत्वाद्

(c) Nor is it being-accidental since this would involve deviation with reference to prior absence.

(d) Nor is it being the counter-positive of a prior absence, for there is deviation with reference to destruction.

(e) Nor is it being an existent entity and at the same time being the counter-positive of a prior absence, since the opponent does not accept existence as a generic attribute, and since existence *per se* is to be found also in destruction.

(2) (The argument) that this jar is produced by knowledge and so on which are different from the knowledge, desire to do and effort which are not eternal and which produce this jar, since it is an effect, like a cloth, cannot be admitted, since it does not have a supporting reason because of the absence of contradiction in a negative instance. Otherwise there would be the possibility of establishing the locus of eternal merit and demerit, happiness and sorrow, by the inference: This jar is produced by the unseen which is different from the non-eternal unseen which produces this jar, because it is an effect like a cloth; this experience of happiness and sorrow are produced by happiness and sorrow which are different from the non-eternal happiness and sorrow which produce it, because it is experience of happiness and sorrow. And also because of the possibility of the counter-inference (in the following way): This jar is not produced by knowledge etc., which are different

इत्यादिना नित्यधर्माधर्म-सुख-दुःखाश्रयस्यापि सिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । अयं घटः स्वजनकानित्यज्ञानाद्यतिरिक्तज्ञानाद्यजन्यः घटत्वाद् अपरघटवदित्यादिना सत्प्रतिपक्षाच्च ।।

(3) केचित्तु दृश्यते तावदभिमतविषयग्राहिणीन्द्रिये मनो निवेशयतः पुंसो मनःक्रियानुकूलो यत्नः । तथा च सर्गाद्यकालीनशरीरजन्यज्ञानध्वंसानाधारकालाधारज्ञानजनकात्ममनोयोगजनिका मनःक्रिया तन्मनोगोचरप्रयत्नानाधारतन्मनोगोचरप्रयत्नतद्व्याप्येतरसकलकारणाधारकालानन्तरकालानाधारा तन्मनःक्रियात्वात् संमततन्मनःक्रियावद्, अर्थात् प्रयत्नाधारकालानन्तरकालाधारा सा क्रिया सिध्यतीत्याहुः ।

from the non-eternal knowledge etc. which produce it, because it is experience of happiness and sorrow. And also because of the possibility of the counter-inference (in the following way): This jar is not produced by knowledge etc., which are different from the non-eternal knowledge etc. which produce it, because it has potness like another pot.

(3) Some say that an effort conducive to the action of the mind is observed in a person who has directed his mind to the sense organ that grasps the desired object and hence there is the action of the mind which produces the conjunction between the mind and the self, that produces the knowledge which has a time as substratum which (time) is not the substratum of the destruction of the knowledge which is produced by the body at the time of creation. This action of the mind does not have as substratum the time of the effort whose object is the mind, (further this action of the mind) does not have as substratum a time which is after the time which is the substratum of all efforts, having the mind as object and of all other causes pervaded by them, because it has the nature of an action of the mind, like the action of the mind accepted by both parties. And hence it is established that the action has as substratum a time after the time which is the substratum of effort.

तन्न । सर्गाद्यकाले ज्ञानजनकमनःसंयोगजनकक्रियायां मानाभावः पूर्वक्रिययैव संयोगसंभवात् । ईश्वरवादिनां तन्मनोगोचरप्रयत्नानाधारः कालोऽप्रसिद्ध एव । क्रियात्वस्यैव हेतुत्वे व्यर्थविशेषणत्वं च । किंचैवं प्रयत्नानाधारकालानन्तरकालानाधारत्वम् अर्थात् तत्सिद्धौ मानान्तरादीश्वरसिद्धावर्थान्तरत्वमिति ।।

B. I (1) अत्रोच्यते । अदृष्टाद्वारकोपादानगोचरजन्यकृत्यजन्यानि समवेतानि जन्यानि,

(2) (a) अदृष्टप्रागभावव्याप्यप्रागभावाप्रतियोग्युपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञान–चिकीर्षा–कृतिमज्जन्यानि,

This arugment cannot be admitted: There is no proof for the (existence) of the action of the mind which produces the conjunction of mind which produces knowledge that exists at the beginning of creation, since it is possible for conjunction to take place by means of the previous action (in the previous dissolution) and further for those who admit God, time which is not the substratum of the effort whose object is the mind is unexampled. If mere action is taken as the reason (it has) superfluous qualification. And besides, (it is proved that the action of the mind) does not have as substratum a time which is not the substratum of effort, and not that it has as substratum a time after the effort. If by implication it is proved, then the existence of God is established by some other means; and so there is (the defect of) establishing something other than what is to be established.

B. *Uttarapakṣa*

I (1) On this it is said: Things produced, but not through the unseen and existing by the relation of inherence, which are not produced by an effort which is produced and whose object is the material cause,

(2)(a) (These things) are produced by some one having effort, desire to do and direct knowledge of the material cause, (and which effort, knowledge and desire to do) are not the counter-positive of a prior absence which is pervaded by the prior absence of the unseen.

(b) स्वजनकादृष्टोत्तरोपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञान – चिकीर्षा – कृतिमज्जन्यानि वा,

(c) अपरोक्षज्ञान–चिकीर्षा–प्रयत्नविषयीभवदुपादानानि वा,

(3) समवेतत्वे सति प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वात्, यदेवं तदेवं यथा घटः, तथा चैतानि, तस्मात्तथा ।।

II (1) (a) उक्तपक्षे कस्यचिदनन्तर्भावेऽपि तदादाय तथैव निरुक्तस्य पक्षत्वनिर्देशे समूहालम्बनरूपैवानुमितिरुत्पद्यते ।।

(b) न च जन्यकृत्यजन्यत्वं तावदननुगतेषु एकरूपाभावेन ग्रहीतुमशक्यमिति वाच्यम् । जन्यकृत्यजन्यत्वं हि जन्यकृतिजन्यान्यत्वमित्यन्यत्वेन रूपेण सामान्यलक्षणया तावतामुपस्थितेः । न च

(b) Or these things are produced by some one having effort, desire to do and direct knowledge whose object is the material cause, which are later than the unseen which produces the thing in question.

(c) Or these things have the material causes which are the object of effort, desire to do and direct knowledge.

(3) Since these things being inherent are counter-positive of prior absence. Whatever is thus (having reason) is so (having *sādhya*) like a jar. These are so (i. e. having the reason). Therefore (since this has reason), they are so (i. e. have the *sādhya*).

II (1)(a) In this subject so mentioned even if something is not included, the subject is to be designated taking that also and enunciating it (as subject), (and then) there would be inference of a complex character.

(b) Nor can it be asserted that being-not-produced-by-an-effort-which-is-produced cannot be understood properly, owing to the absence of a common property in discreet things which do not follow consecutively, for being-not-produced-by-an-effort-that-is-produced and thus in this form of-being-other, knowledge of all

जन्यत्वविशेषणव्यावर्त्याप्रसिद्धिः, प्रमेयो घट इतिवदव्यावर्त्तकत्वेऽपि तदुपरक्तबुद्धेरुद्देश्यत्वेन तस्योपरञ्जकत्वात् ।।

(c) उक्तान्यतमत्वमेव सकर्तृकत्वम् । अत एव घटभोक्ता न घटकर्त्तेति व्यवह्रियते ।।

(d) एवं च शब्दफूत्कारादीनां पक्षतैव । ज्ञानेच्छादीनामपि पक्षत्वान्न संदिग्धानैकान्तिकता । उपादानस्य सिद्धत्वेऽपि उपादेयस्यासिद्धत्वेन तद्वत्तया तत्रापि चिकीर्षा । यद्वा—पक्षे हेतौ च न समवेतत्वं विशेषणम् । तेन ध्वंसोऽपि पक्षः । साध्ये च उपादानपदं कारणमात्रपरम्,

such other things occurs by means of the (supernormal relation) in the form of universals. Nor can it be said that the qualification of 'being-produced' does not serve to distinguish (the qualified object from other things) for when it is said that a jar is knowable, although there is nothing that serves to distinguish (it from other things since everything is validly knowable) still the intention is that it (pot) is joined with it (knowability) and therefore it (knowability) is an adventitious characteristic.

(c) Being one of the (things enunciated as *sādhya*) is itself having-an-agent. Hence it is said that one who makes use of a jar is not its agent.

(d) Thus sound, the act of blowing and so on are also the subject. Knowledge, desire etc. are also subject and hence there is no fault of doubtful inconclusive reasoning. Even when the material cause is given, that which is produced from the material cause is not yet given, and therefore there can be desire to do with regard to the material cause as going to have the thing to be produced; or else in the subject and reason, let there be no qualification of 'existing-by-the-relation-of-inherence' and therefore destruction also is subject and in the formulation of *sādhya* the expression 'material cause' (is to be taken) only (in the sense of) cause; or else the expression 'material cause' need not be mentioned and in the statement of subject 'being-not-produced-by-desire-to-do and effort-

अनुपादेयमेव वा । जन्येच्छाकृत्यजन्यत्वं च पक्षे विवक्षितम् । तेन कृतिध्वंसस्य कृतिजन्यत्वेऽपि इच्छाजन्यत्वाभावात् पक्षत्वम् ॥

(e) क्षितिरेव वा पक्षः । न चाङ्कुरे संदिग्धानैकान्तिकत्वम्, पक्षपक्षसमनैरपेक्षेण घटादौ निश्चितव्याप्तेर्लिङ्गस्य तयोर्दर्शनेनोभयत्रानुमित्यविरोधात् । न त्वनुमित्योरन्योन्यापेक्षत्वम्, येनान्योन्याश्रयः स्यात् । प्रतिज्ञाया अविषयत्वात् तत्र पक्षसमव्यपदेशः । न चाङ्कुरस्य पक्षत्वेनानिर्देशात् तत्र न पक्षधर्मताज्ञानमिति वाच्यम् । सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसाधकप्रमाणाभाववति लिङ्गज्ञानस्यानुमितिमात्रकारणत्वात् तत्र क्षितौ पञ्चावयवेन, अङ्कुरे स्वत एवेति न कश्चिद्विशेषः । यदि

which-are-produced' is meant and therefore though the destruction of effort is produced by effort, it is also subject since it has absence of being-produced-by-desire.

(e) Or let only the earth be the subject. And there is no doubtful inconclusive reasoning in relation to a sprout. The invariable concomitance of the reason, ascertained in relation to a jar and so on, without taking into account (whether it is) subject or something like the subject, is seen in both, and so there is no contradiction in having inference in both cases. The two inferences, do not depend on each other so that there could be mutual dependence. The designation of 'something-like-subject' is because it is not the object of the proposition that is to be established. Nor can it be objected that since the sprout is not mentioned as subject, there is no knowledge of the reason being the attribute of the subject. Since the cause of inferences as such is the knowledge of the reason (as present) in that which has the absence of the means of establishing the (*sādhya*) and which absence is accompanied by the absence of the desire to establish (the same) and since this (knowledge) exists with regard to earth, helped by means of the five parts of syllogism; and in a sprout (unaided) by itself, there is no difference. If at the time when in the earth the reason is ascertained if there is no certainty that the sprout has reason, then how can there be the fault of doubtful inconclusive reason?

च क्षितौ हेतुनिश्चयदशायामङ्कुरस्य हेतुमत्तया न निश्चयस्तदा क्व संदिग्धानैकान्तिकत्वम् । अथ पक्षसमे साध्याभावसामानाधिकरण्यसंशयाद् हेतौ व्याप्तिग्रह एव नोत्पद्यते, उत्पन्नोऽपि वा बाध्येत इति चेत् तर्हि महानसेऽपि धूमे व्याप्तिग्रहो न स्यात्, भूतोऽपि वा बाध्येत संदिग्धवह्निकपर्वतापर्वतधूमवतामेकधर्माभावेनापक्षत्वात् । तस्मात् साध्यसन्देहवति हेतुनिश्चयो न दोषः, किंतु गुण एव । अन्यथा अनुमानमात्रमुच्छिद्येत । पक्षादन्यत्र तद्दूषणमिति यदुक्तम्, तत्र पक्षान्यत्वं सिषाधयिषितसाध्यान्यत्वं यदि, तदानपेक्षितानुमितिर्न स्यात् । अथ संदिग्धसाध्यान्यत्वं साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावविषयान्यत्वं वा, तदा अङ्कुरेऽपि तन्नास्ति । अथ प्रतिज्ञाविषयान्यत्वम्, तदा स्वार्थानुमित्युच्छेदः ॥

Now if it is objected (as follows): since in 'something like subject' there is a doubt, if (the reason) is co-existent with the absence of *sādhya*, obviously the ascertainmet of invariable concomitance in reason cannot arise, and even if it occurs, it would be contradicted, (the answer is that) in that case even in the kitchen the universal relation in the smoke would not be ascertained and even if it is ascertained, it would be contradicted, since mountain and non-mountain which have smoke but about which there is doubt if they have fire or not are not the subject since they lack a common property. Therefore the ascertainment of reason in something in which there is doubt if it has *sādhya* or not, is no fault; but it is merit, otherwise all the inferences would be uprooted. When it was stated that (the doubt of *sādhya*) is a fault only in places other than the subject, then in that case if being other than subject meant being something other than *sādhya* which is desired to be established, then there would be no inference which is not (explicitly) desired. But (if being different from subject meant) being something other than the *sādhya* which is doubted, or being different from something where there is the absence of the means of establishing and not establishing (the *sādhya*), then this is absent also, in a sprout. If however, (being other than subject means) being different from the object of the proposition to be established, then there would be no inference for oneself.

(f) नियतविषयज्ञानाजन्यत्वेन पक्षविशेषणात् सर्वविषयज्ञानसिद्धिः ।।

(2) (a) साध्ये च ज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नानां विशेषणत्वेन विशिष्टस्य साधनत्वं विवक्षितम् । तेन न तदुपलक्षितक्षेत्रज्ञेनार्थान्तरम् । सामान्यतोऽपि साध्यनिर्देशे पक्षधर्मतावलेनाभिमतविशेषसिद्धिश्च ।।

(b) नन्वाद्यसाध्यद्वये घटाद्युपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञान–चिकीर्षा–कृतीनामेव जनकत्वमायातु इत्यर्थान्तरम्, नच तेषां व्यभिचारात् क्षित्यादौ न कारणत्वमिति वाच्यम् । अनादौ प्रवाहे कस्यचित् कदाचित् क्षितिद्व्यणुकादिपूर्वं घटाद्युपादानगोचरज्ञानादिसत्त्वात् । न च सर्गाद्यकालीनस्यापि पक्षत्वात् तत्रेश्वरसिद्धिः, परं प्रति तदसिद्धेरिति चेत् ।

(f) Since the subject is qualified by 'not produced by a knowledge which has a particular thing as object', knowledge of everything is established.

(2)(a) And in the *sādhya* because knowledge, desire and effort are (real) qualifiers, production (is attributed to) a soul that is (really) qualified (by these qualifiers) and not to a soul which may be adventitiously qualified by those and therefore is no fault of establishing something other than what is to be established. When *sādhya* is designated in a general way there is the establishment of the desired specific individual (viz. God) by means of the force of (the reason) being the attribute of the subject.

(b) But in the case of the first two *sādhya*, let production belong to the effort, desire and direct knowledge of the material cause of the jar etc; and so there would be (the fault of) establishing something other than that which is to be established. Nor can it be argued that because they (the knowledge of the material cause of jar etc.) may be absent they cannot be the cause of the world. In the beginningless flow (of time) there would be some one at some time who has the knowledge of the material causes of jar etc., prior to earth, dyad etc. Nor can it be argued that one can establish the existence of God, if one takes (the jar etc,) at the beginning of creation, as subject, because for the opponent the

न। ज्ञानादीनां त्रयाणां स्वविषयसमवेतकार्यं प्रत्येव जनकत्वावधारणेनैतदनुमानस्य तदविषयत्वात्। अत एवान्योपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानाद्यजन्यत्वेन पक्षविशेषणमपि न युक्तम्। तृतीयसाध्ये तु नार्थान्तरं क्षित्यादेः घटाद्युपादानासमवेतत्वात्। ननु सामान्यलक्षणादिप्रत्यासत्त्या क्षित्याद्युपादानगोचरं यत् प्रत्यक्षं तज्जन्यत्वमेवास्तु। तथा चेश्वरे न प्रत्यक्षम्, न वा इच्छाप्रयत्नौ। तयोः समानाधिकरणज्ञानाविषयेऽसत्त्वात्। न च तादृशप्रत्यासत्त्यजन्यत्त्वं प्रत्यक्षविशेषणम्, परं प्रत्यसिद्धेरिति चेत्। न। द्रव्यत्वेन ज्ञानलक्षणया वा कपालगोचरप्रत्यक्षेऽपि घटादावकर्तृकत्वात् क्षित्यादौ सकर्तृकत्वनिर्वाहकं ज्ञानं सिध्यद् विल-

(beginning of creation) is unexampled. This is not true, because the three things, knowledge etc., produce only the effect which inheres in their own (respective) objects. This inference (establishing the existence of God) has not this (knowledge of the two halves of jar etc.) as object. And therefore, it is not proper to qualify the subject by 'being-not-produced-by-direct-knowledge-etc. whose-object-is-the-material-cause-of-another-thing.' In the third *sādhya*, however, there is no fault of proving something other than what is to be proved, since the earth etc. do not inhere in the material cause of the jar etc. But it may be objected: Let there be being-produced by that perception which has the material cause of the earth etc., as the object by means of the relation in the form of universals and therefore there is no perception in God, nor desire and effort, since they are not present in regard to something which is not the object of the cognition having the same locus. Nor need it be objected that 'being-not-produced-by-such-relations' is a qualification of perception since the opponent does not admit it (i. e. a relation in the form of a universal idea). It is not so. Even when there is perception of the (two) parts of a pot through relation in the form of (the universal idea of) substance or by means of (the relation) in the form of knowledge, the jar etc. will not be produced and so knowledge which establishes the existence of an agent for the earth etc. is different (from the knowledge arising by means of the apprehensional connection in the form of universal

क्षणमेव सिध्यति । न च अवयवविभागद्वारा क्षित्यादिषु, जलक्षेपात् समुद्रादिषु, हस्तक्षेपात् परमाणुद्वयसंयोगे च द्वचणुकेषु अस्मदादिकर्तृकत्वादंशतः सिद्धसाधनमिति वाच्यम् । तत्र हि क्षितिनाशे अस्मदादीनां कर्तृत्वम्, न तु खण्डक्षितौ । अवस्थितसंयोगेभ्य एव तदुपपत्तेः, सकलतदुपादानगोचरज्ञानेच्छाकृतीनामभावाच्च । अत एव द्वचणुकेऽपि न कर्तृत्वम् । जलक्षेपादधिकपरिमाणकसमुद्रादेः सपक्षत्वमेव घटस्येव ॥

(c) ननु घटे साध्यविकलत्वम् अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां ज्ञानादेरेव जनकत्वात्, न तु तदाश्रयस्य, धर्मिग्राहकस्य अन्वयव्यतिरेकस्य वा ग्राहकस्याभावात् । न च घट आत्मजन्य उत्पत्तिमत्त्वाद् ज्ञानवदिति वाच्यम् । आत्मसमवेतत्वस्योपाधित्वात् । घट आकाशजन्य उत्पत्ति-

idea etc.). Nor can it be said that there is partially (the fault of) establishing what has already been established because we are makers of earth etc. by means of the division of parts (of the earth); of ocean etc., by pouring water (into it); of dyads through the conjunction of atoms etc. by means of the movements of hand. In these cases we are makers with regard to the destruction of the earth, and not with regard to the divided earth, since it arises from already existing conjunction and also because of the absence of the knowledge of the whole material cause of the earth. For the same reason we are not agents of dyad. The ocean with more water by means of the addition of water, is indeed a positive instance like a jar.

(c) But it may be objected that in that case, in a jar there is the imperfection of *sādhya*, since the production of jar belongs only to knowledge etc. by means of positive and negative concomitance and not to the substratum of (this knowledge) because of the absence of the means of knowing the substratum (of this knowledge) or because of the absence of the means of cognizing the positive and negative concomitances. Nor can it be argued that the jar is produced by the soul since it has origin like knowledge since here being-inherent-in-a-soul is an additional condition and also because of the absence of supporting reason as (in the following case): A jar is produced by ether since it has origin like sound.

मत्त्वाच्छब्दवदितिवदप्रयोजकत्वाच्चेति चेत् । मैवम् । प्रयत्नवदात्मसंयोगश्चेष्टाद्वारा घटहेतुः । अतः प्रयत्न इव आत्मापि हेतुः । न च आत्मसंयोगे सत्यपि प्रयत्नं विना न चेष्टेति प्रयत्न एव तत्कारणम्, असमवायिकारणं विना कार्यानुत्पत्तेः । न चात्मसंयोगस्य कारणत्वेऽपि संयोगे परिचायकमात्रमात्मेति वाच्यम् । संयोगमात्रस्याकारणत्वेन संयोगिविशेषितस्य हेतुत्वात् । आत्मसंयोगव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तक्रियाव्यतिरेकस्यासिद्धेर्नात्मसंयोगः कारणमिति चेत् । न । या क्रिया व्यधिकरणयदीयगुणजन्या सा तत्संयोगासमवायिकारणिका यथा स्पर्शवद्वेगवद्द्रव्यसंयोगजा क्रियेति व्याप्त्या तत्सिद्धेः । न च क्रियाया मूर्त्तमात्रसमवेतासमवायिकारणकत्वनियम इति वाच्यम् । कार्यमात्राभिप्रायेण

This is not so. The conjunction of the soul which has effort is the cause of the jar through bodily action and so the soul also having the effort is the cause. Nor can it be argued in the following way: Even though there is the conjunction of the soul, without effort, there is no bodily movement and hence effort alone is the cause of that (bodily movement) since without the non-inherent cause, there cannot be any effect. Nor can it be argued that even if the conjunction of the soul is held to be the cause, the soul is only an adventitious qualifier (*paricāyaka*) because conjunction alone not being the cause, that which is qualified by conjunction is the cause. If it is argued that the conjunction of soul is not the cause because one cannot establish an absence of a movement, owing to the absence of the conjunction of soul, it is not true; that movement which is produced by a quality of something else which is existing in another locus, has as its non-inherent cause a conjunction with that (i. e. that something else) just like a movement which is produced by the conjunction with an object having the qualities of touch and speed (and) by this invariable concomitance, it (the fact that the conjunction of soul is the cause of bodily movement) is established. Nor can it be said that any non-inherent cause (of a movement) must inhere only in objects having movement, for if all effects are intended, there is deviation with reference to knowledge etc.; there is no supporting reason if some

ज्ञानादौ व्यभिचारात्, विशिष्याप्रयोजकत्वात्, असमवायिकारणसंयोगाश्रयस्य तत्कार्यंजनकत्वनियमाच्च। अन्ये तु अनुकूलकृतिसमवायित्वं कर्तृत्वम्, न तु जनकत्वे सति, गौरवात्। कर्त्तरि कारकव्यपदेशश्चाभियुक्तानां सविशेषणे हि इति न्यायेन कृतिपर्यवसन्न एव। एवं ज्ञानेच्छाकृतिजन्यत्वमेव साध्यम्। तदाश्रयत्वमेवेश्वरस्य कर्तृत्वम्।।

(d) अथ घटे कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनताज्ञानं चिकीर्षाद्वारा हेतुः, तच्च न प्रत्यक्षं चिकीर्षाविषयेऽनागते इन्द्रियासन्निकर्षात्। किं तु अनुमितिरूपम्। तथा च साध्यविकलो दृष्टान्तः साध्याप्रसिद्धिर्वा दोष इति चेत्। न। सिद्धवृत्त्यसिद्धविषया हि कृतिः सिद्धविषयप्रत्यक्षे

particular case (is intended); and hence the rule is that the substratum of conjunction which is the non-inherent cause, is the cause of the effect. Others think that being-an-agent consists in the inherence in the agent of the effort that is conducive (to the production of the thing in question) and (being-an-agent is not that he, while the effort inheres in him) produces (the effect), because of logical complexity. And naming the agent as the doer finally applies to (his) effort according to the principle of the learned, viz. (when a particular affirmation or denial does not refer to the substantive, then it applies to) the qualifier. Thus the *sādhya* is being-produced-by-means-of-effort-desire-and-knowledge and God's agenthood means that he is their substratum.

(d) Now with regard to a jar the knowledge that something is feasible through effort and that it is a means to the desired end is the cause through the desire to make; such a knowledge is not perception since there is no contact of the sense organs with the object of desire which has not yet come into existence; but (such a knowledge) is in the form of inference and hence there is the fault that the example has absence of the *sādhya* or that the *sādhya* is unestablished.

This is not true because effort has as object something that does not yet exist, but is present in something already existing, (and effort) will come into existence only when there is the perception of that which is already existing. Even if there

सति संभवति । न हि मृदवयवानां संस्थानविशेषे कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनतानुमितावप्यवयवस्य प्रत्यक्षेणोपस्थितिं विना प्रवृत्तिः । अत एव यागे शब्दात्तदुपजीविलिङ्गाद्वा कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वेऽवगतेऽपि हविरादीनां प्रत्यक्षेणानुपस्थितौ न प्रवृत्तिः । न चोपादानप्रत्यक्षं प्रवर्त्तकज्ञानोपक्षीणम् । अप्रत्यक्षे परमाणौ तत्क्रियायामिष्टसाधनताज्ञानेऽपि प्रवृत्त्यभावात् । प्रवृत्तिविषयस्य मृदङ्गादेः प्रत्यक्षत्वाद् न शब्दफूत्कारादिना व्यभिचारः । न चाभिमतग्राहकेन्द्रियसंयोगार्थं मनसि प्रयत्नजन्यक्रियादर्शनाद् व्यभिचारः, अदृष्टसहकृतत्वगिन्द्रियेण हि मनोवहनाडीनामुपलम्भेन तद्गोचरप्रयत्नाद् नाडीक्रिया, ततः स्पर्शवद्वेगवन्नाड्या

is inferential knowledge of the particular arrangement of the parts of clay, that it is feasible and it is desirable to have a particular arrangement of the parts of clay, still without knowledge of these parts through perception there will be no action. For the same reason, even if there is knowledge of sacrifice that it is feasible and desirable through word or reason depending on it, still without the knowledge of the objects etc. to be offered, through perception, there will be no action.

Nor is it the case that the knowledge which will lead to action (i. e. knowledge that something is feasible and desirable) renders the perception of the material cause weak. Even if there is knowledge that the invisible atom and action on it are conducive to the desired end, still there is no action if the atoms are not perceived. There is no deviation with regard to sound and noise from the act of blowing since there is perception of the tabor and so on which are the objects of action.

Neither can it be said that there is deviation because we see in the mind, movement produced by effort for the sake of the conjunction with the sense organ which grasps the desired object, since through the perception of the veins which carry the mind by means of the sense organ of touch assisted by the unseen, there is effort with it (the vein) as object; then there is movement in the mind because of noiseless conjunction with the vein which has

नोदनान्मनसि क्रिया, न तु प्रयत्नात् । अत एव जलाद्यभ्यवहारमलोत्सर्गहेतुनाडीनामनाद्यभ्यासवासनावशाद् अदृष्टसहकृतत्वगिन्द्रियेणोपलम्भात् तद्गोचरप्रयत्नः ।।

(e) नन्वेवं घटादावनुमितिजन्यत्वदर्शनादीश्वरेऽनुमितिरपि सिध्येत । यथा प्रत्यक्षस्येन्द्रियजन्यत्वेऽपि नित्यं तदीश्वरे तथानुमितेर्लिङ्गजन्यत्वेऽपि सा तत्र नित्यैव, अनित्येनानादिद्व्यणुकाद्यजननादिति चेत् । न । स्वसुखदुःखाभावादिसाधनतानुमितेर्हि हेतुत्वं घटादौ गृहीतम् । न च भगवति शरीरादृष्टाभावेन सुखमस्ति । अतो न क्षित्यादौ तस्य तथानुमितिर्यथार्था संभवति । न च तादृगनुमितेरनुमित्यन्तरस्य वा अनुमितित्वेन घटादौ प्रवृत्तिविषयप्रत्यक्षवत् हेतुत्वं गृहीतमिति नेश्वरेऽनुमितिः ।।

touch and velocity and not because of effort. For the same reason there is perception of the veins for drinking water etc. and ejecting foeces owing to beginningless experience and impression, by means of the sense of touch assisted by the unseen, and so there is effort with regard to these.

(e) In this way, since we see in jar 'being-produced-by-inference', inference also would be established in God, and just as perception which, though produced by sense organs, is eternal in God, even so, though inference is produced by reason, in God it is eternal, since by a non-eternal (agent) there would be no production of beginningless dyad and so on. This cannot be admitted. In jar etc. the causality of that inference which makes known that the (jar) is a means of one's own happiness or absence of sorrow, is cognized. Nor is there in God happiness since he has no body and no merit; therefore with regard to earth etc. his inference is not real. Such an inference (of means for happiness etc.) or another inference (as means of desired end) has no causality with reference to jar etc. like the perception of the object of action, and so there is no inference in God.

(f) ननु द्वेषजन्यकृतिसाध्ये चिकीर्षाविरहाद् व्यभिचारः। तद्दृष्टान्तेन क्षित्यादौ द्वेषसाध्यत्वाद् ईश्वरे द्वेषोऽपि भवेत्। द्वेषवतः संसारित्वे भगवतोऽपि तथात्वापत्तिरिति चेत्। न। न हि सर्पादिद्वेषादेव तन्नाशानुकूलव्यापारे कृतिरुत्पत्तुमर्हति। प्रयोजनमन्तरेण प्रेक्षावतां दुःखैकफले कृतेरनुत्पत्तेः। किंतु दुःखसाधनध्वंसं तत्साध्यदुःखानुत्पादं वा फलमुद्दिश्य तत्साधनताज्ञानात्। तथा चेष्टसाधनताज्ञानात् तत्रेच्छास्त्येवेति सैव कृतिकारणम्, क्लृप्तत्वात्। द्वेषस्तु परंपरया तदुपक्षीणः। कुतस्तर्हि द्वेषसिद्धिः? शत्रुं द्वेष्मीत्यबाधितप्रत्ययात् ॥

(g) न चादृश्यस्य कर्त्तुरनुपलब्धिबाधः, अनुपलब्धिमात्रस्य बाधकत्वेऽतीन्द्रियोच्छेदात्, योग्यानुपलब्धेश्चासिद्धेः। परमात्मनोऽयो-

(f) There is deviation with reference to something that is produced through aversion since there is no desire to do; taking this as example there could be 'being-produced-by-aversion' with reference to earth etc., and so there would be aversion in God, (and) for one who has aversion, there could be bondage and so there would be the objection that God would also be under bondage. This cannot be admitted; it is not a fact that only because of aversion towards a snake etc. there arises effort leading to its killing; without any benefit, for discerning people no effort will arise (to do) that which has only sorrow as result; but one has in mind the destruction of the means of sorrow, or the non-origin of sorrow on account of it, as the result and from the knowledge of the means for this result (there arises effort). And so because of the knowledge of the means of what is desirable there will indeed be desire; and so this naturally is the cause of effort; aversion however, is weakened by desire since it is only indirectly (the cause of effort). How then is (the existence of) aversion established? (It is established) from the uncontradicted knowledge that I hate (my) enemy.

(g) Nor is an invisible agent of the (universe) contradicted because of non-apprehension. If non-apprehension alone were a contradiction, then anything beyond the senses would be denied.

ग्यत्वनियमात् । शशश्रृङ्गप्रतिबन्द्या च नादृश्यमात्रनिरासः । परमाण्वादिस्वीकोरात् । नाप्ययोग्यकर्तृ निरासः । चेष्टया ज्ञानादिमतः परात्मनोऽनुमानात् परं प्रति तस्यायोग्यत्वात् । नापि श्रृङ्गे पशुत्ववदप्रयोजकम् । कर्तुः कार्यमात्रे कारणत्वावधारणात्, प्रतिबन्दिमात्रस्य चादूषणत्वात् । शशे पशुत्वेनायोग्यश्रृङ्गसिद्धिः कुतो नेति चेत् । न । अर्थान्तरत्वात्, विपक्षे बाधकाभावेन व्याप्त्यसिद्धेः, श्रृङ्गत्वस्य योग्यसंस्थानविशेषव्यङ्ग्यत्वेनायोग्यस्य विरोधेन शङ्कितुमशक्यत्वात्, शशे श्रृङ्गस्यात्यन्ताभाव इति सर्वेषामबाधितप्रत्यक्षबाधितत्वाच्च ॥

(In the case of God) there is no non-apprehension of something which is fit to be perceived; since it is accepted that the supreme soul is not fit to be perceived. Nor is it the case that by the false analogical answer of the horns of a hare[1] not everything that is invisible is denied, because the atoms etc. have been admitted. Nor is an agent who is not fit to be perceived denied, since through bodily action, the soul of another possessing knowledge and so on is inferred because for the opponent also it is not fit to be perceived. Nor is it the case that just as (for the reason in the inference) being an animal (a hare) must have horns, there is no supporting argument, (so also for the reason in the inference, being an effect, there is an agent, there is no supporting argument), since it is accepted that all effects have an agent, as cause (and so) false analogical answer alone is no fault. Why is it that there is no inference of an invisible horn in a hare because of its being an animal? This is no (argument) because it is establishing something other than what is to be established; and because (since in the inference, being an animal, it has horns, the reason) does not have contradiction in a negative instance, pervasion will not be established, and because, being a horn is understood through a constitutive form which is fit to be perceived, an invisible horn cannot be (even) doubted owing to contradiction and because it is contradicted by the uncontradicted perception of all that in a hare there is the constant absence of horns.

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[1] i. e. if a hare had horns, they would have been visible; since no horn is visible, it is concluded that it has no horns.

(h) अथ कृतिकार्यत्वयोः नान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां व्याप्तिग्रहः, त्वन्मते व्यापककृतेः सत्त्वे तद्देशे समये वा कृतिमात्रव्यतिरेकानिरूपणात्। नित्यकृतेरन्वयोऽपि न गृहीतः। वह्निमात्रव्यतिरेकोऽस्ति गृह्यते चेति ; न चैवमाकाशात्मनोरसिद्धिः, समवायिमात्रस्य व्यतिरेकानिरूपणेन कार्यं समवायिकारणजन्यमिति व्याप्तेरसिद्धेरिति वाच्यम्। समवायिकारणत्वग्रहे हि तत्संसर्गाभावोऽप्रयोजकः, निमित्तमात्रसाधारणत्वात्। किंतु यत्समवायि तत्र कार्यम्, यन्न समवायि तत्र नेति अन्योन्याभावमादाय कार्यं समवायिजन्यमिति व्याप्तिग्रहसंभवात्। समवायित्वेन तयोरन्योन्याभावोऽस्ति गृह्यते च। यद्वा भावकार्यं समवेतमिति व्याप्त्या तयोः

(h) Now it is not possible to cognize invariable concomitance of effort with being-an-effect through positive and negative concomitance since in your opinion if the effort which is the pervader is present, at that time or place, it is not possible to perceive the absence of all effort. The positive concomitance of an eternal effort is not even established. The absence of all fire and smoke exists and is perceived. Nor can it be objected that thus ether and soul cannot be established, because it is not possible to perceive the absence of all non-inherent causes (of ether and soul) and so it is not possible to establish the invariable concomitance that all effects are produced by an inherent cause. In cognizing inherent cause, relational absence is not a cause because it is common also to efficient cause; but through mutual absence in the form of what is an inherent cause, there, there is effect, what is not an inherent cause, there, there is no effect, there is the cognition of invariable concomitance that an effect is produced by inherent cause: thus there is mutual absence of them (ether and soul) and it is cognized. Or by means of the invariable concomitance that a positive effect inheres (in something) they (ether and soul) are established.

This objection cannot be admitted. When smoke is ascertained in positive concomitance with such and such a fire, then in the absence of such and such fire, the absence of all smoke is

सिद्धिरिति। न। यथा हि यद्यद्वह्नेरन्वये धूमो गृहीतस्तत्तद्व्यतिरेके धूममात्रव्यतिरेकग्रहाद् वह्निधूममात्रयोर्व्याप्तिग्रहः, न तु पर्वतीयवह्नेरन्वयव्यतिरेकग्रहात्। न चान्यान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामन्यव्याप्तिग्रहेऽतिप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम्। यद्विशेषयोरन्वयव्यतिरेकग्रहस्तत्सामान्ययोर्बाधकं विना व्याप्तिग्रहात्। स च वह्निधूमव्याप्तिग्रह उत्पद्यमानः सकलधूमगोचरो धूमत्वपुरस्कारेण प्रसिद्धधूमगोचर एव वा। तथेहापि कृतिविशेषकार्यविशेषयोरन्वयव्यतिरेकग्रहो बाघकमन्तरेण कृतिकार्यमात्रयोर्व्याप्तिग्रह उपायः। न तु पक्षधर्मताबललभ्यविशेषान्वयव्यतिरेकग्रहः। अनुमानमात्रोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्। एतेन—

ascertained and so there is the cognition of the invariable concomitance between all instances of fire and all (instances of) smoke; (and this is) not because of cognition of the positive and negative concomitance of fire on the mountain.

Nor can it be objected that by the presence and absence of some things, invariable concomitance of some other things is cognized and so there is over-extension. When there is the cognition of the concomitance of the presence and absence of two particular things, then if there is no contradiction, there is the cognition of the invariable concomitance between all instances of these two things; this cognition of invariable concomitance so arisen between fire and smoke extends to all instances of smoke owing to the fact of their having smokeness or to all instances of known smoke; so here too the cognition of the concomitance of presence and absence of particular effort and effect, if there is no contradiction, is the means of cognizing the invariable concomitance between all instances of effort and all instances of effect, and it is not the case that the cognition of the concomitance of the presence and absence of the particulars ascertained through their being the attribute of the subject, (the means of cognizing invariable concomitance); in that case every inference will be destroyed. By this also is rejected (the following): if in order to avoid the presence of 'being-an-effect' in a sure negative instance an

"कार्यत्वस्य विपक्षवृत्तिहतये संभाव्यतेऽतीन्द्रियः
कर्त्ता चेद् व्यतिरेकसिद्धिविधुरा व्याप्तिः कथं सिध्यति?।
दृश्योऽथ व्यतिरेकसिद्धिमनसा कर्त्ता समाश्रीयते,
तत्त्यागेऽपि तदा तृणादिकमिति व्यक्तं विपक्षेक्षणम् ।।"

इति निरस्तम् । ननु यदि कर्तृमात्रव्याप्तिग्रहाददृश्यकर्तृसिद्धिः, तदा वह्निमात्रव्याप्तधूमाददृश्यजाठरीयवह्निसिद्धिरपि स्यात् । न स्यात् । अदृश्यवह्नेर्धूमानुत्पत्तेर्दृश्यस्यैव तत्र हेतुत्वात् ॥

(i) ननु ज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नत्रयव्यतिरेकान्न कार्यव्यतिरेकः, किंतु एकैकव्यतिरेकात् । तथा च व्यर्थविशेषणत्वेन विशिष्टव्यतिरेको न हेतुव्यतिरेकव्याप्य इति न हेतोर्विशिष्टसिद्धिः, साध्याभावव्यापकाभावप्रतियोगिन एव साध्यगमकत्वादिति चेत् । न । यत एकैकव्यतिरेकात् कार्यव्यतिरेकः, अत एव कार्यत्वादेकैकं सिध्यत् त्रयमपि सिध्यति ।

invisible agent is assumed, how can invariable concomitance be established (since) there is no negative concomitance; if in order to get negative concomitance, a visible agent is depended upon, then grass and so on where such an agent is absent, are sure negative instances.

If there is the establishment of an invisible agent by means of the invariable concomitance with agent as such, then even invisible fire in the stomach could be established, by means of the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire as such. No, it cannot be established, because invisible fire will not produce smoke, only visible (fire) is the cause of it.

(i) There is the absence of an effect not when there is the absence of knowledge, desire and effort (taken collectively), but when there is the absence of any one of them, and thus because of useless qualification (of the *sādhya*) the absence of the qualified is not pervaded by the absence of the reason and so the reason does not establish the qualified since only the counter-positive of an absence that is the pervader of the absence of *sādhya* can establish the *sādhya*. This cannot be admitted since from the absence of any one of them there is the absence of an effect; for the same reason, from (the reason of) being-an-effect, any one (of them) is

आर्थस्तु समाजः ।।

(j) स्यादेतद्, अशरीरनित्यज्ञानादिमान् सर्वज्ञः कर्त्ता पक्षे विवक्षितः घटादौ च कार्यत्वस्य तद्विपरीतकर्तृसहचारदर्शनाद् विशेषविरुद्धत्वमिति चेत् । न । हेतोर्विवक्षितसाध्यविपरीतसहचारमात्रस्यादूषकत्वात्, अन्यथा अनुमानमात्रोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् । न चानित्यज्ञानासर्वज्ञशरीरिकर्तृत्वेन समं कार्यत्वस्य व्याप्तिरस्ति, येन विपरीतसाधने विरुद्धत्वं स्यात् । तादृशव्याप्तिश्च त्वया मया वा नाङ्गीक्रियते, अङ्कुरादौ योग्यानुपलम्भेन शरीरिकर्तृकत्वाभावात् । अथ यथादर्शनबलप्रवृत्तव्याप्त्या अनित्यज्ञानादिमान् कर्त्तोपनेयः, पक्षधर्मतया च नित्यज्ञानादिमान् । तथा च उपनेयविशेषयोर्विरोधेन व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतयोर्विरोधात् परस्परसहकारिताविरहान्नानुमानं विशेषविरोधादिति चेत् । न ।

established (and so) all the three are established and the collection (of knowledge, desire and effort comes about) by implication.

(j) This also could be added. In the subject an agent who is without a body, with eternal knowledge and so on and (who is) omniscient is meant; in the jar etc. (the reason of) being-an-effect is seen along with an agent with contradictory (qualities), and therefore there is (the fault of) contradiction of the particular. This cannot be admitted: There is no harm in a reason seen only together with a *sādhya* with (qualities) opposed (to the desired *sādhya*), otherwise every inference would be destroyed. Nor is the invariable concomitance of being-an-effect with an agent who is non-eternal, non-omniscient and who has a body (accepted) so that there could be contradiction in proving a *sādhya* with opposed (qualities); such an invariable concomitance is not accepted either by you or by me since in a sprout etc., because of the non-apprehension of a visible (agent) there is the absence of an agent who has a body.

Now, just as by means of invariable concomitance obtained by the force of perception, an agent who has non-eternal knowledge etc. is to be inferred and by the (reason) being the attribute of the subject (an agent) with eternal knowledge etc. is to be inferred, so also there is contradiction between the two particular things

अनित्यज्ञानादिकर्तृजन्यत्वेन व्याप्त्यग्रहात् । ज्ञानादिमत्कर्तृजन्यत्वव्याप्तेश्च पक्षधर्मताबललभ्यविशेषाविरोधात् । केवलाया व्याप्तेः पक्षधर्मतायाश्च पृथगुपनायकत्वाभावाच्च, एकवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् । तथा च निरपेक्षतादशायां विशेषानुपस्थानादेव न विरोधज्ञानम् । सापेक्षतादशायां तु सहोपलम्भादेव विरोधप्रतियोगिनोः सिद्ध्यसिद्धिभ्यां विरोधज्ञानाभावश्च । लिङ्गविशेषणसाध्यविशेषणविरोधे च विशेषविरोधः, यथा चन्दनप्रभववह्निमानयम् असुरभिधूमवत्त्वादिति ।।

to be inferred and hence because of contradiction between the invariable concomitance and the relation of reason to the subject there is no mutual co-operation (of invariable concomitance and the relation of reason to the subject). Therefore there is no inference at all, because of the fault of contradiction of the particular.

This cannot be admitted, because (of the following reasons): invariable concomitance of being-produced-by-an-agent with non-eternal knowledge etc. is not cognized; but invariable concomitance of being-produced-by-an-agent-with-knowledge is (cognized) and so there is no contradiction with the particular (*sādhya*) which is established by the force of the reason being an attribute of the subject; and (further) invariable concomitance itself and the reason being the attribute of the subject do not separately cause inference, since (in that case) one of them would be useless. Thus when they are not (mutually) dependent, the particular (*sādhya*) being not established, there is no contradictory knowledge; when there is mutual dependence, since they (reason and agent with eternal knowledge) are perceived together, there is no contradictory knowledge, even if there is the establishment or non-establishment of the counter-positives of opposition. There is contradiction of the particular only when there is contradiction between the qualifications of the reason and the qualifications of *sādhya* as for example: This has fire which arises from sandal-wood because it has non-fragrant smoke.

(k) ननु ज्ञानत्वनित्यत्वयोः कर्तृत्वाशरीरित्वयोश्च परस्परविरुद्धत्वेन एकधर्म्यसमावेशात् कथं नित्यज्ञानादिकर्तृसिद्धिरिति चेत्। न। उपसंहारस्थानस्याभावात्। तथाहि– ईश्वरे तद्बुद्धौ चाशरीरित्वकर्तृत्वे बुद्धित्वनित्यत्वे चोपसंह्रियमाणे विरुद्धे, न तु स्वाश्रयस्थिते। उभयोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्। न चेश्वरस्तद्बुद्धिर्वोपस्थिता, उपस्थितौ वा धर्मिग्राहकमानेन तयोर्विरोधापहारात्। अनुपस्थिते च तद्द्वये विरोधज्ञानमकिंचित्करमेव, अस्मदादिबुद्धौ व्योमादौ कुविन्दे मुक्तात्मनि चोपस्थिते विरोधोपसंहारात्। बुद्धित्वनित्यत्वयोः कर्तृत्वाशरीरित्वयोरनधिगमेऽपि ईश्वरे अशरीरिकर्तृत्वनित्यज्ञानादिसिद्धिरप्रत्यूहैव। अत एव नित्यत्वावयवत्वयोर्विरोधज्ञानमकिंचित्करमेवेति परमाणुसिद्धिः।

(k) Being-knowledge and being-eternal, being-an-agent and being-without-a-body, are mutually contradictory and so they cannot come together in one subject; therefore, it is not possible to establish an agent with eternal knowledge and so on. This is not true. There will be no instance (in which this contradiction can be) established. For if in God, being-without-a-body and being-a-maker, in his knowledge, being-knowledge and being-eternal, are concluded, then it would be contradictory; but not when (they are concluded) in their respective substrata for otherwise they would destroy each other. Nor is the case that God and his knowledge are cognized (by us); when they are cognized, by means of the means of cognition which cognizes the subject (i. e. God) the contradiction between them (i. e. God's knowledge and its eternity) is removed; when they (i. e. God and his knowledge) are not cognized, the contradictory knowledge of these two (knowledge and its eternity) does not matter, since in our knowledge and so on, in ether and so on, in a weaver and in a liberated soul, when they are cognized, the contradiction could be established. Even when 'being-knowledge' and 'being-eternal', 'being-an-agent' and 'being without-a-body' are not known, there is no difficulty in establishing in God 'being-without-a-body' and 'being-an-agent', eternal knowledge and so on. It is for this reason, i. e. because the knowledge of contradiction between being-eternal and having-

ईश्वरतद्बुद्ध्यादिकं तर्कितमिति चेत् । न । तर्कस्य प्रसञ्जनस्य संशयस्य चाज्ञातेऽसंभवात् ॥

(l) (i) स्यादेतत्, घटादौ कृतिसाध्यता हस्तादिव्यापारद्वारैव गृहीता, न तु साक्षात् । न च पितापुत्रयोरेकघटसाधनत्वमिव प्रयत्न-हस्तादिव्यापारयोः साक्षात्साधनत्वं वाच्यमिति वाच्यम् । घटार्थं हस्तव्यापारवत् कुलालसमीपस्थस्य हस्तादिव्यापारशून्यस्य तद्घट-कर्तृत्वापत्तेः । न च हस्तादिव्यापारवत्ता अशरीरस्य संभवति । अन्यादृशी च कृतिसाध्यता न दृष्टा । शरीरतद्व्यापारौ चाङ्कुरे बाधिताविति कर्त्तुरपि बाध एव । अन्यथा त्वदनुमानादेव क्षेत्रज्ञ एव

parts, is not of much consequence, there is the establishment of atoms. It may be argued that God and his knowledge etc. are objects (only) of a supposition. The answer to this is (that) even a supposition, superimposition, or a doubt cannot take place in the case of an object which is not known.

(l) (i) This also may be said: The feasibility of the effort with regard to jar etc. is understood through the action of the hand etc. and not directly. Nor should it be said that just as the father and the son produce a jar, effort and action of the hand etc. directly produce (a jar), for in that case it could be objected that the making of jar could be said to belong to a person without movement of hand and so on, but sitting near a potter who has movement of hand for making a jar. Nor does the action of the hand etc. belong to some one who is without a body. No other kind of feasibility of effort is seen (and) a body and its actions are contradicted in a sprout. Hence an agent also is certainly contradicted. Otherwise an individual soul could be inferred as the agent (of the sprout) by your inference because there is the absence of the contradiction of the non-apprehension of something which is fit to be perceived with reference to the soul of another who has knowledge etc. If the causality of an individual soul is exercised only through the operation of the body and if the operation of the body is contradicted with reference to a sprout, an individual soul is

कर्त्तानुमीयेत बुद्ध्यादिमत्परात्मनो योग्यानुपलब्धिबाधाभावात्। शरीरव्यापारद्वारैव क्षेत्रज्ञस्य हेतुत्वात्, शरीरव्यापारस्य च अङ्कुरे बाधात् स बाधित इति चेत्। तर्हि कर्तृमात्रस्यापि तद्द्वारैव चेष्टेतरकार्ये कर्तृत्वावधारणात्, तद्बाधे कर्तृमात्रबाधोऽपि। एवं च कृतिसाध्यत्वे शरीरव्यापारजन्यत्वं प्रयोजकमिति स एवोपाधिः। एवं ज्ञानेच्छयोरपि इच्छाकृतिद्वारा जनकत्वमिति कथं द्वारं विना क्षित्यादौ जनकत्वमिति। उच्यते। जन्यमात्रे हस्तादिव्यापारजनककृतित्वेन न जनकत्वम्। चेष्टायां क्षित्यादौ च व्यभिचारात्। घटादौ च तथा जनकत्वमिति जन्यमात्रे कृतिमात्रस्य जनकत्वविरोधिविशेषयोर्जन्यजनकभावे बाधकं विना सामान्ययोरपि तथाभावनियमात्। न हि विशेषे विशेषप्रयोजकत्वसामान्ये सामान्यप्रयोजकत्वविरोधि। चेष्टेतरकार्ये शरीरव्यापार-

contradicted (as its agent); then, since for all agents, agency is understood only through the instrumentality of the operation of the body, with regard to everything except bodily action, when operation of the body is contradicted, every agent is also contradicted. And thus in the case of the feasibility of effort, 'being-produced-through-the-operation-of-the-body' is a condition, and hence it is indeed an additional condition. Thus since for knowledge and desire, production is through the operation of desire and effort respectively, how can there be production of the earth etc. without operation?

It is replied: Being produced is not attributed to everything produced through an effort which produces action of hand etc., since there is deviation with reference to bodily action and the earth etc. In the jar and so on, such agency is thus established; therefore the causal connection between two specific things (effect and effort) contradict the agency of effort as such and effect as such, (still) the causality of all (effects) and all (efforts) could be established when there is no contradiction. The (rule) that the cause of a particular is particular, is not opposed to the rule that the cause of universal is universal. If it is argued that in the case of everything except bodily action, the causality of effort is (exercised) through the operation of the body, there is

द्वारैव कृतेर्हेतुत्वात् तेन विना क्षित्यादौ न कृतिसाध्यतेति चेत्। न। चेष्टेतरकार्यमात्रे शरीरव्यापारजनककृतित्वेन न जनकत्वम्, क्षित्यादौ व्यभिचारात्, किंतु तद्विशेषे घटादावित्युक्तत्वात्। न चैवमामवातजडीकृतकलेबरस्य प्रयत्नादेव घटोत्पत्तिः स्यात् हस्तादिव्यापारं विनापि कृतेर्हेतुत्वादिति वाच्यम्। घटे कृतिवत् हस्तादिव्यापरस्यापि हेतुत्वात्। यदुक्तं क्षेत्रज्ञ एव कुतो नानुमीयेत इति। तन्न। यदि हस्तादिव्यापारककृतिमान् क्षेत्रज्ञोऽभिमतः, तदा हस्तादिव्यापारस्याङ्कुरे योग्यानुपलम्भबाधात्। अथ हस्तादिव्यापारशून्यकृतिमानभिमतः, तदोमित्युत्तरम्, स एव भगवानीश्वरः ॥

(ii) अत एव सहभावनिरूपकत्वे नियतपूर्ववर्तित्वं कारणत्वम्।

no feasibility of effort in the case of the earth etc. without bodily movement, it is not true, since it is said that production of everything except bodily action, is not through the effort which produces bodily action, because there is deviation in the case of the earth etc.; but only in the case of jar etc., its particulars, (the causality of the body is exercised through bodily operation). Since without action of hand etc. also, there is causality for the effort, it cannot be objected that in this way even from the effort of a person whose body is rendered immobile through rheumatism jar would be produced, because in the case of jar, just like effort the action of hand etc. is also a cause. It was asked why an individual soul would not be inferred? (It is not inferred because) if an individual with operation of hand etc. is desired, then since action of hand etc. is contradicted in the case of a sprout, there is the contradiction of the non-apprehension of something fit to be perceived. If (a soul) having effort (but) without action of hand etc. is desired, then the answer is 'yes'. He is indeed the Lord, God.

(ii) It is for the same reason[1] (the following is rejected).

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[1] i. e. since it is established that even without bodily action, effort causes effects.

समवाय्यसमवायिनोस्तथात्वेन निमित्तेऽपि तथाभावात्। अन्यथा प्रतिबन्धकाभावानन्तरं प्रतिबन्धकसत्त्वकाले कार्यं स्यात्। प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य पूर्वं सत्त्वात्। न च कृतेः सहभावनिरूपकत्वं स्वतः, कार्यसमयेऽभावात्। तथा च तत्परिचायितव्यापारद्वारा तस्याः सहभावनिरूपकत्वम्। अतः शरीरव्यापारद्वारैव कृतेर्जनकत्वम्, न केवलाया इति निरस्तम्। समवाय्यसमवायिप्रतिबन्धकाभावानामविनश्यदवस्थत्वेन कारणत्वात्, तथैवान्वयव्यतिरेकात्। तेन तेषामग्रिमविनाशक्षणे न कार्यम्। अन्यथा प्रतिव्यक्ति कार्यसहभावनिरूपणे कार्योत्पत्तेः प्राक् सहभावस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात् कारणत्वानिश्चयेन क्वापि प्रवृत्तिर्न

Causality is that which while determining coexistence exists invariably in the previous moment. Since inherent and non-inherent causes are of such a nature, instrumental cause is also thus; otherwise after the absence of hindrance, when there is hindrance, there would be effect, since the absence of the hindrance was present before. Nor can it be said that determining coexistence that belongs to the effort is not by itself since it (the effort) is absent at the time of the effect and so (it is) through the action (of the body) that makes known (that it is produced through the effort). Therefore that the agency that belongs to the effort is through the action of the body and not by itself, is denied. Inherent and non-inherent causes are causes, (only) when they are not destroyed, because positive and negative concomitances are in this way. Therefore at the first moment, after their destruction, there is no effect. Otherwise,[1] for each individual (cause) the determination of co-existence with an effect (is necessary) (but) before the origin of the effect, it is not possible to determine the co-existence, and so there would be no activity. Therefore (a cause is) necessarily to be defined (in terms of) its belonging to the same class (as the thing which was perceived to be the

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[1] i. e. if in the definition of instrumental cause 'being-perceived-together' is also included

स्यादिति तज्जातीयत्वस्यावश्यवाच्यत्वे विनश्यदवस्थं कथं सहभावेनापि व्यवच्छेद्यम् ?। अतः स्वरूपयोग्यतारूपा कारणता तत्रापि। कार्याभावस्तु सहकारिविरहात्। अन्यथा निमित्तानां प्रत्येकं कार्यसहभावनिरूपकत्वेन जनकत्वे गौरवम्। प्रागभावस्य प्रतियोग्यजनकत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च। अन्यथा उत्पन्नोऽपि घट उत्पद्येत, सामग्र्याः सत्त्वात्। न च स एव तत्र प्रतिबन्धकः, अभावान्तरस्य तत्राकारणत्वेन कारणीभूताभावप्रतियोगित्वरूपस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वस्य प्रागभावकारणत्व एव विश्रामात्। न चैका सामग्री एकदा एकमेव कार्यं जनयति स्वभावादिति वाच्यम्। सामग्रीतद्विरहस्य कार्यतदभावप्रयोजकत्वेन सामग्र्यां सत्त्यां कार्यस्य, तदभावस्य सामग्रीविरहस्य वज्रलेपायितत्वात्॥

cause) and hence how can (a cause which is in a) state of destruction (at the time of the destruction of effect) be distinguished by (the qualification of) co-existence; therefore the causality (in the former) is potential. The absence of an effect is because of the absence of auxiliary conditions. Otherwise, if instrumental cause is cause when its co-existence with the effect is perceived, then there would be too many assumptions. Besides, there would be objection that prior absence would not be able to produce its counter-positive; otherwise,[1] the jar which is produced, will be produced (again) since the causal complexes are present. Nor is it to be said that it (the jar) is the hindrance since no other absence being its cause, hindrance would be the counter-positive of prior absence and so prior absence would certainly be the cause. Nor is it to be said that one causal complex produces only one effect by its nature. Causal complex and its absence, being the cause of the effect and its absence (respectively), it is inseparably (established) that when the causal complex is present there is effect and when the causal complex is absent there is the absence of the effect.

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[1] i. e. if prior absence is not cause.

(m) (i) स्यादेतत्, कर्त्ता शरीर्येव, ज्ञानमनित्यमेव, बुद्धिरिच्छाद्वारैव, इच्छा कृतिद्वारैव हेतुरित्यादिप्राथमिकव्याप्तिप्रत्यक्षविरोधान्नाशरीरनित्यज्ञानादिकर्तृसिद्धिः। अत एव शरीरमनित्यमेवेति नियमान्न कर्तृत्वेन नित्यातीन्द्रियशरीरसिद्धिरीश्वरे। न चाप्रयोजकत्वम्, निरुपाधित्वेन शङ्काकलङ्काभावात्। कार्यत्वसकर्तृकत्वयोरपि यदि निरुपाधित्वमस्ति, तदापि तुल्यबलत्वेन सत्प्रतिपक्षवत् प्रतिरोधोऽस्तु। न च कार्यत्वं पक्षधर्मतासत्त्वाद् बलीयः, कर्त्ता शरीर्येवेत्यादौ तु तन्नास्तीति वाच्यम्। ज्ञानमनित्यमेवेत्यादिव्याप्तेरेव क्षित्यादौ ज्ञानजन्यत्वविरोधित्वात्। एवं कार्यं ज्ञानजन्यम्, ज्ञानमनित्यमेवेत्यनयोर्विरोध एव।

(m) (i) This also could be said: An agent is indeed endowed with a body, knowledge is certainly non-eternal, knowledge is a cause through desire and desire through effort. Since it is against such an invariable concomitance which is cognized at first, it is not possible to establish an agent without a body and with eternal knowledge. For the same reason, since it is the rule that a body is indeed non-eternal, it is not possible to establish in God, in as far as he is a maker, an eternal and invisible body. Nor is it the case that there is no supporting reason: There is no additional condition and so there is no doubt. If there is no additional condition between being-an-effect and having-an-agent, then with equal force let there be opposition as in a counter-reason. Nor can it be said that being-an-effect is an attribute of the subject and so it is stronger and that this is not the case (in the reason of the counter-inference): An agent is certainly endowed with a body. With reference to the earth etc., there is contradiction in saying that it is produced by knowledge because of the invariable concomitance that knowledge is indeed non-eternal. Thus there is contradiction between (the two statements that) an effect is produced by knowledge and knowledge is only non-eternal, and if there is no contradiction, let both statements stand; so with reference to earth etc., when it is concluded that they are produced by some one having a body and having non-eternal knowledge, there is contradiction. Besides, with reference to the statement that knowledge

अविरोधे तु द्वयमपि स्यात्। तथा च क्षित्यादौ शरीर्यंनित्यज्ञानपर्यंवसाने बाध एव। किं च ज्ञानमनित्यमेवेत्यादौ नित्यज्ञानादेरप्रसिद्धेस्तदव्यावर्त्तकतया नोपाधित्वनिश्चयः, तत्संशयो वा, कार्यत्वसकर्तृकत्वव्याप्तिग्रहदशायां शरीरव्यापाराव्यभिचारादुपाधेर्निश्चयः संशयो वास्तीति ॥

(ii) तन्न। ज्ञानमनित्यमेवेत्यादिव्याप्तेरसिद्धेः। विपक्षबाधकाभावेनाप्रयोजकत्वात्। निरुपाधिसहचारदर्शनव्यभिचारादर्शनादेव व्याप्तिग्रहः। निरुपाधित्वमेव वा विपक्षे बाधकमिति चेत्। न। अवयवो महानेव, तेज उद्भूतरूपमेवेत्यादिव्याप्तिग्रहात् परमाणुनयनादेरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्। अथ द्रव्यचाक्षुषेऽनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वस्य, साक्षात्कारे

is indeed non-eternal, since eternal knowledge etc. are not yet established it (the qualification of non-eternal) does not serve to distinguish and so there is neither certainty nor doubt about an additional condition; at the time of the determination of invariable concomitance between being-an-effect and having-an-agent because of the absence of deviation of the action of the body, there is certainty or doubt of additional determination.

(ii) This cannot be admitted, because the invariable concomitance that knowledge is indeed non-eternal is not established. There is also no supporting reason because of the absence of contradiction in a negative instance. If it is argued that invariable concomitance is ascertained because of the perception of concomitance without additional condition and because of non-perception of deviation, or not having any additional condition, is itself contradiction in a negative instance (then) this cannot be admitted, because (in that case) it would be impossible to establish atom, eye etc. because of the ascertainment of invariable concomitance that a part has magnitude, light has manifest colour etc. Now, since with regard to the perception of substances having several parts and with regard to perception (itself), contact of the senses with the object is the cause, on account of it there is contradiction in a negative instance and therefore the (means of cognition which)

विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षस्य हेतुत्वात् तन्मूलकविपक्षबाधकेन परमाण्वादिसाधकस्य बलवत्त्वात् परमाण्वादिसिद्धौ विरोधिव्याप्तेर्बाधः, न तु वैपरीत्यम्। विपक्षबाधकाभावेन तस्या अबलवत्त्वादिति मन्यसे, तर्हि ज्ञानादिकार्ययोः कार्यकारणभावावधारणात् तन्मूलकविपक्षबाधकेन निष्कलङ्कव्याप्तिग्रहात्, पक्षधर्मताग्रहसहितान्नित्यज्ञानादिसिद्धौ व्यभिचारान्न व्याप्तिः। अन्यथा साध्यं पक्षातिरिक्त एवेत्यादिनिरुपाधिसहचाराद् व्याप्तिग्रहे सकलानुमानोच्छेदः ॥

(iii) वयं तु ब्रूमः — पक्षधर्मताबलान्नित्यं ज्ञानं सिध्यद् बुद्धिरनित्यैवेति व्याप्तिप्रत्यक्षेण न प्रतिबध्यते, अस्मदादिबुद्धिमात्रविषयकत्वेन भिन्नविषयकत्वात्। एकविषयविरोधिज्ञानस्यैव प्रतिबन्धकत्वात्, नित्यत्वानित्यत्वयोरेकजातीयद्रव्येऽविरोधात्। बुद्धि-

establishes atoms etc. are stronger and hence one can establish atoms etc. Therefore there is contradiction with regard to the contrary invariable concomitance and not its opposite. If you think that owing to the absence of contradiction in a negative instance, it is not strong, then since the relation of cause and effect is understood with reference to knowledge and effect etc., there is contradiction in a negative instance, and hence there is the ascertainment of invariable concomitance without any fault and so because of the (reason) being the attribute of the subject, there is the establishment of eternal knowledge etc. Hence because of deviation, there is no invariable concomitance (of knowledge and being-non-eternal). Otherwise, if the cognition of invariable concomitance (arises) from the concomitance without any additional condition that *sādhya* exists outside the subject, all inference would be destroyed.

(iii) We however say: The eternal knowledge which we establish through the relation of the reason to the subject, is not contradicted by the perception of the invariable concomitance that knowledge is indeed non-eternal, since it has as object only our knowledge and so it has a different object. There will be contradiction only when there is contradictory knowledge with regard to

मात्रेऽनित्यत्वावधारणात् कथं तद्विशेषे नित्यत्वबुद्धिरिति चेत्। न। बुद्धिमात्रपदस्येश्वरानीश्वरबुद्धिपरत्वे विरोधाद् व्यभिचाराच्च। अस्मदादिबुद्धिमात्रपरत्वे च भिन्नविषयत्वेनाप्रतिबन्धकत्वात्। बुद्धित्वं नित्यावृत्त्येवेत्यवगतम्, अतः कथं तत्र नित्यवृत्तित्वावगम इति चेत्। न। उभयसिद्धनित्यावृत्तित्वावगमेऽपि अतिरिक्तनित्यवृत्तित्वावगतौ विरोधाभावात्। बुद्धित्वमनित्यत्वव्याप्यमवगतं नानित्यत्वाभाववति ज्ञेयमिति चेत्। न। अनित्यत्वव्याप्यत्वमनित्यमात्रवृत्तित्वम्, तत्र चोक्तमेव। एतेन कर्त्ता शरीर्येवेत्याद्यपि ज्ञानं प्रतिबन्धकमित्यपास्तम्॥

(n) (i) ननु कर्तृजन्यत्वे जन्यत्वं नावच्छेदकम्, किं तु घटत्वादिकमेव तेनैव रूपेणान्वयव्यतिरेकग्रहाद्, आवश्यकत्वाच्च,

one object; there is no contradiction in being-eternal and non-eternal in relation to substances belonging to the same class. Since every knowledge is understood as non-eternal, how can a particular knowledge be eternal? This cannot be said because by knowledge in its entirety, knowledge of God and (knowledge) of beings other than God are included and so there would be contradiction[1] and deviation[2]. If by knowledge, only our knowledge is understood, (then knowledge of God is a) different object, and so there is no opposition. If it is argued that being-knowledge does not at all exist in anything which is eternal and so how can it exist in something eternal, it cannot be admitted: Although it may not exist in something eternal which is accepted by both parties, there is no contradiction in its existing in something eternal, different from it. If it is argued, being-knowledge is understood as pervaded by being non-eternal, (and) it cannot be known in something which is not non-eternal, it cannot be admitted; 'being-pervaded-by non-eternity' means existing only in things which are non-eternal and this objection has already been answered. By this also the knowledge that an agent is only some one having a body as a hindrance, is rejected.

(n)(i) 'In being-produced-by-a-maker' the limitor is not 'being-produced' but 'being-a-jar-etc.,' because in such a form is the

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[1] In asserting that every knowledge is non-eternal.

[2] Because there could be knowledge without the knowledge of being eternal.

अननुगतमपि जन्यतावच्छेदकं वह्निजन्यतायां धूमत्वादिवत् । अथ घटत्वादिवज्जन्यत्वमप्यवच्छेदकम्, नहि विशेषोऽस्तीति सामान्यमप्रयोजकम् । तथा च वह्निजन्यत्वे धूमविशेषः प्रयोज्योऽस्तीति न धूमसामान्यमग्निं गमयेत् । तस्माद् यद्विशेषयोः कार्यकारणभावः, तत्सामान्ययोरपि बाधकं विना तथात्वनियम इति चेत् । न । तत्र बाधकाभावात् अत्र च ज्ञानमनित्यमेवेत्यादि प्राथमिक बहुव्याप्तिबाधात्, तुल्यत्वे वा व्याप्तिसंशयाधायकत्वात् । न च कार्यकारणभावमूलकत्वेन कार्यत्व-सकर्तृकत्वव्याप्तिर्बलीयसीति वाच्यम् । विरोधिप्रत्यक्षेण कार्यकारणभावस्यैवासिद्धेः । एतेन धूमादौ वह्निजन्यतावच्छेदकमनुगतं न संभवति, इह तु जन्यत्वमनुगतमस्ति, अतो बाधकं विना न त्यज्यते इति परास्तम् । ज्ञानमनित्यमेवेत्यादिसहचारावसायस्य बाधकं विना

cognition of positive and negative concomitance, and because such is the necessity. Even something which does not follow consecutively could be the limitor in (being-produced) just like 'being-smoke' with regard to 'being-produced-by-fire'. Now let 'being-produced' be also the limitor just like 'being-jar'. It is not the case that since there is the particular, the general is not a cause. If it were so, since a particular smoke is among that which is produced by fire, smoke (as such) would not (enable us) to infer fire. Therefore the relation of being-an-effect-and-a-cause between particulars exists also between the universals when there is no contradiction. These arguments cannot be admitted. There is no contradiction in that case[1]; here in this case (it cannot be admitted) because it is contradictory to the several primary instances of universal concomitance or if they are equal, then there would be doubt about universal concomitance. Nor can it be argued that the universal concomitance between being-an- effect and having-a-maker based on the relation of cause and effect is stronger because by opposite perception no relation of cause and effect is established. By this is rejected the position, that in smoke etc., there is no limitor of being-produced-by-fire, with

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[1] i. e. in the relation of cause and effect between universals of being fire and being smoke.

व्याप्तिपर्यवसायितया बाधकत्वादिति ।।

(ii) मैवम् । निरुपाधित्वेन सहचारावसायस्य साधकं बाधकं च विना साधारण्येन व्याप्तिसंशयाधायकत्वात् । अन्यथा साध्यं पक्षातिरिक्त एव, सुखं दुःखसंभिन्नमेवेत्यादिव्याप्तिग्रहस्य कार्यकारणभावग्राहकबाधकत्वे तत्संशयाधायकत्वे वा कार्यात् कारणानुमानोच्छेदे निरीहं जगज्जायेत । तस्माद् यद्विशेषयोः कार्यकारणभावस्तत्सामान्ययोः कार्यकारणभावो बलवता बाधकेनापनीयते । न चात्र तदस्ति । विरोधिव्याप्तिसाधकस्य विपक्षबाधकस्याभावात् ॥

(iii) नव्यास्तु—कार्यं कर्तृजन्यमिति व्याप्तितोऽशरीरनित्यज्ञानकर्त्रुपस्थितौ ज्ञानमनित्यमेवेत्यनेन विरोधप्रतिसन्धानम्, न तु तां विना, प्रतियोग्यनुपस्थितौ विरोधानिरूपणात् । तथाचोपजीव्यबाधाद्

consecutive character but here, however, 'being-produced' has consecutive character and therefore it cannot be rejected without contradiction. The reason is that the certainty of concomitance that knowledge is indeed non-eternal leads to universal concomitance without any contradiction and hence there is contradiction.

(ii) This cannot be admitted. The reason is that the certainty of concomitance without any additional condition having neither proving nor disproving reasons, being common (to both) leads to doubt about universal concomitance. Otherwise *sādhya* is only in that which is other than subject, happiness is only mixed with sorrow, cognition of such universal concomitances being opposed to the cognition of the relation of cause and effect, or causing doubt about it there would be no inference based on cause and effect and hence in this world there would be no desire for action at all. Therefore that relation of cause and effect among particulars, exists between the universals – this can be removed only by a stronger contradiction and there is no such contradiction here, since there is no contradiction in a negative instance which proves the opposite concomitance.

(iii) The moderns say that from the universal comcomitance that an effect is produced by an agent, there is the knowledge of an agent who is without a body and with eternal knowledge; from this cognition there is the knowledge that it is contradictory to

ज्ञानमनित्यमेवेत्यादिव्याप्तिज्ञानमकिंचित्करमेव । अत एव पक्षधर्मताविनाकृतं विरोधिव्याप्तिज्ञानं न हेत्वाभासतयोक्तम्, विरोधप्रतियोगिसिद्ध्यसिद्धिपराहतत्वात् ।।

(3)(a)(i) स्यादेतत्, अस्तु शरीरजन्यत्वमुपाधिः । न च पक्षेतरत्ववत् पक्षमात्रव्यावर्त्तकविशेषणवत्त्वात् साधनविशेषितत्वात् साधनतुल्ययोगक्षेमत्वेन साध्यव्यापकत्वानिश्चयाच्च नोपाधित्वमिति वाच्यम् । चेष्टेतरकार्ये शरीरव्यापारद्वारैव कर्त्तुः कारणत्वात्, शरीरसहकृतस्यैव स्वकार्ये कारणत्वाच्च । न हि शरीरविनाकृतः कर्त्ता शरीरक्रियां चेष्टां घटादिकं वा जनयति । न च यत्सहकृतं यज्जनकं तेन विना तज्जनकम्, अतोऽर्थाच्छरीरजन्यमेव कर्तृजन्यमिति साध्य-

(the knowledge) that knowledge is indeed non-eternal and without this cognition when the counter-positive is not known, there is no ascertainment of contradiction. And thus since there is contradiction of the cause, the cognition that knowledge is indeed non-eternal is not of much consequence. Therefore the knowledge of opposite universal concomitance without the relation of the reason being the attribute of the subject is not considered a fallacy, since (contradiction will be) removed even if the counter-positive of the contradiction is not established or not.

(3)(a)(i) This also may be added: 'being-produced-by-body' is an additional condition. Nor can it be said that it is not an additional condition because it has a qualification that differentiates only the subject like 'being-other-than-subject', because the reason is qualified and because it cannot be determined that it is a pervader of the *sādhya*, since (the additional condition and the reason) have equal force. (It is an additional condition) because in every effect except bodily action an agent is the cause only through the operation of the body and because only something which has the cooperation of the body is considered a cause with regard to its own effects. Nor does an agent who acts without a body produce bodily action or a jar etc. Nor does something which is the cause of something else with the help of some (other) thing, without the help of the latter, produce (that) something;

व्यापकत्वनिश्चयात्, पक्षेतरत्वादौ च विपक्षबाधकाभावान्न साध्यव्यापकतानिश्चय इति तेषामनुपाधित्वे बीजम्। अत एव बाधोन्नीतं वह्नीतरत्वम्, वह्निमत्त्वेन धूमवत्त्वे साध्ये आर्द्रेन्धनप्रभववह्निमत्त्वम्, रसवत्त्वेन गन्धवत्त्वे साध्ये पृथिवीत्वमुपाधिः विपक्षबाधकैस्तेषां साध्यव्यापकत्वनिश्चयात्। न च साधनविशेषितत्वमपि, जन्यत्वं हि प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वम्, शरीरजन्यत्वं च शरीरकारणकत्वम् अन्यानिरुक्तेः। इतरपदसमभिव्याहारेण जन्यपदादितरकारणकस्यैव प्रतीतेस्तदर्थकत्वकल्पनादिति विधौ वक्ष्यते। अत एव शरीरकर्तृकत्वमुपाधिः शरीरसहकृतस्यैव कर्त्तुः कारणत्वात्। व्याप्यं व्यापककोटावनिवेशयत

therefore by implication only that which is produced-by-a-body is produced by an agent and hence the (certainty that the additional condition has the) pervasion of *sādhya*. In being-other-than-the-subject etc., because of the absence of the contradiction in a negative instance, there is no certainty of the pervasion of *sādhya*, and this is the cause that they are not additional conditions; for the same reason, being-other-than-fire which is determined as having a contradiction, having-fire-arising-from-wet-fuel, when having-smoke is to be established through having-fire, having-earth, when having-smell is to be established through having-taste, are additional conditions because their pervasion of *sādhya* is certain since there is contradiction in a negative instance. Nor is the reason qualified, for 'being-produced' means, being the counter-positive of a prior absence and 'being-produced-by-a-body' means having-body as cause since it cannot be derived in any other way, for (when the word 'produced') is used with other words, from the word 'produced', there is the cognition of having-the-other-as-cause and so, that is determined to be its meaning; so will it be (said in the section on the) injunctive. Therefore having-a-maker with-a-body is an additional condition because only an agent helped by a body is the cause. If it is argued that only a means of cognition in which the pervaded is not included in the pervader makes known the invariable concomitance, and hence there is no cognition of invariable concomitance of having-a-maker-with-a-body, in having-a-maker, it cannot be admitted because there is no

एव प्रमाणस्य व्याप्तिग्राहकत्वाद् शरीरिकर्तृकत्वसकर्तृकत्वयोर्न व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेत् । न । विशिष्टाविशिष्टभेदेन व्याप्यव्यापकभावाविरोधात् । अत एव जन्यत्वेन कारणजन्यत्वमनुमेयमिति ॥

(ii) मैवम् । कर्तुर्हि शरीरसहकारिता किं घटादौ कर्तव्ये, कार्यमात्रे वा, स्वकार्ये वा ?। आद्ये कर्त्ता शरीर विना घटादिकं न करोतोति किमायातं कर्त्तुः कार्यमात्रकरणे। द्वितीये तु कार्यमात्रं कर्तृजन्यमिति न त्वया स्वीक्रियते । स्वीकारे वा शरीराजन्यमपि कार्यं कर्तृजन्यमिति साध्याव्यापकत्वम् । तृतीये तु स्वजन्यत्वं न स्वजन्यतावच्छेदकम् आत्माश्रयात् । तथापि यत्र सकर्तृकत्वमस्ति तत्र शरीरजन्यत्वमावश्यकमिति तस्य साध्यव्यापकत्वम्, तुल्ययोगक्षेमत्वेन हेतुव्याप्यतासंशयाधायकत्वेन सन्दिग्धोपाधित्वं वेति चेत् । न । लाघवेन बाधकं विना कर्तृजन्यत्वे हि जन्यत्वमवच्छेदकम्, न तु शरीर-

contradiction in the relation of the pervaded and the pervader whether they are qualified or not. And therefore by the reason of being-produced, being-produced-by-a-cause is to be inferred.

(ii) This is not so. Does the co-operation of the body for an agent mean that (it is required) in bringing about a jar etc. or every effect or his own effect? In the first case, because the maker does not produce a jar etc. without the help of the body, does it follow that an agent (needs the body) in producing all effects? In the second case, you do not accept that every effect is produced by a maker: If you accept it, an effect which is not produced by a body is also produced by a maker and thus (the additional condition has) no pervasion of *sādhya*. In the third case 'being-produced-by-oneself' is not the limitor of being-produced-by-oneself because of dependence on itself. Even then, where there is having-a-maker, it is necessary that there should be being-produced-by-a body and hence it has the pervasion of the *sādhya*; or by the same sort of purposes to be served, there is doubt if the reason is pervaded; therefore there is doubtful additional condition. This cannot be admitted. Since there is no contradiction, because of logical simplicity, being-

जन्यत्वं गौरवात्। तथा च शरीरजन्यत्वं न सकर्तृकत्वव्यापकम्। घटादौ त्वार्थः समाजः। घटत्वेन शरीरजन्यत्वनियमात्। न तु व्यापकत्वप्रयुक्तः मानाभावात्, शरीरजन्यत्वं न सकर्तृकत्वव्यापकं तद्व्याप्यजन्यत्वाव्यापकत्वाद् नित्यत्ववदिति बाधकात्। हस्तादिनापि कर्तृत्वनिर्वाहेण शरीरस्याप्रयोजकतया साक्षात्प्रयत्नाधिष्ठेयजन्यत्वस्य साधनव्यापकत्वाच्च। शरीरिकर्तृकत्वमपि नोपाधिः जन्यमात्रे कर्त्तुः शरीरसहकारिता विरहात्॥

(iii) (a 1) अथ यद्विशेषयोः कार्यकारणभावस्तत्सामान्ययोरपि बाधकं विना तथा नियम इति त्वयैव निरटङ्कि, तथा च कर्तृविशेष–शरीरजन्यविशेषयोः कार्यकारणभावात् कर्तृमात्र–शरीरजन्यमात्रयोरपि तथाभावः। तथा च शरीरजन्यत्वं कर्तृजन्यतावच्छेदकमिति भवत्यु-

produced and not being-produced-by-a-body is the limitor of being-produced-by-an-agent; thus being-produced-by-a-body is not the pervader of having-a-maker. With regard to a jar etc., since there is the rule that jar is produced by a body, there is (the notion of being-produced-by-body) by the presence of the causal complex, and not by pervasion since there is no proof and since there is contradiction as follows: Being-produced-by-body is not the the pervader of having-a-maker since it (being-produced-by-body) is not the pervader of being-produced which is pervaded by it (having-a-maker), like eternity; and since agency can be accomplished by hand etc., body need not be the cause (of effect) and so being-produced-directly-by-effort is the pervader of the reason. Having-a-maker-with-body is not an additional condition, because in every thing that is produced a maker does not have the co-operation of the body.

(iii)(a1) Now, that relation of cause and effect which exists between particulars, obtains also between the universals, is a rule which you also accept and thus the relation of cause and effect between a particular agent and a particular thing produced by body obtains also between agent in general and being-produced-by-body in general and thus being-produced-by-body is the limitor of being-produced-by-a-maker and hence it (being-produced-by-body)

पाधिः। नचैवं घटत्ववच्छरीरजन्यत्वं सकर्तृकत्वव्याप्यम्, न तु व्यापकमपीति वाच्यम्। उभयसिद्धसकलसकर्तृकवृत्तित्वेन साध्यव्यापकत्वनिश्चयात्। जन्यत्वेऽपि सकर्तृकत्वव्याप्यत्वग्राहकमस्तीति चेत्, तर्हि उभयत्र व्याप्तिग्राहकसाम्ये विनिगमकाभावाद् व्याप्तिसंशयाधायकत्वेन सन्दिग्धोपाधिर्व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिर्वा। साधनव्याप्यतासंशयाधायक एव हि सन्दिग्धोपाधिः। स च साध्यव्यापकत्वे साधनाव्यापकत्वे वा उभयत्र वा संशयात्। न च वाच्यं शरीरजन्यत्व–सकर्तृकत्वयोरन्वयव्यतिरेकज्ञाने जन्यत्व–सकर्तृकत्वयोस्तद्ग्रह आवश्यक इति लाघवात् तयोरेव व्याप्तिग्रहः, न तूपाधिसाध्ययोः। साध्यसाधनयोर-

is an additional condition. Nor can it be said that like being-jar being-produced-by-body is pervaded by having-a-maker and not its pervader. Since it (being-produced-by-body) exists in everything that is accepted by both parties as having a maker, there is the certainty of its being the pervader of *sādhya.* If it is argued that it could be cognized that being-produced also is pervaded by having-a-maker, then, since there is similarity in the means which enables us to cognize invariable concomitance, there is nothing that enables (us to determine which has real invariable concomitance), and so there is doubt about invariable concomitance and hence there is either doubtful additional condition or (the fault of) not having invariable concomitance. For doubtful additional condition is indeed doubt about the reason being pervaded (by it); and this could be from the doubt if it is the pervader of *sādhya* or if it is not pervaded by the reason or by both. Because of the knowledge of positive and negative concomitance between being-produced-by-body and having-a-maker, it is necessary that there is the cognition of the same between being-produced and having-a-maker and therefore because of simplicity the cognition of invariable concomitance is between them (i.e. being-produced and having-a-maker) and not between the additional condition and *sādhya* since the knowledge of positive and negative concomitance of *sādhya* and reason take place even when being-produced-by-body is not known-this cannot be held, because there is no cognition of invariable concomitance through positive and negative concomitance of agents

न्वयव्यतिरेकज्ञानं च शरीरजन्यत्वानवगमेऽपि भवतीति विनिगमकमिति । यतो न कर्तृमात्र–जन्यमात्रयोरन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां व्याप्तिग्रहः कर्तृमात्रस्य व्यतिरेकाभावात् । किं तु विशेषयोरन्वयव्यतिरेकेण कार्यकारणभावेन वा सामान्ययोस्तथात्वग्रहः, तौ च तुल्याविति ॥

(a 2) उच्यते, अस्तु तावद् घटत्ववज्जन्यत्व-शरीरजन्यत्वयोरपि कर्तृजन्यतावच्छेदकत्वेन सकर्तृकत्वव्याप्यत्वं ग्राहकतौल्याद् विनिगमकाभावाद् विरोधाभावाच्च । सकर्तृकत्वव्यापकत्वं तु शरीरजन्यत्वस्य कुतः ? घटत्ववदव्यापकस्यापि जन्यतावच्छेदकत्वात् । उभयसिद्धसकर्तृकेऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां शरीरजन्यत्वस्य व्यापकत्वग्रह इति चेत् । न । शरीरजन्यत्वविनिवेद्यत्वेन तुल्यन्यायेन च प्रथमं

in general and being-produced in general since there is no absence of agents in general; but through the positive and negative concomitance of particulars or through the relation of cause and effect (between the particulars), there is the cognition of the same (i.e. the relation of cause and effect) between universals. They (the positive and negative concomitance of the relation of cause and effect which makes it possible to cognize the invariable concomitance between being-produced-by-body and having-a-maker) are equal.

(a2) If it is argued like this, the answer is as follows: let being-produced and being-produced-by-body also be the limitor of being-produced-by-a-maker and thus be pervaded by having-a-maker, because the means of cognizing these are similar, and because of the absence of a criterion favouring one alternative, and because of the absence of contradiction. But why should being-produced-by-body be the pervader of having-a-maker, since like potness, something which is not a pervader can also be the limitor of being-produced. If it is argued that in those things which are accepted by both parties as having-a-maker, being-produced-by-body is cognized to be pervader, by means of positive and negative concomitance, this cannot be admitted: Because being-produced (has the characteristic of) making known being-produced-by-body, and because (in both cases there is) equal argument,

कर्तृजन्यत्वे जन्यत्वमवच्छेदकं क्लृप्तमिति तद्विरोधेन शरीरजन्यत्वस्य सकर्तृकत्वव्यापकत्वानवगमात् । अत एव न सन्दिग्धोपाधित्वम् ।

(iv) (a 1) ननु घटादौ शरीरजन्यत्वे कर्तृजन्यत्वमनुगतमवच्छेदकं बाधकाभावात् । नच लाघवाद् घटत्वादिकमेत्र तथा, कर्तृजन्यत्वेऽपि जन्यत्वस्यातथात्वापत्तेः । एवं शरीरजन्यत्वव्याप्यं सकर्तृकत्वं वह्नेर्धूम इवेति भवत्युपाधिः । किंच कर्तृजन्यत्वे जन्यत्वं, शरीरजन्यत्वे वा सकर्तृकत्वमवच्छेदकमिति संशयेऽपि न हेतोः साध्यव्याप्यत्वनिश्चय इति चेत् ।।

(a 2) तर्हि घटादौ कर्तृजन्यत्वे गृहीते तस्य शरीरजन्यत्वावच्छेदकत्वं ग्रहीतव्यम् । घटे च घटत्ववज्जन्यत्वमपि बाधकं विना कर्तृजन्यतावच्छेदकं गृहीतम् । अतो जन्यमात्रे कर्तृजन्यत्वान्न शरीर-

first of all, being-produced is determined to be the limitor of being-produced-by-a-maker and so in opposition to this, being-produced-by-body is not cognised to be the pervader of having a-maker. Therefore there is no doubtful additional condition.

(iv)(a1) Now, in jar etc. which are produced by body, being-produced-by-a-maker is consecutive and (so it is the) limitor because of the absence of contradiction. Nor can it be said that owing to simplicity, being-jar etc. are such; in that case, the objection will be that in being produced-by-a-maker, being-produced would not be such (i.e. limitor). Thus having-a-maker is pervaded by being-produced-by-body, just as smoke by fire, and so it (being-produced-by-body) is an additional condition. Besides, when there is doubt if in being-produced-by-an-agent, being-produced is the limitor or in being-produced-by-body, having-an-agent is limitor, there is no certainty if the reason is pervaded by *sādhya*.

(a2) If it is argued like this, then (the answer is that) in jar etc. only after knowing it to have been produced by a maker, can being-produced-by-body be cognised as its limitor, and in a jar, like being-jar, being-produced is also understood as the limitor of being-produced-by-a-maker and therefore in all that is produced, there is being-produced-by-a-maker and therefore in being-produced-by-body, it (being-produced-by-maker) is not the limitor since

जन्यत्वे तदवच्छेदकत्वं प्रथमगृहीतोपजीव्यविरोधात् । अत एव न तस्य हेतौ व्याप्तिसंशयाधायकत्वमपि ।।

(v) (a) एतेनानणुत्व-क्षित्यवयववृत्त्यन्यत्वादय उपाधित्वेन निरस्ताः । जन्यत्वस्य साध्यव्याप्यत्वेन तेषां साध्याव्यापकत्वात् ।।

(b) (i) तथापि क्षित्यादिकं न कर्तृजन्यं शरीराजन्यत्वाद् गगनवदिति सत्प्रतिपक्षोऽस्त्विति चेत् । न । अस्य प्रसिद्धकर्तृजन्यत्वाभावविषयकत्वात्, अप्रतीतप्रतियोगिकाभावस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात् । स्थापनानुमानं च पक्षधर्मताबलात् प्रसिद्धकर्तृभिन्नकर्तृकत्वसाधकम् । अतो भिन्नविषयत्वान्न प्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धकभावः । अत एव तद्व्यापकरहितत्वादिकमभावसाधकं बाधकमपास्तम् । तस्य प्रसिद्धाभावविषयकत्वेनाप्रसिद्धाभावविषयकत्वात् । व्यक्तिसाधकस्य च विशेषतोऽप्रसिद्धव्यक्तिसाधकत्वनियमात्, अन्यथा अनुमानवैयर्थ्यात् । कर्तृजन्यत्वमनुगतं घटादौ प्रसिद्धं यत् साध्यम् , तदभावो मया साध्यत इति चेन्न. कर्तृजन्यत्वमनुगतमपि पक्षधर्मतावलेनाप्रसिद्धं कर्त्तारमादाय पर्यवस्यति ।

it is opposed to that which was known at first as cause. Therefore there is no doubt about invariable concomitance in this reason.

(v)(a) By this, not-having-atom, being-different-from-existing-in-the-parts-of-earth as additional conditions are also rejected, since being-produced is pervaded by *sādhya*, they are not pervaders of *sādhya*.

(b)(i) However, the earth etc. are not produced by an agent since it is not produced by body, like ether - let there be such a counter-reason. This cannot be admitted, because this (the counter-inference) has as object the absence-of-being-produced-by-a-maker-who-is-known, since an absence whose counter-positive is not known cannot be cognized; the establishing inference, however, establishes by the force of the reason being an attribute of the subject, an agent different from the agent who is known and therefore it has a different object. Hence there is no relation of that which is to be prevented and that which prevents. For the same reason also, the contradiction which establishes the absence (of the *sādhya*) by the reason of having-the-absence-of-its-pervader is rejected,

तदभावस्तु प्रसिद्धस्य कर्त्तुरभावमादाय सिध्यति, नाप्रसिद्धस्यानुगतस्यापि, कर्तृ जन्यत्वस्य तदभावस्य च कर्तृ व्यक्तिघटितत्वात् । अन्यथा व्यक्ति-तदभावासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । नचैवं सत्प्रतिपक्षोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः, तस्य गोत्वाद्येकभावाभावसाधकविषयत्वात् ।।

(ii) एतेन ज्ञानत्वं न नित्यवृत्ति ज्ञानमात्रवृत्तिजातित्वात् स्मृतित्ववत् , ज्ञानं न नित्यगुणवृत्तिगुणत्वव्याप्यजातियोगि चेतनविशेषगुणत्वात् सुखवत् , आत्मा न नित्यविशेषगुणाधारवृत्तिद्रव्यत्वापरजातिमान् विभुत्वाद् गगनवदित्यपास्तम् । प्रसिद्धे नित्ये व्योमादौ प्रसिद्धायाश्च

because this has as object an absence of (something that) is known, and not an absence (of something that) is not known. (An inference which) establishes an individual should necessarily establish an individual who is particular and not yet established, otherwise inference would be useless.

If it is argued that being-produced-by-agent which is consecutive and which is known in a jar and so on is the *sādhya* and its absence is established by me, then (the answer is that) although being-produced-by-agent is consecutive, it establishes at the end, an agent who is not yet established by the force of reason being an attribute of subject; the absence of it (i.e. the absence of such an agent) is established by the absence of an established agent, not by the absence of some unestablished agent, though consecutive, because being-produced-by-agent and its absence are joined with an individual agent. Otherwise an individual and his absence cannot be established. Nor is thus the destruction of (the fault of) all counter-reason since it is present in establishing the presence and absence of one thing like cowness etc.

(ii) By this also (are) refuted (the following): Knowledgeness does not exist in something eternal because it is a generic attribute existing only in knowledge like memory; knowledge is not conjoined with a generic attribute which is pervaded by quality-ness which does not exist in eternal quality because it is the special quality of the soul like happiness; the soul does not have a generic attribute which is pervaded by substance-ness which exists in the substratum of eternal special qualities, because it is all-pervasive like ether.

रूपत्व-जलत्वादिजातेर्व्यतिरेकविषयत्वादप्रयोजकत्वाच्च ॥

(iii) (a1) किं च क्षित्यादौ शरीराजन्यत्वमसिद्धम् अदृष्टद्वारा तज्जन्यत्वात् । न चादृष्टाद्वारकजन्यज्ञानाजन्यत्वं हेतुः, ज्ञाने जन्यत्वविशेषणस्याव्यावर्त्तकत्वेन व्यर्थत्वात् । न च स्थापनायां पक्षविशेषणेऽप्ययं दोषः, प्रमेयो घट इतिवदुपरक्तबुद्धेरुद्देश्यत्वात् ॥

(a2) (i) (a) अपि च शरीराजन्यत्वे व्यर्थविशेषणत्वम्, लाघवेनाजन्यत्वस्यैव व्याप्यत्वात्; न च निष्प्रयोजनविशेषणत्त्वमसिद्धम्, व्याप्तिग्रहोपयुक्तविशेषणवत् पक्षधर्मतोपयुक्तविशेषणस्यापि सप्रयोजनत्वात् । व्यभिचारवारकस्यापि सार्थकत्वेऽनुमितिप्रयोजकत्वस्यैव तन्त्रत्वात् । व्यभिचारवारकविशेषणवत्त्येव व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेत् । न । निर्विशेषणेऽपि गोत्वादौ व्याप्तिग्रहात् । तत्रापि व्यक्तिविशिष्टे व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेत् । न । स्वतो व्यावृत्तगोत्वस्याव्यभिचारात् । अन्यथा अन्योन्याश्रयात् । अपि च व्यभिचारवारकविशेषणवत्येव व्याप्तिग्रह

(These inferences have) as object the absence of such generic attributes as colourness, waterness and so on which are established in ether and so on which are existing.

(iii)(a1) Besides in earth etc, there is the absence of not-being-produced-by-body, because through the unseen (the earth etc. are) produced by it. Nor is the case that the reason is not-being-produced not through the unseen, by means of knowledge which is produced, because the qualification of being-produced does not serve to distinguish and hence it is useless. Nor is there such a fault in the establishing inference, since as in the (statement) jar is knowable, what is intended is only a knowledge that it has that.[1]

(a2)(i)(a) Besides there is useless qualification in (the reason of) being-produced-by-body: For simplicity, not-being-produced itself could be considered as that which is pervaded. Nor is it to be said that (in the present case) there is no useless qualification since like the qualification which enables us to cognize invariable concomitance, a qualification which enables us to cognize that the reason exists in the subject is also useful; even in the case

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[1] i. e. the qualified has qualification.

इत्यप्रयोजकम्, सहचारदर्शनादिसत्त्वे तदभावेन व्याप्तिग्रहाविलम्बात् । व्यभिचारावारकविशेषणशून्य एव व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेत् । न । प्रमेयधूमे व्याप्तिग्रहात् । अथ तत्रोपात्तव्यभिचारावारकविशेषणशून्यत्वं विवक्षितम्, न च तत्र प्रमेयत्वं विशेषणमुपात्तमिति चेत् । न । विरोधात्, न हि तत्रोपात्तं तेन शून्यं चेति घटते ।।

(b) यद्विषयत्वेन परामर्शः कारणमनुमितौ, तल्लिङ्गम्, प्रकृते च व्यभिचारादन्यथासिद्धेश्च न विशेषणविषयकत्वेन तत्त्वमिति चेत् ।

of a qualification that serves to avoid deviation its meaningfulness is dependent on its usefulness to inference. If it is argued that the invariable concomitance is grasped only in that which has a qualification which enables (one) to avoid deviation, it cannot be admitted, since in cow-ness etc. which have no qualification there is the cognition of invariable concomitance. Evcn here, if it is argued that the invariable concomitance is cognized in that which is qualified by individual, it cannot be admitted, since cowness, which is differentiated by itself has no deviation. Otherwise there would be mutual dependence. Besides, there is no supporting reason for (the position) that it is only in something which has qualification to avoid deviation, there is cognition of invariable concomitance, for there is no delay in grasping invariable concomitance, when there is the cognition of concomitance, on account of the absence (of qualification). If it is argued that invariable concomitance is grasped only in that which has no qualification which serves to avoid deviation, it cannot be admitted since in knowable smoke there is the cognition of invariable concomitance. Nor can it be said that here being-knowable is not used as a qualifier, since there is contradiction. It is not proper to say that it is used and it is absent.

(b) That which being the object of synthetic knowledge, is the cause of inference, is reason. In the present case, however, because (the present reason has) deviation and because (it is a) dispensable antecedent, it is not a cause of inference with (its) qualification (also) as the object (of synthetic knowledge). This

न । धूमस्याप्यतत्त्वापत्तेः, व्यभिचारात् , तद्विषयत्वेनानुमित्यकारणत्वात् ।।

(c) अथैकमवच्छेदकम् , अपरत्र व्याप्तिः, यद्वा लाघवेन व्यासज्यवृतिरेकैव व्याप्तिरिति विशिष्टव्याप्त्यर्थः, तत्र विशेष्यतावच्छेदकस्य व्याप्त्यनवच्छेदकत्वेन विशेषणस्य तदवच्छेदकत्वनियमाद् एकवृत्तित्वबाधे सत्येव व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वमिति व्याप्तेश्च न शरीरजन्यत्वाभावे नील़धूमादौ च व्याप्तिरिति विशेष्यमात्रे सा, तथा च स्वरूपासिद्धिः, तद्वारणार्थं विशेषणाभिधाने व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरिति चेत् । न । अव्यभिचारस्यानौपाधिकत्वस्य वा विशिष्टे नीलधूमादौ सत्त्वेन तद्व्यतिरेकसाधने बाधात् । न च विशेष्यत्वमुपाधिः, साधनव्यापकत्वात् । किं च सौरभविशेषवद्धूमरहितमिदं चन्दनप्रभववह्निरहितत्वात्,

cannot be admitted since (in that case) even smoke will not be a cause, because of deviation: (and because) having it as the object (of synthetic knowledge), it is not the cause of inference.

(c) Now limitor is one (part of the reason), in another (part) is invariable concomitance. Or because of logical simplicity invariable concomitance is only one existing (in the parts of the reason) together; this is the meaning of invariable concomitance of qualified; here only when the limitor of qualficandness is not the limitor of invariable concomitance, should the qualification be the limitor of it (invariable concomitance); this being the rule, in the absence of not-being-produced-by-body and in blue-smoke, there is no invariable concomitance; invariable concomitance is only in the qualificand and thus in order to avoid the fault of the reason not occuring in the subject, a qualification is added and then there is the fault of the absence of invariable concomitance.

This cannot be admitted: for not-having-deviation or not-having-additional-condition is present in blue smoke etc. which are the qualified and hence there is contradiction in establishing their absence.

Nor can it be said that the qualificand-ness is an additional condition since it pervades reason. Besides, by inferences such as,

निर्धूमोऽयमार्द्रेन्धनप्रभववह्निरहितत्वादित्यादावपि कारणविशेषाभावेन कार्यविशेषाभावानुमानं न स्यात्, वह्निरहितत्वादिकं चोपाधिर्भवेत्, व्यतिरेकिण्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वं च हेत्वभावव्याप्यं न स्यात्, द्रव्यानाश्रितत्वस्यैव व्याप्यत्वाद्, रूपादिषु मध्ये गन्धस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वादित्यादौ त्वयाप्यसिद्धिवारकविशेषणस्वीकाराच्च । अपि च गौरवेण विशिष्टस्य व्यापकतापि न स्यात् । तथा च स्थापनानमाने उपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानचिकीर्षाकृतिमज्जन्यता, धूमेनार्द्रेन्धनप्रभववह्निः, घटत्वेन शरीरजन्यत्वादिकं नानुमीयेत ॥

(d) यत्तु जन्यान्योन्याभावापेक्षया शरीरजन्यान्योन्याभावस्याल्पत्वात् तेषामेव व्याप्यत्वमिति विपरीतमेम लाघवमिति । तन्न ।

this (place) is without smoke with particular fragrance, because there is the absence of fire arising from sandalwood; this (place) is without smoke because there is the absence of fire arising from wet fuel, there would also not be any inference of the absence of a particular effect from the absence of a particular cause. Besides, absence of fire would be an additional condition. In the negative inference, not-being-dependent-upon-substance-other-than-the-eight-substances will not be pervaded by the absence of reason, since not-being-dependent-on-substance, itself will be pervaded. And you yourself have made use of qualification to avoid the fault of reason not occuring in the subject in such cases as among colour etc. smell is made the object of cognition (by the organ of smell).

Besides the qualified will not even be pervader and thus, in the establishing inference, being-produced-by-someone-having-direct-knowledge-of-the-material-cause-desire-and-effort; fire arising from wet-fuel, by smoke; being-produced-by-body etc. by means of jar, will not be inferred.

(d) It is said that in comparison with the mutual absence of being-produced, the mutual absence of being-produced-by-body is fewer, and therefore they (mutual absences of being-produced-by-body) are the pervaded and therefore the opposite (to being-produced) is simple. This cannot be admitted since without any

विरोधाभावेन बहूनामल्पस्य च व्याप्यत्वात्, स्नेहे शीतस्पर्शवत्त्वजलत्वयोर्गन्धाभावेऽपृथिवीत्वपृथिवीत्वाभावयोरिव। अन्यथा नीलधूमस्यैव व्याप्यत्वे धूममात्रस्याव्याप्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। किं च त्वन्नये बह्वन्योन्याभावापेक्षया जन्यत्वात्यन्ताभावस्यैव व्याप्यता स्याद् एकत्वात्॥

(e) प्रमेयत्वाद्यनन्तधर्मविशिष्टस्य व्याप्तावपि प्रयोजनाभावान्नानुमाने तदुपन्यासः॥

(f) अथ लाघवेन जन्यत्वस्य शीघ्रोपस्थितिकतया जन्यत्वाभावत्वेन शीघ्रं व्याप्तिग्रहः, न तु शरीरजन्यत्वाभावत्वेन विलम्बितप्रतीतिकत्वात्। यत्र विशेषण-विशेष्यान्यतराभाववति साध्यम्, तत्र विशिष्टाभावस्यापि व्याप्तिरिति चेत्। न। एवं ह्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वे सति सत्त्वादिकमनित्यत्व–सकर्तृकत्वव्याप्यतया न गृह्येत, शीघ्रोपस्थिति-

contradiction both many and few could be said to be the pervaded, just as in relation to oiliness, having-cold-touch and water-ness and in relation to absence of smell, mutual absence of earth as well as constant absence of earth are the pervaded; otherwise it could come about that only blue smoke is pervaded and not all instances of smoke. Besides, in your opinion, it would come about that only the constant absence of being-produced would be that which is pervaded since it is only one and not the mutual absence of being-produced, since it is many.

(e) Although there is invariable concomitance in those which are qualified by infinite qualities like knowability, because of the absence of any use they are not used in inference.

(f) Now, owing to simplicity, being-produced could be understood easily, and so the cognition of invariable concomitance (arises) soon (for the reason of the) absence-of-being-produced, and not for (the reason of the) absence-of-being-produced-by-body, because its cognition takes time. Where *sādhya* is in the absence of either the qualification or the qualificand, there is invariable concomitance also in the absence of the qualified. This cannot be admitted since 'having-existence-while-having-origin' will not be cognized as pervaded by non-eternity and 'having-agent' since

कतया घटत्वादेरेव तथाभावात् । यदि च सामान्यविशेषभावाद्विरोधाभावेनोभयस्यापि व्याप्यता, तदा शरीराजन्यत्व-जन्यत्वाभावयोरपि तुल्यम् ॥

(g) किंच शरीरजन्यत्वं विशिष्टं तदभावं विशिनष्टि, न तु साक्षात्, तथा च शरीरजन्यत्वाभावोऽखण्ड एव हेतुः, अतो न व्यर्थविशेषणता । नचात्र विशिष्टाभावो विशेष्याभाव एव, क्षित्यादावजन्यतापत्तेः । अत एव स्थापनायां शरीरजन्यत्वमुपाधिः साध्याभावव्याप्याभावप्रतियोगित्वेन साध्यव्यापकत्वनियमात् ॥

(h) व्यर्थविशेषणेऽधिकं निग्रहस्थानमिति चेत् । न । हेतुद्वयोपन्यासे च तत्, इह तु विशिष्टमेकमेव हेतुरिति विरुद्धस्थले उक्तमिति ॥

(ii) (a) उच्यते, नीलधूमादौ व्याप्तिरस्त्येव, अन्यथा विशेषाणामव्याप्यत्वे निराश्रया व्याप्तिः स्यात् । नीलत्वमपि न व्याप्यता-

being-jar becomes quickly the object of cognition and hence it is the pervaded. If it is argued that because of their character as universal and particular, both have the characteristic of being-pervaded, then in the case of 'being-produced-by-body' and 'being-produced', the same is(the situation).

(g) Besides, being-produced-by-body is the qualified and it qualifies its absence not directly; and thus the absence-of-being-produced-by-body is an indivisible reason and so there is no useless qualification. Nor can it be said that here the absence of the qualified is the absence of the qualificand for in that case in the earth etc. there would be the absence of being-produced. Therefore in the establishing inference being-produced-by-body is additional condition, since the pervader of *sādhya* is the counter-positive of the absence which is pervaded by the absence of *sādhya*.

(h) If it is argued that useless qualification is a point of defeat called the superfluous (*adhika*), it cannot be admitted; that happens only when two reasons are mentioned, so is it said in the place (treating about) contradiction and here the cause is qualified and one.

(ii)(a) (These objections) are answered: There is invariable

वच्छेदकं गौरवात् । किं तु धूमत्वमेव दण्डत्वेन कारणत्वे रूपमिव । धूमत्वं च न नीलिम्नि, किं तु तदाश्रये धूमे इति नीलधूमस्य न हेतुत्वम् । नीलधूमे नीलस्य विशेषणत्वे तद्विशिष्टे न धूमत्वम् । उपलक्षणत्वे च धूमादेवानुमितिः । किं च व्याप्यतावच्छेदकस्यैव हेतुतावच्छेदकत्वमिति न नीलधूमत्वं तथा । न चैवं धूमत्वस्यावच्छेदकत्वेऽपि सामग्रीसत्त्वान्नीलधूमादनुमित्युत्पत्तौ हेत्वाभासत्वं न स्याद्, अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकस्य तत्त्वादिति वाच्यम् । तदभावेऽपि नीलधूमप्रयुक्तसाध्यवत्प्रत्ययस्य भ्रमत्वेन तत्करणस्याभासत्वसंभवादिति दिक् ।

(b) एवं शरीराजन्यत्वेऽपि न शरीरमवच्छेदकं गौरवात्, येन विशेषणेन विना व्याप्तिर्न गृह्यते तस्यैव व्याप्यतावच्छेदकत्वनियमात् । अत एव गन्धस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वादित्यत्राप्रसिद्धत्वेन रूपादिषु मध्य इति

concomitance in blue smoke, otherwise if the particulars are not pervaded, there will be no substratum for invariable concomitance. Blueness also is not the limitor of pervaded-ness because of logical complexity; but only smoke-ness, just as when (a stick is) the cause qua stick-ness, colour (is not the limitor of pervaded-ness); smoke-ness is not in blue but in smoke which is its substratum and so blue smoke has no reason-ness. In blue smoke, if blue is a qualification there is no smokeness in the qualified. If it is only an adventitious qualification, then the inference is only by smoke. Besides, since the limitor of pervadedness is the limitor of reason-ness, blue-smoke-ness is not that (not limitor of pervaded-ness and so not limitor of reason-ness). And even if smoke-ness is the limitor, since there is inference by means of blue-smoke, it cannot be said that there is no fallacy since it occurs only when there is hindrance to inference. Even if that (hindrance of inference) is not there, because there is erroneous cognition that the *sādhya* is established by blue-smoke there is fallacy; this is the direction.

(b) Thus in not-being-produced-by-body, body is not the limitor because of logical complexity, owing to the rule that, only that qualification without which invariable concomitance is not cognized, is the limitor of pervaded-ness. Therefore in (the inference

विशेषणं विना व्याप्तिर्ग्रहीतुं न शक्यत इत्यसिद्धिवारकमपि विशेषणं सार्थकमेव । सुरभिधूमविशेषादौ च चन्दनप्रभवाग्न्यादेः कारणत्वात्, कारणाभावस्य कार्याभावप्रयोजकतया व्याप्यत्वनिश्चयः ।।

(c) व्यापके च न व्यर्थविशेषणता, विशिष्टस्य कारणत्वेन व्यापकत्वात् । परिशेषव्यतिरेकिणि विपक्षबाधकेनानन्यगतिकतया विशिष्टस्य व्यापकत्वाद् विशिष्टाभावस्य हेत्वभावव्याप्यत्वम् । यत्र च विपक्षबाधकं नास्ति, तत्र विशिष्टस्य व्यापकतापि न यथा कार्यस्य द्विकर्तृकत्वे ।।

(d) नापि शरीरजन्यत्वाभावोऽखण्डो हेतुः, यदि हि शरीरजन्यत्वं सकर्तृकत्वप्रयोजकं स्यात् तदा तदभावप्रयुक्तः सकर्तृकत्वाभाव इति तस्य साध्यव्याप्यता स्यात्, न चैवम्, किं तु जन्यत्वं, लाघवात् ।

using the reason that) 'only smell is made the object of cognition', since there is (the fault that the reason is) unestablished, without the qualification of 'amidst colour etc.', invariable concomitance cannot be cognized. Therefore a qualification which avoids (the fault that the reason is) unestablished is also meaningful; in the inference of a particular fragrant smoke and so on, fire arising from sandalwood and so on is the cause, and so there is the determination of pervaded-ness because absence of cause brings about the absence of effect.

(c) In the pervader there is no useless qualification, since the qualified is the pervaded as the cause (of the pervaded). In the case of a specific negative inference, because there is no contradiction in a negative instance, there is no other possibility, (but that) the qualified is the pervader and hence the absence of the qualified is pervaded by the absence of the reason. Where there is no contradiction in a negative instance, the qualified is not the pervader as in the case of the inference, wherever there is effect, there is duality of agency.

(d) Nor can it be said that not-being-produced-by-agent is an integral reason; if however, being-produced-by-body is the cause of having-a-maker, then the absence of it (being-produced-by-body) would bring about the absence-of-having-an-agent and

तथा चाजन्यत्वमेवोपाधिः। साध्यव्याप्याभावः साध्याभावव्यापक इति नियमेन तस्य साध्यव्यापकतानिश्चयात्। सकर्तृकत्वशरीरजन्यत्वयोर्व्याप्त्यभावेन तदभावयोरपि व्याप्त्यभाव इति व्याप्यत्वासिद्धत्वाच्च। अत एव शरीरजन्यत्वाभावस्याकर्तृकत्वाव्याप्यत्वात् तदभावयोरपि व्याप्यव्यापकभाव इति निरस्तम्, शरीरजन्यत्वस्य सकर्तृकत्वाप्रयोजकत्वात् ॥

(e) न चाजन्यत्वं पूर्वसाधनव्यतिरेकत्वेन नोपाधिः सत्प्रतिपक्षोच्छेदप्रसङ्गादिति वाच्यम्। स्थापनायां यत्राभासत्वम्, तत्र विशेषादर्शनदशायां सत्प्रतिपक्षे पूर्वसाधनव्यतिरेकस्य साध्याव्यापकत्वेनानुपाधित्वाद्, यथा शब्दोऽनित्यो गुणत्वादित्यत्र शब्दो नित्यो व्योमैक-

thus it (absence of being produced by body) would have been pervaded by the *sādhya*. This is not so, but being-produced, is so owing to logical simplicity. And thus being-not-produced is certainly additional condition (in counter-reason). The reason is that the absence of that which is pervaded by *sādhya* is the pervader of the absence of *sādhya*, and so there is the certainty that it (being-not-produced) has pervasion of *sādhya* (being-not-produced-by-body); hence there is no invariable concomitance between having-agent and being-produced-by-body; therefore there is no invariable concomitance between their absences. Therefore since the absence-of-not-being-produced-by-body is not pervaded by not-having-an-agent, it is rejected that there is the relation of the pervaded and pervader between their absences, because being-produced-by-body, does not bring about having-an-agent.

(e) Nor can it be said that because of its being the negative of the earlier reason, 'not-being-produced' is not an additional condition for (in that case) any counter-reason would be impossible. This is because where there is fallacy in the establishing inference, if the differentiating (characteristic) is not cognized, the absence of the establishing reason cannot be taken as an additional condition, since it does not pervade the *sādhya*, as for example sound is not eternal, because of quality-ness; in this case, sound is eternal because of its-being-the-only-quality-of-ether is the counter-inference; here absence-of-quality is not an additional condition,

गुणत्वादित्यनेन सत्प्रतिपक्षे गुणत्वाभावो नोपाधिः, जलपरमाणुरूपे साध्याव्यापकत्वात् । न चैवमनैकान्तिकत्वमेव तन्नोद्भाव्यम्, सत्प्रतिपक्षमुपेक्ष्य तस्योद्भावनानर्हत्वाम् । किञ्च प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वे सति समवेतत्वस्य, तत्प्रतियोगित्वे सति सत्त्वस्य, सत्त्वे सत्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वस्य वा हेतुत्वे एषामन्यतमव्यतिरेके उपाधिरिति न पूर्वसाधनव्यतिरेकः । अत एवाजन्यत्वस्य नोपाधित्वं ध्वंसे साध्याव्यापकत्वादिति न दोषः ।।

(f) अन्ये तु यन्निष्ठा यन्निरूपिता च व्याप्तिर्येन विशेषणेन विना न गृह्यते, तत्र विशिष्टं व्याप्यतावच्छेदकम्, अकर्तृकत्वनिरूपिताभावनिष्ठव्याप्तौ च शरीरं विनैव प्रतियोगितया जन्यत्वमवच्छेदकं क्लृप्तमिति न शरीरजन्यत्वमवच्छेदकं धूमे नीलधूमत्वमिव। अतिगौरवेण

because there is the absence of pervasion of *sādhya* in the colour of the atoms of water. Nor is to be said that deviation is to be there spoken of since it is not proper to abandon counter-reason and speak of deviation. Besides the reason could be, being-inherent-while-being-the-counter-positive-of-a-prior-absence, being-existent-while-being-the-counter-positive-of-it (prior absence), or being-existent-while-having-origin, and so the absence of any one of them could be additional condition; hence the absence of the first reason (is not additional condition). Therefore not-being-produced is no additional condition since in destruction it does not pervade *sādhya*. Thus there is no fault.

(f) Others say that where the invariable concomitance existing in something and governed by something is not grasped without a (particular) qualification, there the qualified is the limitor of pervaded-ness. In the case of the invariable concomitance governed by having-no-agent, existing in an absence, since the counter-positive (of the absence) is not (qualified by) body, the limitor (of pervasion) is certainly 'being-produced' and 'not-being-produced-by-body' just as in the case of smoke, blue-smoke-ness (is not the limitor of pervasion, but jut smokeness). Owing to great logical complexity, being-produced-by-body, owing to not-being-the-counter-positive, being-produced, are not limitors (of pervasion), and so since there is no limitor of pervaded-ness, absence of not-produced-by-body is

शरीरजन्यत्वमप्रतियोगितया च जन्यत्वं नावच्छेदकमिति व्याप्यतावच्छेदकाभावान्न शरीरजन्यत्वाभावोऽकर्तृकत्वव्याप्यः। व्यभिचाराभावात्, तथेति चेत्। न। क्षित्यादावेव व्यभिचारात्, अन्यथा क्षित्यादिकं नादृष्टहेतुकं शरीरजन्यत्वभावादित्याद्यपि स्यात् ॥

(4)(a) नन्वस्तु तावदशरीरनित्यज्ञानादिकर्त्रनुमितिः, तथापि सानुमितिरयथार्था, अशरीरे कर्तृत्वज्ञानत्वात्, ज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नेषु नित्यत्वज्ञानत्वात्, शरीराजन्ये सकर्तृकत्वज्ञानत्वात्, घटःकर्त्ता, घटज्ञानादिकं नित्यम्, व्योम सकर्तृकमिति ज्ञानवदिति साध्यम्। नचोपजीव्यबाधः, अनुमितिर्हि उपजीव्या, न तु तद्यथार्थत्वमपीति चेत्। न। कर्तृकार्ययो-

not pervaded by not-having-agent. If it is argued that owing to the absence of deviation it is so (i.e. the absence of not-produced-by-body is pervaded by not-having-agent,) it cannot be admitted because there is deviation in the case of earth and so on, otherwise it could be said that that the earth and so on are not caused by the unseen because of the absence of not-produced-by-body.

(4)(a) Now, let there be the inference of an agent who is without body, with eternal knowledge and so on, yet such an inference is not valid (knowledge) since in that which has no body, there is the knowledge of agency, in knowledge, desire and effort there is the knowledge of eternity, in that which is not produced-by-body, there is knowledge of having-agency, just like knowledge, such as, a pot is an agent, the knowledge of jar and so on is eternal, ether has an agent. Nor is there contradiction of that which is depended upon, for the inference is that which is depended upon and not its validity also. This cannot be admitted; since there is the relation of effect and cause between agent and effect without any additional condition, it has no supporting reason. Otherwise even the inference of fire in mountain would not be valid since there is the knowledge of fire in something other than that which is accepted to be having fire by both parties and thus there would be the destruction of all positive and negative concomitance. Besides the invalidity of the inference is to be known by it (and not caused by it). And thus (the question is) whether the inferential knowledge which has arisen through fault, while it is

निरुपाधिकार्यकारणभावेन एतस्याप्रयोजकत्वात् । अन्यथा पर्वते वह्न्यनुमितिरयथार्था उभयसिद्धवह्निमद्भिन्ने वह्निज्ञानत्वादित्यादिना सकलान्वयव्यतिरेक्युच्छेदः । किं च अनुमितेरयाथार्थ्यमनेन ज्ञाप्यम्, न तु कार्यम्, तथा च दोषादुत्पन्नस्यानेन ज्ञापने तत्रायमेव दोषो दोषान्तरं वा ?, नाद्यः, अन्योन्याश्रयात्, उत्पन्ने तस्मिन् ज्ञापनम्, ज्ञापकादेव च तस्मात् दोषात् तदुत्पत्तिरिति । नान्त्यः, असिद्धेः ॥

(b) तर्कापरिशुद्धिस्तु न दूषणम् । यदीश्वरः कर्त्ता स्यात्, शरीरी स्यात् । इष्टसाधनताज्ञानवान् स्यात्, प्रयोजनवान् स्यात्, अनित्यज्ञानवान् स्यात् । क्षित्यादि यदि सकर्तृकं स्यात् शरीरिकर्तृकं स्यादित्यादितर्काणां विपर्यये आश्रयासिद्धिव्यर्थविशेषणत्वादिना विपर्ययापर्यवसानेनाभासत्वात् ॥

(c) ननु क्षित्यादावेककर्तृसिद्धिः कुतः, एककर्तृकत्वेन व्याप्त्यभावात् । न च लाघवात्, तस्याप्रमाणत्वात् । सकर्तृकत्व-प्रमाणादेव लाघवसहकृतात् तत्सिद्धिरिति चेत् । न तावदनुमितिमात्रे

being made known, is it made known through this fault itself or through another fault; it cannot be the first because of mutual dependence; after it has arisen, it is made known; by that which it is known, it also takes its origin. Not the last case because it (another fault) is not established.

(b) Incorrectness of supporting argument is not a fault. If there is a God, he would have a body, he would be endowed with knowledge of what is conducive to his desire, he would have some benefit to achieve, he would have non-eternal knowledge. If the earth and so on, have an agent, they would have an agent with a body; such supporting arguments in their opposition do not have any subject; would have useless qualification, and since they do not have contradiction in opposition, are fallacious.

(c) How can (only) a single agent for the earth and so on could be established since there is no invariable concomitance with a single agent. Nor can it be said because of logical simplicity (there is only one agent) since simplicity is not a means of valid cognition. If it is argued that by the same means of cognition

लाघवं सहकारिव्यभिचारात्, मानाभावाच्च । न हि लिङ्गपरामर्शे सति तद्विलम्बेनानुमितिविलम्बः, येन सहकारिता स्यात् । नापि लध्वनुमितौ, अन्योन्याश्रयात् । नापि व्यक्त्यनुमितौ, धूमेन वह्न्यनुमितौ एकद्विहस्तसंशयाभावापत्तेः । साधकाभावेन नानात्वासिद्धौ कर्तृसिद्धिरेवैककर्तृसिद्धिरिति चेत् । न । एकत्वसाधकाभावेनैकत्वासिद्धौ कर्तृसिद्धिरेव नानात्वसिद्धिरित्यस्यापि सुवचनात् ।

अथ यमर्थमनालम्बमानाऽनुमितिः पक्षे साध्यसंसर्गं न विषयीकरोति, स पक्षधर्मताबलत् सिध्यति, नत्वधिकमपि । तथा च द्वितीयं कर्त्तारमविषयीकुर्वत्यपि कर्त्तारं विषयीकरोत्येवेति न द्वितीयमवगाहते,एकस्तु कर्त्ता सिध्यति । तदविषयत्वे कर्तृविषयतैव न स्यात् । एकविषयत्वाभावे नानाविषयत्वास्याप्यभावात् तद्घटितत्वात् तस्येति चेद्, एवं तर्हि कर्त्रैकत्वमपि

which establishes having-agent, supported by simplicity, (one can establish only one agent)it cannot be admitted, since in all inferences simplicity is not a support, because of deviation and because there is no proof. It is not the case that after the consideration of the reason, there is delay for inference because of the delay of something (which could be considered) a support. Nor is it a (support) in light inference because of mutual dependence. Nor is (simplicity a support) in the inferences of individuals, for in that case, when fire is inferred from smoke, there could be no doubt if the fire is one or two arms (in height). If it is argued, because of the absence of means of cognition which establishes several agents, a single agent is established, it cannot be admitted; by the absence of argument which establishes one agent, the agent that is established is many indeed - this could as well be said.

Now that thing without making which the object of the inference, the relation of *sādhya* (to subject) does not become its object that thing is established by the force of the relation of the reason to the subject and not anything more (can be established). And thus while it does not make a second agent as the object, it does make an agent as object and so it does not cognise two agents. Only a single agent is established. When this is not the object (of cognition) there would be no agent at all as the object

न विषयः स्यात् एकत्वविषयत्वं विनापि कर्तृविषयत्वसंभवात् । वस्तुगत्यैकः सिध्यति, न त्वेकत्वेनेति चेत् । न । एकत्वासिद्ध्या वस्तुगत्यैक इति ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात् । तथा चेश्वरे एकत्वानेकत्वयोर्नित्यसंशय इति । उच्यते । यत्र प्रणाणे लघुगुरुविषयता संभवति, तत्र लाघवसहकारिता। कारणता-कार्यता-व्याप्यतादिग्राहके प्रत्यक्षे प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तग्राहक उपमाने शब्दशक्तिग्राहकानुमाने तथाविधप्रमाणमात्रे सकलतान्त्रिकैः सहकारित्वकल्पनात् । एवं लाघवम् एवं गौरवम् इति ज्ञानानन्तरं बाधकं विना लघूनामेव कारणत्व-कार्यत्व-व्याप्यत्व-प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्व-शब्दशक्यत्वानां ज्ञानदर्शनात् । तत्रापि लाघवानादरे शब्दशक्यत्वादिसंशये तन्मूलक-

of cognition since when there is the absence of one object there is absence of many objects, since manifoldness implies it (oneness). If it is argued like this, even the oneness of the agent will not be the object of cognition since even without having one-ness as object, an agent could be the object (of cognition). If it is argued that by the nature of the thing one is established but not qua one, it cannot be admitted, since if oneness is not established, then it is impossible to know one by the nature of the thing; and thus with regard to God, there would be eternal doubt about the oneness and manifoldness; it is replied: where in the means of cognition, the contentness (may be) logically simple or complex there is the auxiliary cause of simplicity; this is because in perception which cognises causality, effect-ness, pervaded-ness, in comparison which cognises the cause of usage of words, in inference which cognises the potency of words, thus in all means of cognition, all learned men have accepted (simplicity) as auxiliary cause. In this way it is simple, in this way it is complex; after such knowledge, when there is no contradiction the simple is understood to have causality, effect-ness, pervaded-ness, the causality of usage, the nature-of-being expressed of words, when simplicity is not taken into account, there would be doubt about the potency of words and so on, and hence there would be the elimination of all usages based on this, because of the absence of a criterion favouring one alternative. This discussion is begun and simplicity is not admitted as a part of it, this is indeed great recklessness.

व्यवहारोच्छेदो विनिगमकाभावात् । सोऽयं विचारमारभते लाघवंच न तदङ्गमङ्गीकरोतीति महत् साहसम् ।

नन्वेवं वस्तुगत्या नानाकर्तृकेषु घटेषु घटत्वेन कुलालकर्तृकत्वानुमानेऽपि बाधकानवतारदशायां लाघवादेककर्तृसिद्धिः स्यात् । न चेष्टापत्तिः, अनुमित्यनन्तरं नानैककर्तृकत्वसंशयादिति चेत् । न । तत्रापि लाघवेन कर्त्रैक्यमेव सिध्यति । तत्सन्देहस्तु ज्ञानप्रामाण्यसंशयादिति पश्चान्नानाकर्तृकत्वसाधकप्रमाणादेककर्तृकतानुमानं तत्र बाध्यते । नचैवं क्षित्यादिकर्त्तर्यपि प्रामाण्यसंशयादेकत्वानेकत्वसंशयो दुरुच्छेदः, एकत्वे बाधकस्याभावेन प्रामाण्यनिश्चयात् । न चैकत्वसाधकाभाव एव बाधकः, अनुमितेरेत्र लाचवसहकारेणैकत्वसाधकत्वात् ॥

अन्ये तु क्षितिकर्ता अङ्कुरकर्त्रभिन्नः अशरीरकर्तृत्वाद् अङ्कुरकर्तृवदिति अभेदानुमानादेककर्तृसिद्धिः । न च क्षितिकर्त्ता अङ्कुरकर्तृ-

If that is so, in the case of jars which have in reality many agents, let there be only one agent, by means of logical simplicity if there is no contradiction, when inference is made by the argument from jar-ness to having-potter-as-agent. Nor can it be said that this is acceptable, for after inference there could be doubt if there is one agent or many agents. If it is argued like this, it cannot be accepted: Even in this case, the one-ness of the agent is established. Doubt about it arises, because of the doubt about the validity of knowledge and so afterwards by the means of cognition which establishes many agents, the argument which establishes only one agent is contradicted. Nor can it be said that with reference to the agent of earth etc., because of the doubt of validity (of this knowledge) there is unremovable doubt if the agent is one or many; because of the absence of contradiction, (to assert that the agent is) one, there is the certainty of validity. Nor can it be said that the contradiction is the absence itself of the means of establishing oneness. By the support of simplicity the inference itself establishes oneness.

Others say that by the argument that the agent of the earth is not different from the agent of the spprout, because the agent has no body, like the agent of the sprout, one agent is established

भिन्नः अङ्कुरेऽकर्तृत्वात् कुलालवदिति सत्प्रतिपक्षः, अनित्यज्ञानानामाश्रयत्वस्योपाधित्वादित्याहुः। अत्राप्यप्रयोजकत्वे भेदाभेदयोर्गौरवलाघवे एव शरणम् ॥

(d) तथापि कथं नित्यसर्वविषयज्ञानसिद्धिः? । पक्षधर्मताबलादिति चेत्, व्यापकतयाऽवगतस्य पक्षसंबन्धमात्रं पक्षधर्माद्धेतोः सिध्यति। तथा च पक्षे तदुपादानगोचरज्ञानमात्रं सिध्येत्, न तु नित्यसर्वविषयज्ञानम्। तेन रूपेण व्यापकत्वाग्रहात्, न च येन विनानुपपत्तिः सोऽपि विषयः, व्यतिरेकिविलयापत्तेः ॥

अत्र प्राञ्चः—यमर्थमनालम्बमाना अनुमितिः पक्षे साध्यसंबन्धं न विषयीकरोति, स पक्षधर्मताबलात् सिध्यतीत्यनुपपत्तिमूलकोऽ-

by the inference which has (as object) non-difference. Nor is there counter-reason that the agent of the earth is different from the agent of the sprout, since he is not the agent of the sprout, like a potter, since here 'being-the-substratum' of non-eternal-knowledge, is additional condition. (The reason) here also has no supporting reason, (and in order to establish whether there is) difference or no difference complexity or simplicity is to be resorted to.

(d) However, how is it possible to establish eternal knowledge whose object is everything? If it is argued that it is possible to do so because of the force of the reason being the attribute of the subject, (the answer is) that only the relation with the subject, of that which is understood to have invariable concomitance is established by the force of the reason being the attribute of the subject and so in the subject, only the knowledge of its material cause is established, not however knowledge which is eternal and whose object is all things, since pervader-ness is not grasped in that way. Nor is it the case that, that without which there is incongruity, that also is the object, for in that case, there would be the objection that all negative inferences would be eliminated.

On this the Naiyāyika-s of the old school say that, that thing without having which as object, an inference does not make the relation of *sādhya* (to the subject) as its object, that (thing) is established by the force of the reason being the attribute of the subject. Thus the inference from positive concomitance is based

न्वयी, प्रतीतानुपपत्त्या व्यतिरेकी। तदिह अनादिद्व्यणुकादिकार्यप्रवाहस्य पक्षत्वे तदुपादानस्यानादिज्ञानगोचरत्वं विना नोपादानगोचरज्ञानजन्यत्वमनादिकार्यप्रवाहस्यानुमितिरालम्बते, अनादितैव च नित्यता। सर्वमुक्तावपि तत्सत्त्वमनादिभावत्वात्। पक्षतदुपादानविषयतैव च सर्वविषयता। लाघवात् तु तावद्विषयकमनाद्येकमेव ज्ञानं सिध्यति, न तु नित्यानित्यज्ञानानीति।

न व्यास्तु–अनित्यज्ञानाजन्यत्वेन पक्षविशेषणाज्ज्ञानं सिध्यन्नित्यमेव सिध्यति, अनित्ये-बाधादिति।

वाचस्पतिमिश्रास्तु–लाघवादेकज्ञानसिद्धौ उत्पत्तिमतोऽनादिकार्यप्रवाहं प्रत्यजनकत्वात् परिशेषेण नित्यज्ञानादिसिद्धिः। नियतविषयता च ज्ञानस्य कारणाधीना कारणं च नित्यज्ञानान्निवर्त्तमानं नियत-

on such incongruity, and inference from negative concomitance is based on such incongruity which is cognised. Here this is (as follows): When the subject is the beginningless flow of effects like the dyad and so on, without having beginningless knowledge of its material cause, the inference does not establish the prodcution of beginningless flow of things, by means of the knowledge of its material cause. Having no beginning is itself eternity; even when all are released, it (knowledge of God) would be present since it is an existing thing without beginning; having as object the subject and its material cause is itself having all things as object; by logical simplicity one knowledge which is beginningless and whose object is all things, is established, not however eternal knowledge and non-eternal knowledge (are established).

The Naiyāyika-s of the modern school say that since the subject is qualified by not-produced-by-non-eternal-knowledge, that knowledge which is established is indeed eternal knowledge, because there is contradiction with regard to non-eternal knowledge.

Vācaspatimiśra says that because of logical simplicity one knowledge alone is established and since (knowledge) with a beginning cannot be the cause of the beginnigless flow of effects, by exclusion, we can establish eternal knowledge and so on. That knowledge which has a determined object, is dependent on cause,

विषयामादाय निवर्त्तत इति सर्वविषयत्वसिद्धिरिति ।।

षट्पदार्थप्रतिपादकवेदकर्तृत्वेनेश्वरस्य षट्पदार्थगोचरसाक्षात्कारवत्त्वेन वा सार्वज्ञ्यम् । घटाकाशसंयोगादिकं प्रति ईश्वरस्य कर्तृत्वाद् घटादिगौचरमपि ज्ञानं सिद्धमिति केचित् ।।

ननु घटादीनां कथमीश्वरकर्तृकत्वं भवति ? घटः ईश्वरकर्तृकः कार्यत्वात् क्षितिवदित्यनुमानादिति चेत् । न । घटस्य द्विकर्तृकतया तद्दृष्टान्तेन क्षित्यादिरपि द्विकर्तृका स्यात् । तथा च घटवत् क्षितिः क्षितिवद् घट इतीश्वरानन्त्यम् । कार्ये कर्तृत्वेन कारणता, न तु द्विकर्तृत्वेनेति चेत्, तर्हि नेश्वरकर्तृत्वेन कारणता किंतु कर्तृत्वेनेति । मैवम् । ज्ञानादीनां नित्यत्वेन सर्वविषयतया घटाद्युपादानविषयत्वमपीति कथं न तेषां घटादिकारणता कुलालादिज्ञानतुल्यत्वात् । तदाहुराचार्याः—"परमाण्वदृष्टाद्यधिष्ठातृसिद्धौ ज्ञानादीनां नित्यत्वेन सर्व-

and eternal knowledge has no cause and therefore it has no determined object and hence its object is all things.

Or, since God is the author of the Veda-s which treat about the six categories, he has direct knowledge of six categories, and so he has knowledge of all things. Some say that since God is the agent of the conjunction between ether and pot, it is established (that he has) knowledge whose object is jar and so on.

How can God be considered the maker of jar and so on? If it is argued that jar has God as maker because of effect-ness like earth, this cannot be admitted since jar has two makers and taking it as example the earth could also be shown to have two makers; and thus earth is like jar and jar is like earth and hence there would be Gods without end. If it is argued that causality is (in the form) that an effect has a maker and not two makers, then, in that case causality is not (that an effect has), God as maker, but (that it has) maker. It is not so. Knowledge etc. are eternal and so they have everything as object; therefore they have as object also the material cause of jar etc., and so they cannot but have the causality in regard to jar etc. since it is like the knowledge of the potter and so on. Hence it is said by the preceptor: "When it is

विषयत्वे वेमाद्यधिष्टानस्यापि न्यायप्राप्तत्वात् । न तु तदधिष्ठानार्थमेवेश्वरसिद्धिः" इति । "अहं सर्वस्य प्रभवो मत्तः सर्वं प्रवर्त्तते" इत्याद्यागमाच्चायमर्थोऽध्यवसेयः ।

अथेश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञत्वे सर्वविषयभ्रान्तेर्ज्ञाने ईश्वरोऽपि भ्रान्तः स्यात् । भ्रमस्येव तस्यापि भ्रमविषयविषयकत्वादिति चेत् । न । रजतत्वप्रकारकज्ञानवानयमिति ज्ञानं न भ्रमः, अभ्रान्तस्य तथात्वात् । इदं रजतमिति ज्ञाने रजतत्वं प्रकारः, तेन स भ्रमः । ईश्वरज्ञाने च रजतत्वप्रकारकत्वं प्रकार इति स न भ्रमः, अत एवास्मदादिरपि भ्रान्तिज्ञो न भ्रान्त इति ।।

(e) स्यादेनत् प्रयोजनं विना कथमीश्वरः प्रवर्त्तते ? सुखस्याभावाद् अधर्माभावेन निर्दुःखत्वात् । करुणया प्रवर्त्तत इति चेत्, तर्हि परसुखदुःखप्रहाणे प्रयोजने । तथा च स्वर्गीणमेव सृजेद्, न

established that there is the guide for atoms and unseen, since knowledge and so on being eternal, have all things as object, it is also logically concluded that he directs also the loom and so on. And it is not the case that God is established in order to guide the the loom and so on. This meaning is also confirmed from such statements in tradition. "I am the origin of everything; from me everything comes into being".

If God is omniscient, he has the knowledge of all erroneous cognitions of all objects, and so he would also have false cognition, for just as erroneous cognition, even the knowledge of erroneous cognition would have as object, the object of erroneous cognition. This cannot be admitted. The knowledge that this knowledge has as qualifier-ness silver-ness is not erroneous since one who is not mistaken has such a knowledge. In the knowledge that this is silver, silverness is qualifier and so it is erroneous; in the knowledge of God, having-silverness-as-qualifierness is the qualifier and so it is not erroneous. Therefore, even those like us and so on also who have the knowledge of erroneous cognitions are not mistaken.

(e) This also could be said: How can God act without any purpose? He has no happiness; he has also no sorrow because he does not have any demerit. If it is said that he acts out of

नारकिणम् । धर्माधर्मपरतन्त्रत्वात् तदनुरूपं फलं प्रापयतीति चेत्, तर्हि आवश्यकत्वात् कर्मनिमित्तमेव जगद्वैचित्र्यमस्तु, किमीश्वरेण अनपेक्षितकीटादिज्ञानवता ? । कर्मनिरपेक्षत्वे चैकदैव सदा च सर्गप्रलयौ स्याताम् , ज्ञानादीनां नित्यत्वात् । किंच तत्प्रयत्नस्य करुणाजन्यत्वेन शरीरादिजन्यत्वापत्तौ संसारित्वापत्तिरिति । न । ईश्वरानभ्युपगमे विचारस्याश्रयासिद्धत्वात् । तमभ्युपगम्य पृच्छसि चेत्, तदाकर्णय— जगत एव तदिच्छाविषयत्वेन स्वेष्टसाधनताज्ञानसत्त्वात् । वस्तुतस्तु– क्षित्यादि तत्तदसाधारणक्रमिकादृष्टादिसामग्रीसमवहिता ईश्वरज्ञानादयो यदा भवन्ति, तदा क्षित्यादिकं करोतीति व्यवहारः । सर्गप्रलयासाधारणक्रमिकादृष्टादिसामग्रीसमवहितत्वमेव तदिच्छायाश्चिकीर्षा संजिहीर्षात्वे । न चैवं किं तज्ज्ञानादिनेति वाच्यम् । क्षित्यादीनां

compassion, then the purpose is the happiness of others or removal of their sorrow and thus he would create only those who are happy and not those who are sorrowful. If it is argued that (God) is dependent on merit and de-merit, and he causes them to receive the fruit according to this; in that case (he acts), out of necessity. Then let the variety of the world be due to one's actions; what is the use of a God who has knowledge of useless insects? If (God acts) without dependence on the past action of (individuals) then there could be simultaneously and always also creation and destruction, since the knowledge etc. of God are eternal. Besides since his effort would be produced through compassion, it would be produced by body. Hence (God would be) a transmigrating soul; these are not true. If the argument is without accepting God, then there would be (the fault of) having no subject. If you ask accepting God then listen; the world is the object of his desire, and so he has the knowledge of what conduces to the accomplishment of his desire. In fact, when the knowledge etc. of God are accompained by the causal complex which are extraordinary and which come in order, like unseen then it is said that (God) creates the world. The desire of God to create or to destory is simply the presence of the causal complex of creation and destruction which are extraordinary and which come in due order like the unseen

कार्यत्वेन ज्ञानजन्यतया नित्यज्ञानादीनामपि जनकत्वात् सुखादिशब्दयोरात्माकाशदिवत् ।।

(f) नन्वशरीरात् कथं वेदघटादि शब्दव्यवहारसंप्रदायः ?। उच्यते । सर्गादावदृष्टोपगृहीतभूतभेदाद् मीनशरीरोत्पत्तौ अदृष्टवदात्मसंयोगाद् अदृष्टसहकृतप्रयत्नवदीश्वरसंयोगाद्वा सकलवेदार्थगोचरज्ञानाद् विवक्षासहिताद् मीनकण्ठताल्वादिक्रिया—तज्जन्यसंयोगाद्वेदोत्पत्तिः । एवं कुलालादिशरीरावच्छेदेनादृष्टसहकृतप्रयत्नवदीश्वरसंयोगात् तद्बुद्धीच्छासहितात् प्रयत्नोत्पत्तौ सकलघटानुकूलव्यापाराद् घटोत्पत्तिः । एवं प्रयोज्यवृद्धप्रयोजकवृद्धभावादिमच्छरीररूपावच्छेदेनादृष्टसहकृतेश्वरज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नादेव वाग्व्यवहारः । ततस्तद्दर्शी बालो व्युत्पद्यते । सोऽयं भूतावेशन्यायः ॥

etc. Nor can it be asked: In that case what is the use of (God's) knowledge etc? Since earth and so on are effects they are produced by knowledge and so even eternal knowledge and so on are also causes just like the soul and ether are causes of happiness and sound respectively.

(f) Now, how can the Veda-s, the usage of words like jar and so on (originate) from someone who has no body. The reply is as follows: In the beginning of creation, from the elements which are joined with the unseen there is the creation of the body of the fish; (and then) by means of the conjunction of the soul having the unseen or by means of the conjunction of God who has effort and who is assisted by the unseen, by means of the knowledge of all the contents of the Veda-s, together with the desire to speak, (of God) there is action in the neck and the palate of the fish and from this conjunction, there is the origin of the Veda-s; in a similar manner, by means of the conjunction of God who has effort and who is helped by the unseen, (in the place) limited by the body of the potter and so on, assisted by his (potter's) knowledge and desire, there is action conducive to (the production of) all jars, and hence there is the origin of jar. In like manner, there is the usage of words by means of the knowledge, desire and effort of God, assisted by the unseen in the place limited by the first body

यत्तु यथा लिप्यादिना मौनिश्लोकोऽनुमाय पठ्येत, तथा सर्गान्तरोत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानवता भोगार्थं सर्गादावुत्पन्नेन मन्वादिना सर्वज्ञेश्वराभिप्रायस्थो वेदः साक्षात्कृत्यानूद्यते, ततोऽग्रिमसंप्रदायः। स एव च कायव्यूहं कृत्वा घटादिवाग्व्यवहारं प्रवर्त्तयतीति मतम्। तन्न। प्रतिसर्गाद्यनन्तसर्वज्ञकल्पनायां गौरवात्, तेषामेव क्षित्यादिकर्तृत्वसंभवेनेश्वराननुमानाच्च। एतेन सर्गादौ सर्गान्तरसिद्धयोगिन एव क्षितिकर्त्तारः सन्त्विति परास्तम्। सर्गादावनन्तसर्वज्ञसिद्धिश्च किं प्रमाणान्तरात्, क्षित्यादिकर्तृग्राहकाद्वा ? । नाद्यः, तदसंभवात्। नान्त्यः, अनादिद्व्यणुकादिकार्यप्रवाहस्य सकर्तृकत्वानुमानाल्लाघवसहकृतादेकस्यैव सर्वज्ञस्य सिद्धेः।

अथेश्वरज्ञानमूलकशब्दशक्तिग्रहे प्रयोज्यव्यापारानुमितघटज्ञाने घटशब्दस्य कारणत्वग्रहो भ्रमः स्यात् तदीयज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वात्।

in the form of the learner and the teacher. The child who sees it is taught. This is the principle of possession by spirit.

Another opinion (is that according to which) just as from the script and so on, a stanza of a silent (poet) is inferred, even so, by Manu and so on who have attained realization, in the previous life, and existing at the beginning of creation, for the sake of enjoyment, the Veda-s existing in the mind of the omniscient God, have been perceived; they are then repeated. Then from him comes about the first tradition. That Manu having created many bodies starts the usages of words like jar and so on. This cannot be admitted, because of logical complexity, in assuming many omniscient beings in each creation; they themselves could create earth and so on and therefore God need not be inferred. By this is rejected also the opinion that in the beginning of creation, the enlightened ones, themselves existing in another creation are the agents of earth. Is the existence of many omniscient beings at the beginning of creation established by means of other means of knowledge or by means of the means of knowledge which establishes the maker of earth and so on; it cannot be the first because it does not exist. Not the last because by the inference of establishing a maker for the eternal flow of effect like dyad and so on, only one

तथा च तज्जन्यघटशब्दशक्तिग्रहस्य भ्रमत्वेन सकलशब्दज्ञानं भ्रमः स्याद् भ्रमपरंपरामूलकत्वात्। अनित्यसर्वज्ञमूलकशाब्दग्रहे च नायं दोष इति चेत्। न। व्यापारानुमितमिदं घटज्ञानं घटपदजन्यमिति ज्ञानस्य शब्दशक्तिग्रहकारणस्य भ्रमत्वेऽपि घटपदं घटशक्तमिति ज्ञानस्य यथार्थत्वाद् विषयाबाधात्। न च भ्रममूलकत्वेनास्य भ्रमत्वमनुमेयम्। तदंशे व्यधिकारणप्रकाराभावेन बाधाद्, बाधितविषयत्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च। अत एव घटमानयेति शब्दानन्तरं सूत्रसञ्चाराधिष्ठितदारुपुत्रकस्य घटानयनव्यवहारदर्शनाद् बालो घटपदे व्युत्पद्यते। तन्मूलकशाब्दज्ञानमपि न भ्रमः, तस्यापि भ्रमत्वे प्रयोज्यव्यवहारादिदानीं व्युत्पत्तिर्न स्यात्।

omniscient being is established with the help of the auxiliary cause of the logical simplicity.

In understanding the potency of words which is based on the knowledge of God as its cause, the cognition that the cause of the knowledge of jar, inferred by the actions of the learner is the word 'jar' would be erroneous for his (God's) knowledge is eternal and thus the understanding of the potency of words like 'jar' which is caused by it would be erroneous, since it is based on a series of errors. If it is argued that there is no such fault, if the potency of words is cognized through a non-eternal omniscient being, it cannot be admitted. This is because even though it is erroneous (to think that) the cause of the knowledge of the potency of the word inferred by the action (of the learner) is the word 'jar', the knowledge that word 'jar' has potency in relation to (the thing) jar is true, since the object is not contradicted. Nor is it to be inferred that it is based on error. If something is a qualifier in something, absence of this qualifier in that (is error) and besides having-a-contradicted-object is an additional condition. For the same reason after the words 'bring a jar', it is seen that the doll under the influence of the string, brings a jar and so the child learns the (meaning of the) word 'jar' but the knowledge of words, based on that is not error; if this also is error, there would be no learning from the actions of the learner, because there would always be doubt if this person who learns has become proficient

किमयं प्रयोज्यश्चेतनव्यवहाराद् व्युत्पन्नोऽचेतनव्यवहाराद्वेति संशयस्य वज्रलेपायमानत्वादिति ।।

5. "विश्वतश्चक्षुरुत विश्वतोमुख विश्वतोबाहुरुत विश्वतस्पात्। सं बाहुभ्यां धमति सं पतत्रैर्द्यावा-भूमी जनयन् देव एकः" इत्यादिश्रुतयः, "उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः। यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य विभर्त्यंव्यय ईश्वरः" इत्यादिस्मृतयश्च मानत्वेनानुसन्धेया इति ।।

because of the speech of a conscious being or of an unconscious being.

(5) "Everywhere he has eyes; everywhere he has face, everywhere he has arms, everywhere he has feet. That one Lord by his arms and wings moves and produces the heaven and the earth". These revealed texts and texts of tradition such as: "It is said that the best person is the supreme soul; he having created the three worlds protects them without in any way himself diminishing", are also to be added as proofs (for the existence of God).

CHAPTER 3

COMMENTARY ON GAṄGEŚA'S ĪŚVARAVĀDA

3

Introduction

Implied in this introductory sentence is the idea that according to Gagṅgeśa the connection between the treatise on inference in general and the inference of God is much more than casual. It is only on the basis of the nature of inference as explained in the earlier section of *anumānu* of T C, that it is possible to prove the existence of God. Implied also is the rejection of the position of Buddhists ond others according to whose logic it would be impossible to prove the existence of God. It should be recalled here that the logic as developed by Dharmakīrti and his successors is such that it becomes impossible to establish the existence of God. The core of the difference between the Buddhist and Nyāya systems of inference lies in their conflicting approaches to the problem of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*)[1].

A. I (1) Subject (*pakṣa*)[2] should be mentioned by its name in an inference for another (*parārthānumāna*). But this is not possible;

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[1] This difference of the two kinds of logical systems should be seen not merely in the different formulations of invariable concomitance but chiefly in the principles and presuppositions underlying these systems. Thus the Buddhist logic as expounded by Dharmakīrti and his disciples would imply that all our knowledge would be of individual things which if not always directly perceived by us, belong to the class of those things which could be directly perceived by us. The Nyāya system holds, on the contrary, that on the basis of what could be directly perceived by us, we can have cognition also of those things which cannot be directly perceived by us.

[2] Subject is a translation of the technical term *paksa*. For a clear description of the various opinions regarding it, Cf. T C section on *paksatā*. An elementary knowledge of the problems involved may be gained from *A Primer of Indian Logic* by Kuppuswami Sastri p. 190 ff.

if the earth and so on are individually the subject, since there are ever so many things in the world like trees, mountains and so on which could be taken as subject, it would be impossible to mention them individually in formulating the inference. They cannot be taken together as the subject since they lack a common characteristic which could be taken as the limitor of subjectness by which the subject could be distinguished from things which are not subjects. Hence they cannot be considered the subject, even when they are taken together.

(2) Nor can the object of doubt or discussion be considered the subject, for in this case one cannot be sure about which object one has doubt if it has a maker or not; therefore something definite cannot be taken as subject and the inference establishing the existence of God proposed. In more technical language the same idea is expressed by saying that there is no real limitor of the contentness (*viṣayatā*) of doubt or dispute. Another reason why the object of doubt or dispute cannot be taken as the subject is that, if it is the subject, then the limitor of the subjectness would be being-the-object-of-doubt-or-dispute. Here, therefore doubt and dispute become constituents of the respective limitors. But doubt and dispute cannot be considered limitors either as real qualifiers or as adventitious qualifiers. They cannot be limitors as real qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) since both parties in the discussion the—proponents and opponents—are convinced of their positions and hence they have no doubt; they cannot be limitors as adventitious qualifiers (*upalakṣaṇa*) because someone or other, at some time or other can have a real doubt if a jar also has a maker or not. Therefore a jar has also the contentness of doubt as an adventitious qualifier. Hence jar also will be included in the subject and in that case there will be partially the fault of establishing what has already been established, since it is agreed by both parties that a potter is maker of jar. Further, the object of doubt or dispute cannot be considered the subject for if it is the subject then the inference is made taking that as the subject but actually the doubt is about a particular object such as the earth if it has an agent or not. Hence the inference is to be made taking the earth as the subject. Therefore if the inference is made taking the object of

discussion and not the earth as the subject, there would be the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established.

(3) In order to avoid the difficulties just pointed out, it is possible to formulate the subject more precisely. Thus here it is pointed out that the subject could be either something produced but not produced by a maker with the help of body or it could be something produced, but not produced by a body. The difference between these two formulations lies in this that in the first the subject is connected with the maker and in the second the subject is not connected with the maker, and so there is simplicity[1]. But even these cannot be accepted as the subject because in that case certain things which could be taken as subject cannot be included in the formulation of the subject. These things are the specific qualities of the soul[2], sound[3], the sound of blowing, the Veda-s etc. at the beginning of creation. In order to produce these things God also requires the help of body[4]. But then it may be argued that

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[1] *laghutva*, i.e. simplicity is a reason which the Naiyāyika-s often use in their arguments. This is described and established by Gaṅgeśa in this *Īśvaravāda* itself. cf. TCI pp.76, 15–79,6. For an explanation of this principle in a modern language, cf. Matilal, The *Navya-nāya Doctrine of Negation*, p. 83. Simplicity is said to be of three kinds: *kalpanālāghava*, *śarīralāghava* and *upasthithilāghava*. In the present instance since there is no mention of *kartṛ*, agent, in the second formulation of the subject there is *śarīralāghava*.

[2] Specific qualities of the soul are the following: *buddhi*, *sukha*, *dukkha icchā*, *dveṣa*, *yatna*, *bhāvanā*, *dharma*. The Nyāyavaiśeṣika theory is that individual souls do not produce these qualities, but God directly produces them. We do not have any experience that we produce knowledge etc.; this is the argument in support of the theory.

[3] Sound is also not produced by individual souls since according to the Nyāyavaiśeṣika doctrine, the material cause of sound is ether and we have no direct perception of ether. Further according to Nyāvaiśeṣika, in order that someone produces something he should have the direct perception of the material cause. And so since we do not have any direct perception of ether, the material cause of sound, we cannot also produce sound.

[4] For teaching men the Veda-s, the customs and so on, God also requires a body. This is discussed by Gaṅgeśa later in the *Īśvarānumāna* itself cf, TCI p.84 ff. For a description of a slightly different process, cf. G. Chemparathy, *An Indian Rational Theology*, p. 152 ff.

it is possible to include these also in the subject by formulating the subject in the form of a conjunct knowledge (*samūhālaṃbanā*). This also cannot be admitted because even the human souls are also the cause of the earth through their unseen. The souls act through their bodies and gain the unseen and by means of this unseen, the world is produced by them. Hence it is not something which is produced without the help of body; i.e. there is the fault of the absence of subject (*pakṣāprasiddhi*). Hence this way of formulating the subject cannot also be accepted.

(4) Now two formulations of the subject are given in such a way that everything which is limited by the limitor of subject-ness could be included in them. The first is that the subject is something produced but not produced by the effort of something that is produced; the second is that the subject is something produced but different from something produced by an effort which is accepted by both parties to be the cause of certain things. The purpose of these two formulations is to exclude everything that is produced by human beings from the formulation of the subject. This is brought about by the qualifications, 'not produced by the effort of something that is produced' and 'different from something produced by an effort which is accepted by both parties to be the cause of certain things', in the two formulations of the subject respectively. However, even this formulation of the subject is not acceptable since according to the opponent the world is produced through the effort of human beings by means of the unseen.

(5) It was pointed out that the earth and so on are produced by effort of human beings by means of the unseen, and hence the earth and so on cannot be taken as the subject in formulating a syllogism to prove the existence of God. Now two formulations of the subject are given in such a way as to avoid this difficulty. According to the first one the subject is something produced but not produced by an effort which produces the unseen. By this formulation all those things which are produced through unseen are excluded from being the subject. Thus the earth and so on in as much as they are produced by us through the unseen are

excluded from being the subject but are included in as far as they are directly produced by God. However, since God is also the cause of the unseen, the earth and so on are produced by an effort that is the cause of the unseen also and therefore they cannot be included in the formulation of the subject. To avoid this fault, a second formulation of the subject is given: Something produced but not directly produced by an effort which is produced. The meaning of this is as follows. Something produced includes both jars and so on and earth and so on. But jars and so on are produced by individuals directly without the help of unseen; the earth and so on are however produced indirectly by human souls through the help of unseen. Hence the former is excluded from being the subject and the latter included. And the previous fault that since God is also the cause of unseen, the earth etc. are produced by an effort which produces the unseen and so they cannot be included in the subject, is also avoided. But then there is partially the fault of establishing what has already been established. Jars etc. are not directly produced by human souls but through bodily action and so they will also be included in the formulation of the subject. But it is accepted by both parties, that they have a maker. Hence occurs the fault of establishing what has already been established. Therefore these formulation of the subject are also rejected.

(6) It was pointed out earlier that if the object of doubt or dispute is taken as the subject, then there could be the fault of proving something other than what is to be proved. The subsequent formulations of the subject showed some possible ways of avoiding this fault; they were rejected for various reasons. Now another formulation of the subject is given in such a way that this fault may be avoided. Hence it is stated that the earth alone could be taken as the subject. But this formulation also cannot be accepted since in that case there would be the fault of inconclusive reason, with reference to a sprout. This is so because the opponent does not admit that the reason, viz. being-an-effect is pervaded by having-an-agent; he therefore admits that although in a sprout, there is the reason of being-an-effect, there is doubt if

the *sādhya* of having-an-agent is present there or not. Hence the reason in the inference is inconclusive.

Now follows a comparatively long discussion whether the reason here is inconclusive or not. It is finally shown that it is so. Let us follow the argumentation step by step. First of all a *pūrvapakṣin* raises the objection: The fault of inconclusive reason occurs only when there is doubt if the reason exists or not in a sure negative instance, i.e. the fault of inconclusive reason occurs only when it is sure that in something there is no *sādhya* and when it is doubtful if in that thing there is reason or not. This is denied. The fault occurs when it is doubted if the reason exists or not in that which has the absence of *sādhya*. This can take place in two ways: It is possible when there is doubt if the reason exists in that which has the absence of *sādhya* or when there is doubt if there is the absence of *sādhya* in that which has the reason. In the present case, however, the sprout has the reason of being-an-effect, but there is doubt if it has the *sādhya* of 'having-an-agent'. Hence there is the fault of inconclusive reason.

But then there could be a further objection. If inconclusive reason is defined without reference to the sure absence of *sādhya*, then there could be this fault in the subject also, for there is doubt if the *sādhya* is present in the subject and there is certainty that the reason is present there. This objection cannot be admitted for in that case all possibility of inference itself would be destroyed. Hence the fault occurs only in those places other than the subject. It may be objected further that in the present case of the sprout, since it is already doubted if it has an agent the only way to speak of the possibility of inconclusive reason here would be that the reason is certainly present here. Hence when there is no such certainty, there is also no inconclusive reason. And when there is such a certainty there could be inference since all the conditions for inference are present as in the case of subject. This objection also cannot stand, because the sprout is not the object of an inferential proposition (*pratijñā*). An inference takes place only with reference to the object of such a proposition. But if it is stated that sprout also could be taken as subject, then it is another proposition that is to be established. But it may still be urged that it is possible, first of all to prove the existence of *sādhya* in the sprout and then in the earth. This also is impossible because in that case there would be mutual dependence of inferences viz. it is possible to establish the *sādhya* in the earth only after establishing it in the sprout and it is possible to establish it in the sprout only after establishing it in the earth. Hence there would not be even one inference. Besides, it is in the earth that the *sādhya* is to be established and so if the *sādhya* is established in the sprout, there would be the fault of proving something other than what is to be proved. However, it may further be urged that someone has no doubt at all that there is *sādhya* in the sprout; in that case, there would be no fault of inconclusive reason, nor of proving something other than what is to be proved. In that case another fault occurs namely if the earth is taken as the subject, or if particular agents are established for particular effects, God is not established, for none of these agents need be God.

(7) Non in order to answer this objection and to establish the existence of God directly another subject is formulated. Such a subject is the dyad at the beginning of creation. It is true that if all the dyads are included in the subject, there is no need of the qualification of 'in-the-beginning-of-creation' for the dyad, for only God can be the maker of all the dyads including those at the beginning of creation. Although we do not have direct perception of the atoms, the material cause of dyads, we can have their knowledge through the unseen and hence we could be the agents of present dyads. Thus when the intention is to establish God, what is actually established is only ourselves. This is the fault of proving something other than what is to be proved. In order to avoid this fault, the dyad is qualified by 'in the beginning of creation'. Then God only can be the agent of dyad at the beginning of creation. But this formulation of the subject cannot also be accepted since the opponent does not admit the beginning of creation.

(II)(1) After having so far discussed the nature of the subject, Gaṅgeśa takes up the *sādhya* for discussion. 'Having-an-agent' is first of all, proposed to be the *sādhya* and for this two definitions are offered: Existing together with someone having an effort (*kṛtimat sahabhāvaḥ*) and being produced by someone having an effort (*kṛtimajjanyatvam*). If the *sādhya* is explained here in these two senses, then there would the fault of establishing what has already been established in both cases: In the first case, the earth etc. exist at the same time as the human souls which have effort. This is already accepted by both parties. In the other case, through the unseen the world is created by the effort of human souls. This also is accepted by both parties. Hence the fault of establishing what is already established, and so this formulation of the *sādhya* also cannot be accepted.

(2)(a) In order to avoid this fault of establishing what is already established, the *sādhya* is formulated in a different way: It is 'being-produced-by-someone-having-direct-knowledge-desire-to-do-and-effort-of-the-material-cause, (*upādānagocrāparokṣa-jñānacikīrṣākṛtimajjanyatvam*). Human souls do not have direct knowledge of the material cause of the earth etc. Hence by this inference is to be established someone having such knowledge, desire and effort. Hence there is no fault of establishing what has been already established. But then another fault occurs, namely the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established. The reason is that if having the knowledge of material cause means, having the knowledge of any material cause, then we all have certainly knowledge of some kind of material cause. Therefore what is established is persons like us who have the knowledge of some kind of material cause and not God. Hence the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established.

In order to avoid this fault, it is stated that what is meant, is not merely the fact of being produced by someone having the knowledge of material cause, but also the fact of being produced by such knowledge itself. Therefore, although we may have knowledge of some kind of material cause, eg. knowledge of the material cause of a jar, such a knowledge cannot be taken as a part constituting the *sādhya*, since such a knowledge does not produce the earth etc. Hence there is no fault of proving something other than what is to be proved. But then another fault occurs, namely the fault of establishing what has already been established, for both parties agree that we produce the earth through the unseen. This unseen is produced by means of·sacrifices which we offer through our knowledge of the material cause of sacrifice, e.g. clarified butter etc. used in sacrifice.[1] Hence this kind of our knowledge produces the earth and this is accetpable to both parties. Therefore there is the fault of establishing what has already been established and so this formulation of the *sādhya* is also to be rejected.

(b) Now another formulation of the *sādhya* is given in such a way as to avoid the fault of establishing what has already been established. Accordingly, the *sādhya* is stated to be being-directly-produced-by-such-knowledge etc. The knowledge of human souls have as object clarified butter etc. which is the material cause of sacrifices. It is only through the unseen produced by the sacrifices (and not directly) that the human souls produce the earth etc. But the knowledge of God which is eternal produces the earth etc. directly without any operation coming in between. And this is what is to be established and hence there would be no fault of establishing what is to be established. This formulation of the *sādhya* also cannot be accepted because of the following difficulties. Being directly produced by knowledge etc. means that something is produced by an effort, but at the same time, it is not produced by a product of the same effort. This just means that the thing in question should be straight produced without anything else coming in between the cause and the effect; or being directly produced by knowledge etc. could mean existing at the moment immediately after the effort. If being directly produced by knowledge etc. is understood in any of these senses, then the jar which is the example in the inference establishing the existence of God, will not have the *sādhya*. The reason is that the jar is produced by the effort of the potter, not directly but through the operation of the action of his body. Hence it would follow that the potter is not the agent of the pot, a position which cannot obviously be admitted. In order to avoid this fault, it may be pointed out that bodily action itself is taken as the example in the inference establishing the existence of God. In that case, since bodily action is directly produced by the mental effort of the potter, there is no fault of the example not having the *sādhya*. But then such a *sādhya* (being-directly-produced) will be found only in bodily action. However, it is admitted by both parties that the reason of 'being-an-effect' is in a jar etc. and it will have no *sādhya* of the kind just described. Hence there would be the fault of deviation.[1] Further 'being-an-effect' would be a reason with the additional condition[2] of having-bodily-action. This cannot be admitted. Therefore bodily action cannot be taken as an example in the inference establishing the existence of God.

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[1] Sacrifice gives heaven for its performer, but not directly. Sacrifices are performed and it is only after a long time that the performer attains heaven and so since the effect should immediately be preceded by the cause, the unseen is said to be produced directly by sacrifice. Hence although the sacrifice does not exist after it is performed, the unseen which it produces exists even at the time immediately before the attainment of heaven by the performer. It should further be noted that in the present case, the performer has the knowledge of the material cause of sacrifice, namely clarified butter and so on. Hence through such a knowledge, sacrifice is performed, and through the sacrifice unseen, by means of which the universe is brought about, is produced. Hence individual souls produce the universe and not God. Such is the argument here.

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[1] Deviation is the term for *vyabhicāra*; in the present instance the reason is present, but the *sādhya* is absent.

[2] Additional condition is the term used for *upādhi*. The general definition of *upādhi* is *sādhyavyāpakatve sati, sādhanāvyāpakatvam.* The stock example for this is the following when one establishes smoke by the reason of fire, the reason, fire is said to have the additional condition of 'originating from wet fuel'. There is smoke in the kitchen since the fire there originates from wet fuel. Hence the additional condition pervades the *sādhya*. There is however no smoke in a red hot iron-ball, though there is fire in it; the reason is that the fire there does not arise from fuel. Hence the additional condition does not pervade the reason. For a detailed discussion of *upādhi* see *upadhivāda* in *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. This section is also translated into German and annotated by E. Frauwallner: Die Lehre von der zusatzlichen Bestimmung (upādhiḥ) in Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi Wien, 1970; also Gangopadhyay, Mrinal Kanti: 'The concept of upādhi in Nyaya logic', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* (1971) p. 146ff.

(c) It was pointed out that there would be the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established, if having-an-agent is taken to mean being-produced-by-someone-having-direct-knowledge-of-material-cause. In order to avoid this fault another way is pointed out: The *sādhya* of having-an-agent is to be taken to mean having-direct-knowledge of the material cause of earth. Since we do not have such a knowledge, there is no fault of establishing something other than what is to be established. But then the difficulty is that such a direct knowledge of the material cause of earth is nowhere established. However, it may be argued, the expression 'material cause' signifies also a relation i.e. when the expression 'material cause' is uttered, invariably one expects to know the material cause of which thing is in question. Therefore when the *sādhya* is said to be being-produced-by-knowledge-of-material-cause, the expression material cause here would signify the material cause of the earth. An example will make the argument clear. When one asserts that Caitra is devoted to his mother like Maitra, it means that Caitra is devoted to his mother and Maitra is devoted to his mother and not that they are devoted to the mother of somebody else. But this kind of argument cannot be admitted, because in verbal cognition it is possible that a word gets a particular meaning because another particular word is used nearby; but in inference, this is not the case; in inference, word is not a source of valid cognition since the trustworthiness of the disputants cannot be accepted.

In an inference, the invariable concomitance of the pervader is to be cognized in the reason. This invariable concomitance is cognized as governed by the consecutive character in the pervader. Such a consecutive character which is the limitor of pervadedness is material cause-ness as such and not the material cause of earth and hence there is the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established, since what is established is that effects have as their agent someone who knows their respective material causes and not that the earth is produced by someone who knows its material cause. Besides, in this way, in the case of a pot and so on, that which can be established as the limitor of pervaded-ness is simply, being-the-material-cause-of-respective-individual-things. Hence there would be no cognition of invariable concomitance in general since material-cause-ness as such is not cognized to be the limitor of pervadedness.

But it may be objected that the invariable concomitance is not always cognized as governed by the consecutive character in the pervader and so the *sādhya* is 'being-produced-by-direct-knowledge-of-the-material-cause-of-earth' and hence there would be no fault of proving something other than what is to be proved. In that case, still another fault can be thought of as occurring: If the *sādhya* is 'being-produced-by-the-direct-knowledge-of-the-material-cause-of-the-earth', it would be impossible to cognize its invariable concomitance in the reason of being-an-effect.

Besides another fault also occurs, namely proving something that has already been proved. The reason is that by means of knowledge arising from the relation in the form of universals, we also have the knowledge of the material cause of earth and hence we are agents of earth etc. Although our knowledge etc. are not existing in the moment immediately preceding the production of the earth, because at that time souls do not have bodies and so they have no knowledge, still our souls according to Nyāya, being eternal exist even at that time. Therefore we are adventitiously qualified by such knowledge which comes into existence afterwards. Therefore through the unseen we are the creators of the world. One cannot, however, object in this case, that things are not produced by knowledge but only by one having knowledge, since it is simpler to postulate a characteristic rather than that which is characterized. In the present instance, it is simpler to assert that individual souls through their knowledge etc. produce the world rather than to affirm that there is a God who creates the world. Further direct production of things through knowledge has already been rejected.[1]

(3)(a) Now the subject is designated in such a way as to avoid the already mentioned fault of proving what has already been proved. If the subject were designated only as something produced but not produced by a produced knowledge etc. of the material cause, there would ensue the fault of the absence of the subject itself. The reason is that the earth and so on are produced by knowledge arising from the relation in the form of universals etc.[2] through the help of the unseen. To explain: Human souls have the knowledge of the material cause of the earth, namely atoms in as far as they are material causes. The material cause of the earth also comes under the generic notion of material cause and so by means of relation of universals, human souls also have the knowledge of the material cause of the earth. And through the unseen they also produce the earth in the sense that it is because of their merit that the earth etc. are produced. Therefore it is not the case that they are not so produced, and hence the absence of subject.

Similarly also, if the *sādhya* were merely being-produced-by-knowledge-desire-and-effort, there would be the fault of establishing what has already been established since through the unseen, we also produce the earth and so on. When, however, the qualification of being not-produced by the relations in the form of merit, knowledge, or universal is added to the formulation of the subject and *sādhya*, this fault of establishing what has already been established is removed, since the earth and so on are expressly stated not to have been produced by knowledge arising from such relations.

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[1] Even though human souls who have attained realization may exist at the time directly preceding the creation of the world, they do not have the unseen. This reasoning also cannot be admitted; it is accepted by both parties that there is logical simplicity in postulating a characteristic rather than that which is characterized: In the present case, it is easier to postulate the unseen rather than God. Such is the comment of Jayadeva on this passage of T C., supporting the opinion of Gaṅgeśa himself.

[2] For perceptual knowledge it is necessary to have the contact of the senses with the object. There are six kinds of ordinary contact of the senses with the object. This has already been mentioned by Uddyotakara (cf. *Nyāya-darśanam*, edited by Anantalal Takur, Darbhanga, 1967, p. 199). The later Naiyāyika-s added three more: *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, *jñānalakṣaṇa* and *yogaja*. For a detailed account of these cf. *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge* by S. Chatterjee, Calcutta, 1965, p.209 ff. On *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, there is an excellent study by G. Bhattacharya, in Festschrift fur Erich Frauwallner, Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud und Ostasiens und archiv fur indische Philosophie band 1968/1969. p. 65 ff.

Another way of formulating the subject and the *sādhya* is also given. Here also if the formulation of the subject were simply something produced but not produced by knowledge and so on which are produced, there would again be the fault of the absence of the subject, for the earth and so on are produced through the unseen by knowledge etc. that are produced. In order to avoid this fault, the qualification of 'not being produced by a relation which produces the direct knowledge of such things as will happen in the future', is added to knowledge and so on that are produced. And since by this qualification it is stated that the earth and so on are not produced by such knowledge arising from such relations, there is no fault of the absence of the subject. The qualification of *sādhya* in this formulation is to be explained in the same way as the qualification in the previous formulation of the *sādhya*.

In our experience, there is no instance of knowledge, desire and effort existing at the same time. The knowledge of the material cause of the pot is destroyed by the desire to make the pot which comes to exist in the next moment after the knowledge; and desire itself is destroyed, when effort comes to exist. Effort itself ceases to exist after another moment.[1] This is our experience; but in God there is no cessation of knowledge and so on and hence there is absence of the particular *sādhya*. In order to avoid this fault, it is stated that the desire exists immediately after knowledge, and effort exists after desire. It does not mean that desire exists only after knowledge but that desire exists also after knowledge, since God's desire exists always. Similarly, when it is said, effort exists after desire, it does not mean that effort exists only after desire but that effort exists also after desire; God's effort also is eternal. Hence the text says only that knowledge and so on do not exist together, i.e. they are not non-eternal; non-eternal knowledge and desire cannot exist together, i.e. non-eternal knowledge ceases to exist, when non-eternal desire originates in the same soul. Nor do eternal knowledge and desire occur one after another; they exist always. Therefore there is no fault of the absence of *sādhya.* By this is also answered the objection that there would be the fault of contradiction with regard to earth because the earth is not produced by desire and effort which begins to exist after knowledge and desire respectively for when it is stated that desire and effort exist after knowledge and desire respectively and explained in the way it is explained above, there is no such fault of contradiction in the earth.

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[1] This is according to the Nyāya principle that the perceptible specific qualities of an omnipresent reality is destroyed by the same sort of quality that comes afterwards.

(b)(i) The opponent does not admit the relations in the form of merit, knowledge, or the universal and hence they cannot even be adventitious qualities. Therefore a subject which is qualified by these also does not exist for him. The enunciation of the *sādhya* also contains these qualifications and so the *sādhya* is also non-existent for him. Hence the reason has the faults of the absence of subject and *sādhya*.

(ii) If, however, these relations, are admitted the subject will not be something not produced by them, because the substratum of these relations, namely individual souls through their unseen could produce the earth and so on. If thus the subject is produced through the knowledge and so on of individual souls, by means of the unseen, there would indeed be the fault of establishing what has already been established.

It may then be objected that direct production of the world through the knowledge etc. not arising from merit and so on is intended, and therefore the faults mentioned above do not arise. Such direct production, however, cannot be admitted, since in the jar and so on which are given as examples such direct production cannot be seen, for it is through the bodily movements of the potter, that the jar is produced. And it is not the case that the knowledge of the potter directly produces it. Further, if direct production of the world through the knowledge, not arising from the relation in the form of special knowledge and so on is intended, there would also be the fault of the absence of *sādhya*. This comes about in the following way: The purpose of the jar which is taken as example is to bring water. This knowledge of the purpose of the jar is inferential and not perceptual; but such a knowledge which is not perception also is needed for the production of the jar; therefore it cannot be said that a jar is produced by direct, perceptual knowledge. Hence the fault of the absence of *sādhya*. Further such inferential knowledge of the purpose of the jar is based on perception, i.e. one has to see first of all that water is brought by means of jar and from such perceptions, one can have the knowledge of invariable concomitance by which one has the inference that jars are for bringing water. Since the invariable concomitance here is based upon perception, one cannot speak of the jar as not produced by a knowledge produced by a perception that is produced. Hence also the fault of the absence of *sādhya*.

(iii) It was stated that even if one admits the relations in the form of merit and so on, it could as well be that the world is produced by the unseen of those who have them, and therefore there is the fault of establishing what is already established. In order to avoid this fault, a way is now proposed. The invariable concomitance is in the form: Wherever there is 'being-an-effect', there is 'being-produced-by-the-knowledge-of-the-material-cause-of-that-effect' and not in the form wherever there is 'being-an-effect', there is 'being-produced-by-the-knowledge-of-the material-cause-of-something'. Therefore the reason of 'being-an-effect' in the earth, establishes the maker of the earth and not the maker of something else. This has not yet been established and therefore there is no fault of establishing what has already been established.

This argument also cannot be admitted. If 'being-an-effect in a jar and a cloth has the invariable concomitance of 'being-produced-by-the-knowledge-of-the-material-cause-of-jar',there is indeed deviation. This is so because it is possible to cognize in a cloth 'being-an-effect', without cognizing in it 'being-produced-by-the-knowledge-of-the-material-cause-of-jar'. If it is argued that 'being-an-effect' in a jar and in a cloth establishes their respective agents (i.e. their respective 'being-produced-by-the-knowledge-of-material-cause) no cognition of the invariable concomitance would be possible. This is so because by the word 'that' (*tad*) the respective individual *sādhya* is meant and therefore, it would be impossible to cognize the invariable concomitance of all the *sādhya*-s. Nor can it be argued that by the force of the word 'that' (*tad*) we get the invariable concomitance of all the *sādhya*-s. It is not right to bring in the characteristics of 'word' in support of inference. The objects denoted by the words 'which' and 'that' do not have a consecutive character and so 'presumption' which is considered a valid means of knowledge by the Mīmāṃsaka-s, is explained by the Naiyāyika-s as negative inference, precisely because there is no invariable concomitance by positive concomitance in it. If invariable concomitance of 'being-produced-by-knowledge-of-material-cause' in general only is grasped, there is again the fault of establishing what has already been established: We have knowledge of material cause and by means of this knowledge, we could produce the earth and so on through the unseen.

(4) Now another possible inference to establish the existence of God is proposed: We did not have a body in the beginning of creation, therefore we cannot also have knowledge[1] and if we have no knowledge of the material causes and so on of things, we cannot either be their makers. Therefore we can establish the existence of God as the substratum of knowledge which exists at the same time as the causal-complex which produces the dyad and so on. Causal complex is mentioned here because otherwise there could be the fault of establishing what has already been established. This is so because, it is admitted by both parties that particular causes like time and so on can also produce the dyad. But at that

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[1] According to Nyāya all forms of cognition except perception, depends on perception and for perception, we need the senses and for senses the body. Hence without body, there is no possibility of any knowledge.

time since all the elements of the causal complex are not present, time and so on cannot produce the dyad and so there is no fault of establishing what is already established. But then the following objection may be raised against this argument which tries to establish the existence of knowledge which produces dyad: The causal complex of the unseen which produces the dyad, would be enough to bring about the dyad. This cannot be admitted, because in that case what is produced would be the unseen and not dyad. For the causal complex of one thing does not produce another. And therefore the causal complex of the unseen does not produce the dyad.

Such an inference establishing the existence of knowledge which produces the dyad cannot be admitted because the enunciation of the subject cannot be accepted: Creation is recurring and beginningless; and so we cannot speak of a beginning of creation. Besides even if knowledge and so on are established, it does not follow that they produce the world. And there is no supporting argument to establish the existence of God as the substratum of such a knowledge.

Others bring the following argument to prove the existence of God: The dyad at the beginning of creation is produced by effort which exists at the same time as the non-inherent cause of dyad. This reasoning also is denied for the reasons given to reject the previous argument; further there is also no supporting argument for the reasons.

III (1)(a) Now the discussions turn round on the reason of the inference establishing the existence of God and in particular on what 'being-an-effect' means. The first meaning suggested is that, it is suitable to be produced by the effort of someone. A jar, for example is suitable to be produced by the effort of a potter. This is the meaning of the word according to the force of its parts taken etymologically. This meaning however of 'being-an-effect' cannot be accepted, because, although indirectly, i.e. through the unseen, the world could be produced by the effort of individual souls, still according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, it is not produced by the desire and effort of anyone directly. Therefore such a kind of 'being-an-effect' i.e. direct production by effort, does not exist in the earth and so on.

(b) Another definition of 'being-an-effect', therefore is proposed: 'Being-an-effect' means without existing in a prior time, existing at a later time. Even the eternal things exist at a later time and therefore in order that the definition of 'being-an-effect' may not extend to them also, the qualification of 'not-existing-at-a-prior-time' is given. 'Not-existing-at-a-prior-time' could happen to completely non-existent things like hare's horn which do not have a maker. In order to exclude such things, the qualification of 'existing-at-a-later-time' is added. Obviously, non-existent things cannot exist even at a later time and so they also are excluded. However even this definition cannot be accepted, because the prior times of the reasons in the subject and in the example, are different and therefore there can be no consecutive character. So it is also not possible to say which exactly is the limitor of 'cause-ness'. Hence it is impossible to determine which exactly is the reason. Besides if by prior time, the time prior to everything is meant, such a prior time does not exist, since the universe has no beginning, and so we cannot speak of a prior time of the universe. Therefore a reason which has a non-existent qualification, is itself non-existent.

(c) In order to avoid these faults another defiinition of 'being-an-effect' is given. One need not speak of a prior time of everything'; it need not be the case that the effect should be non-existing at all prior times. It is enough that it is not related to some prior-time, while it is related to some later time. Thus 'being-an-effect' is defined as 'existing-at-some-time'. However, this definition also cannot be accepted: Even prior-absence which does not have a maker exists at some time and does not exist at some other time; and therefore it has the reason of 'existing-at-sometime', but does not have the *sādhya* of 'having-a-maker' and thus there is deviation.

(d) In order to avoid this deviation the definition is further refined as 'counterpositive-of-a-prior-absence'. But this also cannot be admitted since destruction also has a counterpositive, but does not have a maker; therefore there is deviation.

(e) In order to avoid this deviation the definition is given the qualification of 'which-being-existent', then the full enunciation of the reason is 'while-being-existent, being-the-counterpositive-of-a-prior-absence'. This definition also cannot be accepted because the opponents (Mīmāṃsaka-s) do not accept existence as a generic attribute. But if by 'being-existent' only the fact of having a temporal relation is meant, then even in destruction, there is such existence.

(2) Now a possible inference to establish the existence of God is proposed. According to Nyāya even those things which are produced by individual souls are also produced by God. Therefore the reason of 'being-an-effect' has the invariable concomitance also of 'being-produced-by-God'. Therefore the argument is that taking anything produced by an individual soul, say a jar, one can infer God also as the maker by the reason of 'being-an-effect' which is in the jar. This inference, however, cannot be admitted: Because there is no supporting argument for the reason. This is further explained in the following way. If by the reason of 'being-an-effect', it is possible to establish God also as the maker of pot, then by the same sort of reason, it is possible to establish the existence of the unseen which is other than the non-eternal merit which produces the jar. Similarly it would come about that the experience of any joy and sorrow would be caused not only by this non-eternal joy and sorrow, but by eternal joy and sorrow also. All these cannot naturally be accepted by the Naiyāyikas-s. Besides, it would be possible to propose a counter-reason: This jar like another jar is not produced by eternal knowledge which is different from the non-eternal knowledge which produces it, because it is a jar.

(3) Now another inference establishing an effort is proposed. The purpose is that by establishing a particular sort of effort one can at the same time establish God also as the substratum of this special kind of effort. When two senses have their requisite

auxiliary causes to produce knowledge one causal complex produces knowledge and another does not produce knowledge at the same time. The reason for this is that the mind is conjoined with the sense which produces knowledge and it is not conjoined with the sense which does not produce it. In order to have this conjunction of the mind with the sense, there must be an effort of the soul. By this effort of the soul an action of the mind is produced which in turn produces the conjunction of the mind with the sense. This action of the mind is the subject of the inference. This may further be explained as follows: Take as example a body existing at the beginning of creation, and the first knowledge produced by this body. There is a time which is the substratum of the destruction of this knowledge, i.e. the time after the third moment of such a knowledge. Omit such time and take only the time which is not the substratum of the destruction of the first knowledge. Take the knowledge which has as substratum this time. This knowledge will be the first knowledge produced by this body. In order to produce this knowledge, there should be movement of the mind. In order to produce this movement, there is no one else at that time except God. This is the trend of the argument.

The *sādhya* in this inference is as follows: Take the mind by which this first knowledge as described in the enunciation of the subject is produced. All efforts except those at the beginning of creation to produce the first knowledge, having this mind as object, are efforts of individual soul. Take a time which is not the substratum of all these efforts (namely the time preceding the first knowledge when this mind is actually the object of the effort of God). This time should also be such that it will not be after the time which is the substratum of all causes of the first knowledge except the effort and those which are pervaded by it. Therefore what is proposed to be established is an effort for the first act of human knowledge. This effort cannot be the efforts of individual souls according to the presuppositions of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system. Thus it will come about that the movement of the mind will be produced by an effort which does not belong to the individual soul.

The reason in the inference is the nature of the mind itself. Effort of the soul is the cause of all movments of mind. Therefore it comes about that the movement of the mind occurs at a time which is after the time of the effort. Such an effort cannot be the effort of an individual soul, because efforts of the individual souls presuppose knowledge and desire and at that time the knowledge of the individual soul does not exist. Therefore God is established as the substratum of such an effort.

But this inference cannot be accepted: It is not necessary that the movement of the mind which produces the knowledge, should actually be present at the beginning of creation. The movement of the mind during the time of dissolution, could also bring about the conjunction of the mind with the soul and this conjunction produces the knowledge in question. Besides, the mind which actually is conjoined with the soul, will produce knowledge, as soon as there is a body. During the time of dissolution, however, there is no body and hence the mind cannot produce any knowledge either.

There is also another reason why this inference cannot be accepted. In the enunciation of the *sādhya*, effort is mentioned; but as long as this effort is not qualified by 'produced' or 'belonging to individual soul', by effort, one can understand also effort of God. And there is no time which is not the substratum of the effort of God. In order to avoid this fault, if the word 'produced' is added to qualify 'effort' then another fault occurs. According to the tenets of those who admit God, effort of God is the cause of all effects and therefore of all movements. Therefore in the enunciation of the reason, it would have been enough to say 'being-a-movement' and it is not necessary to mention 'being-a-movement-of-that-mind' as the reason. Therefore there is useless qualification of the reason; hence there is absence of invariable concomitance; there is also the point of defeat called 'more' (*adhika*).

A further reason to reject this inference is the following: It can only be established by this inference that the movement of the mind does not have as substratum a time which is not the substratum of the effort. This does not mean, therefore, that the the movement of the mind is after the effort in question. If by another inference implied in these arguments God is established, then there would be the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established.

(B)(I)(1) Now Gaṅgeśa gives his own inference establishing the existence of God. The subject is enunciated in only one way, but the *sādhya* in three different ways. The subject is said to be those things existing by the relation of inherence and produced, but not through the unseen and also not by an effort which is produced and whose object is the material cause. We have now to explain the purpose of each of these qualifications of the subject. Commentators like Jayadeva, Pragalbha and Rucidatta have gone into the details. It should, however, be noted that from most of the explanations given for the qualifications, it is clear that they are used to avoid or to include instances from the peculiar standpoint of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika world-view; and as such they have not much philosophical or logical worth objectively; but it will be very unwise to conclude from this that the whole of Gaṅgeśa's *īśvaravāda* is likewise without much value from the standpoint of philosophy or logic. Gaṅgeśa was very much conditiond by the cosmology of his times almost in the same way as Aristotle was by the physics of his time. But it would indeed be foolish not to see and value the logical and philosophical acumen of Gaṅgeśa inspite of certain peculiar Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika presuppositions influenced by the broad current of Hindu mythology and cosmology of his time.

We shall now give the explanations in due order. Pragalbha[1] fiirst of all notes that the subject proposed is a mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*) and according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, an absence is not a separate category. Therefore the subject in which absence is a constitutive element is also no category. Pragalbha answers this pointing out that the subject is something which is not the object of the cognition that has as qualifier-ness 'being-produced by-a-produced-effort' which effort has as object the material cause of the thing. Further the thing which is the subject is not brought about through the unseen. Thus the thing which is considered as the subject is not the object of such a particular kind of cognition but at the same time, it is the object of a cognition.[1] Such a characteristic of being the object of a particular kind of coginition is the consecutive character that is to be considered as the limitor of subjectness. And this is acceptable to both parties.

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[1] I am giving here references to Pragalbha's commentary on *īśvaravāda* of Gaṅgeśa from a copy of the manuscript of the work in Saraswati Bhavana, Benares.

Now the expression 'material cause' should be understood in the sense of the material cause of each thing in question; and it should not be taken as the material cause of earth and so on, which are taken as the subject. Hence the 'material cause' means 'the material cause of jar and so on' which are produced by efforts which are produced. The subject therefore is, those things which are not produced like this. Explaining 'material cause' in this way, there is no room for the objection that this should be understood in the sense of the material cause of earth and so on; and so, since some one having the knowledge of the material cause of the earth is not yet established, the subject itself would be unestablished. If 'material cause' is explained in the sense of material cause in general, then one can understand any material cause by the expression 'material cause'. And in that case sound will not be included in the subject, because conch shell and so on are the material causes of colour and so on and therefore we have the knowledge of some kind of material cause, e.g. conch shell and therefore we should also be causes of sound.[2] Since material cause is explained as material cause of each thing in question, occasion for this objection also does not rise, since we do not have an effort whose direct object is the material cause of sound namely ether.

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[1] Qualifier-ness is *prakāratā*. Here the rather complicated expression means only that *janyakrtijanyatva* is not the *prakāra* of the cognition; but the cognition has a *prakārā*. Therefore this can mean only that the *prakāra* of the cognition is only *janyakṛtya-janyatva*.

[2] We do not have direct perception of material cause of sound namely ether and so God should be considered as the maker of sound.

But an objection could now be raised: The qualification of 'not through the unseen' (*adṛṣṭādvāraka*) would be useless, because if 'material cause' is interpreted in the sense of the material cause of the respective things as explained in the above manner, then individual souls do not have the direct perception of the material cause of earth and so they are not produced through the unseen by an effort that is produced. Therefore different commentators have explained the qualification in different ways.

Some give the following explanation. If a copper vessel is anointed with a certain medicine, movement is produced. Here after our effort by which the vessel is smeared with a certain herb, a particular unseen is produced, and by means of this, the movement is produced in the vessel. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, one who produces this movement is God himself. Therefore this movement also should be included in the subject. But on the other hand, since the movement is produced by means of our effort to smear the vessel with the herb which in turn produces the unseen and through this the movement, it could be said that the movement is produced by an effort that is produced. In this case, they cannot be included in the subject. But when the qualification of 'not through the unseen' is also added, since this movement is brought about by an effort that is produced, by means of the unseen, it would follow that the movement is not brought about by an effort that is produced without the instrumentality of the unseen. Therefore, it comes about that this movement also could be included, in the subject. Thus the qualification 'not through the unseen' becomes meaningful.[1] But this opinion cannot be admitted: The unseen is not produced by means of smearing the vessel with any suitable reagent. The movement is produced by the conjunction of the reagent with the vessel. Though Pragalbha and Rucidatta mention such an opinion only Rucidatta prefers expressly this view.

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[1] This meaning is arrived at by means of the use of double negative; for other uses of double negation, cf. D. C. Guha, *Navyanyāya System of Logic* Motilal Banarsidas, second revised edition, Delhi, 1979, p. 207 ff.

Some others explain the qualification of 'not through the unseen' in the following way: Poison through snake-bite and so on is ejected out of a person after certain incantations which produce the unseen. God actually brings about the ejection of this poison. Therefore this also has to be included in the enunciation of the subject. But, again, on the other hand, this removal of poison is brought about through the unseen produced by the recitation of *mantra-s* by a certain person, and so it is produced by an effort that is produced. Hence it cannot be included in the enunciation of the subject. But when the qualification of 'not through the unseen' is added, this also could be taken as the subject, because we cause the removal of poison only by means of the unseen (produced by the chanting of the *mantra-s*) but God produces it directly. Therefore when the qualification of 'not through the unseen, is added, this also can be included in the subject. But this opinion also cannot be admitted because we do not have an effort whose object is poison which is the material cause of the movement of poison; but our effort of recitation of *mantra-s* has as material causes, our lips, palate and so on. Therefore the movement of the poison is not produced by an effort that is produced and as such it is not to be excluded from the enunciation of the subject. And therefore in order to include this movement of the poison in the enunciation of the subject, the qualification of 'not-through-the-unseen' need not be given. This is the opinion of Jayadeva and Rucidatta.[1]

Some others explain that the qualification of 'not-through-the unseen', is added in order to include also heaven[2] in the enunciation of the subject. If this qualification were not added, it would come about that heaven which is produced by the unseen produced by the meditation of non-difference in the individual soul through its own effort will not be included in the subject, since heaven is produced by an effort that is produced. But actually heaven is conferred by God himself and so it also should be included in the subject. But when the qualification of 'not-through-the-unseen' is added, heaven also will be included in the subject, because we bring about heaven only through the invisible merit produced by meditation but God directly causes it. Therefore heaven becomes something 'not-produced-through-unseen-by-an-effort-that-is-produced' and as such it is included in the formulation of the subject. But this explanation also is rejected because in that case a bath in the Ganges will also be included in the formulation of the subject. This comes about in the following way: A bath in the Ganges is brought about by an effort that is produced by means of the unseen, i.e. in order to be able to take a bath in the Ganges, one needs a special unseen. Therefore a bath in the Ganges is something produced by an effort that is produced through the unseen. This means that a bath in the Ganges is something not produced by an effort that is produced not through the unseen. Thus it also is included in the subject. And if this also is included in the subject there would partially be the fault of establishing what has already been established for it is accepted by both parties that a bath in the Ganges is also effected by an effort that is produced.

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[1] cf. TCI p. 16, Rucidatta, op cit. p. 1952.

[2] Heaven is a particular form of happiness according to this system.

Jayadeva finally gives his own opinion about the use of the particular qualification. According to him if the qualification is not added, then such cases as whiteness of the body of Kālī (a dark woman) will not be included in the subject because the whiteness in the body of Kālī is produced by her asceticism which in turn is performed by her effort. Ascetical practices produce the unseen which in turn produces the whiteness of her body. Therefore it is something produced by an effort that is produced through the unseen and hence it cannot be included in the subject. But since according to accepted beliefs, this whiteness is directly caused by God, it should also be included in the enunciation of the subject. Therefore when the qualification 'not-through-the-unseen' is added, to the formulation, the whiteness in question becomes something not produced not through the unseen, i.e. produced through the unseen and hence it is included in the subject. Rucidatta also gives this as the true explanation.

This opinion, however, is not completely endorsed by Jayadeva, for afterwards he gives another explanation introducing it with the words 'in fact' (*vastutastu*) which seems to indicate that this is the explanation which pleases him most. And this explanation is as follows: The qualification of 'not-through-the unseen' means 'not-through-the-qualities-of-the-soul'. If the qualification is not interpreted like this, then meditation, self-realization, and so on cannot be included in the subject. But self-realization and so on are also to be included in the subject since they are conferred directly by God. Now when the qualification of 'not-through-the-unseen, is explained as 'not-through-the-qualities-of-the-soul', the subject would signify things which are not produced through-the-qualities-of-the-soul. Self-realization and so on are indeed produced through the qualities of the soul, namely, hearing, reflection and so on which are just different kinds of knowledge. This is the same as saying that they are something not produced by an effort that is produced not through unseen which is a quality of soul. Thus they are also included in the subject. Jayadeva however adds that if in fact the unseen is produced by our effort and it is through this unseen that the self-relization is achieved, then there is no need of of taking the qualification of 'not-through-the-unseen', in the sense of 'not-through-the-qualities-of-soul'.[1]

Both Jayadeva and Rucidatta admit that the qualification of 'not-through-the unseen' is added in order to include such cases as 'whiteness' of the body of Kālī and self-realization. There is no difference of opinion regarding this. Pragalbha, however, gives some other opinions also. He mentions, for instance, the opinion of those who say that in order to include self-realization also in the subject, it would be enough to add in the enunciation of the subject 'not produced by knowledge desire and action'. Although self-realization is brought about by effort, according to this

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[1] Rucidatta, however, points out that this explanation of Jayadeva cannot be admitted: 'not through the unseen cannot be interpreted as 'not-through-the-qualities-of-soul.' The reason is the following: Although self-realization is achieved through meditation, i.e. through the qualities of the soul since meditation is nothing but a kind of knowledge, still the conjunction, of the soul with the mind is produced by God and this conjunction is brought about without the help of any other quality of the soul.

Naiyāyika, it is not brought about by desire. Therefore it also will be included in the subject. By this also the movement of the five-fold vital airs which is brought about by God is also included in the subject because though the movement of the five-fold vital airs is caused by our effort, it is not brought about by our knowledge and desire. But according to Pragalbha himself, there is no need of adding 'not-produced-through-knowledge-and-desire' in the formulation of the subject and there is also no need of including the movement of the five-fold airs as in the subject, because they also can be taken as the subject if the inference is in the form of compound cognition.[1] Further the purpose of certain other parts of the limitor of the subject-ness is shown. Destruction has no material cause and so it is not produced by an effort that is produced. Hence it also becomes a part of the subject. In order to exclude it, the qualification of 'being-inherent' is given; and so since destruction does not inhere in anything, it is excluded from the subject.

(2)(a) The *sādhya* is formulated in three different ways. The first formulation has the qualification of 'not-being-the-counter-positive-of-a-prior-absence-which-is–pervaded-by-the-prior-absence-of–the-unseen'. If this qualification is not added, then there would be the fault of establishing what has already been established, because individual souls have direct knowledge of clarified butter and so on which are the material cause of sacrifices and so on and through the unseen that is produced by sacrifice, they bring about the earth and so on. But when the above qualification of 'not-being-the-counter-positive-of-a-prior-absence-which-is-pervaded-by-the–prior-absence-of-the-unseen' is added, this fault is removed because of the following reason. The knowledge of individual souls who perform sacrifices is produced and such a knowledge of the material cause of the sacrifice is needed in order to perform sacrifice which in turn produces the unseen. Hence as long as there is the prior absence of such a knowledge, there is also the prior absence of the unseen. Therefore the knowledge which is the counterpositive of the prior absence which is pervaded by the prior absence of the unseen, can only be knowledge of individual souls since the knowledge of God can never be the counterpositive of a prior absence. But a knowledge which is not the counterpositive of such a prior absence is to be understood in the *sādhya* and such knowledge can only be the knowledge of God, or the knowledge of an individual soul which does not produce the unseen, like the knowledge of a potter which does not produce earth and so on because it does not produce the unseen. Hence only knowledge etc. of God can be taken here since they alone can produce the earth and so on in the way described above and so there is no fault of establishing what is already established. Here, if instead of this qualification of the *sādhya*, the qualification of 'not-producing-the-unseen' were added, then there would be contradiction (*bādha*) since the knowledge of God also produces the unseen. Therefore the qualification of 'not-being-the–counterpositive–of–a–prior–absence–of–the–unseen' is added. These explanations are the same in all the commentators.

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[1] Compound cognition is *samūhālambana*. i.e. a cognition which has more than one chief qualificands (*viśeṣya*) For further explanations of this concept, cf. B. K. Matilal. *The Navy-nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, Cambridge. Massachusetts, Harvard University, Press, 1968, p. 63 ff.

Another qualification of the first enunciation of the *sādhya* is 'direct knowledge of material cause'. If by the expression 'material cause' is meant, any material cause, there would be the fault of establishing what has already been established with respect to sound and so on. The reason is that we have knowledge of the conch which is the material cause of the colour and so, since we have knowledge of some kind of material cause, we would be producing also sound. All these difficulties have been explained in connection with the discussion on the formulation of the subject. The only difference here is that knowledge and desire which have conch-shell as object are not causes of sound, but only of effort. It means only that knowledge and desire which have as object conch-shell, produce the effort with regard to it and not the sound itself. Therefore sound is not produced by the knowledge and desire of individual soul and therefore there is no fault of establishing what is to be established. But still when the *sādhya* is to be interpreted as being-produced-by-knowledge, being-produced-by-desire and being-produced-by-effort, there is partially the fault of establishing what has already been established since it is already accepted that sound is caused by our effort whose object is the conch-shell.

In order to avoid these difficulties 'material cause' is to be understood in the sense of the material cause of the respective things in question in the same way as it was explained in connection with the subject. Knowledge, desire and effort are causes of those things which inhere in their objects and so the effort which has conch shell as object would produce an effect which inheres in the conch shell and not in the ether. An individual soul does not have knowledge, desire and effort whose object is ether which is the inherent cause of sound. Therefore an individual soul cannot produce sound and hence in no way, there is the fault of establishing what has already been established.

But then the qualification of 'not being the counterpositive of a prior absence which is pervaded by the prior absence of the unseen' in the enunciation of the *sādhya* is useless, since the respective material causes will require the respective knowledge and so on. Atoms and so on cannot be the object of knowledge which is produced and therefore eternal knowledge would be established. Hence there is no need of the above qualification of *sādhya*. Here also the difficulty is solved as in the case of the formulation of the subject. This qualification of the *sādhya* is added in order to avoid the fault of partially establishing what has already been established, in the case of the whiteness of the body of Kālī: Kālī has knowledge of her body in which whiteness inheres and so Kālī would be the cause of whiteness, (but in fact, according to traditional belief, it is God who confers this whiteness and not she herself). Therefore there is partially the fault of establishing what has already been established. When the above qualification is added this fault also is removed because the knowledge of Kālī is 'the counterpositive of a prior absence which is pervaded by the prior absence of the unseen' and hence it is excluded from being the *sādhya*.

It may, however, be noted, that the unseen referred to in the formulation of the *sādhya* be understood in the sense of the unseen which produces the respective thing in question, viz. the individual instance of the subject and example. If it is not taken in this sense, it would come about that the knowledge and so on of individual souls also will be such that they are also not the counterpositive of a prior absence which is pervaded by the prior absence of the unseen. This is so because knowledge and so on of a potter would be the counterpositives of prior absences which are pervaded by the prior absence of the unseen; but the knowledge and so on of the weaver having the thread and so on as their object, will not be such counterpositive of such prior absences. Thus it comes about that the knowledge and so on of individual souls will not be the counterpositive of a prior absence which is pervaded by the counterpositive of the unseen. Therefore the unseen is to be understood in the sense explained above; viz. the unseen which produces the respective thing in question. But then it may be objected that if the unseen is understood as the unseen that produces the respective thing in question, (*savajanakādṛṣṭam*) then invariable concomitance cannot be cognized because of the absence of a consecutive characteristic. The answer to this is that the invariable concomitance here is to be understood in the sense of a similar invariable concomitance.[1]

The word *aparokṣa*, direct, qualifies knowledge and so on in the enunciation of the *sādhya*. It is indeed logically simpler to use *pratyakṣa* than to use *aparokṣa*, but the latter is preferred because

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[1] Similar invariable concomitance is to be explained in the following manner. Such an invariable concomitance occurs when one cognizes a similar kind of invariable concomitance from a similar kind of reason. For example: A benedictory verse has the completion of the book as the result, because while it has result, it does not have a result other than the completion of the book, just like eating. Here in the example of eating, there is no invariable concomitance of having the result of the completion of the book, but only a similar invariable concomitance of 'having the result of satisfaction' in a similar reason. It should be borne in mind that 'similar invariable concomitance' (*sāmanyavyāpti*) referred to here is different from the *sāmanyavyāpti* in the section on *sāmanyavyāpti* in the T.C. There *sāmanyavyāpti* means such instances of invariable concomitance as in all cases of smoke there is fire, as distinguished from *viśeṣavyāpti* or particular instances of invariable concomitance, e.g. mountain-smoke and mountain fire.

pratyakṣa could mean knowledge produced by senses and in that case there is no such knowledge in God. Here *aparokṣa* (direct) means that which is not produced by the consideration of reason and so on.

(b) The second enunciation of the *sādhya* is to be explained in the following way. By the word *sva* in *svajanaka* in the enunciation of *sādhya* the respective things like jar and so on of the example and also the earth and so on which are included in the subject should be understood. Thus the knowledge of the potter comes after the unseen which produces the jar; and he has the direct knowledge of the material cause of the jar and so he produces it. In the same way the knowledge which comes after the unseen and which produces the earth can only be the knowledge of God for the knowledge of individual souls cannot have as object atoms and so on.[1]

(c) The third enunciation of the *sādhya* may be explained as follows: The *sādhya* should be inherent in the object of the direct cognition, desire and effort. This means that in the atoms and so on which are the material cause and which are the object of direct cognition, desire and effort, the earth and so on which are the subject, are inherent. The knowledge of individual souls cannot have as object the atoms which are the material cause of the earth and so on and therefore we can establish the knowledge and so on of God which have as object these things. Here it may be noted that the meanings of the suffixes *cvi* (in the sense of that which was not before, has been made thus) and *śatṛ* (present participle) are not meant here, since the knowledge and so on of God are eternal.

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[1] Here the role of unseen in the production of things is to be precisely differentiated: Everything including jars and earth and so on are produced through the unseen as a general cause but there is this difference. In the case of jars and so on, a potter has already the unseen to produce the jar. He then has the knowledge of the material causes of the jar and so on and so he produces the jar. One who makes use of the pot has the necessary unseen to be able to make use of the pot and so he makes use of it. In the case of earth and so on, they are produced by us only in the latter sense, i.e. because of our actions such as offering sacrifices we have acquired unseen and through the operation of this unseen we are able to make use of or 'enjoy' the earth and so on; we are not its actual makers since we do not have direct knowledge of its material cause such as atoms and so on.

It may however be objected that in so formulating the *sādhya*, there is partially the fault of establishing what has already been established because Kālī has the knowledge of her body which is the material cause of the white colour which has been given to her directly by God. And so Kālī herself, and not God, confers this whiteness; in order to avoid this fault, knowledge and so on which are referred to in the enunciation of the *sādhya* is to be understood in the sense of knowledge which produces the thing in question. Here in the case of Kālī's whiteness, it is not produced by the knowledge which Kālī has of her body; but by the knowledge of God that has as object the body of Kālī in which the whiteness inheres. Thus there is no fault of establishing what has already been established.

(3) The various elements in the formulation of the reason also have definite purposes in view. Thus in order to avoid deviation in destruction, the qualification of 'being-inherent' is added in its enunciation because if the reason were merely 'being-the-counterpositive-of-prior-absence' then destruction is also the counterpositive of a prior absence and therefore it also should have a maker; but according to Nyāyavaiśeṣika, destruction does not have a maker, since it does not have material cause. Hence the deviation. This deviation is avoided when the qualification of 'being-inherent' is added because destruction does not inhere in anything. If, however, the reason were, merely, 'being-inherent' then the universals like cowness and so on which inhere in cows and so on, do not have a maker, since they are eternal and thus there would have been deviation. In order to avoid this deviation, the qualification of 'being-the-counter-positive-of-a-prior-absence' is added. The eternal universals such as cowness and so on are never counterpositives of prior absence; thus there is no deviation with regard to these.

This, in short, is the inference which Gaṅgeśa brings forward to establish the existence of God. As was remarked in the beginning of these explanations, many aspects of the discussion of the commentators seem to be based not merely on some very far-fetched conclusions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines, but even on some peculiar assumptions of Hindu mythology as in the case of the movement of copper vessel, and so on. These very peculiar instances and discussions turning round them are not likely to attract the modern students of philosophy or of Nyāya. But there is danger here, however, of missing the significance of the achievement of Gaṅgeśa within the broad stream of Indian philosophy in general and of the Nyāya system in particular.

Gaṅgeśa's formulation of the inference shows the carefulness and accuracy with which he fought against the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsakā-s. For according to them the world is produced by ordinary individuals by means of the unseen which they have acquired. This only means that the world comes into existence because of our merit. The formulation of the inference particularly the enunciation of its subject and *sādhya* are aimed against the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsakā-s. They hold that the world is produced by individual souls by means of the unseen. It is precisely against this view that Gaṅgeśa has formulated his syllogism. According to him these very things need a maker who knows their material causes. It is true that the world is produced because of our unseen: This only means that we make use of the world or enjoy it according to our unseen; it is not the case that we actually make the universe, for one who makes anything should have knowledge of its material cause. We do not have the knowledge of the material cause of the earth and so on, viz, atoms and so we cannot make them. They need a maker who knows their material causes.

Within the tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, Gaṅgeśa shows considerable originality in the formulation of the syllogism for it was his purpose to meet the arguments of the Buddhists and Mīmāṃsaka-s; and nowhere in the tradition, do we find a syllogism so exactly formulated to meet precisely the objection coming from the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsaka-s. Even from a purely philosophical and logical point of view, the significance of Gaṅgeśa cannot be underrated. He had the correct intuition that the heart of the problem of the proof for the existence of God lies in the nature of invariable concomitance of 'having-a-maker' with 'being-an-effect'. Such an invariable concomitance, Gaṅgeśa rightly contends, extends to all effects and to all of their respective makers. But more of this problem will be discussed when Gaṅgeśa treats later the questions regarding reason and invariable concomitance.

II(1)(a) Rucidatta makes the following remark: Meditation and the unseen are produced by an effort that is produced. Therefore these cannot be included in the enunciation of the subject; but on the other hand the particular qualities of the soul are supposed to be directly caused by God. Hence these also should be included in the formulation of the subject; this can be done by mentioning them also, in the enunciation of the subject in the form of a compound cognition.

Jayadeva, however, makes the following observation: Ritual action in the form of various kinds of observances destroy all kinds of de-merit which are obstacles to self-realization. These actions through the destruction of de-merit bring about self-realization which therefore becomes something produced by an effort that is produced. Hence it cannot be included in the subject. Similarly, benedictory prayer before any performance removes the obstacles to the performance and through the destruction of the obstacles, these prayers produce the performance. Such performances are something produced by an effort that is produced and as such cannot be included in the subject. In order to include these, namely, self-realization and so on also in the subject the text says that these also could be included in the subject in the form of a compound cognition.

Jayadeva's interpretation cannot be accepted because of the word '*api*' (even) used by Gaṅgeśa. It is too cumbersome to postulate instrumentality for the destruction of de-merit and for the destruction of obstacles. In the first instance we have to assume de-merit, then its destruction and its instrumentality. This a complex process; therefore it is much easier to assume instrumentality for merit itself. In the second case, bededictory prayer does not produce the destruction of obstacles, and cause the result, but the effort whose object is benedictory prayer produces destruction of obstacles and not the result itself. Therefore the result is not something produced by an effort that is produced. Hence there is no difficulty to include it in the subject. But if someone objects in the way indicated above, the answer is that the subject should be mentioned including those things also in the form of a compound cognition.

(b) But an objection is to be raised: 'being-not-produced-by-an-action-that-is-produced' is a constituent of the limitor of subject-ness. But this cannot be cognized properly because of the absence of a consecutive character. To explain: It is because there is a consecutive character like jar-ness that the counter-positive-ness (*partiyogitā*) of the absence of jar can be cognized in all jars. There is no such consecutive character in all subjects viz. in all that is not produced by effort that is produced. Hence it also cannot be cognized properly. This objection is rejected for the following reason: Being-not-produced-by-an-effort-that-is-produced means a mutual absence whose counter-positive is those things which are produced by an effort that is produced. This kind of being a mutal absence could be considered as the relation in the form of a universal and by means of this there could be the knowledge of everything that is subject, like the earth so on.

But then another objection arises: In the opinion of the opponent everything is created and therefore there is nothing that is not produced. Hence by the qualification of 'being-produced', there is nothing from which this qualification differentiates; as for example, there is no need of saying black crow, since all crows are black. This objection also cannot be admitted because it is not necessary that every qualification should differentiate; a qualification can also be used just to describe the nature of the thing in question. Thus 'black' in black crow shows only that crows are black and it does not serve to differentiate it from anything else. This is also a correct use of qualification. Besides according to the tenets of Nyāya system there are things like ether, atoms. souls etc. which are not produced. Therefore that which is differentiated by the qualification of 'being-produced' is everything eternal. Hence the qualification serves to describe the nature of the thing according to the opinion of the opponent and to differentiate it from other things according to Nyāya doctrines. It is not necessary that a qualification should have the same use in both the systems.

(c) Now an answer is given to the following question: The *sādhya* in the establishing inference is not just having-an-agent; but the three elaborately formed *sādhya-s* as discussed above. Therefore the *sādhya* that is established in the actual subject is different from 'just-having-an-agent'. To this question the answer given is that the three elaborately formulated *sādhya-s* are the same as the *sādhya* of having-an-agent. But then the question arises how can these be the same? Having-an-agent can mean either being-produced-by-an-action or being-produced-by-an-agent-having-an-action, and it cannot mean the elaborately enunciated *sādhya* as in the establishing inference. To this, an answer is given on the basis of common experience. If the agents of those things which are produced by the unseen of those who enjoy those things, are said to be those who enjoy those things, then those who make use of the pot could be considered the makers of the pot. But this is not the case; only the potter is described as the maker of the pot.

(d) Now the objection which was raised earlier that the qualities of the soul which are produced and sound cannot be considered as subject is answered. Because of the way in which the subject is designated in the establishing inference, it is possible to include also these things in the subject. Thus the qualities of the soul which are produced are included in the subject since we do not have any effort (*kṛti*) with any of these qualities as object of the action.[1] Nor can sound be produced by us since we do not have the direct perception of its material cause, i.e, ether, and so it also is included in the formulation of the subject. Hence there is also another advantage, namely, there is no fault of even doubtful inconclusive reason which was mentioned earlier.

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[1] Why is it that we do not have an action whose object is knowledge etc? The answer is that just as a potter has an experience in the form: 'I make a pot', we do not have an experience in the form: 'I make a knowledge' or 'I make a desire.' If it is argued that we do have such an experience, then we will have to postulate another experience with that knowledge or desire as object and thus there will be an infinite regress. Hence the Nyāya position is that we do not actually produce our knowledge and so on, but God himself produces these qualities in us when the casual complex is present.

Then another difficulty arises: How can there be desire to do (*cikīrṣā*) with regard to things such as atoms which already exist and which are eternal, since existing things which are eternal cannot again be brought about? The answer to this objection is that although atoms and so on are eternal, they could be the object of desire to do, in as much it is desired that from them the dyad is to be formed.

It should be noted that if the formulation of the subject in the establishing infrerence is accepted, then destruction (*dhvaṃsa*) cannot be included in the subject since it does not have any material cause. Thus, it will not have the *sādhya* of having-an-agent, nor will it have the reason which is qualified by 'being-inherent'. Therefore, although the establishing inference may not have such faults as deviation and so on, yet destruction will not have an agent; and hence God will not be its cause. Nor is it possible to hold that God is not the cause destruction; for according to Nyāya doctrine, it is not possible to have a new dyad without the destruction of the previous-dyad. For the destruction of the dyad, it is necessary to have the perception of the inherent cause of the dyad viz, the atoms. Now this perception of atoms is not possible for us, but only for God. Hence God is the cause of the destruction. Therefore it is necessary to include destruction also in the formulation of the subject. In that case, however, it is not possible to take the word *upādāna* in the sense of inherent cause, since destruction does not have an inherent cause, but only in the sense of cause, or in the formulation of *sādhya*, the word *upādāna* could be omitted; then in the formulation of the reason, the qualification of 'being-inherent' should also be omitted. It is to include destruction also in the subject that the sentence beginning with *yadvā* is used. This is the explanation of Rucidatta.

But Jayadeva comments differently: In order to avoid the fault of deviation in destruction, it is necessary to add the qualification of 'being-inherent-while-having-existence' in the formulation of the reason. Now the Mīmāmsaka-s do not admit inherence as a relation nor do they admit existence as a universal and hence the reason is not acceptable to them. Besides according to the Mīmāṃsaka-s, destruction is identical with its substratum and hence there would be no fault of deviation in destruction and therefore it is not necessary to add any special qualification in the reason to avoid the fault of deviation. Nor can it be urged that since the destruction of the dyad is nothing but the substratum of the destroyed dyad viz: the atoms (which are eternal) there is no need of the qualification of 'being-existent' or 'being-inherent' in the reason, in order to avoid the fault of deviation in destruction, because the atoms are not produced and hence they do not have the characteristic of 'being–produced'. Therefore, they cannot be included in the subject. For these reasons Jayadeva says that Gaṅgeśa is giving here a formulation of subject and reason according to Nyāya which accepts absence (destruction) as a separate category. According to this formulation then, Gaṅgeśa excludes the qualification of 'being-inherent' in both the formulations of the subject and *sādhya* and so destruction also is included in the subject and the reason is found also in destruction. In the formulation of the sādhya, the word 'upādāna' is to be taken simply in the sense of cause. In that case however, there would be the fault of establishing what has already been established. For human souls have the direct knowledge of the musical instruments etc. which are the instrumental cause of sound and so human souls would be the agents of sound. In order to avoid this fault, one should take the word upādāna in the sense of substratum (*adhikaraṇa*) and so, since human souls do not have the direct perception of the substratum of the sound namely, ether, there is also no fault of establishing what is already established. Musical instruments and so on are only limitors of the substratum-ness of sound and not the substratum of sound. This is the interpretation of Jayadeva.[1]

However, in order to include destruction also in the subject, it is not enough to add 'not-being-produced-by-an-effort-that-is produced' in the formulation of the subject, but it is necessary to add 'not-being-produced-by-a-desire-and-effort-that-are-produced'. The reason for this addition in the formulation of the subject is the following: The destruction of the effort of human souls is caused by this effort itself, since according to the tenets of Nyāya, the counterpositive is itself a cause of destruction. Therefore one of the causes of destruction of effort is effort. Hence destruction of effort being produced by effort itself which is produced, cannot be included in the formulation of the subject. When however, the addition of 'not-being-produced-by-a-desire-and-effort-that-are-produced' the difficulty is avoided, since destruction of effort is produced by effort only and not by desire also. Hence destruction of effort is included in the statement of the subject.

Jayadeva further points out that it is necessary to add the qualification of 'not-being-produced-by-a-knowledge-desire-and-effort-that-are-produced' in order that destruction of effort may also be included in the subject. The reason for this is the following: According to the tenets of Nyāya system, the special qualities of the soul which are produced immediately afterwards are the cause of the destruction of special qualities of the soul, which exist in the immediately preceding moment. And so effort is the cause of the destruction of desire, since effort comes after desire. Desire is also the cause of the destruction of desire since desire is the counterpositive of this destruction. Therefore since destruction of desire is caused by desire and effort that are produced, it is not the case that it is not produced by a produced desire and effort. Therefore it cannot be included in the subject. In order to avoid this fault, it is necessary to add also 'not-produced-by-knowledge-that-is-produced' in the formulation of the subject. When this is done, since destruction of desire is not caused by knowledge which is produced, destruction of desire can be included in the subject.

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[1] However, Rucidatta criticizes this opinion of Jayadeva; Rucidatta accepts the musical instruments etc. as the substratum of sound through the relation of limitor and the limited. The reason for this is the experience that there is sound in musical instruments etc. and also the similar experience of pleasure in the body by the relation of limitor-ness, though the pleasure exists in the soul by the relation of inherence. Hence there is partially the fault of establishing what is already established since we have the perception of musical instruments, the substratum of sound. D. Pisharodi, however, denies this position of Rucidatta on the basis of the Nyāya tenet that the relation of the limitor and the limited (of the qualities) does not govern existence. The relations of qualities which govern existence are only the relations of inherence or self-sameness (*svarūpasaṃbandha*) or some forms of conjuctuion (*saṃyoga*). The relation of limitor and the limited is an indirect relation and so it does not govern existence; cf. *kārikāvali* of Viswanathapancānana with the commentaries *Muktāvali*, *Dinakari* and *Rāmarudri* p. 208.

(e) But every destruction cannot be included in the subject since the destruction of the last sorrow does not have the *sādhya* mentioned. Only experience (*bhoga*) and means to it are produced by the unseen. And the final destruction of sorrow is neither *bhoga* nor its means; for *bhoga* is the experience of pleasure or pain. Since at the time of the final destruction of sorrow, there is no body, there cannot be the experience of the final destruction of sorrow. Therefore, this cannot be included in the formulation of the subject, since being not produced by the unseen, it is also not produced by God. And therefore there would be the fault of inconclusive reason with reference to the final destruction of sorrow or liberation; in order to avoid this fault, it is necessary to add in the formulation of the subject 'different from liberation'. But this is too cumbersome. Besides the limitor of subjectness (*pakṣatā*) is qualified by 'not-being-produced'. This is a mutual absence which is not admitted by the opponent as a category. In order to avoid these difficulties let the earth alone be taken as the subject and then there would also be no fault of inconclusive reason. The invariable concomitance of the reason is determined in a positive instance (*sapakṣa*); it is also no fault to doubt about the existence of *sādhya* in a subject or something like a subject; therefore there could be inference in the subject and in something like subject when the reason is ascertained to exist in these. There is also no mutual dependence as was earlier feared.[1] It is not the case that only after inference in the subject, there is inference in the *pakṣasama* and only after inference in *pakṣasama* there is inference in the subject and hence there is no mutual dependence; the reason is that as already pointed out, once invariable concomitance is grasped in a *sapakṣa*, there is no difficulty in having an inference in subject and *pakṣasama*, in both of which the existence of the reason is ascertained.

Now another doubt arises: That which is the qualified (*viśeṣya*) in an inference, is called the subject and so why is the sprout called *pakṣasama?* A subject is that which is the qualificand in the verbal cognition that arises from the sentence expressing the proposition that is to be proved. In the present case the proposition that is to be proved is that the earth has an agent and here the qualificand in the verbal cognition is the earth and just as there is doubt if the earth has an agent or not, so also there can be doubt if the sprout has an agent or not. In this sense there is similarity between earth and the sprout, because of which the sprout is called the *pakṣasama.* Hence a *pakṣasama* is that which is not the qualificand in the verbal cognition that arises from the sentence expressing the proposition to be proved, while it is the qualificand in a doubt about the *sādhya.*

But if this is the nature of the subject, then it is impossible to have a consideration (*parāmarśa*) which is necessary to have an inference in the sprout because it is a *pakṣasama* (and not a *pakṣa*) and hence it does not have the relation of the reason to the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*)which is also the content of the cognition of consideration. Therefore it is impossible to have inference at the same time in the subject and *pakṣasama.* The answer to this is given by changing the definition of subject: A subject is that which has subjectness; and subject-ness is the absence of the means of establishing the *sādhya* (or in the interpretation of Śiromaṇi, the absence of the certainty of the *sādhya*) together with the absence of the desire to establish the same. Such a kind of subject-ness is found both in the earth which is the subject and in the sprout which is the *pakṣasama*. Therefore, there is no difficulty in having inferences with regard to both.[1] The knowledge of the reason which is qualified by invariable concomitance in a subject having such subject-ness is the cause of inference. Such a knowledge with regard to the earth is in the form of five, syllogistic members; with regard to sprout it is by itself, without these parts of syllogism.

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[1] cf. TCI, p. 4

The objection which was raised earlier that there would be inconclusive reasoning with reference to a sprout, when inference of God is made, taking earth as subject, does not seem tenable, for the reason is ascertained as existing in the earth and not in the sprout. If for someone there is no certainty of the reason in the *pakṣasama*, there is no fault of inconclusive reason, since there is neither reason nor *sādhya* here. For the fault of inconclusive reason, it is necessary to have the certainty of reason but doubt about *sādhya*. It is however further suggested that the fault of inconclusive reason may arise in another way. It was pointed out earlier that there is subjectness both in the subject and in the subject-like and therefore there could be inference in both; the present objection tries to show that this is not quite true, for when there is doubt, if the *sādhya* is in a sprout or not, it means that there is doubt if the reason is co-existent with the *sādhya* or co-existent with the absence of *sādhya*. This is actually a doubt about the deviation of the reason. And when there is doubt of deviation, invariable concomitance itself is not grasped and even if it is grasped it will be contradicted. Therefore it will be impossible to cognize the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent in a jar and so on (which have certainly the reason of being-an-effect) because the doubt of deviation prevents the cognition of invariable concomitance. Therefore it would be impossible to have inference in a *pakṣasama*. The answer to this is that, it would be impossible to have any inference at all, if one interprets in this way the definition of subject as doubt of *sādhya*, according to the old school. For, if one wants to infer fire in a mountain from smoke, he should have first cognized the invariable concomitance in such places as kitchen where the presence of reason and *sādhya* is certainly cognized. But if at that time there is doubt about the invariable concomitance of fire in smoke with regard to the smoke in the yard of the house, there is doubt of deviation and hence no inference is possible, because those objects in which there is smoke and about which there is doubt, if they have fire or not, do not have a consecutive character and so they cannot be considered subject. Therefore the determination of reason in that which has the doubt of *sādhya* is no fault, on the contrary it is a good thing. Otherwise no inference would be possible.

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[1] In this connection, the following may also be pointed out: It is necessary to ascertain the existence of the reason in the earth and to make sure that the reason is pervaded by 'having-an-agent' in order to infer that the earth has an agent. It is also necessary that the earth has such subject-ness; but it is not necessary to know also that the earth has subjectness. It may further be pointed out that subject in early Nyāya is defined as doubt about *sādhya;* others of the old school define it as desire to infer. But in the case of those who infer clouds in the sky just from hearing thunder, there is neither doubt that there are clouds in the sky nor is there any desire to prove the existence of clouds. Hence Gaṅgeśa rejects these opinions of the old school. Besides, scriptures enjoin that soul which has been known through verbal cognition by means of scriptures should also be inferred. This shows that the certainty of the *sādhya* does not always prevent inference. Hence Gaṅgeśa defines subject-ness in such a way as to include inferences in all these places; this definition of subjectness as given by Gaṅgeśa in the section of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* on *paksatā* is given here.

It was stated in the *pūrvapakṣa* that doubt of *sādhya* is a fault in all places except in the subject. Here if the subject means, being the locus of the *sādhya* which is desired to be established, then there would be no inference like the inference of clouds from thunder where the *sādhya* is not explicitly desired; if however, the subject means being something in which *sādhya* is doubted, then even sprout would not be something other than that in which the *sādhya* is doubted for in the sprout also the *sādhya* is doubted. If further the subject is, something where there is the absence of proofs establishing or not establishing *sādhya*, then this is not the case even in sprout for in the sprout there is the absence of these proofs. And if by being subject meant, being the object of the proposition to be proved, then there is no possibility of an inference for oneself, because in an inference for oneself there is no syllogistic step. For these reasons it is not correct to say that doubt about *sādhya* is a fault in something other than the subject.

(f) When the earth and so on are taken individually as the subject it would be impossible to establish the existence of a God who is omniscient. So one can doubt. Such a doubt is removed by this qualification of 'not produced by a knowledge having a particular object' for the subject. Then the inference for the existence of God would be in the form: 'The earth which is not produced by knowledge whose object is a particular object, has an agent'. The meaning of this qualification of subject can be explained as follows: A potter must have knowledge of the two halves of the pot in order to make the pot; a cloth-maker must have knowledge of the threads in order to make a cloth. This means that the maker of a particular object must have knowledge, desire and effort with regard to the material cause of the particular object; but knowledge that is inferred in inferences like the 'earth has an agent because it is an effect' has all things as object. And the subject is to be qualified as 'being-not-produced-by-a-knowledge-which-has-a-particular-thing-as-object'. And by this, knowledge that has all things as object is established.

(2)(a) In the formulation of *sādhya*, the expression 'material cause' (*upādāna*) is used. Now although it is not possible that the knowledge of the material cause of jars etc. which human souls have, produces earth etc., it is possible that the knowledge which the human souls who are yogins have as object the material cause of earth also and so instead of establishing the existence of God, we establish the existence of yogins. Hence there is the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established. This objection is answered by saying that the knowledge, desire and effort which are mentioned in the formulation of *sādhya* are to be taken as real qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) and not as adventitious qualifiers (*upalakṣaṇa*). The knowledge of yogins are only adventitious qualifiers. Here the meaning of adventitious qualifier is to be understood in the following way: Although knowledge of the human souls who have become yogins have as object the material cause of the world, still this knowledge etc. are not the real cause of the world since the strict definition of causality cannot be applied to them, because such knowledge of yogins is absent before every successive creation of the world though it may be present before one creation. And so they are not creators of this world. By stating that the knowledge and so on that are mentioned in the *sādhya* are to be taken as real qualifiers in the sense that they are real causes, thereby meaning that they are before every successive creation, it follows that those who have such knowledge are also causes. And so when the subject is formulated in a general way (i.e. without the qualification of 'not being produced by a knowledge whose object is a particular thing') as in the establishing inference or when the earth alone is taken as the subject, then by means of the force of the relation of the reason to the subject, we can establish the existence of God.

(b) Since the fault of proving something other than what is to be proved is doubted only in the case of the first two *sādhya-s* explicitly, it is clear that the fault does not occur in the case of the third *sādhya*. The material cause of the dyad cannot be the object of the knowledge of the human soul whose object is jar etc. Therefore in the third *sādhya*, there is no such fault. In the case of the first two *sādhya-s* the fault is doubted in the following way: It was stated earlier that in the *sādhya*, knowledge of material cause means knowledge of material cause as such in order that the limitor of being-the-*sādhya*, be the same in subject and example. Therefore by knowledge of the material cause, in the formulation of *sādhya*, it is possible also to take the material cause of jar etc. Therefore let the earth etc. be produced by knowledge, desire and effort whose objects are jar etc. Thus there can be the fault of proving something other than what is to be proved.

Here Rucidatta discusses the possibility of this fault in the following way: It is possible to say that there is no fault of proving something other than what is to be proved because the same knowledge and so on of God which has as object jar and so on also, produce the earth etc. The answer to this is that the very knowledge of jar etc. which the human soul has, causes the earth etc. and so there is the fault of proving something other than what is to be proved. But then it is possible to deny the existence of this fault of proving something other than what is to be proved in another way, viz. when one is trying to establish infinite knowledge, it is not correct to speak of the fault of proving something other other than what is to be proved with reference to finite knowledge which is already accepted by both parties. This objection can also be rejected and the same fault can be shown to exist here in the following way: That characteristic which is the limitor of the pervaderness of the reason is also the qualifier (*prakāra*) in the inference establishing *sādhya* in the subject, and it is not possible to establish some other characteristic which is not the limitor of the pervader-ness, to be a qualifier of the *sādhya*.[1] Therefore according to Rucidatta, oneness, eternity and so on can be proved as the characteristics of God only by another inference. Therefore the conclusion is that it is possible to doubt about the existence of the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established because here the limitor of the pervader-ness of the reason is being-knowledge etc. of jar and so on and that is also the limitor of being-*sādhya*,

But it may further be objected: If being-produced by such knowledge etc. of jar and so on are taken as the *sādhya*, then such a *sādhya* does not occur before creation. Hence they are not the cause of the world. Therefore it is not possible to speak of the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established; nor is the reason contradicted, since it is the case that the world etc. comes into existence, even without the knowledge of jar etc. These arguments cannot be admitted, because in the beginningless flow of time it is possible that someone at some time or other has the knowledge etc. of jar and so on at the time immediately preceding the creation of the world. Therefore it is possible that the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established occurs here; and at the same time there is no fault of contradiction. It may further be objected that the subject is qualified by 'in the beginning of creation'. Therefore only those things which are at the beginning of creation are the subject. Hence there is no fault of establishing something other than what is to be established, neither is there any contradiction because no finite knowledge exists before creation. This also cannot be admitted since the opponents like Mīmāṃsaka-s do not admit beginning of creation and therefore the qualification of the subject proposed cannot be accepted.

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[1] As for example in the inference *parvato vahnimān*, *vahnitva* (fire-ness) is the limitor of pervader-ness, it is also the qualifier in the conclusion.

Now the main objection that there is the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established is answered. When the knowledge and so on of a human soul are causes of a thing without the instrumentality of the unseen, the way in which their causality is exercised is to be understood in the following way: By the relation of content-ness (*viṣayatā*) are knowledge, desire and effort causes of an effect which exists in its substratum by the relation of inherence. Thus there is knowlege of the two halves of the pot in the two halves of the pot by the relation of content-ness, and in the same two-halves of the pot, exists the pot, by the relation of inherence. In non-technical language this means, in order to make the pot, one must have knowledge of the two halves of the pot. In the opinion of those who hold that God is the cause of desruction, the causality here will be described as follows: By the relation of contentness, the knowledge of God is the cause of destruction that relates itself to its substratum by the relation of selfsameness (*svarūpasaṃbandha*). When the causality has been determined like this, it is impossible that the knowledge, etc. of jar could be the cause of the earth, dyad etc., (nor of the destruction of dyad etc. whose substratum (*āśraya*) is atom). Hence, there is no possibility of the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established. Therefore, also is rejected the position of those who say that the subject is to be qualified by 'being-not-produced-by-direct-knowledge-etc.-whose-object-is-the-material-cause-of-another-thing', in order to avoid the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established, for when the causality of knowledge etc, in regard to any effect, is understood in the way explained above, there is no possiblity of the fault of establishing something other than what is to be established.

Now another objection is raised, the point of which is that even if the knowledge which is a part of formulation of the *sādhya*, be not qualified by 'direct'. and even if desire and effort are not a part of the formulation of the *sādhya*, still the existence of God could be established. So the *sādhya* will be only 'being produced by knowledge whose object is the material cause'. Such a knowledge will produce the world because God is established as its cause. Thus there will be no fault of establishing what is already established, because human souls will not have direct knowledge of the material cause of the world. The knowledge which is thus established as the cause of the world will not be the ordinary perception of human souls but will be similar to the knowledge of human souls by the help of the apprehensional connection in the form of universals. Thus it will come about that in God there is no ordinary perception such as we have and hence also no desire and no effort which should have the same object as the knowledge. This of coure will be acceptable to the present objector, since it is necessary only to establish the knowledge which is necessary to produce the world and thus establish the existence of God. It is however, not added explicitly that the knowledge that produces the earth is similar to the knowledge which is produced by the relation in the form of universals since the opponent does not admit such a relation. Therefore the knowledge that is said to produce the world is similar to that which is produced by the relation in the form of universals, and at the same time, the knowledge whose object is the material cause of the earth.

The answer to this objection is as follows: The *sādhya* that is so formulated by the opponent here should be a description of having-an-agent. But it is not the normal use to speak of a jar etc. as having an agent because someone or other has knowledge of the material cause of the jar by means of the relation in the form of universals. If it were so any one who has knowledge of the material cause of the jar as just a substance, or anyone who has the knowledge of the material cause of the jar by means of the relation in the form of knowledge, would also be considered the agent of jar; but this is not the case. And the *sādhya* is formulated in such a way as to show that one can speak of an agent only if there is direct knowledge, desire and action with regard to the material cause of the thing in question.

Now another objection is raised: There is the possibility of the fault of establishing what has already been established, if the *sādhya* is taken as formulated in the establishing inference. This objection however, is to be raised as Jayadeva points out[1] only in case the subject is taken as the earth itself as mentioned in discussion on the establishing inference. Thus when someone tills the earth or breaks it in any other way, the broken earth (*khaṇḍakṣiti*) is produced; similarly when more water is poured into the ocean, a bigger ocean is brought into existence, or by the movement of the hand a dyad is produced through the conjunction of two atoms. The knowledge, desire and effort needed to produce these effects belong to human souls. Hence human souls are agents of these things; and so at least certain things whose agents according to the establishing inference should be God, have as agent human beings and so there is the fault of establishing what is already established. This is the objection.

The answer to this is that human souls are not the agents of the broken earth and so on. Human souls have knowledge, desire and effort with regard to the destruction of the conjunction of the parts which is the non-inherent cause of the earth. Human souls are the cause of the destruction of the earth as a whole unit, (*mahākṣiti*) and not the cause of the broken-earth (*khaṇḍakṣiti*) The *khaṇḍakṣiti* is formed from the conjunction that is already existing. Gaṅgeśa brings another reason also to show that there is no fault of establishing what is already established. If the human souls are the agent of the broken-earth, then the human souls should have the direct knowledge of every part of the material cause of the broken earth. But this is just impossible. Hence human souls will not be the cause of the broken earth; and so there would be no fault of establishing what is already established. By the same kind of reason, it is possible also to show that human souls are not agents of the dyad by means of the movement of the hand, since human souls do not have direct knowledge of atoms, the material cause of dyad. Further, there is also no fault of establishing what is already established in the case of the bigger ocean which is made by pouring water into it. Here human souls have the direct knowledge of material cause (water) of the conjunction between the ocean and the water that is poured. Hence human souls are the cause of this bigger ocean. So this bigger ocean is not the subject, since it is produced by human souls. It is a *sapakṣa* like jar, Hence there is no fault of establishing what is already established.

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[1] cf. TCI p. 26

(c) Now another objection is raised against the first two formulations of *sādhya* in the establishing inference for in these two formulations, it is pointed out that the cause of what is stated as the subject is the one who has knowledge and not merely the knowledge. But here the objection is that what is actually the cause of that which is stated as the subject is knowledge, desire and effort themselves and not the one who has such knowledge and so on. The reason for this objection is that the example of a jar does not have the *sādhya* of being produced by someone who has knowledge and so on, because there is positive and negative concomitance between knowledge etc. and jar and not between one who has knowledge and jar. There is no means to cognize the subject (*dharmin*) which is the cause, nor is there any positive and negative concomitance by which the causality of the *dharmīn* may be cognized. This could be explained in the following way: It is not possible to cognize positive and negative concomitance between ether and sound; however, since sound is an entity that is produced it must have an inherent cause. This inherent cause cannot be such a substance as earth, or any other substance which is accepted by both parties. Therefore it is necessary to accept another subastance, namely, ether as the inherent cause of sound. There is no similar means of establishing a subject (*dharmīn*) as the cause of the earth and so on. It is possible only to establish that the knowledge and so on are the causes of the earth just as it is possible to establish the causality only of knowledge etc. with reference to a jar and not that of a potter. Thus in the case of earth, there is no cognition of positive and negative concomitance between someone who has knowledge and earth, but only between knowledge and earth.

But it may be objected that there is argument to show that the substratum of knowledge and so on is also cause. This argument which is in the form of inference is as follows: A jar is produced by soul since it has origin just as knowledge. But this inferenee is not valid because the reason has an 'additional condition' viz. 'being-inherent-in-soul'. Here the reason does not have the pervasion of the additional condition, i. e. where there is origin, there is no 'being-inherent-in-the-soul', as in the case of a jar. Therefore only that which is existing in the soul by the relation of inherence and has origin, is produced by the soul. Hence the objection that jar is produced only by knowledge and not by the one who has knowledge, namely, soul, still holds good. Further the reason in the inference that a jar is produced by soul since it has origin, has no supporting argument and so there is the fault of not having pervasion (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*), for by the reason of having-origin, the false inference that jar is produced by ether just like sound, can also take place; this obviously cannot be admitted, since it is accepted by all that ether is not a cause of jar. Therefore the objection that knowledge and so on and not the one having these, should be considered as the cause of the things produced that are mentioned in the formulation of the subject, still stands. However, this objection also cannot be admitted. It is clear that by means of perception with the help of the cognition of positive and negative concomitance, bodily action is also determined as the cause of jar. For that bodily action, the conjunction of the soul having effort with its own body, is also necessary, i.e. such a conjunction is the non-inherent cause of bodily action. Therefore it must be admitted that the soul having effort is also the cause of bodily actions.

But this answer is not accepted by the opponent. The soul which according to Nyāya is omnipresent has always conjunction with the body, whether there is bodily action or not. But effort (of the soul) is not always there and when there is no effort, there is also no bodily action. Hence it follows that the effort of the soul is an indispensable antecedent that invariably precedes bodily action; it is indeed the counter-positive of the absence which brings about bodily action and hence effort of the soul is the cause of bodily action and the conjunction of the soul becomes a dispensable antecedent and hence no cause. This objection also cannot be admitted; it is the accepted general rule that all positive effects have a non-inherent cause, i.e. every effect except destruction has a non-inherent cause; now bodily action is a positive effect and it must have a non-inherent cause; this non-inherent cause cannot be the effort which is a special quality of the soul; it can only be the efficient cause. Therefore if one wants to save the principle that every positive effect has a non-inherent cause, one has also to accept that the conjunction of the soul having effort with its bodily action is the non-inherent cause of bodily action and not a dispensable antecedent. And when the conjunction of the soul is accepted as cause, then not only conjunction itself but also the object (here, the soul) whose conjunction is necessary is also the cause of bodily action.

Now another objection is raised to show that the soul is not the cause of bodily action: It may be admitted that the effort of the soul and its conjunction with the body are causes; but from this, it does not follow that the soul which is the substratum of both the effort and the conjunction is also the cause. When it is said that the conjunction of the soul is the cause, the word 'soul' here is used only as an adventitious qualifier, namely it only shows that the conjunction of other things is not the cause, but only the conjunction of the soul is the cause, but it does not show that the soul is also a real cause. The answer to this objection lies in this that if all the conjunctions are not causes, and if only that conjunction which has a particular object as its counterpositive is cause, then it follows that, that object is not merely an adventitious qualifier, but a real qualifier, And hence it is also the cause. In the present case, this particular object is the soul and hence, soul also is the cause of bodily action.

But the objection that the soul is not the cause of bodily action may be raised in another way. If something is not produced when something else is absent, the latter something which is absent can be said to be the cause of the former. When the conjunction of the two halves of the pot is absent, the pot is not produced; hence the conjunction of the two halves of the pot is the cause of the pot. In the same way, it is not established that the absence of the conjunction of the soul with its body is the cause of the absence of bodily action since we have no experience of absence of the bodily action brought about by the absence of the conjunction of the soul, since conjunction of soul with body is always present. So it cannot either be affirmed that the conjunction of the soul is a cause of bodily action and hence it cannot be said to be the non-inherent cause of bodily action. The answer to this objection is as follows: It is accepted by both parties that when something is not produced, when something else is absent, then the thing which was absent can be said to be the cause of that which was not produced. In the present case the conjunction of the soul with the body is not a matter of perception, but of inference. In order to establish this, an example in which the invariable concomitance is grasped is given; the other syllogistic steps are understood. This can be explained as follows: A movement is produced by a quality of something else., eg., a movement in the leaves of a tree is produced by the speed of air. Now the movement which is produced in the leaves of the tree, has as its non-inherent cause the conjunction of the leaves with air. But this conjunction is not a matter of perception, but of inference. Similarly, it is possible to show that the bodily action or the movement of the body has as its non-inherent cause the conjunction of the soul with the body.

It is necessary to point out the purpose of the various parts in the sentence giving the example. Movement (*kriyā*) is mentioned in order to avoid deviation. If movement is not mentioned one can take 'something' to mean the colour of jar which should then be produced by the quality which is existing in something else, eg. conjuction of the two halves of the pot. This obviously is not true, since the colour of the jar is produced by the colour of the two halves of the pot. The colour of the two halves of the pot and not the conjunction of the two halves of the pot, is the non-inherent cause of the colour of jar. Deviation occurs also if the qualification of 'existing in a different locus' (*vyadhikaraṇa*) is not given. When a substance which is heavy, falls, the non-inherent cause of the first fall is the heaviness existing in the substance, and not its conjunction with something else. Deviation occurs also if 'quality' is not introduced in the enunciation of invariable concomitance here. In the case of the fall of a mango from the tree, the fall subsists in the mango and not in the parts of the mango which are the cause of mango. The fall is not caused by the conjunction of the parts of the mango, i. e., the conjunction of the part of the mango is not the non–inherent cause of the fall of the mango though the fall itself is produced by the mango. Hence when it is added that the movement in question is produced by "quality", then there is no deviation, since the fall of the mango is not caused by the quality of conjunction inhering in the parts of the mango.

Now a counter-thesis is given, trying to disprove the invariable concomitance of conjunction of soul with bodily action. Conjunction of the soul cannot be the cause of bodily action; therefore the soul is not the cause of bodily action and hence soul is not the cause of jar either. The invariable concomitance that is the basis of this inference is as follows: Every movement has as non-ihherent cause that which inheres in a tangible object, as for example the movement of the leaves of a tree has as non-inherent cause the conjunction of leaves with air. In the present case the non-inherent cause of bodily movement is said to be the conjunction of the soul with the body; but this conjunction inheres also in the soul which is not tangible (*mūrta*). Therefore bodily-action cannot be caused by the conjunction of the soul. The answer to this counter-thesis is that such an invariable concomitance which is the basis of the counter-thesis cannot be admitted. If by the word *kriyā* is meant everything that is produced, there is deviation with reference to knowledge etc. Here the effect is knowledge of human souls which has as non-inherent cause the conjunction of soul with the mind; but the soul here is not *mūrta*. Therefore, there is deviation and so the invariable concomitance of the counter-inference is not correct. If by the word *kriyā* is meant just movement, then the invariable concomitance has no supporting argument. It is the general principle that the substratum of conjunction which is the non-inherent cause produces the respective effect, i.e. there is supporting reason in the case of the reason (i.e. *kriyātva*). It is our experience that 'that which is the substratum of the non-inherent cause of a thing is the cause of the thing in question. For example the conjunction of the two halves of the pot is the non-inherent cause of the pot. This conjunction inheres also in the two halves of the pot which actually are also the causes of the pot. Here both Jayadeva and Rucidatta add that there is no need of adding 'non-inherent' in the formulation of the reason, viz, the substratum of the conjunction which is the non-inherent cause; it is enough to state: Substratum of conjunction which is the cause. The substratum of the conjunction of the stick, namely, the stick is also the cause of the pot. The word 'non-inherent' is added however in the text because the conjunction of the soul with the body, is actually the non-inherent cause of bodily action.

It was objected that in the example there is the absence of *sādhya*. Now an answer is given to this in another way: Having-an-agent does not mean as was mentioned, while being-produced-by-direct-knowledge-desire-to-do-and-effort, being-produced by the substratum of these; only when having-an-agent means this, do knowledge and so on as well as their substratum become agents. But it is not necessary to take this as the meaning of having-an-agent; it is enough to take it as meaning the inherence of effort that is conducive to produce the effect. Thus the potter also is the agent in the sense explained, namely in him inheres the effort and so on which are conducive to the production of the pot. Hence the objection that the example has no *sādhya* is not valid. God is also not established as the cause of earth etc. but he is established as the substratum of knowledge and so on which are cause of earth etc. According to this opinion, the invariable concomitance that was expressed earlier in order to establish the existence of God, namely, that movement which is produced by a quality existing in something different has as non-inherent cause the conjunction with that something, need not be resorted to in order to establish the existence of God.

Now an objection may be raised against this position: It is the accepted principle in grammar to say that the agent, instrument etc. are causes of the action[1]. Therefore the substratum of knowledge etc. are also causes. This objection is answered by pointing out that when something that is qualified is asserted or denied, when the assertion or denial cannot be applied to the qualificand, they are applied to the qualification: e.g., when it is said that the one who has riches is dead, if the person who is said to be dead, is still alive, the assertion applies only to the riches and means only that he lost his riches.[2] Similarly in the present case when, because of the difficulties already mentioned, the one who has knowledge etc. cannot be considered the cause, it follows that knowledge etc. are to be considered the causes. Therefore according to this school the *sādhya* in the inference establishing the existence of God would be being-produced-by-knowledge etc. and not being-produced-by–someone-having-knowledge etc. And having-an-agent, means 'being-the-substratum-of-such-knowledge-etc.' and not 'while-being-the-substratum-of-knowledge-etc.-being-cause'. By the particle *tu,* however, it is implied that the theory mentioned is not to be accepted, because there is no difficulty in attributing the causality of action (*kriyā*) to the one who has effort (*kṛti*) and not to the effort itself. Besides it has been shown that the agent has causality.

(d) Now it is doubted in another way that there is the absence of *sādhya* in the example. Effort (*kṛti*) is the cause of jar and so on; desire to do is the cause of effort and the cause of desire to do is the knowledge that the thing in question is feasible and desirable. This knowledge can only be inference and not direct perception since the object of desire to do (*cikīrṣā*) has not yet come into existence and hence no contact of the senses is possible with it. Therefore jar etc. are not produced by the agent not merely by direct perception, but also by inference. Hence the *sādhya* of the example is defective, i.e. being-produced-by-perception which is an integral part of the *sādhya* does not occur in the *sādhya* of the example and so there is the fault of absence of *sādhya*.

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[1] cf. *karotīti kārakam*, *Mahābhāṣya*, 1.4. sutra, 23.

[2] The general principle relevant here is the following: *saviśeṣaṇe hi vidhiniṣedhau sati viśesye anvyabādhe viśeṣaṇamupasaṃkrārmate.*

This objection is met in the following way: Effort indeed has as its object something that has not yet come into existence; but such an effort takes place only when there is the perception of that which already exists, i.e. the material cause of the thing to be produced. The effect is simply not produced by the inference, that it is possible and it is desirable to produce the thing in question. Hence even if there is inferential knowledge that a particular arrangement of clay (i.e. conjunction of clay which is the non-inherent cause of pot) is both possible and desirable, no pot can be made without the perception of the clay from which the pot is made. Thus by negative concomitance, it is established that the perception of the material cause of jar and so on is necessary for the production of the pot. Besides, it is not always necessary that the knowledge that something is possible and desirable be in the form of inference; it can be in the form of verbal cognition as is the case with sacrifice: One knows that a particular sacrifice is both possible and desirable from the injunction of Veda-s. But even here the Mīmāṃsaka-s also must agree that even if one knows by means of verbal cognition from the Veda-s that sacrifices are possible and desirable, no sacrifice can be performed without the direct perception of clarified butter and so on.[1] Therefore it does not follow either that even if there is the knowledge that something is possible and desirable, the knowledge of the material cause is superfluous and not a cause. As for example even if we have the knowledge that a dyad is possible and desirable, we do not have any action to produce it since we do not have any direct perception of atoms which are the material cause of dyads.

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[1] It is generally accepted that even after verbal cognition that a sacrifice is possible, desirable and is not associated with serious inconvenience, still action does not follow; action follows only after knowing that sacrifice is possible, desirable and is not associated with serious inconvenience for me here and now. Such a knowledge is in the form of inference, cf. *vidhijanyajñāna-janya*.

Now another difficulty is raised: There is no direct perception of the material cause of sound and the (act of) blowing air, namely ether and air respectively. However, these effects are produced through our effort. Therefore it follows that it is not always necessary to have the direct perception of the material cause in order to produce an effect. The answer to this objection is as follows: As pointed out earlier we are not agents of sound and of the noise from blowing, but God; hence it is not necessary for us to have the direct perception of their material cause, namely ether and air respectively. It is sufficient for us to have the knowledge of the musical instruments by which sound is produced; or of lips and so on in the case of blowing; we have such knowledge and so there is no deviation.

Now it is pointed out that at least with regard to the effect of movement in the mind there is no perception of the material cause, namely, mind. In order to have perception through the eyes and so on, it is necessary to have the conjunction of the mind with the respective sense-organs. In order to have such a conjunction of mind, there must be movement of mind. But we do do not have perception of the mind which is the material cause of this movement. Hence, there is deviation. The answer to this is that in order to have movement of mind, we do not need the perception of mind. But there must be movement in the mind in order to bring about its conjunction with the senses. And in order to produce this movement in the mind, the mind should be in conjunction with the vein that carries it; for this conjunction there must be movement in the vein. And for this we must have perceptual knowledge of the vein, and such a knowledge we have. Therefore there is no deviation. However, there are some who hold that we have no perception of the vein that carries the mind. An answer is given to them. When we drink water and so on because of long experience (perhaps even in previous births) we have tactual perception of the veins which are involved in the drinking of water and so on. Thus in the formulation of *sādhya*, knowledge of material cause, means only knowledge of the object of action; it is not necessary to take it in the sense of knowledge of inherent cause. And when we understand material cause, in this sense there is no absence of *sādhya* in example.

(e) Now another objection is raised: If it is held that a jar and so on are produced by means of the inferential knowledge that it is possible and desirable to make it, then it is clear that they are brought about by means also of inference just as by perception of their respective material causes. Such an inference is produced by means of the reason (of the inference) just like the inference of human souls. In that case, God will have body also in order to have the knowledge of reason and so on. This is against the tenets of Nyāya system. In order to avoid this difficulty, it is suggested that the inference so postulated in God is eternal, just like his perception. And an argument to show that inference in God is eternal is also adduced: According to Nyāya system the flow of creation and destruction is without beginning. Therefore every dyad is preceded by another dyad in this creation itself or in the previous creation. And before the production of all these dyads such inference also is necessary; in this case, if the inference of God is not eternal, the causal complex will be far too many, for each instance of production of things would need its inferential knowledge and so on. Hence because of the difficulty of too many assumptions, it is concluded that the inference in God is eternal. This is the objection. The answer is as follows: It would be contradictory to the nature of God to hold that he has inference. The inference that is necessary in making the pot is that this pot will bring about happiness or the absence of sorrow. God, in the Nyāya system, has no happiness because he has no merit, nor has he any sorrow because he has no de-merit. Hence he cannot have any inference showing that something is conducive to his happiness or absence of sorrow. Therefore to infer that if God creates the world through the inference that the world will bring him happiness or absence of sorrow, can only be erroneous and anyone with erroneous cognition cannot be God. But it could further be objected that even if the world is not produced through the inferential knowledge that it brings happiness or absence of sorrow, it is nevertheless produced by the inference that it fulfils God's desire. This also cannot be admitted since the knowledge that something fulfils one's desire need not be inferential; it could be just perception or verbal cognition. Hence we need not conclude that there is inference in God for this purpose. Therefore there is no inference in God.

(f) Now the objection turns around the possibility that in God there could be hatred or dislike which is the opposite of desire, an integral part of the *sādhya.* Such a possibility of hatred is explained in the following way: Desire is not always the cause of effort; one can have effort because of hatred as for example the actions which lead to the killing of a snake; we know also that certain things are made out of hatred; in fact all things are at sometime or other, for some one or other, means to happiness or sorrow. Hence things are brought about by desire or hatred; hence there is no contradiction in saying that the world is brought about by means of hatred. In that case, it has to be admitted that God has hatred and one who has hatred will have transmigration; then God also will have transmigration which means God will be just a human soul and so the earth etc, would be produced by human souls; therefore the reason in the inference establishing the existence of God will have the fault of deviation.

Answer to this objection is as follows: Hatred and desire are not causes in the same way: Desire occurs with regard to all effects; hate is not so. It may be present with regard to some and absent with regard to others. Since snakes and so on are causes of death, they are objects of hatred; but this hatred is not the cause of our action for the killing of snakes, since there is no action without a purpose. And this purpose in the present case is twofold: By killing snakes one destroys something that gives rise to sorrow; and by means of this, sorrow from this thing also does not arise. Therefore there can be desire whose object is the destruction of the means of sorrow; and this desire is the cause of action. Thus hatred is the cause of the action only indirectly;

i. e. it is not a real cause, but is superfluous (*ānyāthāsiddha*). Therefore God also does not act out of hatred, but by desire or will. From this it does not follow that if desire is invariably antecedent to effort, then it is enough to admit desire but not also hatred. The question that arises then is how to establish the existence of hatred? We know that there is hatred because of our uncontradicted experience that we hate our enemies. This experience also shows that hatred is not a negative entity i.e. merely the absence of desire but something positive (*bhāva*) since our experience is of a positive thing

(g) It has now been established that the direct knowledge of the material cause and desire are integral parts of the *sādhya.* There is no need of a discussion whether effort (*kṛti*) should be an integral element of *sādhyu* since it is accepted to be so, both in the old and modern schools of Nyāya. Now the objection is that such a *sādhya* qualified in this way is contradicted in the subject. God who is to be established is not an object of perception by means of the external senses. And so from the absence of the perception of God one can conclude to the absence of God; in tachnical language, where there is the absence of the perception of the counterpositive, there is the absence of the counterpositive itself. This is the objection; the answer to this is that if it were so, it would be impossible to establish the existence of anything that is beyond the perception of the senses. But it is accepted by both parties that there are such entities as ether etc. which are not objects of perception. But then it may be objected that it is not the mere absence of the perception of the counterpositive that establishes the absence of the counterpositive, but the non-perception of something which is the proper object of perception. And being a proper object of perception means that if all the causes of perception are present, the perception of the object should take place. And such a perception does not take place with regard to God. Therefore God who is the object of such a perception also does not exist. The answer to this objection is that such a proper object of perception is not present here, for it is admitted by all that God who is to be established by the Naiyāyika is not a proper object of such a perception.

It may further be objected that if this is the case then one can as well say that it is because horns of a hare are not proper object of peception that one does not perceive them and not because they do not actually exist. Hence it will come about that horns of a hare also exist. This obviously cannot be accepted. Therefore it must be admitted that the horns of a hare do not exist, because they are not perceived or in general what is not perceived does not exist. Similarly God also who is not perceived, does not exist. The answer to this also, has already been pointed out: If one accepts that what is not perceived does not exist, it is not possible to establish anything that is beyond the senses. And it is accepted by all that there are such things as atoms and ether which are not directy perceived. Nor can it be said that the existence of an agent who is not a proper object of perception can simply be denied, just as the horns of a hare are denied because they cannot be perceived. The reason is that such objects as the souls of other persons, though not perceptible, are inferred by means of bodily action. Here therefore the inference of the souls of other persons is stronger and hence the absence of such souls is denied. In the same way, though God is not directly perceived, his existence is inferred. It can further be objected: The inference purporting to establish the existence of God does not have any supporting reason just as the inference, hare has horns because it is an animal, has no supporting reason. This objection too is false because it is not a true analogical answer to assert that from being an animal you can conclude to having horns. And even if there is false analogical inference with a reason having neither invariable concomitance nor existence in the subject, there is no harm. Further, in the present case, the reason is being-an-animal and this reason has no invariable concomitance of having-horns.

But then another difficulty could be raised: In the example of jar and so on the reason of 'being-an-effect' is cognized to have the invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent'. Having accepted this invariable concomitance, we infer the existence of an invisible agent in the earth etc. by means of the same reason. In the same way, having cognized in cow and so on the invariable concomitance of 'having-horns' for the reason of 'being-an-animal', one may infer by means of the same reason invisible horns in a hare. Hence it is not right to answer the previous objection pointing out that the reason in the analogical answer has no supporting reason. The answer to this objection is that here there is the fault of proving something other than what is so be proved. The reason in the inference establishing the existence of God is 'being-an-effect'. With this reason one establishes the existence of an agent. When this is the point of discussion, it is not proper to set out to establish the existence of horns by means of the reason of being-an-animal. This is to be done when the discussion is about establishing horns. Besides, the reason of being-an-animal does not have the invariable concomitance of having-horns, for there is no contradiction in a sure negative instance: There can be 'being-animal', even where there is the absence of 'having-horns' as in the case of a horse. Further, the generic attribute of 'horn-ness' is cognized by the knowledge of the particular conjunction of the parts of the horns. The generic attributes of jar-ness and so on which are pervaded by earth-ness, are cognized by means of knowledge of the particular conjunction of parts which is the non-inherent cause of the thing in which jar-ness and so on inhere. It is by means of such knowledge of the particular conjunction of the parts that it is possible to cognize horn-ness in cows and so on. Such a particular conjunction of parts is always visible and therefore it is not proper even to doubt whether there is a particular conjuntion of parts which is invisible. While cognizing a hare by means of the knowledge of the particular conjunction of its parts one also cognizes that this particular conjunction of parts does not give rise to the knowledge of horn-ness, but actually gives rise to the knowledge of the absence of horn-ness. Therefore being-an-animal does not have the invariable concomitance of having-horns. Hence there is no similarity for the reasons 'being-an-animal' and 'being-an-effect' and so it is impossible to hold that there is no invariable concomitance of having-an-agent in the reason of being-an-effect.

(h) In order to establish the *sādhya* of being-produced-by-an agent by the reason of being-an-effect, first of all, it is to be established that an agent is the cause of every effect. But inorder to establish this. it is necessary to show that an effort (*kṛti*), which is the characteristic of an agent, is the cause of every effect. Now the objection is that such a causal connection of effort and effect cannot be demonstrated, because it is not possible to show the positive and negative concomitance of effort in 'being-an-effect'. To explain: The effort of God which is to be established is the pervader; here it means that this effort has as object everything and is present at all times. Therefore it is not possible to cognize the absence of the effort of God. It is even not established that the effort of God is present always and everywhere since his effort itself is not yet established. But the absence whose counterpositive is limited by fire-ness, which is necessary to cognize the invariable concomitance of fire in smoke exists and it is cognized; and therefore there can be valid inference only in such instances and not in the previous case.

But it may be objected that if positive and negative concomitances are the cause of the cognition of invariable concomitance, there are difficulties: e.g. it will not be possible to establish ether and soul which are the inherent causes of sound and knowledge respectively, because, in order to establish the concomitance, wherever there is an effect, there is being-produced-by-an-inherent-cause, one should also know the absence of all the respective inherent causes. This is not possible, since soul and ether are ever-present realities. Hence it is also not possible to establish the existence of ether and soul; nor is it possible to establish the invariable concomitance of being-produced-by-an-inherent-cause, in 'being-an-effect'. The answer to this objection lies in distinguishing the causality of the action of God with reference to all effects and the causality of ether and soul with reference to sound and knowledge respectively. The former is efficient and the latter is inherent. In order to cognize efficient cause, the knowledge of relational absence(*saṃsargbāhva*) is necessary, but in order to cognize inherent cause the knowledge of mutual absence only is necessary. That which is not the inherent cause of something, in that there is not that effect; this is the form of negative concomitance in establishing an inherent cause. And here the concept of mutual absence is employed and not that of relational absence. By means of this kind of negative concomitance, it is possible to establish the existence of both ether and soul. However, there are dfficulties in establishing the causality of inherent cause in this way. First of all there is no need of cognizing the qualified entity of inherent causality, in a substance; it is enough to cognize the subjunct (*anuyogin*) of inherence and causality. By these cognitions, the knowledge of inherent causality arises, just as when there is the causal complex of the cognition of blue and the causal complex of the cognition of that which is qualified by jar-ness, there arises the cognition of blue jar without any further need of a causal complex for the cognition of 'blue jar'. Besides there is another fault. The positive concomitance is in the following way: That which (e.g. jar) is the subjunct of inherence of something (jarness), in that (jar) something else (jarness) exists; such an invariable concomitance implies only the relation of subsistence (*āśrayatva*), and not of causality, i.e. it does not prove that jar is the cause of jarness, but only its substratum[1]. Because of these difficulties another way of establishing ether and soul is pointed out; the invariable concomitance is in the following form: Whatever is a positive effect must inhere in something. Since sound and knowledge are positive effects, they also must inhere in something. Those things in which sound and knowledge inhere are respectively ether and soul.

So far objections against the main objection that there cannot be any invariable concomitance of effort for the reason of 'being-an-effect', have been answered. And so the main objection itself stands. It is to deny this main objection that the *na* is introduced here. And the answer to this main objection is as follows: We cognize the invariable concomitance of fire in smoke by means of positive concomitance that whenever there are individual instances of smoke, there are individual instances of fire and by the negative concomitance that whenever the absence of all these individual fires is cognized, absence of all smoke is also cognized. It is in this way that the invariable concomitance of fire is cognized in smoke and not by means of the positive and negative concomitance of fire and smoke in the mountain, because such positive and negative concomitance of fire on the mountain is not cognized, since it has yet to be inferred that there is fire in the mountain.

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[1] These explanations are based on Jayadeva's *Aloka* cf. TCI, p. 34 and Rucidatta's remarks on this section of TCI.

But then it may be objected that if the invariable concomitance is cognized in this way, it will imply actually that by the cognition of the positive and negative concomitance of two things, the invariable concomitance of two other things is cognized. This objection, however, cannot be admitted. It is true that by the positive and negative concomitance of two things, the invariable concomitance of two other things cannot be cognized. But when we cognize the positive and negative concomitance of two individual things, if we cognize in those particular things, also their respective generic attribute, we can cognize the invariable concomitance of all particulars that are qualified by the two respective attributes. To explain: We cognize the invariable concomitance of fire in the kitchen, in the smoke in the kitchen, by means of the positive and negative concomitance, i.e. when there is smoke in the kitchen, there is fire and when there is no fire, there is no smoke either. But when such cognition takes place we cognize fire as qualified by fire-ness and smoke as qualified by smoke-ness and therefore actually we cognize the invariable concomitance of all that which is qualified by fire-ness in all that which is qualified by smoke-ness, i.e. invariable concomitance of all instances of fire in all instances of smoke. This is the case when there is no contradiction. When there is contradiction, it is not possible to cognize the invariable concomitance between that which is qualified by the respective generic attributes. An example of this contradiction is the following: In order to have the visual perception of light, which has no manifest touch (*udbhūtasparśa*) we have to admit that manifest colour (*udbhūtarūpa*) is the cause of visual perception; in order to have the tactual perception of air which has no manifest colour we have to admit that manifest touch is the cause. Hence because of this we cannot accept that the cause of perception by external senses is either manifest colour or manifest touch.

When the invariable concomitance is thus cognized as existing between particulars as qualified by their generic attributes, the cognition has as object all the particulars in as much as they are all qualified by this generic attribute since Nyāya system admits the relation in the form of the universal. When this relation in the form of universal is not admitted as in the Mīmāṃsa-system the cognition of invariable concomitance does not cover all the individuals qualified by the generic attribute. But the Mīmāṃsaka-s also do not deny such an invariable concomitance in as much as in all the particulars having a particular attribute, the invariable concomitance of something else is cognized. As for instance, though all instances of particular smoke as qualified by smoke-ness are not cognized, still in all cases of smoke which is qualified by smoke-ness, the invariable concomitance of fire is cognized and so it is possible to infer from smoke in the mountain, fire in the mountain.

After having explained the example, the principle is applied to the case in question and it is shown that there is invariable concomitance of effort in 'being-an-effect'. Here the particular effort is for example the effort which produces jar. By the principle already explained, there is invariable concomitance not only of the particular effort and the particular jar produced by it, but also between effort (in general i. e. all efforts) and effect (in general i. e. all effects). If without accepting this general invariable concomitance, the particular invariable concomitance for the reason as existing in the subject only is accepted, then there would be no possibility of any inference at all. This is to be understood as referring to all inferences which are made without explicit desire (*siṣādhayisā*) to infer an object already known through other means of knowledge, because a valid means of knowledge is expected to give new knowledge; i. e. knowledge which has not been previously acquired by any other means of valid knowledge, and not knowledge which has been already acquired, as for example, fire which is known through perception as existing in a mountain could be afterwards inferred also, if one has a desire to do so. Now the point of the answer to the main objection is that no inference excepting the cases of inference out of desire to do so, would be possible if the invariable concomitance of all that which is characterized by a certain general attribute is not cognized in all that which is characterized by some other attribute. The reason is that the logical conclusion from the point of view of the opponent is that if the particular instance of *sādhya* as existing in the subject is not known already, it would be impossible to have the knowledge of positive and negative concomitance which is necessary for the cognition of invariable concomitance of that particular instance of *sādhya* and reason existing in the subject. This means to say that a particular instance of inferential knowledge should have already taken place, in order to have that inference. This is obviously false. The Buddhist opponent, the Naiyāyika points out, seems to admit only such a kind of invariable concomitance; and in this case, because it would be impossible to cognize the invariable concomitance before the knowledge of *sādhya*, every inference which takes place without the explicit desire to infer becomes impossible.

Once the true nature of invariable concomitance as existing between all that which is characterized by a particular attribute and all that which is characterized by some other particular attribute, is established, it follows that the buddhist objection that an invisible agent cannot be established, falls to the ground. The reason is that it is not necessary to have the knowledge of the positive and negative concomitance of the particular instance of *sādhya*, in the present case God, in order to have the cognition of the invariable concomitance of *sādhya* in general in the reason in general, in the present case 'being-an-effect' in general. One can establish this general invariable concomitance by means of one or more instances where the positive and negative concomitance of the *sādhya* can be cognized. And therefore the Buddhist objection contained in the *kārikā* quoted in the text[1] stands rejected automatically. The point of the objection raised in the *kārikā* is as follows: If, in order to establish true invariable concomitance of having-an-agent-in being-an-effect, i.e. according to the text: In order that being-an-effect may not exist in a sure negative instance, an invisible agent is supposed in such things as grass and so on, it is not possible to cognize the negative concomitance of the *sādhya* since it is invisible; but if in order to cognize negative concomitance, a visible agent is postulated, then, there would be deviation in such things as grass and so on since it is accepted by both parties that the grass and so on have no visible agent. This is the objection which has been rejected in the way indicated above by establishing the true nature of invisible concomitance and the means of cognizing it.

Now an objection is raised against the answer given: If the invariable concomitance is between all that is characterized by a particular attribute with all that is characterized by another particular attribute, and if therefore it is possible to establish a particular *sādhya* with a different quality as in the case of inferring an invisible agent by means of the reason of being-an-effect, then it would be possible, in the same way to infer invisible fire in the stomach. This is not possible, since invisible fire does not produce smoke; only visible fire does so; in our present instance we do not accept the causality in the form that effects have visible agents but only that effects have agents. Therefore when the knowledge that the earth and so on have an agent is not contradicted, (as in the present case, for here there is only doubt if the earth and so on have an agent and not the certainty that the earth and so on have no agent) there is no difficulty in inferring an invisible agent for them.

[1] Ratnakīrti mentions the same stanza in practically the same words (Ratanakīrti, op. cit, p. 45), but Jñānasrīmitra gives quite differently the last two lines. (Jñānasrimītra, op. cit. p. 285). It is therefore clear that Gaṅgeśa quotes this passage from Ratnakīrti who may have adapted it from his master in order to make it more appropriate to the context.

(i) The reason of being-an-effect is accepted as having both negative and positive concomitance, like the reason of smoke. If this is the case, knowledge, desire and effort–all the three—are the causes of the effect in question, Then only the *sādhya* will be 'being-produced-by-knowledge-desire-effort'. But when anyone of these three is absent, the effect will not be produced. Hence it is not necessary that there should be the absence of all the three in order that there be the absence of effect. Therefore there is a useless qualification in the *sādhya* and hence it would be enough that the *sādhya* be simply formulated as being-produced-by-knowledge, or being-produced-by-desire, or being-produced-by-action. The reason for this is the following: That which establishes a *sādhya* is the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader (*vyāpaka*) of the absence of *sādhya*. Thus smoke which is the counter-positive of the absence which is the pervader of the absence of fire, establishes fire. In the present case, 'absence of being-an-effect' would be the pervader of each of the absences whose counterpositive is knowledge, desire or action; and it is not the case that the absence of being-an-effect is the pervader of the absence whose counter-positive is knowledge, desire and action taken together. Therefore by means of the reason of being-an-effect which is the counter-positive of the absence of being-an-effect, one can establish only being-produced-by-knowledge, being-produced-by-desire or being-produced-by-action; and it is not possible to establish being-produced by all the three together.

The answer to this is as follows: The *sādhya* is indeed established by the counterpositive of the absence which pervades the absence of *sādhya*. It is also true that the absence of 'being-an-effect' can be governed by the absence of knowledge, absence of desire or absence of effort. However, precisely because of this there is no difficulty in the absence of being an effect, be governed by all the three absences together. In that case too, being-an-effect becomes the counterpositive of the absence which pervades the absence whose counter-positive is the present *sādhya* of being produced by knowledge, desire and effort. Therefore it is possible also to establish the *sādhya* of being-produced-by-knowledge-desire-and-action by the reason of 'being-an-effect'.

(j) When we cognize the invariable concomitance of *sādhya* with particular characteristics in a reason and with particular characteristics in an example, we infer such a *sādhya* with these particular characteristics in the subject. To explain: In the kitchen we cognize the invariable concomitance of fire with yellow colour and so on in smoke that rises without break straight from fire. From similar kind of smoke we infer similar kind of fire in the mountain. In the case of the inference of God, however, the inference is not in the same way: In a jar and so on the invariable concomitance of an agent having non-eternal knowledge, body and many actions is cognized. Therefore, in earth and so on also, the invariable concomitance of a similar agent having these characteristics of non-eternal knowledge, body and many actions can only be inferred. But the Naiyāyika asserts that there is no agent of such characteristics for earth and so on but an agent with eternal knowledge and so on. Therefore the reason has the fault of opposition (*virodha*), i.e. in the case of reason in the earth, it does not co-exist with the *sādhya* having these characteristics of non-eternal knowledge and so on. Hence it is pointed out that there is this fault of opposition to the particular (*sādhya*) in the reason.

The answer to this is as follows: It is no fault to establish a *sādhya* having characteristics different from the characteristics of the *sādhya* in the example. If this were a fault, then no inference would be possible; in the example kitchen-fire is cognized; in the subject mountain-fire is established. These are two instances of *sādhya*, viz. fire with different characteristics of being in the kitchen and being in the mountain; but the reason is just smoke. If therefore by means of the reason different instances of *sādhya* with different characteristics as just explained cannot be established, then no inference would be possible. Therefore, this kind of opposition to the particular *sādhya* is no fault at all.

Now another argument is brought forward to show that the above fault is not present here. If the invariable concomitance were in the form: Wherever there is being-an-effect, there is being-produced-by-an-agent-having-non-eternal-non-omniscient-knowledge-and-having-a-body, it is evident that by means of such an invariable concomitance one cannot establish the existence of an agent who has eternal and omniscient knowledge and who is without a body. But the invariable concomitance is not in this form; it is only in the following form: Wherever there is 'being-an-effect', there is 'being-produced-by-an-agent'. And there is no harm if such an agent is also omniscient, eternal, and without a body. There is certainly no difficulty, if in fact the agent of a particular pot be an old potter, even though the invariable concomitance was cognized in the example of another pot whose agent was a young potter. And in our present case, it cannot be said that because in a jar and so on, the invariable concomitance of an agent who is not omniscient and not eternal is cognized, an agent with such characteristics only is inferred in the earth and so on. The reason is that both parties accept that the earth and so on have the reason of 'being-an-effect' and that they do not have an agent having a body and non-eternal knowledge and so on. The opponent does not accept that the earth and so on have an agent and therefore he cannot accept that the earth and so on have an agent with non-eternal knowledge and so on. The Naiyāyika also does not accept that the earth and so on have an agent having a body and non-eternal knowledge and so on; but an agent without a body and having eternal knowledge and so on.

Now another objection to show that there is the fault of the contradiction of the particular *sādhya*, is raised: In our experience the invariable concomitance of an agent having non-eternal knowledge is seen in the reason of 'being-an-effect'. Therefore in an inference based on such an invariable concomitance, the *sādhya* can only be being-produced-by-someone-having-non-eternal-knowledge-and-so-on and not being-produced-by-someone-having-eternal-knowledge-and-so-on. Otherwise we cannot say that from smoke we can infer only fire and not some other substances also. On the other hand, the reason in the subject establishes the *sādhya* as actually existing in the subject and not in any other subject. Hence the reason of 'being-an-effect' that is to be found in the earth and so on actually establishes (according to the Naiyāyika) an agent having eternal knowledge and so on. Therefore there is contradiction between that which is to be inferred by the invariable concomitance and that which is to be inferred by the force of the relation of the reason to the subject. This is the objection.

Now an answer is given to this objection. In the present case that which is inferred by means of the invariable concomitance is not an agent having non-eternal knowledge and so on, since the invariable concomitance of an agent with non-eternal knowledge is not grasped in the reason of 'being-an-effect; the invariable concomitance only of an agent with knowledge and so on is cognized in the reason of 'being-an-effect'. The reason is that the positive and negative concomitance establish only that an effect is produced by an agent, and not necessarily by an agent having non-eternal knowledge and so on. Here of course a question may arise naturally: Is not the invariable concomitance of an agent having non-eternal knowledge congnized in the reason of 'being-an-effect'? Pragalbha answers that this is not possible since there would be logical complexity (*gaurava*) in cognizing invariable concomitance in this form and so invariable concomitance of an agent only with knowledge and so on (dropping the qualification of non-eternal) is cognized. Therefore the *sādhya* in the present case is only a particular instance of the pervader, viz. being-produced-by-an-agent-having-knowledge. And in this way there is no fault of the contradiction of the particular *sādhya.*

But it may then be urged that by means of the invariable concomitance of being-produced-by-an-agent-having-knowledge-and-so-on, we can establish also being-produced-by-an-agent-having-non-eternal-knowledge-and-so-on. And in this case also there is contradiction of the particular. This objection could have been raised, if invariable concomitance alone were the cause of inference. But in fact, neither invariable concomitance alone nor the relation alone of the reason to the subject can cause inference; but both of them together produce inference. If it were not so one of them would be useless in bringing about an inference; this however, is not admitted by any of the parties. Therefore when the invariable concomitance and the relation of the reason to the subject exist separately, we cannot establish the particular *sādhya* in question and there cannot be any contradiction as pointed out above. When they are together, and co-operate with one another in order to effect the inference, the desired *sādhya* will be established and there will be no contradiction. Thus it comes about that when the *sādhya* of an agent with eternal knowledge and so on is not established there is obviously no contradiction; and if it is established also, there is no contradiction.

But then, in what does the fault of contradiction of the particular consist? The answer is that such a fault occurs when the qualification of the reason contradicts the qualification of *sādhya,* in such a way that the things which are qualified viz. the reason and the *sādhya* cannot exist together. As for example if one infers, this smoke is not fragrant because it is caused by fire rising from sandal wood, there is contradiction. Here the qualification of 'not fragrant' which qalifies smoke contradicts the qualification of 'rising from sandal wood' which qualifies fire. Hence smoke and fire as qualified by these qualifications cannot have co-existence (*sāmānādhikaṇya*). Therefore in this case, there is the fault of the contradiction of the particular.

(k) Now, another objection similar to the fault of the contradiction of the particular is raised in another way. 'Being-knowledge' and 'being-eternal' are contradictory; similarly 'being-an-agent' and 'having-no-body' are contradictory. In atoms and so on, there is being-eternal, but there is no being-knowledge. In the knowledge of human souls, there is indeed 'being-knowledge' but not 'being-eternal'. Neither God nor his knowledge is already established and so all instances of knowledge which are established are non-eternal. Therefore it could be said that 'being-knowledge' and 'being-eternal' do not co-exist in one thing, namely in knowledge. The same could be said about 'being-desire' and 'being-eternal'; 'being-effort' and 'being eternal'.

In the same way as long as God is not established, 'being-a-maker' can only be attributed to human souls. Being-an-agent is here understood as inherence of knowledge, desire and action.

All the knowlege, desire and action of human souls are non-eternal; and their causes are the bodies of the human beings. Therefore in our experience 'being-an-agent' implies always 'having-a-body'. Hence there is contradiction in 'being-an-agent' and 'having-no-body'. Therefore 'being-an-agent' and 'having-no-body' do not co-exist in the same thing, namely in the human soul. Therefore the conclusion is that it is not possible to establish an eternal knowledge and an agent in whom this knowledge inheres. This is the objection.

The answer to this is the following: It is not yet established that there is something in which these contradictory qualities exist. If only such an object is established can one point out that there are contradictory qualities in such an object. But this is not the case. Indeed 'being-an-agent' and 'having-body' are not considered contradictory in a human being. Similarly it is clear that 'being-knowledge' and 'being-non-eternal' have co-existence (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) in the knowledge of man. In a similar way, only when 'being-an-agent' and 'having-no-body', 'being-knowledge' and 'being-eternal' are established in God, is one in a position to understand that these qualities can have co-existence. But such a God is not established prior to the inference proving the existence of God. Therefore any contradiction that may be present before the existence of God is proved, does not matter, for the contradictions that may arise between 'being-eternal' and 'being-knowledge' in human knowledge and 'being-an-agent' and 'having-no-body' in human agency (*kartṛtva*) cannot prevent the inference of the eternal knowledge of God as well as his agency. Further, in support of the argument, an example which is acceptable to both parties, is given. The point of the example is that although 'being-a-part' and 'being-eternal' are contradictory in other things, still an atom is established both as a part and as eternal and both parties have no objection to this. In the same way contradictions which are discussed in the previous paragraphs and which arise before the existence of God is established are not to be taken seriously.

It was just established that God could be an agent without having a body and that his knowledge is eternal. Hence it follows that there is no contradiction between 'being-an-agent' and 'having-no-body', and between 'being-eternal' and 'being-knowledge'. However, how can it be asserted that there is no contradiction between 'being-an-agent' and 'having-no-body' so long as God is not established? Similarly, how can it be held that there is no contradiction between 'being-knowledge' and 'being-eternal' as long as the knowledge of God is not established? And God and his knowledge are not the objects of certain knowledge but only of supposition (*tarka*) and a *tarka* is not a valid means of knowledge. For these reasons, it is not proper to assert that there is no contradiction between 'being-knowledge' and 'being-eternal' and so on. The answer to this is the following: *tarka* is a particular kind of knowledge which is called a supposition in the following form. Even when one knows that there is no fire in the lake, one can desire to have a knowledge in the following form: Let one have a knowledge that the lake without fire, has fire; or simply, lake has fire. In order to have this kind of knowledge, one should have already knowledge of the lake, of fire and so on. Therefore, if there is a *tarka* whose object is God, then he should already be the object of our knowledge by another means of knowledge since *tarka* is not a means of knowledge. Thus if God is already known by a means of knowledge, then it can also be established that there is no contradiction between 'being-knowledge' and 'being-eternal' and so on.

(1)(i) Now the same fault of the contradiction between 'being-an-agent' and 'having-no-body', between 'being-knowledge' and 'being-eternal' is doubted in another way. Whatever can be accomplished through effort (*kṛti*) can be brought about only by bodily action. Therefore even when God wants to create something, there should be bodily action; when there is no body there is no bodily action either which is indispensable for being an agent. Therefore there is contradiction between 'being-an-agent' and 'having-no-body'. Similarly, knowledge can produce something only through effort (*kṛti*) and this effort brings about something only through bodily action. Therefore in order to bring about an effect there should be desire and effort and body and in order to have desire and effort, there should also be knowledge. Such is the process according to our experience and therefore knowledge, desire and effort can produce things only through bodily action. All this is clear in the example of a jar: Knowledge (of the material cause and so on) desire and effort of the potter, produce the pot through his bodily action and without it, it is quite impossible to produce the jar.

But it may be argued that the effort (*kṛti*) is directly the cause of the pot, just as a father and the son work together to produce a pot doing different things necessary to produce it; but neither the father is the cause of the pot through the son, nor the son through the father; both are directly the cause of the pot. In the same way the effort of God and the bodily action are directly the causes of the world and one does not depend on the other. This cannot be admitted; for in that case, it would be possible to say that like the potter who is actively engaged in making the pot, anyone who is sitting near him without doing anything but has mental effort (*kṛti*) whose object is the pot, would also be considered the maker of the pot. This is just impossible, since such a person is not considered in our experience as making the pot. Therefore, if God is to be the agent of the world, he has to be so through bodily action, and since the movement of the hand and so on are not to be found in anyone having no body, it is to be concluded that earth and so on have no agent at all.

But if it is argued that an agent with bodily action is actually inferred by means of the inference meant to prove the existence of God, then by this inference only a human soul need be established. It is true that every human being has the experience that he is not the agent of the earth and so on. But this applies only to oneself; this therefore does not prevent one from inferring that another person is the agent of the earth and so on. But it may be pointed out against this position that a human soul cannot be the agent of the earth and so on, since the human souls are agents only through bodily action, and since no bodily action is seen with reference to the earth. In that case it would follow that everything that is produced will be produced only through bodily action. Therefore the reason of 'being-an-effect' has the additional condition of 'being-produced-by-the-action-of-body', since 'being-produced-by-body' is the pervader of the *sādhya* of 'being-produced-by-an-agent' and since it is not the pervader of the reason of 'being-produced', for with reference to the earth and so on, there is no 'being-produced-by-the-action-of-body. A further objection is the following: Just as effort brings about things through bodily action, so also desire causes them through effort and knowledge through desire. The operation in the production of an effect has to be something produced; therefore desire and effort have to be something produced. But according to the Naiyāyika, in God desire and effort are also eternal. Therefore they cannot be causes either, because they are not produced. Hence the reason of being-an-effect has the fault of deviation with reference to the earth and so on.

The answer to these objections is now given: The positive and negative concomitance between particular causes and effects could be applied to all of them, when there is no contradiction. Therefore even if the causality between certain particulars requires bodily operation, it does not follow that the causality of all instances of particulars requires bodily operation; for it is agreed by both parties that everything produced is not produced through bodily operation, because it is accepted by both parties that such objects as the earth, the bodily action itself, and so on, do not come into existence through another operation i. e. bodily action. And at least for bodily action, it is admitted by both parties that effort (*kṛti*) produces it without another bodily action coming in between. As already pointed out, it could be asserted that the causality existing between particulars, could be accepted as existing between all the instances of these particulars. When, however, it is established that a particular thing is the cause of some other thing, it does not follow that such a causal relation is opposed to the causal relation between all instances of these particulars. There is no difficulty at all if a particular as particular is the cause of a particular thing and that such particulars in as far as they have the universal of the same class is cause of all instances of the particular.

Now an objection is made based on the above principle of the *sidhāntin* himself. In the particular instance, it is shown that effort (*kṛti*) produces things through the operation of bodily action; therefore bodily action should be present in all instances of this causality. Hence it is not correct to say that the earth and so on are produced without bodily action. The answer to this is already given. It is not established that all effects except bodily action, are produced through bodily action, since there is deviation in the case of earth and so on.

Then it may be objected that a person whose limbs are quite stiff because of rhumatism and therefore who is incapable of bodily action could produce the jar just by the force of his mental effort since bodily action is not an indispensable condition of producing the pot and so on according to the invariable concomitance proposed. The answer to this is that a particular effect of a jar needs bodily action in order that it may be produced; but from this it does not follow, as already pointed out, that all effects are produced through bodily operation. This will become clearer later when it is established that being-produced-by-a-body is not an additional condition of the reason of being-an-effect.

Now an answer is given to the objection earlier raised: Why not a human soul with bodily operation be inferred as the cause of the-world? The answer is obvious: It is contradicted in our experience that a human soul through bodily action is the cause of the world; in other words, a human soul with bodily action producing something, is fit to be perceived and it is not perceived; hence there is the fault of the contradiction of non-perception of something that is fit to be perceived (*yogyānupalambhabādha*). But if one infers a soul without bodily action as the cause of the world, then this is acceptable, for such a soul indeed is God.

(ii) Now an objection that is occasioned by this answer is raised. The point of the objection is as follows: If a cause is defined only as that which invariably exists prior to the effect, then even those objects which have been existing prior to the effect, but which have ceased to exist at a time immediately preceding the effect could also be considered a cause. This cannot be admitted since it is not possible that a thing that has ceased to exist for a long time be considered a cause of the thing produced afterwards. Therefore in the definition of the cause, it is necessary to add also that it is perceived as existing together with the effect. Hence a cause is that which invariably exists prior to the effect but which also governs co-existence with the effect. Such a definition of the cause applies to the known causes, namely, inherent and non-inherent causes. The two halves of the pot and their conjunction exist at the moment of the production of the pot and also afterwards as long as the pot exists. Therefore it is necessary that an instrumental cause is also defined in this way. If the instrumental cause is also not thus defined the following difficulty arises. A particular kind of jewel is considered to be a hindrance to the burning of fire. But before the jewel is placed at the location of fire, there was the absence of the jewel in question. Hence if the instrumental cause (here the absence of the hindrance) need not be perceived together with the effect in order that it be a cause, then it could be that since the absence of the jewel was there, before it was brought there, this previous absence could be considered the cause of burning. This obviously cannot be admitted. But when it is admitted that the perception of the cause together with the effect is necessary in order that something be cause, then, since the previous absence of the jewel is not perceived together with the effect of burning, it cannot be considered a cause; but the cause can be only the absence of the jewel existing at the time of burning. Therefore a cause is to be defined as that which invariably exists prior to the effect and also seen together with the effect. Therefore the mental effort is also to be perceived together with the effect. But this is just impossible because effort (*kṛti*) is mental and it cannot be an object of perception, and also because mental efforts last only for two moments. Therefore a mental effort can be perceived only through its bodily operation, i.e. if the bodily operation produced by the mental action is perceived together with the effect, then the mental effort can also be considered a cause. Therefore all the efforts of human souls are causes through bodily action and the mental effort of God cannot be considered cause since no bodily action is caused by it, and it is not perceived together with an effect.

Such a definition of causality also stands rejected by the previous answer. It has been shown that not all efforts are causes through bodily operation since there is contradiction with reference to the earth and so on. These are accepted to be effects by both parties, but a bodily operation is not cognized there. It is admitted that the example of inherent and non-inherent causes and the absence of hindrance are causes only when they are perceived together with the effect; from this, it does not follow that all types of causes should be so observed. It is not the case, as is evident, that sticks and so on should be observed together with the pot, the effect; they should just produce the conjunction of the parts of the pot, and then they need not be present any more. If it is insisted that all causes should be observed together with the effect, then it becomes just impossible to produce anything; for it is necessary that a particular thing be observed together with the effect in order that it be considered cause; but in order to produce a thing one has to make use of the cause before the actual production of the thing. Thus there can be no activity with regard to anything. Hence we cannot hold that in order that something be accepted as cause, it has to govern coexistence with the effect. It is enough that we have seen that certain kinds of things produce certain kinds of effects and things of the same kind produce effects of the same kind. This is called causality in potency (*svarūpayogatā*). Therefore a cause is something which invariably exists prior to the effect; but it is not necessarily perceived together with the effect. Hence it is concluded that instrumental causes need not be perceived together with the effect. If one insists that the instrumental causes, in order that they be causes, should be perceived together with the effects, then there would be the fault of too many assumptions.

And besides, it would be impossible that a prior absence produces its counter-positive, if it is insisted upon, that a cause must be perceived together with its effect. The reasoning involved here is as follows: An absence and its counter-positive cannot exist together in the same place and time. It is held in the Nyāya system that prior absence and destruction exist in the inherent cause. In the same way the counter-positive of prior absence, e.g. jar also is said to exist in the inherent cause. If therefore the effect and its prior absence were to exist in the inherent cause at the same time it would follow that they are not opposed to each other. Therefore it should be admitted that prior absence exists only till the effect begins to exist. However, it is accepted that prior absence is the cause of the effect; but if as cause, it has to be perceived together with the effect it cannot be considered cause, for it is obvious from what has been said that prior absence cannot be so perceived together with the effect.

But then it may be objected that prior absence need not be considered a cause. This opinion, however, cannot be admitted for the following reason: Let us suppose that the causal complex of a jar is at hand and so jar has come into existence. Now even after the jar has come into existence, there are the two halves of the pot and also their conjunction i.e. the causes of the jar. In that case, why should not the same jar again come into existence? It does not again come into existence because some cause in the totality of the causal complex is lacking. And this cause which is absent is the prior absence. But here the question may arise what is it that destroys prior absence? According to some, it is the causal complex of the jar. The causal complex of the jar produces the jar and destroys the prior absence at the same time. If this theory is accepted, it follows naturally that a jar and its prior absence cannot exist together. It would also follow that since prior absence exists invariably before the jar, it is the cause of the jar and because prior absence ceases to exist once the jar is produced, the jar cannot come into existence again. However those who do not admit prior absence point out that the same effect is not produced again because that effect itself is the hindrance. Hindrance is the counterpositive of the absence which is a cause. Therefore when effect exists in its inherent cause neither the same effect nor another effect can be produced again in the same inherent cause, since there is hindrance. This opinion, however, is rejected. The reason for this rejection is the following: Let us suppose that a jar has come into existence in its inherent cause. This jar is now considered the hindrance for the same jar or a similar jar to come into existence in the same locus. But the mutual absence of the jar is not the cause of the jar; nor is its destruction hindrance of jar. And according to the old school, in the inherent cause, there is no absolute absence of the effect. The absolute absence exists only in places other than the inherent cause of the effect. Therefore when one speaks of the absence which is the cause, this can only mean prior absence and not an absolute absence as the objection implies.[1]

Now another solution is proposed to solve the difficulty that an effect that is produced could be produced again. This consists in showing that one set of causal complex would produce only one thing. Therefore, once a causal complex has produced one thing, it does not produce it again nor another thing of a similar nature. This opinion also is rejected because of the general principle admitted by all the parties that when the causal complex is present, the effect is produced and when the causal complex is not present, the effect is not produced. When one does not admit that prior absence is a cause of the effect in question, then in reality the causal complex continues to exist even after the thing in question is produced, if ever produced. Therefore there is no difficulty for the same thing to be produced again, for the basic principle remains undisputed, namely, when there is causal complex, effect is produced, when there is no causal complex, effect is not produced. Hence, in order to solve the difficulty why an effect which is produced is not produced again, one has to admit that prior absence is a cause of the effect and that once the effect is produced the causal complex ceases to exist. Hence when the effect is produced one of its cause, namely, prior absence ceases to exist and therefore since the causal complex does not exist any more, the effect that is produced is not produced again.

(m)(i) Now another objection is raised in the following way: In establishing God we want to establish an agent without a body and with eternal knowledge, desire and effort. This is against our experience which is always of an agent having a body. Therefore when God is established as an agent without a body, it is against our experience; similarly our experience is that knowledge is not eternal and so when God is established as having eternal knowledge, it contradicts our experience. Such is also the case with God's desire and effort. Besides God's knowledge, desire and effort are established as eternal and hence they do not need any operation; this again contradicts our experience: Our experience is that knowledge acts through bodily action. Therefore it is not possible to establish a God who is without a body and who is endowed with eternal knowledge, desire and effort. It may, however, be possible to argue that since an agent has always a body, there is also body in God; but this body is invisible and eternal; the *pūrvapakṣin* denies this because of our experience that a body is always visible and eternal.

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[1] Here it may be noted that according to the old school, hindrance is the counterpositive of a relational absence; according to Gaṅgeśa hindrance is the counterpositive of a prior absence and according to the moderns of later times, hindrance is the counterpositive of an absolute absence.

Again the *pūrvapakṣin* shows that there is no absence of supporting reason in this reason which establishes that an agent has body and so on. The reason for the presence of supporting reason is that there is no additional condition. It would however be possible for the *siddhāntin* to argue that there is invariable concomitance of having-an-agent, in the reason of being-an-effect; and that there is no additional condition at all in this reason adduced by him. Therefore, there is no difficulty in inferring an agent for the earth and so on also. To this the *pūrvapakṣin* answers 'having-an-agent' is pervaded by 'having-body'. Therefore it cannot be said that neither of the reasons is stronger than the other. Hence the respective reasons has the respective invariable concomitance and relation to the subject. Therefore there is a fault like that of a counter-thesis (*satpratipakṣa*). Because of this it is not possible for the *siddhāntin* to infer an agent without a body. This counter-thesis cannot be admitted: Only when the reason of the establishing inference and the reason of the counter-inference have the invariable concomitance respectively of the *sādhya* and the absence of the *sādhya* and relation to their respective subjects, there will be equal force for the two reasons. Now the reason of being-an-effect which is the reason in the establishing inference does exist in the subject—this is accepted by both parties. Having-an-agent, which is the reason in the counter-thesis is not proved as existing in the subject, and therefore it is not accepted by both parties. Therefore since the reason of the establishing inference is stronger, there is no counter-thesis.

Against this the *pūrvapakṣin* argues that even if there is no counter-thesis, there is the fault of contradiction. The reason is that the invariable concomitance of non-eternity could be found in knowledge-ness. And such an invariable concomitance would prevent the cognition of co-existence of eternity in knowledge-ness. When the Naiyāyika establishes 'being-produced-by-knowledge' in the earth and so on, he establishes by the same inference that the knowledge in question is eternal. But invariable concomitance of non-eternity in knowledge-ness prevents such an inference and therefore the reason of being-an-effect has the fault of contradiction; when, however, there is no contradiction between eternity and knowledge-ness, it could as well be that the earth and so on could be produced by knowledge and so on which are not eternal. Therefore even though the reason of being-an-effect does not have the fault of counter-thesis, it has the fault of contradiction.

Now the *pūrvapakṣin* shows that in knowledge-ness and so on, which are the pervaded, there is the invariable concomitance of non-eternity. This is done by showing that there is no additional condition, not even its doubt with regard to the invariable concomitance in question, and that, on the contrary, there is the certainty about the absence of an additional condition. In the invariable concomitance of non eternity in knowledgeness, the only possible additional condition can be being-human-knowledge. But this additional condition can serve only to differentiate human knowledge from the knowledge of God. But the knowledge of God is not yet established. Therefore the additional condition in the form of a qualification of knowledge, serves no purpose; it does not help one to infer deviation when there is the absence of the additional condition. Therefore one cannot be certain, nor even doubt that there is additional condition, since it is certain that there is no additional condition.

In the reason of 'being-an-effect' however, there could be the certainty of an additional condition. We cognize the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent in the reason of being-an-effect in such examples as a jar and so on. For grasping such an invariable concomitance, we need also a supporting reason. The basis of such a supporting reason is the relation of causality that obtains between a jar and the potter. When such causality, however, is grasped, we cognize also the causality of the bodily action of the potter. Therefore the invariable concomitance of 'being-produced-by-a-body', (which is the additional condition) could be cognized in having-an-agent, which is the *sādhya* of the establishing inference. In the earth and so on we cognize the absence of the invariable concomitance of 'being-produced-by-a-body' in the reason of 'being-an-effect'. Therefore, there is the certainty of the additional condition of being-produced-by-a-body. This is the objection.

(ii) The answer to this lies in showing that there is no invariable concomitance of non-eternity in knowledge-ness. First the opinion of the old Naiyāyika-s is given. According to them there can neither be the fault of counter-thesis nor of contradiction. The invariable concomitance, however of non-eternity in knowledge-ness, is denied for the following reason: There would be no hindrance to normal activity even if there is no invariable concomitance of non-eternity in knowledge-ness, as would be the case if there is no invariable concomitance of fire in smoke. In the latter case, no one would try to produce fire in order to get smoke. But such is not the case even if some kind of knowledge is eternal; there would be no kind of cessation of activity.

Now the *pūrvapakṣin* tries to show again that there is actually the invariable concomitance of non-enternity in knowledge-ness. The reason is that invariable concomitance is cognized when there is the knowledge of one thing always existing when something-else is present and when there is the knowledge of the absence of deviation. Such is the case with regard to non-eternity and knowledge-ness. In all instances of our experience, knowledge is not eternal: Non-eternity is always present when there is knowledge and there is no deviation at all. Now the *siddhāntin* answers this by means of a similar reasoning which shows that invariable concomitance cannot be cognized by the means suggested. If that were so, we can conclude the invariable concomitance of medium dimension in parts since in all instances of our experience of parts, there is medium dimension. If such an invariable concomitance is accepted, it would follow that the atoms also would have medium dimension which is a contradiction in terms and so it would be impossible to establish atoms. Therefore we have to admit that there is no such invariable concomitance. Further, in our experience all instances of light have manifest colour and hence we can assert the invariable concomitance of manifest colour in light. In that case, eyes would not be light at all since the light of the eyes has no manifest colour. Therefore we cannot accept such an invariable concomitance of manifest colour in light. In the same way we cannot accept the invariable concomitance of non-eternity in knowledge-ness.[1]

Now the attempt of the *pūrvapakṣin* to deny the above argument is shown: It is pointed out that there could be no invariable concomitance of having medium-dimension in parts. In order to have perception, it is necessary to have many substances, i.e. there will be perception of only those things which have many parts and which, therefore, have also medium dimension. If it is argued that all the parts have medium dimension, then it would follow that even atoms being parts, would have medium dimension, and in order to have medium dimension, they also should have parts. Thus there would be infinite regress. In order to avoid this, it is to be admitted that there is no invariable concomitance of medium dimension, in parts. Similarly for ordinary visual perception it is indispensable to have the contact of the eyes with the object. Thus we establish also the existence of the sense organs of the eyes, which are actually different forms of light (*tejas*) which have no manifest colour. Therefore it becomes also necessary to deny the invariable concomitance of medium dimension in parts and of manifest colour in light. On the contrary one has to assert invariable concomitance of medium dimension which is brought about by many substances, in the perception of substances and also the invariable concomitance of the contact of the senses in perception. Thus if it is argued in this way that there is invariable concomitance of medium dimension in parts, and that there is invariable concomitance of manifest colour in perception of substances, then in a similar way, it is possible to show the invariable concomitance of 'being-produced-by-knowledge' and so on in effects as follows. It has already been established that all instances of effects, are produced by knowledge, desire and effort. Therefore it could be argued that there is the invariable concomitance of knowledge and so on, in effects in general. But the reason of being-an-effect which is in the earth and so on, is such that it is not brought about by any operation of the body. Therefore though it is brought about by knowledge and so on, it is not brought about by non-eternal knowledge and so on but eternal knowledge and so on. Therefore it is not possible to accept the invariable concomitance of non-eternity in knowledge; if this procedure is not possible, then all question of inference would be impossible. The reason is that when you have established the invariable concomitance of fire in the smoke in the example of smoke in the kitchen, you cannot any more object that such invariable concomitance obtains only in instances of smoke which you have actually experienced and not in the case of smoke in the mountain where fire is to be inferred. If this is not accepted the natural consequence is that there would be no inference at all.

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[1] The arguments here are based on the Nyāya theory that the atoms have only atomic dimension and that the light of the eyes is not manifest.

(iii) Now Gaṅgeśa is giving his own opinion: He is directing his arguments chiefly against those who do not accept the relation in the form of universals. And according to them, when one says something contradicts something else. it means that when something is cognized at a particular place and time, it is not possible also to cognize its absence in the same place and time; there is, however, no difficulty at all for the thing to be present in some other place. Similarly in the present case, though eternity is not present in all the instances of knowledge of human beings, there is no difficulty for eternity to be found in another instance of knowledge namely, knowledge of God. Further, there is no difficulty if certain instances of a particular kind of substance are eternal and some other instances not eternal; as for example the atoms of earth-substance is eternal while its dyad is not eternal. But if the objection that all knowledge is non-eternal is raised, then the answer is that if in the word 'all', the knowledge also of God is not intended, there would be no contradiction; if however, the knowledge of God is included, then there is no invariable concomitance of non-eternity in knowledge since the knowledge of God is eternal and hence there is deviation.

Another way in which the contradiction is raised and answered is pointed out: Knowledge-ness is the same in all knowledge and such knowledge-ness is always understood as not existing in something eternal and therefore how can it be understood as existing in something eternal? The answer is again similar to the one already given. Even if it is accepted that in all instances of knowledge which are already established and accepted by both parties there is no eternity, there is no harm that eternity exists in the knowledge of God which is to be established; just as earthness exists in such non-eternal instances of earth like the jar and so on, but it can without any difficulty exist also in such eternal instances of earth as its atoms.

The same difficulty is formulated in yet another way: Knowledge-ness is cognized to be pervaded by non-eternity; therefore it does not exist anywhere where there is the absence of non-eternity. The question is not anything new and so the answer is the same as the above. The principle underlying the answer is that although all the instances of knowledge which are now known to us are non-eternal, there is no contradiction in holding that a knowledge which is to be established can be eternal. This is the answer to those who do not accept the relation of the universal. The answer to those who accept such a relation is as follows: If in the invariable concomitance mentioned, by knowledge is meant only non-eternal knowledge of human beings, then by this kind of invariable concomitance, one cannot establish that the knowledge of God is not eternal. In order to infer such a conclusion the invariable concomitance should be: All knowledge is non-eternal. But then such an invariable concomitance will not be valid since the knowledge of God is not non-eternal. Further, the same kind of reasoning is used to show that the invariable concomitance that agents have bodies does not prevent the inference that God who is an agent does not have a body, i. e. although all the agents whom we know have such bodies, there is no difficulty in establishing an agent, namely, God, who has no body.

(n)(i) Now in another way it is objected that there are the faults of the absence of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*) and through this fault also the fault of contradiction (*bādha*). 'Being-produced' would have been the limitor of everything that is produced by an agent if there is positive and negative concomitance of agent and effect; but this is not the case since according to the opponent there is no agent for earth. Therefore there is no invariable concomitance of 'being-produced-by-an-agent', in 'being-produced'. Hence there is the fault of absence of invariable concomitance. According to the *pūrvapakṣin* it is 'being-jar' and so on which are the limitors of 'being-produced-by-agent', since we have the experience that an agent is the cause of a jar and so on. It is in this way that the positive and negative concomitance is cognized; when there is agent, there is jar; when there is no jar there is no agent of the jar. It cannot either be objected that being-jar and so on have no consecutive character in the sense that being-jar is not present in all that is produced, and so it cannot be the limitor of all that is produced by an agent. The reason is that just as all the characteristics that are present in that which is produced by fire could be considered limitors of 'being-produced-by-fire' as for instance 'being-light', 'being-smoke' etc., even so all the characteristics that are present in 'being-produced-by-an-agent' could be considered limitors of 'being-produced-by-an-agent'. Hence there is no difficulty in considering 'being-jar' as the limitor of 'being-produced-by-an-agent'.

But it may be objected by the *siddhāntin* that just as being-jar and so on are the limitors of 'being-produced-by-agent', even so 'being-produced' also could be the limitor of 'being-produced-by-agent'. A reason is brought forward by the *siddhāntin* in support of this view. When 'being-jar' which is the particular, is accepted as the limitor of 'being-produced' that is governed by an agent, there is no difficulty either in accepting 'being-produced' which is the universal as the limitor of 'being-produced' that is governed by an agent'. Further, if one accepts that the particular of 'being-jar' could be the limitor (of being-produced that is governed by an agent) and at the same time does not accept that the universal of being-produced is not such a limitor then it would follow that from smoke in general (*dhūmasāmānya*) one cannot infer a corresponding fire in general (*agnisāmānya*). This is to be explained as follows: Being-jar is a particular in relation to being-produced which is the general, since being-jar is found only in all jars while being-produced is found in all that is produced. Now it cannot therefore be asserted that being-produced is not related at all to jar; i.e. being-produced is not also the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent. If it is so asserted then it would follow that smoke in general (*dhūmasāmānya*) does not cause the inference of fire in general (*agnisāmānya*). It means that what is produced by a particular fire is a particular smoke, e.g. white smoke; by another instance of fire another instance of particular smoke is produced, e.g. black smoke. Thus it would follow that only by means of white smoke, black smoke and so on can one infer fire and not just by smoke; i.e. one cannot infer fire from all instances of smoke which is qualified by being-smoke. Therefore it has to be admitted that just as a particular instance of smoke is caused by a particular instance of fire, so also all instances of smoke are produced by fire. Therefore it has to be admitted also that when there is the relation of cause and effect between particulars, the same relation of cause and effect obtains between all instances of these classes of cause and effect when there is no contradiction. Hence it has to be concluded that all instances of effect are produced by agent. Hence being-produced is the limitor of being-produced by an agent. Hence there is no fault of the absence of invariable concomitance of being-produced-by-an-agent in being-produced.

Now this is denied by the *pūrvapakṣin*. His reason to do so is as follows: There is no contradiction in asserting that all instances of smoke are caused by fire. Therefore it could be admitted that being-smoke is the limitor of being-produced by fire. But here, i.e. in accepting that being-produced is the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent, there is contradiction; i.e. there is contradiction (*bādha*) in accepting that all effects are produced by agents. This contradiction is as follows: When it is cognized that all instances of knowledge are non-eternal, how can it be asserted that the earth and so on are produced by an agent, since by our experience it is contradicted that the earth and so on are produced by an agent having non-eternal knowledge. Further since the invariable concomitance of non-eternity is cognized in being-knowledge, it is just impossible to cognize being-produced by an agent having eternal knowledge. Therefore it is impossible also to cognize being-produced as the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent. When, however, the invariable concomitance of being-produced-by-an-agent in being-produced and the invariable concomitance of non-eternity in being-knowledge are equally strong, there would be at least doubt as to which is the real invariable concomitance. Hence, it would be also impossible to assert that being-produced is the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent.

Now the *siddhāntin* tries to show that the invariable concomitance of being-produced-by-an-agent in being-produced is stronger. The reason for this is that there is the relation of cause and effect, between agent and effect. Naturally the *pūrvapakṣin* rejects this on the ground that such a relation of cause and effect is not established between agent and effect. The reason is that the perception through the mind that knowledge is only non-eternal, prevents the cognition of the relation of cause and effect between agent and effect. The earth and so on are not produced by an agent who has non-eternal knowledge. Thus the *pūrvapakṣin* asserts his position and rejects the theory of the *siddhāntin* that being-produced is the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent. He repeats also the basic reason in support of his position; our experience is that knowledge is non-eternal and hence there is invariable concomitance of non-eternity in being-knowledge.

(ii) Now Gaṅgeśa gives first of all his own answer to these objections. The basic point of the answer is that if the objection were valid, then there would be no possibility of any inference at all. The reason is that when there is concomitance (*sahacāra*) of the *sādhya* in the reason and along with this, there is neither a supporting argument (*tarka*) nor a disproving factor (e.g. *upādhi*), then there would be doubt about the invariable concomitance of *sādhya* in the reason; but when there is supporting argument or disproving factor, there is no doubt about invariable concomitance. Such is the case here. And if there is such a doubt about the invariable concomitance even when there is supporting reason or the absence of disproving factor, it would follow that the *sādhya* can be said to exist only in places other than the subject. The reason is that the certainty of *sādhya* occurs only in *sapakṣa* and so the certainty of invariable concomitance also is to be found only there. If the doubt of invariable concomitance of *sādhya* with reason occurs in the subject even when there is supporting reason and absence of disproving factor, then there would be no certainty of the relation of cause and effect which is the basis of invariable concomitance. An example in support of the argument is given: We find happiness mingled with sorrow. Therefore when we infer something as means to happiness, we have doubt if this thing would lead us to happiness which is not mingled with sorrow and so there would be no real perception of the cause of happiness. Hence not cognizing the relation of cause and effect between that which gives rise to happiness and happiness itself, there would be no action. Therefore the general principle that all effects have agents as causes have a supporting reason, i.e. the relation of cause and effect between the particulars obtains also between universals when there is no contradiction. Such a general principle as all effects have agents as causes can be denied only by a strong disproving factor. Such a factor does not exist here. Therefore when it is accepted that everything produced has an agent as cause, it follows that being-produced is the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent. The main principle on which the solution is based, is the presence of *tarka* for the *siddhāntin* and its absence for the opponent, i.e. there is supporting reason for asserting that all things that are produced have agents as cause and no supporting reason for saying that knowledge is non-eternal.

(iii) The answer of the moderns for the same difficulty is now given: An effect should be brought about by some agent e.g. a jar is brought about by a potter. Therefore wherever there is effect, it is brought about by some agent. Now though being-effect in a jar could be brought about by a potter who has non-eternal knowledge and so on, being-effect in the earth and so on cannot be brought about by some one having non-eternal knowledge. Therefore it can be brought about only by some one having eternal knowledge and who is without a body. Now only when one has the knowledge of an agent who has eternal knowledge, there would be contradiction with the invariable concomitance that knowledge is only non-eternal. So when the cognition of an agent with eternal knowledge has not yet arisen, there cannot be any contradiction. The reason for this is that contradiction itself is a relation and in order to have a knowledge of relation, it is necessary to have a knowledge of the related things. In the present case only when one has the cognition that knowledge is only non-eternal and that there is an agent with eternal knowledge, would contradiction arise, and not before. Therefore the cause of contradiction is the knowledge that there is an agent who has eternal knowledge; but this cause is not yet established. Hence contradiction which is its effect is also not present. Therefore even if there is at present a cognition that knowledge is non-eternal, it cannot prevent another cognition that another instance of knowledge, which is not yet established, is eternal. An example for this is also pointed out. Lake has fire because of smoke; here the mere knowledge that water has the invariable concomitance of the absence of fire does not cause the fallacy of contradiction. It is also necessary to know that water is actually present in the lake. Similarly in the present case, if it was established by some other means that there is eternal knowledge, there would have been contradiction. But this is not the case, since an instance of knowledge which is eternal is only going to be established. Since this opinion is introduced as *navyāstu*, it would seem that Gaṅgeśa does not accept this solution. The reason for this is that there is actually no absence of the cause of contradiction as the moderns point out. All instances of knowledge that are so far cognized, are non-eternal; therefore the invariable concomitance of non-eternity is cognized in knowledge and hence it would be difficult to say that the knowledge which is to be established is eternal. And the contradiction between being-eternal and being-non-eternal is already cognized even before the inference that the earth and so on are produced by someone having (eternal) knowledge. Therefore Gaṅgeśa seems to prefer the first answer given to solve the difficulty.[1]

(3)(a)(i) Now it is doubted that there is the additional condition of being-produced-by-a-body in the reason of being-produced. In the example of a jar and so on we can cognize the pervasion of being-produced-by-body, in being-produced-by-an-agent. Thus the additional condition pervades the *sādhya*. In the earth and so on which are the subject, there is the reason of being-produced, but not the additional condition of being-produced-by-a-body; therefore it does not pervade the reason. Hence being produced-by-body is really an additional condition.

Now an objection with three supporting reasons is raised to show that being-produced-by-body is not really an additional condition. There is no additional condition, if it serves to differentiate only the subject. Here being-produced is qualified by the additional condition of 'by-body'. If this qualification is not there, then the remaining part of the reason, namely, 'being-produced' occurs also in the earth and so on; when this qalification however is added to the reason, it does not occur in the subject, i.e. in the earth and so on. Hence this qualification serves only to distinguish the earth and so on from all other things. In jar and so on which are the positive instances there occurs being-produced-by-body, and in the negative instances like ether and so on there does not occur being-produced-by-body, since being-produced itself does not occur there. Therefore being-produced-by-body distinguishes other things from earth and so on which are only just produced and which are the subject. The meaning of all this is that if in the subject the absence of the additional condition is established, then the reason that is brought forward is unable to bring about the inference of the *sādhya*. But such an additional condition which serves only to distinguish the subject from other things cannot be considered a real additional condition. A clear example of such an additional condition which cannot be considered a real additional condition is 'being-other-than-the-subject' (*pakṣetaratva*). Fire is established in the mountain, by means of smoke; but then 'being-other-than-mountain', is in the kitchen and so on where there is fire and hence there is the pervasion of 'being-other-than-mountain' in the *sādhya* of fire. There is no 'being-other-than-mountain' in mountain which has smoke. Hence there is non-pervasion of 'being-other-than-mountain' in the reason of smoke. Hence 'being-other-than-mountain' should be considered an additional condition; but such an additional condition is not really considered an additional condition, because it serves only to distinguish the subject from other things.

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[1] Udayana however, seems to accept such a solution cf. *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 377.

The second reason that is brought forward to show that being-produced-by-body is not really an additional condition is that the reason is qualified. In the present case the reason is 'being-produced'. This is governed by body and hence qualified by it. Since the reason is thus qualified, it cannot be considered a real additional condition. And if it were considered a real additional condition then if fire is inferred in the mountain by the reason of smoke and if the smoke which establishes fire is actually white, then black smoke could be considered as additional condition. We can establish the pervasion of black smoke in kitchen and so on which has black smoke and its non-pervasion in mountain which has white smoke; thus although the definition of additional condition applies also to black smoke, it cannot be really considered an additional condition, because in that case all valid reasons could be given some qualification that occurs in the reason that exists in the example but does not occur in the reason that exists in the subject and thus they could be rendered invalid as having some kind of additional condition.

The third reason to show that being-produced-by-body is not really an additional condition is that there is no certainty that there is pervasion of the *sādhya*, as in the case of the reason itself. This is to be explained as follows: Just as one can doubt if being-produced has the pervasion of being-produced-by-an-agent, so also one can doubt if being-produced-by-body has the pervasion of being-produced-by-agent. Therefore one cannot determine the pervasion of being-produced-by-agent in being-produced-by-body. Hence being-produced-by-body cannot be considered an additional condition.

According to the opponent, all these reasons denying the existence of an additional condition cannot be accepted; being-produced by body is indeed an additional condition. The reason is that all effects except bodily action are produced by an agent through the operation of the body. So human souls are agents only through body. But with regard to bodily action, the agents are agents directly and not through another body, for otherwise, there would be infinite regress, since one bodily action would need another body and action of this body would need another body and so on. Therefore it is stated that all effects except bodily action are produced by agents through bodily action. The opponent has accepted only human souls as agents. The effects that are produced by human souls, i.e. by knowledge, desire and action of these souls, are only through the operation of the body. This means that only when there is knowledge, desire and action in human body by the relation of being-limitor, there is bodily action in body by the relation of inherence. Therefore, when there is knowledge and so on in human souls by the relation of inherence and when the human souls are limited by body, then this knowledge and so on produce bodily action which in turn produces jar and so on. Thus one can show that being-produced-by-body is an additional condition of being produced.

This is being further clarified. When the agent has no body as is the case in the state of liberation an agent does not produce either bodily action or jars and so on. Therefore it is concluded that body is the instrumental cause of things produced by agent. A potter is the agent of the pot by means of certain instruments; when these instruments are absent, he cannot also be the agent. In the same way, an agent is the cause of things assisted by body and so when the assistance of the body is absent, he cannot either be an agent. Therefore only as assisted by body can an agent be agent. Therefore being-produced-by-agent is pervaded by being-produced-by-body. Thus the third reason which has been brought forward, viz. that there is no certainty of pervasion of the *upādhi* in the *sādhya* as there is the same kind of doubt of pervasion of *sādhya* in the reason and so being-produced by body is not an additional condition is rejected.

Now the *pūrvapakṣin* rejects the first reason to deny the existence of this additional condition. It is not possible to admit that a qualification which is meant to differentiate only the subject is not an additional condition. When there is contradiction, i. e. when there is certainty that there is no *sādhya* in the subject, a qualification such as being-other-than-subject (*pakṣetaratva*) is an additional condition. As for example take the inference: Fire is not hot because it is produced. Here since by perception it is certain that fire is hot, there is contradiction in saying that fire is not hot. Therefore 'being-other-than-fire' is considered an additional condition. There is the pervasion of being-not-hot in things other than fire; hence there is the certainty of the pervasion of *sādhya*, but in fire which is produced and which is the subject, and which has the reason of 'being-produced' there is 'no-being-other-than-fire' and hence there is no pervasion of the additional condition in the reason. Therefore being-other-than-fire is an additional condition. But when there is no contradiction, i. e. when it is not certain that there is no *sādhya* in the subject there is no additional condition either.

Similarly, in the following inference the reason is qualified and the qualification serves to differentiate only the subject. But this qualification is considered to be an additional condition by all the

Naiyāyika-s The inference in question is: The red hot iron ball has smoke because it has fire. Here 'produced-by-wet-fuel' is an additional condition, though it qualifies the reason and though it serves only to distinguish the subject. Therefore it is to be concluded that what makes something an additional condition is not whether it is a qualification that serves to differentiate only the subject or not, but whether it has contradiction in a negative instance or not. Again in the inference, the jar has smell because it has taste, being-earth is an additional condition. Here it is an additional condition, certainly not because the reason has no qualification but because there is contradiction in a negative instance': There is not a place where there is smell and from where earth is absent. And so in the present case, if an effect is to be produced by an agent, it has to be produced through the action of the body. Therefore with regard to everything that is produced, body is also a cause; hence being-produced-by-an-agent has the pervasion of being-produced-by-body and so it is an additional condition.

It has already been shown that although 'having-fire-originating-from-wet-fuel' qualifies the reason, it is an additional condition. Now it is shown 'produced-by-body', in the present case, is not even a qualification. The reason is that being-produced which is the reason means the counter-positive of a prior absence; being-produced-by-body, however, does not mean being-produced that is governed by body; in that case the reason would have been really qualified but it means having body as the cause. It is not possible either to explain being-produced-by-body in any other way. For it is said in the discussion on injunctions that when words such as being-produced are used with other words, they mean only that those things which are produced and so on, have as cause those entities denoted by the other words. Therefore, since being-produced-by-body is such a qualification, it is an additional condition. Similarly having-body-as-agent is also an additional condition.

Now an objection of the *siddhāntin* that being-produced-by-body, cannot be considered an additional condition is answered. If it were an additional condition the pervasion of having-as-agent-someone-having-body' is to be cognized in having-an-agent which is the *sādhya*. Now it is shown that the cognition of such a pervasion is just impossible. The reason is that having-an-agent which is the pervaded is also included in the formulation of the pervader. The invariable concomitance so formulated would be as follows: Wherever there is 'having-an-agent', there is 'having-as-agent-someone-having-body'. There cannot be any real invariable concomitance in such cases, because of the principle that a thing in itself and the thing when qualified do not really differ; as for example pure existence and existence qualified by substance, quality or action, do not differ. Therefore the pervaded and the pervader are in fact the same and so there cannot be any real pervasion. Hence one cannot have an inference in the form: The mountain has brilliant white fire, since it has fire, because the reason and *sādhya* are the same.

The answer to this objection is as follows: It is not true that there cannot be invariable concomitance between objects which do not have any difference: When there is difference between the limitors of the relationship, there can be invariable concomitance. When there is difference between the limitors of that which is intended (*uddeśyatā*) and that which is spoken of (*vidheyatā*) there could be invariable concomitance. When there is difference between a thing in itself and the same thing as qualified, then also there could be the relation of invariable concomitance between them. An example for this is given. Even the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Buddhists admit that by means of the reason of *janyatva* (being-produced) one can infer *kāraṇajanyatva* (being-produced-by-cause), i.e. there is invariable concomitance between them. Here also the pervaded is included in the enunciation of the pervader: Wherever there is 'being-produced', there is 'being-produced-by-a-cause'. Further, here too, there is no real difference between the pervaded and the pervader, but only difference between the limitors of relationship; i.e. here the relation is between *janya* and *kāraṇajanya*. The adjunct of relation is *janya* and the subjunct is *kārṇajanya*.

The limitor of adjunctness is *janyatva* and that of subjunctness is *kārṇajanyatva*. Hence when there is difference of the limitors of realationship there can be the relation of invariable concomitance.[1]

(ii) Gaṅgeśa now establishes against all the arguments of the *pūrvapakṣin* that being-produced-by-body cannot be an additional condition. The meaning of asserting that being-produced-by-body is an additional condition is that whenever an agent produces something, he does so only with the help of the body. Now it is asked: Does this help of the body mean that the agent needs the instrumentality of the body in producing such things as a jar and so on or in producing all effects or in producing all effects that are to be produced by an agent? Now it is pointed out that none of these alternatives is possible. It is shown that if the first alternative holds good, there is no fault at all, because from the fact that an agent needs a body to produce such things as jars and so on, it only follows that the instrumentality of the body is needed in producing such things and not all things that are effects. If the second alternative is accepted, it would follow that all effects not only need a cause, which is not objectionable to both parties, but also an agent. This would obviously be against the position of the opponent, for he does not admit an agent for such things as the earth and so on though they are also produced. If however the opinion in question is accepted, it would follow that 'being-produced-by-a-body' will not pervade 'being-produced-by-an-agent' since in the earth and so on there is the absence of an agent with a body. Hence the former will not be an additional condition. If the third opinion is affirmed it would mean simply that, that which is produced by an agent is produced by an agent. In this case that which is to be limited and that which is the limitor will be the same; therefore oneself will be the invariable antecedent of being-produced-by-oneself. Hence there would be dependence on oneself which cannot be admitted. In this way it is shown that in no way 'being-produced-by-body' is an additional condition.

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[1] Here the commentators mention interesting objections and answers. Thus for instance Rucidatta referring to the statement already made in (TCI 53,8) that when the words such as *janyam* (produced) are used with other words, it only means, having as cause that which is signified by the other word. Hence being-produced is not even a part of the statement of the pervader. Therefore the invariable concomitance which is the basis of the inference: 'something is produced-by-a-cause because it is produced' cannot be taken as a real example of invariable concomitance where the pervaded is included in the statement of the pervader. The answer to this objection is taken by Rucidatta from Jayadeva: Being-produced-by-a-cause means being-the-counterpositive of a prior absence which pervades the prior absence of cause; and being-produced is being-the-counterpositive of prior absence. Hence the pervaded is included in the statement of the pervader and thus the example is shown to be correct.

But in that case there could be contradiction with the statement made earlier (TCI 53,6) where in order to deny that the reason was qualified, it was stated that being-produced-by-body means only having-body-as-cause. This contradiction is removed by Rucidatta stating that two different interpretations have to be given according to different contexts.

According to D.Pisharodi, it is not even correct to say that being-produced-by-a-cause has the meaning of having-a-cause as a cause. This is just a tautology or in the more exact Nyāya terms the limitor of that which is intended and the limitor of that which is spoken of are identical. Hence being-produced-by-a-cause cannot be given such a meaning. But being-produced-by-body can be interpreted as meaning having-body-as-cause, since there is no such identity of limitors just mentioned.

Now, an attempt is made in another way by the *pūrvapakṣin* to show that 'produced-by-body' is an additional condition. There is 'having-an-agent' in jars and so on, and at the same time there is also 'being-produced-by-body' in them. Thus being-produced-by-body is the pervader of having-an-agent which is the *sādhya*. At the same time in the earth and so on, though we see being-produced, we do not see being-produced-by-body; therefore we have the doubt if being-produced-by-body pervades having-an-agent. Hence it could be a doubtful additional condition. This argument is also rejected because 'being-produced-by-body' is not the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent. When it is stated that wherever there is 'having-an-agent', there is 'being-produced-by-body', does it mean, with regard to all that is produced by body, an agent is a cause, or does it mean with regard to all that is produced, an agent is the cause? By the law of logical simplicity only the second possibility can be accepted. Thus the limitor of 'being-produced-by-an-agent' is not 'being-produced-by-body', since there is contradiction in the form of logical complexity; such a limitor can only be 'being-produced'. Therefore just because we have seen 'being-produced-by-body' in 'having-an-agent', we cannot conclude that 'being-produced-by-a-body' is the pervader of 'having-an-agent', since being 'produced-by-body' is not the limitor of 'being-produced' that is governed by an agent.

But then the question arises: How is it possible that in the jar and so on there is also 'being-produced-by-body' since by means of 'having-an-agent', we can infer only being-produced. The answer to this is the following: There is the relation of cause and effect between being-a-potter and being-a-pot. But a potter can exercise his causality only through bodily action with regard to a pot. Hence having-body pervades being-a-potter. Therefore also 'being-produced-by-a-body' pervades 'having-a-potter-as-agent'; but there is no proof to show that 'being-produced-by-a-body' pervades merely 'having-agent'. Therefore since there is the relation of cause and effect between being-an-agent and being-an-effect, between 'being-a-potter' which is pervaded by 'having-body' and 'being-a-pot', it is possible to conclude that in a jar and so on, there is also 'being-produced-by-body'. This conclusion is therefore based not on the assumption that 'having-an-agent' is pervaded by 'being-produced-by-body', but on the force of the coming together of various causes.

Further an inference is also given to show that 'being-produced-by-body' does not pervade 'having-an-agent'. 'Being-produced-by-body' does not pervade 'having-an-agent' because 'being-produced-by-body' does not pervade 'being-produced' which is pervaded by 'having-an-agent'. Being-eternal is the example where the invariable concomitance of the *sādhya* is cognized in the reason. Wherever there is being-eternal there is the absence of being-produced, and therefore also the absence of its pervader, namely having-an-agent-with-body; thus the reason is there. The *sādhya* of 'not-being-the-pervader-of-having-an-agent' is also present in being-eternal, since everything eternal has no agent and so it does not have any pervader of an agent either. Thus the invariable concomitance of the *sādhya* is seen in the reason which is present in the example. Here it may be noted that 'not-being-the-pervader-of-being-produced' is a valid reason to infer the *sādhya* of the 'absence-of-being-the-pervader-of-having-an-agent'. However the words *tadvyāpya* is also added to the reason to show that the present reason has really the invariable concomitance of *sādhya* and that there is argument supporting it (*tarka*). The point of this supporting argument is that when something is not a pervader of its pervaded (*vyāpya*), then it is not pervader of its pervader. As for instance we know being-water is not a pervader of being-jar which is pervaded by being-earth. Therefore being-water is also not a pervader of being-earth.

It was shown just now that the additional condition does not pervade the *sādhya*; now on the other hand, it is shown that it actually pervades the reason and so it is not an additional condition.[1] A potter and so on produce the pot and other things by means of effort; this is agreed by both parties. By this effort there comes about action in that organ (but not necessarily in the whole body) which produces the object because of the effort in the soul. Therefore what is needed is that jars and so on which are produced should be directly produced by means of the effort; and it is not necessary that they are produced by body. Hence 'being-produced-by-body' means only 'being-directly-produced-by-effort'.

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[1] The introduction which Jayadeva prefixes to the commentary on these lines is noteworthy. The third position is to be explained not in the sense that being-produced-by-an-agent is the limitor of being-produced-by-an-agent. In this case there would be dependence on itself (*ātmāśraya*); but it should be explained in the sense that being-produced-by-an-agent is the limitor of being produced that is governed by body. Hence there is no dependence on itself. Therefore the sense is that when there is no body the agent is not able to produce anything; and the sense is not that when there is body the agent produces the effect (in this case, it could merely be an *anyathāsiddha* and not a real cause). Hence being-produced-by-an-agent is the pervaded and being-produced-by-body is the pervader. And being-produced is not pervaded by being-produced-by-body and hence also the former is not pervaded by having-an-agent. Thus since being-produced-by-body is the pervader of having-an-agent which is *sādhya* and since being-produced-by-body does not pervade being-produced, being-produced-by-body is an additional condition. Because of this difficulty another argument is brought forward to show that being-produced-by-body is not an additional condition.

And therefore it could also be said that by means of the effort of God, which is directly applied to atoms, everything is produced. Therefore 'being-produced' which is the reason is pervaded by 'being-directly-produced-by-effort'. Therefore 'being-produced-by-body' (here interpreted as being-directly-produced-by-effort) is not a non-pervader of being-produced. Hence it is not an additional condition. Thus 'being-produced-by-someone-having-a-body' is not an additional condition. The reason is that 'being-produced-by-someone-having-a-body' can be interpreted as meaning only 'being-directly-produced-by-effort' and in this sense 'being-produced-by-someone-having-body' is a pervader of 'being-produced' and not a non-pervader. Hence it is not an additional condition.

(iii)(a1) Now another argument is brought forward to show that being-produced-by-body is an additional condition. The argument is based on the principle that when there is the relation of cause and effect between two particulars, and when there is no contradiction, there could also be the relation of cause and effect between the corresponding universals. In the present case, when it is established that there is the relation of cause and effect between a potter who is a particular agent and a jar which is a particular thing produced by body since there is also no contradiction, it follows that whatever is produced by body only is produced by an agent. Thus being-produced-by-body is an additional condition. But then an objection may arise: Being-jar is indeed pervaded by having-an-agent and not vice-versa. Similarly being-produced-by-body is pervaded by having-an-agent and it is not the case that being-produced-by-body is the pervader of having-an-agent. To this the *pūrvapakṣin* answers: In all objects for which according to both parties there are agents, there is being-produced-by-body and therefore being-produced-by-body pervades having-an-agent. Against this, it is argued again: Being-produced has the invariable concomitance of having an agent; therefore it could equally be said that both 'being-produced' and 'being-produced-by-body' have the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent. Therefore doubt arises which reason, being-produced or being-produced-by-body, has the real invariable concomitance of having-an-agent.

This is what could be called having-a-doubtful-additional-condition, and that which causes the doubt whether the reason has real invariable concomitance or not is called a doubtful additional condition. Such a doubtful additional condition could come about because of the doubt if the additional condition pervades the *sādhya* or if it does not pervade the reason; or because of both of these doubts.

Now the *siddhāntin* argues that the true invariable concomitance of having-an-agent can be cognized only in being-produced and not in being-produced-by-body. The reason for this is that the positive concomitance of having-an-agent can be cognized in being-produced-by-body in such examples as a jar. The negative concomitance of this can be cognized in the soul and so on. In the same way the positive concomitance of having-an-agent could be cognized in being-produced (which is an element in being-produced-by-body) in a jar and so on and its negative concomitance in a soul and so on. Therefore since being-produced is logically simpler than being-produced-by-body, invariable concomitance of having-an-agent could be cognized only in being-produced; and the cognition of such an invariable concomitance cannot be had in the additional condition. Besides, the positive and negative concomitance of having-an-agent could be cognized in being-produced even without the cognition of being-produced-by-body.

Now all these objections of the *sidhhāntin* are denied by the *pūrvapakṣin*. Only when the positive and negative concomitance of each instance of having-an-agent and each instance of being-produced is cognized, can the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent, be cognized in being-produced. The negative concomitance of not having-an-agent and not-being-produced may be thought to be cognized also in atoms; however this is impossible since atoms cannot be perceived. Therefore the invariable concomitance can only be cognized in the following way: One can cognize the positive concomitance in a jar and so on and the negative concomitance in the soul which can be perceived.[1] Or one can cognize the relation of cause and effect between the

[1] Soul is an object of mental perception according to Nyāya.

particulars such as the potter and the pot and then apply the principle that when there is the relation of cause and effect between particulars, if there is no contradiction, there is also the relation of cause and effect between the universals. Then we will arrive at the relation of cause and effect in the following form: All effects have agents as cause. By means of the cognition of such a relation of cause and effect one can cognize the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent in being-produced. However the same procedure could be used to arrive at the cognition of the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent in being-produced-by-body, i. e. the particular agents such as the potter and particular object such as the pot which are produced-by-body, do have positive and negative concomitance and so it can be concluded that all agents are agents only in regard to all that is produced-by-body. Hence one can cognize the invariable concomitance of being-produced-by-body in being-produced-by-an-agent. Therefore there is the pervasion of being-produced-by-body in being-produced-by-an-agent. Therefore being produced-by-body is an additional condition.

(a 2) Now, these difficulties of the opponent are answered by the *siddhāntin*. The latter accepts for argument's sake certain aspects of the opinions of the opponent. Thus, let being-jar, being-produced and being-produced-by-body be the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent. Therefore it is possible to admit that being-jar, being-produced, and being-produced-by-body are pervaded by having-an-agent. because there is no argument to show that only one of them is the limitor. But because of this, how can one show that being-produced-by-body is also the pervader of having-an-agent? Being-jar and so on are not the pervaders of having-an-agent; yet they are also limitors of being-produced that is governed by an agent. Therefore being-produced-by-body which is also a limitor of being-produced that is governed by-an-agent, need not be a pervader of having-an-agent.

Now it is urged again that being-produced-by-body could be the pervader of having-an-agent at least in those instances where it is agreed by both parties that there is an agent having body, in things such as jars; in these things the positive concomitance of being-produced-by-body could be cognized. In the earth and so on where according to the Buddhists there is no agent, the negative concomitance of being-produced-by-body could be grasped; hence by means of perception assisted by the cognition of positive and negative concomitances, it could be asserted that being-produced-by-body is the pervader of having-an-agent. An answer is given to this objection: Although the positive and negative concomitances that are required to cognize that being-produced and being-produced-by-body are limitors of being-produced that is governed by-an-agent, are the same, still in order to know that being-produced-by-body is a limitor, one has first of all to cognize being-produced which is an integral part of being-produced-by-a-body. And when being-produced is cognized, it is cognized also as the limitor; therefore after such a cognition, it is not possible to cognize that being-produced-by-body is also a limitor, for this would contradict the previous cognition. Thus when it is cognized that only being-produced is the limitor, it can neither be established that being-produced-by-body is the pervader of having-an-agent.[1] By means of the same argument, i.e. since being-produced-by-body does not pervade being-produced which is pervaded by having-an-agent, being-produced-by-body cannot even be considered as a doubtful additional condition.

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[1] Here an objection is raised by Pragalbha and Rucidatta. Gaṅgeśa has already stated that being-produced-by-body means only having-body-as cause. Therefore how can he now assert that one has to cognize first of all being-produced in order to cognize being-produced-by-body. To this some answer that since being-produced-by-body is logically complex (*guru*), one cognizes already by logical simplicity of cognition (*upasthiti lāghavam*), that being-produced is the limitor. Others answer that in order to cognize the pervasion of being-produced-by-body, in-having-an-agent, it is first of all necessary to have the cognition of having-an-agent. But when this is cognized, it is also cognized at the same time by means of logical simplicity that being-produced is the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent. When thus being-produced is cognized as pervaded by having-an-agent, how can being-produced-by-body which does not pervade being-produced, be cognized as the pervader of having-an-agent. Therefore being-produced-by-body is not a sure additional condition.

(iv)(a1) It was denied by the previous discussions that being-produced-by-body cannot be the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent; now, on the contrary, it is argued that having-an-agent could be the limitor of being-produced-that-is governed-by-body. Therefore being-produced-by-body could be the pervader of having-an-agent. Hence being-produced-by-body could be an additional condition. Now a possible objection of the *siddhāntin* is answered: Being-jar is logically simpler (*laghu*) than having-an-agent, and therefore the limitor of being-produced-by-body could be being-jar and not having-an-agent. The answer to this objection is in the form of a counter difficulty. The *siddhāntin* accepts the invariable concomitance in the form: Wherever there is something produced there is an agent as cause; therefore being-produced is the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent. This is accepted by the *siddhāntin*; but here also being-jar and so on which are logically simpler than being-produced could be considered as limitor; however this is not acceptable to the *siddhāntin*. Hence being-jar cannot be considered the limitor of being-produced-by-body. Therefore it is concluded that having-an-agent is pervaded by being-produced-by-body just as smoke is pervaded by fire. In other words in jars and so on, being-produced-by-body is the pervader of having-an-agent which is the *sādhya* of the *siddhāntin*. In the earth and so on, being-produced-by-body does not pervade being-produced which is the reason of the *siddhāntin*. Hence being-produced-by-body pervades the *sādhya* and does not pervade the reason and so it is an additional condition. Besides it would not be possible to cognize the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent which is the *sādhya* in being-produced. There can be doubt if being-produced is the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent, because being-produced is accepted by both parties to be present in the earth and so on but the opponent does not admit that there is having-an-agent in the earth and so on. Therefore there can be doubt if being-produced is the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent. Similarly there can be doubt if having-an-agent is the limitor of being-produced that is governed by body. The reason is that according to the *siddhāntin* there is an agent for earth and so on, but there is no being-produced-by-body. Therefore there can be doubt if having-an-agent, be the limitor of being-produced that is governed by body. Hence there is also doubt if being-produced which is found in the earth and so on (but where there is no being-produced-by-body) is pervaded by having-an-agent. Thus there is the doubt of the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent in being-produced.

(a)(2) The answer to this is that already with jar and so on as the example we have cognized that being-produced is the limitor of being-produced that is governed by an agent; (being-jar is the limitor of being-produced that is governed by only some particular kind of agent like the potter). Therefore to say that being-produced does not have the invariable concomitance of having an agent would be against this principle that is already established. Hence being-produced has the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent. Just as by means of being-produced, we can infer being-produced-by-an-agent, why don't we infer being-produced-by-body by means of being-produced-by-an-agent ? This is a question which will be discussed later where it is shown that an agent need not invariably be someone having a body. By means of the same reason, i.e. being-produced-by-an-agent is not the limitor of being-produced-that-is-governed-by-body, it is also shown that being-produced-by-body which is proposed as the additional condition, cannot cause a doubt about the invariable concomitance of having an agent in being-produced.

(v)(a) By the same sort of reasoning it can be shown that 'not-being-atom', 'not-existing-in-the-parts-of-earth' and so on should not be considered as additional conditions. According to the *pūrvapakṣin* these also could be additional conditions. Thus not-being-atom is to be found in jars and so on which have agents, therefore it pervades the *sādhya* of having-an-agent; it is not to be found in a dyad which has the reason of being-produced.[1] Hence it does not pervade the reason. Therefore 'being-not-atom' is an additional condition. In the same way, jars exist in the two halves of the jar. However, the Naiyāyika-s do not accept that they exist in the parts of the earth and so in jar there is 'not-existing-in-the-parts-of-earth' and at the same time there is the *sādhya* of being produced by an agent. Hence it pervades the *sādhya*; in the earthern-dyad there is no not-existing-in-the-parts-of-the-earth, i.e. 'existence-in-the-parts-of-earth' and there is the reason of being-produced. Therefore it does not pervade the reason and hence it is an additional condition. All these additional conditions that are proposed should be rejected since it is definitely shown that being-produced is pervaded by having-an-agent. All that are produced have an agent. Even dyad where the reason has no additional condition of not-being-atom has an agent. Hence not-being-atom cannot be considered an additional condition since it will not pervade the *sādhya* of having-an-agent.

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[1] Extension of dyad is also considered atomic.

(b)(i) It is now further objected against the reason of the establishing inference that by means of the counter-reason-of-the-absence-of-being-produced-by-body, it is possible to infer the absence-of-having-an-agent in the earth and so on since in them there is no 'being-produced-by-body'. Gaṅgeśa naturally rejects this and in answering this objection he has in mind primarily those who do not admit the apprehensional connection in the form of universals. It is impossible to have the cognition of an absence without having the cognition of its counter-positive. In the counter inference the *sādhya* is an absence whose counter-positive, namely, being-produced-by-an-agent, is known in such things as a jar and so on. In the establishing inference, however, the *sādhya* is not the counter-positive of such an absence; but something different. This is to be explained in the following way: Although in the earth and so on and also in the example such as jars and so on, there is being-produced which is qualified by the common characteristic of 'being-produced-ness' being-produced in the earth and so on and being-produced in the jar and so on are different. The reason is that being-produced in the earth and so on is not caused by human souls, but being-produced in jar and so on is caused by human souls. Thus the agent of the earth and so on which is to be established and the agent of jars and so on which also is to be established are different. The cognition of the existence and absence of the same thing only is contradictory, not of different things. In other words, in order that the cognition that the floor has no jar prevent the cognition that the floor has jar, the jar which is the object of this cognition and the jar which is the counter-positive of the absence which is the object of the cognition, namely, the floor has no jar, must be the same. This is the only position which can be held by those who do not admit the apprehensional connection in the form of universals.[1] But the counter-inference does not establish the absence of the *sādhya* of the establishing inference in the way just explained. Hence it is not valid.

Now it is pointed out that by the same reason by which it is rejected that the object of the knowledge which is to be prevented and the counter-positive of the absence whose knowledge prevents, must be the same, other counter reasons are also rejected. And one of such counter-reasons is not-having-a-pervader-of-it (having-an-agent). Thus the counter-inference would be: The earth and so on have no agent because they do not have the pervader (of having-an-agent). Whenever there is the absence of the pervader, there should also be the absence of the pervaded. This is the supporting argument. These reasons establish only the absence of agents who are known; they do not establish the absence of the agent who is to be inferred by the establishing inference of the *siddhāntin*. When the object of inference is a positive thing, it has to be something not yet known. The fire in the mountain which is established by smoke in the mountain is not yet known; it is made known only by the inference.[2]

[1] In the opinion of those who admit the apprehensional connection in the form of universals, it is possible to have a knowledge of all jars in as far as they have jar-ness. Therefore the knowledge that the floor has the absence of jar (which prevents the knowledge that the floor has jar) has as object the absence of all jars, i.e. the absence whose counterpositive is limited by jarness. Hence the knowledge, the floor has jar (whatever jar be actually meant) is prevented by the knowledge that the floor has absence of jar.

[2] Here, of course, we do not take into account inferring out of desire an object which is known through another means of knowledge such as perception.

Now the *pūrvapakśin* again argues that his counter-inference establishes the existence of an absence whose counter-positive is known. In a jar and so on having-an-agent is known. In the earth and so on having-an-agent is sought to be established. Although having-an-agent in jars and so on and having-an-agent in earth and so on are different, both have the consecutive character of having-having-an-agent (*kartṛjanyatvatva*) and so the *pūrvapakṣin* shows that it is possible to establish in the earth and so on an absence whose counter-positive is limited by having-having-an-agent (*kartṛjanyatvatva*). This objection is answered by the *siddhāntin* as follows: It is true that having-an-agent in the earth and so on and having-an-agent in the jar and so on have the consecutive character of having-having-an-agent. But the instance of being-an-effect in the earth and so on and the instance of being-an-effect in jars and so on are different and hence the agents which they respectively establish are different. And when the absence of an agent is established, an absence whose counterpositive is known, is established, and not an absence whose counterpositive is not known. The reason is that when one speaks of having-an-agent and the absence-of-having-an-agent, the reference is to particular agents; otherwise it would be impossible to establish an individual and its absence. If this is the case, then it may be objected that there could be no possibility of the fault of counter-thesis, for it is agreed by both parties that in inferences (excepting those made out of desire) the *sādhya* should be something not yet established. The counter-reason should establish the absence of *sādhya*. This is impossible since an absence whose counter-positive is not known cannot be cognized. This objection is answered by showing that it is possible to have the fault of counter-thesis in places where such things as "cow-ness" which are only one and which are already established, are the *sādhya*. When one argues that this is a cow since it has a dewlap, it is possible for another to argue that this is not a cow since it has no dewlap.[1]

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[1] This objection and answer are from the point of view of those who do not admit the apprehensional connection in the form of universals. The reason is that if one admits such an apprehensional connection, one can cognize not only the absence of a particular *sādhya*, but of all *sādhya* in as much

(ii) Now other forms of counter-thesis are given. In the establishing inference the *sādhya* is 'being-produced-by-someone-having-eternal-knowledge'. Therefore the object of inferential knowledge includes also being-eternal as the qualification of knowledge. However, the certainty that knowledge-ness does not exist in something eternal, prevents the cognition that knowledge is eternal. Therefore there is the possibility of a counter-thesis. It is possible to cognize the invariable concomitance taking the example of memory which is also a kind of knowledge. There is no memory which is eternal. Another possible counter-thesis is the following: Knowledge and happiness are known to be the special qualities of the soul. Happiness is non-eternal only. Hence happiness cannot be conjoined with a generic attribute that is pervaded by quality-ness which exists also in eternal qualities. Happiness or knowledge is not like colour which is eternal in atoms except in those of earth, and non-eternal in other substances. In other words, a generic attribute that is pervaded by quality-ness which exists in eternal qualities cannot be present in happiness. In non-technical language, it only means that happiness can only be non-eternal. The reason adduced for this, is that happiness is a special quality of the soul. When thus the invariable concomitance of 'not-being-conjoined-with-a-generic-attribute-that-is-pervaded-by-quality-ness-which-exists-in-eternal-qualities' is cognized in the special quality of the soul, by means of the same invariable concomitance, it is shown that knowledge which is also a special quality of the soul

as the counter-positive-ness is limited by a characteristic that is common to all instances of the *sādhya*. Hence in this way one can cognize the absence of the *sādhya* that is to be established and therefore the objection that here is an absence whose counterpositive is not known, is not valid. Similarly the answer that the fault of counter-thesis occurs only in such places where already known things such as cowness and so on which are only one of their kind are the *sādhya* need not be accepted. Hence Rucidatta points out that in the case of establishing inference, there is supporting argument for the reason and in the case of counter-thesis there is no supporting argument; hence the reasons do not have equal force and therefore actually there is no question of counter-thesis.

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cannot be conjoined with a generic attribute that is pervaded by quality-ness which exists in eternal qualities.[1]

Now another possible form of counter-thesis is discussed. In soul there is the generic attribute of soul-ness which is pervaded by substance-ness. It is also true that the generic attribute of soul-ness exists in the same substratum of the special qualities like knowledge and so on. But as long as a supreme soul is not established, since only a supreme soul is the substratum of eternal special qualities, the generic attribute of soul-ness cannot be said to exist in the substratum of eternal special qualities. Therefore only the generic attributes such as water-ness which exist in the atoms of water which are also the substratum of eternal qualities (for according to Vaiśeṣika colour in atoms of water is eternal) exist in the substratum of eternal qualities and are pervaded by the generic attribute of substance-ness. And such generic attributes of waterness is not to be found in soul just as in ether. All-pervasion (*vibhutva*) is to be found in both. Therefore the invariable concomitance of the absence of such generic attributes which exist in the substratum of eternal qualities and which are pervaded by substance-ness, is established. Hence the *pūrvapakṣin* says that the soul-ness also does not exist in the substratum of eternal qualities. But the *siddhāntin* rejects this also because of the same reason by which he rejected the first counter-thesis. Further all these forms of counter-thesis should be rejected because by them the absence of only such generic attributes as colourness, and water-ness (which are accepted by both parties) is established in such substances as ether (which again are accepted by both parties to be eternal). Therefore, since the object of the inference which establishes God and the object of the counter inference are different, there cannot be any relation of the prevented and that which prevents between the two. Besides there is no supporting reason for the reason of the counter-inference and therefore the reason has no invariable concomitance of the *sādhya*. It all comes to this: Only when the substratum of absence and its counter-positive are established can there be a knowledge whose object is absence; it is not possible to cognize the absence of the horns of hare in the ground, but only of such absences like that of a jar and so on.

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[1] The purpose of the different elements of the reason is as follows: In the atoms of water, there is colour and so on but they are not eternal and hence the *sādhya* does not occur there, and so there is deviation. In order to avoid this, it is specifically pointed out that the reason of special qualities belongs to the soul by adding the word *cetana*, soul in the formulation of the reason. Since number one and so on are qualities of the soul and since these qualities are not eternal, there is again an instance of the presence of reason and the absence of *sādhya*, a deviation. To avoid this it is pointed out that the quality-ness which is the reason, is special quality-ness by adding the word 'special' (*viśeṣa*) in the formulation of the reason. Number is not a special quality. But Rucidatta points out that the deviation still persists since impression (*bhāvana*) is a special quality of the soul and that quality of elasticity (*sthithisthāpaka*) which is a kind of *bhāvana* that exists in the atoms is eternal. In order to avoid this deviation Rucidatta says that qualities in question should be perceptible, i.e. the word *pratyakṣa* (perceptible) should be added in the formulation of the reason. To this Pisharodi points out that oneness, and dimension (*mahatva*) of the soul are not perceptible and so there is no deviation. But then the qualification of 'special' (*viśeṣa*), need not be added to the formulation of the reason, which was meant especially to exclude such qualities as number and so on. Hence Pisharodi concludes that Gaṅgeśa here intends to exclude impression (*saṃskara*) from the special qualities of the soul which are considered to be the reason here.

(iii)(a1) Having rejected the various counter-reasons, now it is shown that the reason in the first and most important counter-inference is weak and does not have equal force with the reason of the establishing inference. It is pointed out that the earth and so on which are taken as the subject do not have the reason of 'not-being-produced-by-body' because through unseen, the earth and so on are also produced by body. This just means that individual souls through their knowledge, desire and action engage their bodies in various activities which bring them de-merit; happiness or sorrow is the result of these and it is to experience this happiness or sorrow which are the result of merit or de-merit that this world is created. Thus the world is actually produced by our body and it is not the case that the world is not produced by our bodies. To this the *pūrvapakṣin* answers that his reason of 'not-being-produced-by-body' does not mean not-being-produced-through-the-instrumentality-of-the-body; but not-being-produced-by-a-knowledge-which-is-produced. It is by means of knowledge and desire of individual souls that they engage in activities and acquire merit or demerit and through them produce the world. Hence the reason of the counter-inference means, not being-produced through unseen by means of a knowledge which is produced. The earth and so on are produced by means of unseen by a knowledge that is produced. Hence it is not the case that the earth and so on are not produced by a knowledge that is produced by means of unseen and so there is no fault of the reason not occurring in the subject. To this the *siddhāntin* replies: Although the fault of the reason not occurring in the subject could thus be avoided, still the qualification of 'produced' for knowledge is a useless qualification since it is not yet established that there is a knowledge which is not produced. Therefore since the reason is qualified by a useless qualification, there will be the fault of having-no-invariable-concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*) or the point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) called 'more' (*adhika*). The *pūrvapakṣin*, then could argue that such a fault occurs also in the reason of the establishing inference. To this the *siddhāntin* answers that such a qualification of the reason in the establishing inference only means that the reason has that characteristic and not that it serves to distinguish it from other things. When you say that a jar is knowable, knowability does not serve to distinguish a jar from other things since there is knowability in all things; it means only that a jar has the characteristic of knowability.

(a2)(1)(a) A further objection is raised against the reason of counter-thesis. namely, being-not-produced-by-body. It is pointed out by the *siddhāntin* that the reason need only be 'being-not-produced' and the qualification of 'by-body' could be omitted since it is useless. The reason is that 'not-being-produced' is logically simpler in comparison with 'not-being-produced-by-body'; and so not-being-produced is the real reason having the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent, just as it is 'smoke' alone and not 'blue smoke' that has the invariable concomitance of fire. Therefore the correct invariable concomitance is whatever is not-produced does not have an agent like atoms. And such an invariable concomitance far from being in any way contradictory to the invariable concomitance of the reason in the establishing inference, is actually the negative concomitance of the same reason. But the *pūrvapakṣin* argues that according to both parties, the qualification of the reason is useful, if the qualification helps the cognition of invariable concomitance. Similarly, it should be admitted that a qualification which serves to engender the knowledge that the reason exists in the subject is also useful. In the present instance it is not the case that the earth and so on are 'not-produced' but it is the case that they are 'not-produced-by-body'. Hence the qualification of 'by-body' serves to establish the existence of reason in the subject. Therefore even if a qualification does not serve to avoid deviation but if it serves to ascertain the existence of the reason in the subject, it should be considered useful.

Now the *pūrvapakṣin* anticipates another possible objection, and answers it: The objection is that one can cognize the invariable concomitance of the *sādhya* only in a reason which has a qualification that serves to avoid deviation. The *pūrvapakṣin* answers that there is no such rule: It is possible to cognize invariable concomitance even in a reason which has no qualification like 'cow-ness'. In the following inference: This one has a dewlap because it has cow-ness, cowness is the reason and it is cognized as the object of ocular perception without any qualification that serves to avoid deviation. Therefore it is evident that there is no rule that invariable concomitance can be cognized in only a reason having a qualification that serves to avoid deviation. Now the objector points out that even in such cases as cow-ness, there is qualification that serves to avoid deviation. The reason is that cowness itself is cognized as existing in a cow and not existing in any thing other than individual cows. Therefore cow-ness as qualified by a particular cow is the reason that has the invariable concomitance of having a dewlap.

But the *pūrvapakṣin* answers to this objection: A generic attribute serves to distinguish individuals of a particular class from the individuals of another class. If such a generic attribute itself is not distinguished from other things by itself then it (the generic attribute) would be in need of something else to distinguish it from other things and thus there would be an infinite regress. Therefore cowness is not distinguished from other things by the help of individual cow; it is distinguished by itself. If this is not the case, then there would also be the fault of mutual dependence. The reason is that in this case, one generic attribute is distinguished from another generic attribute by means of the individuals having the respective generic attributes and the individuals themselves of one class is distinguished from those of another class by means of the generic attribute. The *pūrvapakṣin* further points out that there is no rule which says that only a reason having a qualification that serves to avoid deviation has invariable concomitance. The reason is that if there is the knowledge of concomitance of the reason with the *sādhya* and if there is no knowledge of deviation, then invariable concomitance is grasped without in any way requiring to know that a particular qualification serves to avoid deviation or not.

Now the objector tries to show that it is not enough that there is the cognition of concomitance of the *sādhya* with reason and that there is the absence of the cognition of deviation so that invariable concomitance could be grasped; but it is necessary that there should be the absence of the knowledge that the qualification of the reason does not serve to avoid deviation. The reason is that the knowledge that a qualification of the reason does not serve to exclude deviation is a hindrance to the cognition of invariable concomitance. And since absence of hindrance is also necessary for the production of the effect, in the present instance, the effect of the cognition of invariable concomitance, it is necessary that there be the absence of the knowledge that the qualification of the reason does not serve to avoid deviation. The *pūrvapakṣin* answers that this cannot be admitted because there is the cognition of the invariable concomitance of fire in smoke which has the qualification of 'knowable'. Now it is evident that the qualification of 'knowable' does not serve to distinguish it from anything else, since everything is knowable. Therefore the qualification of 'knowable' does not serve to show that smoke does not occur in something which does not have fire, i. e. the qualification does not serve to avoid deviation. Yet as already pointed out there is no difficulty in having the cognition of the invariable concomitance of fire in smoke with the qualification of 'knowable' which, we know, does not serve to avoid deviation.

But the objector points out that, when it was asserted that the qualification of the reason should serve to avoid deviation, it was meant that the qualification should be the object of verbal cognition, which can happen only in the case of inference for others. 'Knowable smoke' is a reason in an inference for oneself and hence the qualification is not an object of verbal cognition. And in such cases there is no difficulty for the reason to have the invariable concomitance of *sādhya*. But when the qualification is the object of verbal cognition as in the case of inference for others, then it should serve to avoid deviation; and as pointed out already, the qualification of 'knowable' in knowable smoke is not an object of verbal cognition since it is used in an inference for oneself and hence there is no difficulty for it to have the invariable concomitance of fire. In the present case of the counter-thesis of the inference establishing the existence of God, the reason is 'not-produced-by-body' where the qualification 'by body' is an object of verbal cognition since it is used in an inference for others. And therefore this qualification should serve to avoid deviation which in fact is not the case. This is the point which the objector wants to make.

To this the *pūrvapakṣin* answers that whether the qualification is an object of verbal cognition or not, i.e. whether it is a case of inference for oneself or for others, the qualification is indeed a mode (*prakāra*) of the qualified. Hence the qualified is actually connected with the qualification. And in spite of this, in such examples as 'knowable smoke', there is the cognition of invariable concomitance (of fire) and therefore such reasons as 'not-produced-by-body' also though qualified by 'body' has the invariable concomitance of being produced by an agent.

(b) The *siddhāntin* again tries to show that the reason 'not-produced-by-body' in the counter-inference has useless qualification. And in order to do so, he first of all describes the theory of reason as accepted by both parties. Reason in inference is said to be that which is the object of consideration (*parāmarśa*) which is the cause of inference. In the present case of counter-inference the qualification of 'by body' in the reason of 'not-produced-by-body' does not become the object of consideration because merely by the reason of 'not-produced', without the additional qualification of 'by body', it is possible to establish the absence of an agent, as in the case of ether which is not produced and which has also no agent. Therefore the reason of 'not-produced-by-body' has useles qualification, which does not become object of consideration; hence it has no invariable concomitance and so it has deviation; it is also superfluous (*anyathāsidda*). If such is the case, the *pūrvapakṣin* answers, inference with reason accepted by both parties as valid would not be possible because one can have inference of fire in the mountain by means of consideration which has light as object: One cannot say that only by the consideration which has smoke as object can there be inference of fire. Hence even the reason of smoke which is accepted as valid by both parties for inferring fire would have deviation and would be superfluous.

(c) Now the *siddhāntin* tries to show in another way that there is the fault of the absence of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*) in the reason of the counter-thesis. The argument is based on the nature of the invariable concomitance of the *sādhya* in a reason which is qualified. It is pointed out that when the reason is qualified, the qualification is the limitor of invariable concomitance and the invariable concomitance itself is in the qualificand or for the sake of simplicity, it could be said that the invariable concomitance is both in the qualification and in the qualificand. The general rule however is that only when the limitor of qualificand-ness (*viśeṣyatāvacchedaka*) cannot be the limitor of invariable concomitance, can the qualification be considered the limitor of invariable concomitance. As for example existence (*sattā*) alone does not have the invariable concomitance of substance but only existence which is qualified by something other than quality and action, has the invariable concomitance of substance. Hence being-existence alone cannot be considered the limitor of the invariable concomitance in question, but 'being-existence' as qualified by being-other-than-quality-or-action (*guṇa-karmānyatva*) is such a limitor. However, it is to be noted that it is not the case that existence does not have the invariable concomitance of substance, but that such an invariable concomitance is not limited by 'being-existence' alone but by 'being-existence' as qualified by being-other-than-quality-or-action.

This being the nature of the invariable concomitance in a reason which is qualified, there is no invariable concomitance of the absence of an agent in 'not-produced-by-body' which is the reason in the counter-thesis. Similarly, there is also no invariable concomitance of fire in blue smoke which is taken as the usual example in discussions connected with these problems. Thus the respective invariable concomitance is to be found in being-not-produced and in smoke. The reason is that in our experience we find that being-not-produced has the invariable concomitance of absence of an agent and smoke has the invariable concomitance of fire. Hence being-not-produced itself and being-smokeness itself are the limitors of the respective invariable concomitances and therefore their limitors are not the qualifications of these reasons. In the present counter-inference however, the subject is earth and so on, where there is no absence of being-produced (because they are produced) and hence there would be the fault of the absence of reason in subject (*svarūpāsiddhi*) if the reason were merely 'not-produced'. And in order to avoid this fault, if the reason is qualified by 'body', then since it is joined with a qualification which is not the limitor of invariable concomitance, there occurs the fault of the absence of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*). To this objection, the *pūrvapakṣin* answers as follows: Invariable concomitance is in the form of non-deviation or having no additional condition. And in fact in being-produced-by-body there is no deviation of the absence of agent nor is an additional-condition needed to establish such an invariable concomitance. Similarly in the case of blue smoke also, there is neither deviation of fire, nor is there the need of any additional determination to establish its invariable concomitance. Hence in both cases, the objection is invalid. Now the *siddhāntin* argues that the qualificand-ness itself is an additional determination. Thus in the case of blue smoke, smoke-ness can be considered an additional condition, since wherever there is fire qualified by blue smoke, there is smoke-ness. Thus it pervades the *sādhya* of fire qualified by blue smoke. Similarly wherever there is the absence of agent inferred by means of 'not-produced-by-body', there is being-not-produced (*ajanyatva*). Hence it pervades the *sādhya* of absence-of-agent qualified by not-produced-by-body. The *pūrvapakṣin* rejects this because of the simple reason that such a qualificand-ness pervades the reason. Thus wherever there is blue smoke which is the reason, there is also smoke-ness and wherever there is not-produced-by-body which is the reason there is also being-not-produced.

Now the *pūrvapakṣin* supports his foregoing arguments to show that the reason of 'not-produced-by-body' in the reason of the counter-thesis is valid by bringing other instances of inference which are accepted as valid also by the *siddhāntin* but where the reason is also qualified and the qualification itself is not needed to establish the *sādhya*. These instances of inferences are the following: First, this place has the absence of smoke which has a particular fragrance because it has the absence of fire arising from sandal wood This is an inference accepted as valid by the *siddhāntin* also; there is no fallacy in establishing the absence of a particular effect from the absence of a particular cause that produces it. The *pūrvapakṣin* points out that such an inference also would be impossible if the *siddhāntin* does not accept his counter-inference, namely, the earth and so on do not have an agent because they are not-produced-by-body. The reason is that all the arguments which he urged against this inference could also be urged against the inference accepted also by the *siddhāntin*. As for instance by the reason only of the absence of fire (without it being qualified by 'arising from sandal wood') it is possible to establish the absence of smoke having a particular fragrance. Hence in the inference, the reason has useless qualification and so it has no invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvā-siddhi*). Besides, absence of fire which is the qualificand, will be an additional condition, for in the kitchen and so on where there is no absence of fire, there is absence-of-fire-arising-from-sandal-wood, and so the additional condition does not pervade the reason.

The second inference accepted also by the *siddhāntin* is as follows: This place has no smoke because it has no fire arising from wet fuel. In this inference also, it would be possible to establish the absence of smoke only by the qualificand, namely, absence of fire, without the qualification of arising from 'wet fuel'. Besides, 'absence-of-fire' could be considered an additional condition. The reason is that 'absence-of-fire' does not pervade the reason of 'absence-of-fire-arising-from-wet-fuel'. It is possible that there be absence of fire arising from wet fuel even when there is no absence of fire as in fire in red-hot-iron. The doubt regarding additional condition is raised here and in the previous inference only on the basis that the additional condition does not pervade the reason. If it is objected that for something to be regarded as an additional condition, there should also be its pervasion in *sādhya,* the answer is that it was doubted earlier that smoke is additional condition only on the basis that it pervades the reason of blue smoke.[1]

After having given examples of useless qualifications in reasons having positive invariable concomitance which are accepted as valid also by the *siddhāntin*, the *pūrvapakṣin* gives now an example of a reason having only negative concomitance which is used with useless qualification and which is accepted also as valid by the *siddhāntin.* Here the inference in question is as follows: Sound inheres in a substance other than the eight substances because it inheres in a substance while not inhering in the eight substances; here no positive example can be given; only negative example can be offered and so there is no positive concomitance. Negative concomitance means that the absence of the reason pervades the absence of *sādhya.* Here the absence of *sādhya* is the absence of dependence on a substance other than the eight substances. Since the general principle is that the characteristic that is simpler is the pervaded, here 'absence-of-dependence-on-a-substance' would be the pervaded and not 'absence-of-dependence-on-a-substance qualified by the absence-of-dependence-on-the-eight-substances which is logically complex (*guru*). And in fact, wherever there is 'absence-of-dependence-on-a-substance', there is also absence of dependence on the eight substances and it would be incorrect to have the invariable concomitance in the form: Wherever there is absence of dependence on a substance qualified by the absence of dependence on the eight substances there is absence of dependence on a substance. Hence there is useless qualification of the reason.

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[1] cf. Rucidatta, op. cit. p. 1983.

The *pūrvapakṣin* gives still another example of an inference which is used by the *siddhāntin* but in which the reason has useless qualification. The inference in question is as follows: The organ of smell is made of earth because among colour and so on it cognizes only smell. Here in the reason if there was no qualification, it would be 'because it recognizes only smell'. Now, such a reason will not be present in the subject of 'organ of smell' because it cognizes not only smell, but also absence of smell, smellness and so on. Hence in order to avoid this fault of absence of reason in the subject (*svarūpāsiddhi*) the reason is given the qualification of 'among colour and so on'. Now the reason is in the subject since, when colour and smell and so on are present, the organ of smell cognizes only smell. This qualification of the reason therefore is just to avoid the fault of the reason not occurring in the subject and not for the sake of avoiding deviation. Thus the *pūrvapakṣin* establishes that even the *siddhāntin* adds to the reasons qualifications which are not meant to avoid deviation.

The *pūrvapakṣin* brings another argument: If it is accepted that a characteristic that is simpler is to be considered as the pervaded, then in the same way a characteristic that is simpler is also to be considered as that which pervades. In that case the *sādhya* of the *siddhāntin* namely, 'being-produced-by-some-one-having-effort-desire-and-direct-knowledge-of-the-material-cause' cannot be considered as that which pervades since it is logically too complex, but simply being-produced-by-some-one-who-has-effort; or simply being-produced-by-effort.

Besides, even such *sādhya-s* as are accepted by both parties as validly inferred cannot be accepted; thus one will not be able to infer 'fire-arising-from-wet-fuel' by the reason of smoke, since fire is simpler (*laghu*) in comparison with fire-arising-from-wet-fuel and so fire would be that which pervades and not fire-arising-from-wet-fuel. In the same way, it would not be possible to infer being-produced-by-body by means of jar, since being-produced-by-potter is simpler, and so it only can be inferred, for being-produced-by-body is not a generic attribute, but being-potter is one, and so 'being-produced-by-potter' is simpler than being-produced-by-body.

(d) Now, the *pūrvapakṣin* rejects the reasons of some of those who argue that being-produced-by-body is simpler than being-produced. The argument of those who favour this opinion is that things that are 'not-produced-by-body' are fewer than things which are just 'not-produced'. The *pūrvapakṣin* rejects this argument. He says that there is no contradiction in saying that that which is pervaded, could be more or less in number as regards the instances of their individual occurrence are concerned: There is no difficulty in something which is more in number being considered as the pervaded. As for example oiliness (*sneha*) could be inferred by the reason of having-cold-touch (*śītasparśa*) which are many or by water-ness (*jalatva*) which is one. The idea is that cold touch is many and water-ness being a generic attribute is one; but by both oiliness could be inferred. Similarly absence of smell could be inferred by both mutual absence of being-earth and absolute absence of being-earth. If these instances of pervasion are not accepted, it would follow that only blue smoke which is less in number of instances of actual occurrence, than just smoke, would only be the pervaded and not just smoke also. Therefore the conclusion is that the logical simplicity that determines what the pervaded is, does not depend upon the number of instances of actual occurrence of a particular kind of thing, but upon the logical simplicity of the limitor. Therefore in comparison with being-produced-by-body, being-produced is simpler and so only the latter is the limitor. Further the *pūrvapakṣin* brings another argument also in support of his view using the same kind of reasoning. Mutual absence is many, but the absolute absence is only one. Therefore the mutual absence of being-produced-by-body is many and therefore it cannot be considered as that which is pervaded; but only the absolute absence of being-produced which being only one, should be considered as that which is pervaded. This is not acceptable to both parties. Hence also the arguments brought forth in support of the view that 'being-produced-by-body' is logically simpler is to be rejected.

(e) It is pointed out further that though the qualified reason has the invariable concomitance of the *sādhya,* if the qualification is not needed for inference, such a reason is not made use of in inference; an example for this kind of qualification is smoke qualified by knowability. Though smoke so qualified also has invariable concomitance of fire, still such a qualification is not used in inference, since it is useless to have such a qualification for the purpose in view. By this it is indirectly hinted that the qualification 'by-body' in 'not-produced-by-body' which is the reason in the counter-thesis is not a useless qualification as 'knowable' in 'knowable smoke'.

(f) The *pūrvapakṣin* has thus established that the absence of-being-produced-by-body can be used as a valid reason in the counter-inference. Now the *siddhāntin* brings another objection to this position of the *pūrvapakṣin.* Being-produced is logically simpler than being-produced-by-body and so one cognizes sooner the absence of being-produced than the absence of being-produced-by-body. Therefore the invariable concomitance of absence of an agent is earlier cognized in the absence of being-produced rather than in the absence of being-produced-by-body.

Here the *siddhāntin* answers a possible objection from the *pūrvapakṣin.* The *siddhāntin* admits such inferences as, this place is without smoke having a particular fragrance, because it does not have fire arising from sandalwood; this place has no smoke because there is no fire arising from wet fuel. The reasons in such inferences have qualifications and so according to the principle of simplicity advanced by the *siddhāntin,* in both cases the reason should only be absence of fire. The *siddhāntin* points out, this is not the case in these inferences because in both instances of inference, the reason can be qualified because the invariable concomitance of *sādhya* is brought about by the qualification or by that which is qualified. To explain: Take the case of the *sādhya* of absence of smoke having a particular fragrance. This *sādhya* occurs in red-hot iron ball where there is no smoke at all. Thus the absence of the *sādhya* is brought about by the absence of the qualification of 'arising-from-sandalwood' for there is fire in red hot iron ball. Hence the absence of the *sādhya* is brought about by the absence of the qualification of the reason or more precisely the qualification of the counterpositive of the absence which is considered the reason. There is also the *sādhya* of the absence of smoke having a particular fragrance in a tank of water. Here there is the absence of fire, though the tank may be connected with sandal-wood. Since there is the absence of fire, there is also the absence of fire arising from sandalwood. Hence the *sādhya* is brought about by the absence of the qualified in the formulation of the reason (here again, more precisely the qualified in the counter-positive of the absence which is considered the reason). In such places from the absence of the particular appropriate cause one can establish the absence of the corresponding particular effect. In other words, it means that when the counter-positive of the absence which is the *sādhya* is not brought about by either of the elements alone (but by both the elements of qualification and qualified) of the counter-positive of the absence which is the reason, then in such places the reason should be qualified asbence. To explain: In our present instance of inference, smoke with particular fragrance is the counter-positive of the absence which is the *sādhya*. And smoke with particular fragrance is not brought about either by sandalwood or by fire but only by fire arising from sandalwood which is the counter-positive of the absence which is the reason. In such places, qualified absence can be used as the reason. In the present instance of the counter-inference, this is not the case. Here the *sādhya* is absence of having an agent and the reason is absence-of-being-produced-by-body. What is doubted is precisely if, only being-produced-by-body or just being-produced alone brings about having an-agent. Here by the law of logical simplicity being-produced should be considered as the reason for establishing having-an-agent. Therefore it comes about that only one of the elements of the counter-positive of the absence which is used as the reason brings about the counter-positive of the absence which is considered as the *sādhya*. Hence in this case, the qualified absence cannot be considered as the reason.

To this the *pūrvapakṣin* answers that if such is the case then certain reasons which are accepted by both parties as having the pervasion of something else cannot be considered as such. For instance, it is accepted by both parties that 'while-having-origin, having-existence' is pervaded by being-not-eternal. If the principle of the *siddhāntin*, namely, only that which is logically simple is to be considered as the pervaded, 'being-jar' and so on should be considered as the pervaded and not 'while-having-origin, having-existence'. The *siddhāntin* could answer to this as follows: 'While-having-origin, having-existence' is general or that which pervades, and 'being-jar' is the particular or that which is pervaded in the same way as 'being-jar' is general and 'being-this-individual-jar' is the particular. Therefore if the universal and particular exist in the same locus there is no contradiction. In that case, the *pūrvapakṣin* points out that the same is the case with absence-of-being-produced which is the general and absence-of-being-produced-by-body which is particular and therefore both can exist in the same locus and both can have the invariable concomitance of absence having-an-agent.

(g) Now the *pūrvapakṣin* brings another argument to show that being-produced-by-body can be used as a valid reason in the counter-inference. He argues as follows: 'Absence-of-being-produced-by-body' is different from 'absence-of-being-produced'; just as 'absence of blue jar' is different from 'absence of jar'. Here 'by body' qualifies 'being-produced' and so 'being-produced-by-body' is one and it is as such that it is the counter-positive of the absence. In the case of 'absence-of-being-produced' the counter positive is 'being-produced'. And when the counter-positive is different, absence is also different. Therefore the reason used in the counter-inference is one and indivisible. Hence there is no useless qualification in it and therefore 'absence-of-being-produced-by-body' could be used as the valid reason in the counter-inference.

To this the *siddhāntin* could object: No one can deny that an instance of 'being-produced-by-body' is an instance of 'being-produced'. Therefore the counter-positive of absence-of-being-produced-by-body' is also 'being-produced'. In this way when the counter-positive of an absence is something qualified, the counter-positive in reality is only the qualificand as in the present instance, where being-produced-by-body which is the qualified is considered the counter-positive of the 'absence-of-being-produced-by-body'; but in reality the counter-positive is only 'being-produced', which is the qualificand in being-produced-by-body.

The *pūrvapakṣin* answers to this objection as follows: If this is the case, then it would follow that earth and so on are not produced. The reason is that it is admitted by both parties that the earth and so on are not produced by body. Since it is argued that the absence of being-produced-by-body is the same as absence of being-produced, because the counter-positive of these two absences are the same, it would follow that when one is absent in one locus the other is also absent in the same locus. And so if in the earth and so on there is the absence of being-produced-by-body, it would follow that in them there is also the absence of being-produced. Such a conclusion is not acceptable to both parties. Therefore the principle which is the basis of this conclusion, namely, when the counter-positive of an absence is something qualified, the counter-positive in reality is only the qualificand, cannot also be accepted.

The *pūrvapakṣin* has now established 'absence-of-being-produced-by-body' which is the reason in the counter-inference is quite valid. However, he wants to show, further, that 'being-produced' which is the reason in the establishing inference has the additional condition of 'being-produced-by-body'. This is to be explained in the following way: The *sādhya* in the establishing inference is 'being-produced-by-an-agent', the absence of which pervades, as the *pūrvapakṣin* has shown, the absence of being-produced-by-body. The counter-positive of this absence is 'being-produced-by-body', which according to the *pūrvapakṣin* pervades the *sādhya* of being-produced-by-an-agent. Absence of smoke pervades absence of fire and so the smoke which is the counter-positive of this absence has the pervasion of fire. Similarly being-produced-by-body pervades having-an-agent and so the former is an additional condition.

(h) When there is a useless qualification in the reason, it is a point of defeat called 'more'.[1] And so the *siddhāntin* points out that there is this point of defeat here. The *pūrvapakṣin* answers that such a point of defeat exists only in such places where two reasons are used to establish the *sādhya*, and not here in the present case where there is only one reason though qualified (*viśiṣta*), for when the *sādhya* is established by one reason, there is no point in bringing another reason to establish the same *sādhya*.

(ii)(a) Now the *siddhāntin* shows that the reason of the counter inference, namely, 'being-produced-by-body' does not have equal force with the reason in the establishing inference and therefore the latter does not admit of a counter-reason. He also answers the various objections raised by the *pūrvapakṣin*. The invariable concomitance of fire is present also in blue smoke. It is impossible that the invariable concomitance of fire is not present in blue smoke since blue-ness and smokeness exist in the same individual of blue smoke. If such is not the case then it would happen that the invariable concomitance will not have any support, i.e. it will not be able to exist anywhere, for there is no smoke as such but only particular instances of smoke as blue smoke, black smoke, white smoke and so on, and so if these instances of smoke do not have the invariable concomitance of fire, it is meaningless to say that smoke has the invariable concomitance of fire.

But then the question arises, if such is the case what is the difficulty in making use of 'blue smoke' itself as the reason in inference. In other words, is it not possible to consider 'being-blue-smoke' as the limitor of 'being-reason'? This is not possible because 'being-blue' also cannot be considered part of such a limitor because of logical complexity. It is only in such places as where the limitor of the invariable concomitance is not only the limitor of qualificand-ness that the limitor of qualification-ness should also be considered the limitor of invariable concomitance. In our present instance since smoke-ness itself which is the qualificand-ness, is the limitor of invariable concomitance, there is no need of considering 'being-blue' also as a part of such a limitor.

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[1] cf. hetudaharaṇādhikamadhikam, *Nyāyasūtra*. V. 2, 13.

An example is also given to explain the matter. A stick is considered an instrumental cause of jar; but the limitor of cause-ness is only stick-ness and not also 'colour-ness', or any particular colour that the stick may have. It may further be objected that if blue-smoke has the invariable concomitance of fire, it would follow that blue-smoke could be used as reason in the inference establishing fire. This however is not possible because of the following reason. It has already been stated that the limitor of invariable concomitance is smoke-ness. Only where there is limitor of invariable concomitance can we accept invariable concomitance. And smoke-ness which is the limitor of invariable concomitance occurs by the relation of inherence only in smoke and not in blue. Therefore smoke does not have the invariable concomitance of fire, qualified by blue, but qua smoke. Further if in blue-smoke, in case blue is real qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) then smoke-ness cannot be said to exist in the qualified as such but only in smoke as such. If, however, blue is only an adventitious qualification (*upalakṣaṇa*), then it is clear that only 'smoke' can be used as reason.

Another reason is brought forward to show that only smoke and not blue smoke can be used as reason in the inference establishing fire. Only the limitor of pervaded-ness (i.e. in fact, being-invariable-concomitance) can be considered the limitor of cause-ness; otherwise there would not be any rule that only a particular thing can be used as reason and not any thing else. If this rule is not followed, then it would come about that such things as 'knowable smoke', (*prameyadhūma*) smoke that is a substance (*dravyadhūma*) and so on could be used as reasons. This is not acceptable to both parties.[1]

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[1] Here it should be noted that both Jayadeva and following him Rucidatta support Gaṅgeśa in saying that here blue-smoke-ness is not the limitor of invariable concomitance because of logical complexity and not because it has fewer instances of occurrence than just smoke-ness as some Naiyāyika-s argue. We do not know who precisely held such a view, but their reason is that something that has fewer instances of occurrence should be taken as a limitor. Jayadeva and quoting him Rucidatta also point out that such a reasoning cannot be admitted, because in that case smoke-ness itself cannot be considered the limitor because it has fewer instances of occurrence than

But then a further question arises: If the complex of reasons such as consideration (*parāmarśa*) subjectness (*pakṣatā*) are present, there is no difficulty in having an inference with blue-smoke as reason. And such an inference would be also true knowledge since its qualificand (*viśeṣya*) is that which has fire and its mode (*prakāra*) is fire. The consideration which produces such a true inference should also be true and a reason which is an object of such a consideration cannot but be true; it simply cannot be a false reason. If such is the case, it is not true either that blue-smoke is a false reason. In order that it be a fallacious reason, it must prevent inference; in the present case, the inference is not prevented, but actually produced. The answer to this is that though the inference is not prevented, there is some erroneous notion about the origin of the inference. Although the inference that the mountain has fire is true, it is false to suggest that this inference is caused also by the qualification of 'blue' of the reason blue smoke. The true reason here also is only smoke and it is this alone that causes the inference in question. Hence as the cause of this erroneous notion that blue-smoke is the cause of inference, it is fallacious.

(b) Now all this discussion is applied to the present instance of the inference of the existence of God and the counter-inference seeking to establish the opposite. The opponent has brought

light-ness. The idea here is that both smoke and light have the invariable concomitance of fire, but in as far as both are pervaded by fire, smoke has less instances of occurrence than light since in red-hot-iron ball there is light and fire, but not smoke.

Jayadeva however gives a further reason why there is useless qualification in the reason of blue smoke. If the inference were inference for oneself, Jayadeva points out that there would be no fault. But in an inference for others (*parārthanumāna*) using blue smoke as reason would bring about false doctrine (*apasidhānta*) and hence become erroneous. This is so because if blue smoke is mentioned as the reaon and not smoke alone, it would imply that whatever is not blue smoke does not have the invariable concomitance of fire. This obviously is not true, because all kinds of smoke have the invariable concomitance of fire. Since making use of blue-smoke as reason brings about such a false doctrine, it follows that this cannot be used as reason. Therefore in an inference for others, it is not right to use a reason having useless qualification.

forward 'being-not-produced-by-body' as the reason in the counter-inference. Now from the above discussion concerning blue-smoke, it is clear that absence of 'being-produced-by-body' cannot be the limitor of invariable concomitance because of logical complexity; the limitor can only be the absence of 'being-produced'. The rule is that, that qualification without which it is impossible to cognize invariable concomitance, that only becomes a part of the limitor of invariable concomitance. This implies that such a qualification need not always be intended to avoid deviation. In the present instance, positive invariable concomitance can be cognized in atoms and so on where there is absence of being-produced and also absence of being-produced-by-an-agent; negative invariable concomitance can be cognized in jar and so on where there is the absence of the absence of being-produced by an agent, namely, being-produced by an agent and absence of the absence of being-produced, namely, being produced. Therefore the qualification of 'by-body' in the reason of 'being-produced-by-body' is useless and so it will not be a part of the limitor of invariable concomitance or 'pervaded-ness'. Even those who think that a qualification of the reason should serve to avoid deviation, explain their opinion in this way, namely, without this qualification there would be deviation and so it would be impossible to cognize the invariable concomitance of the *sādhya* with the reason.

Now the *siddhāntin* answers to the objections of the *pūrvapakṣin* against some of the particular instances of the inferences which he, the *siddhāntin* considers as valid. The point of the objection of the *pūrvapakṣin* was that even the *siddhāntin* in certain inferences makes use of a reason with a qualification which does not serve to avoid deviation but serves only to show that the reason is not 'unexampled'. The *siddhāntin* here hints that he does not admit that a qualification is used in the reason only to avoid deviation; a qualification can also be used if it would be otherwise impossible to cognize the invariable concomitance of the *sādhya* with the reason. Therefore in the present instance of inference the organ of smell is made of earth because it has only smell as the object of cognition-, the reason 'because it has only smell as the object of cognition', means that while it does not have anything else as the object of cognition, it has smell as the object of cognition. Such a reason cannot exist in the organ of smell which is the subject since it has also smell-ness and so on also as the object of cognition. Therefore the qualification of 'among colour and so on' is added to the reason and the reason becomes, 'because among colour and so on, it makes only smell as the object of cognition'. And such a reason is present in the organ of smell because when colour and so on are present, the organ of smell cognizes only smell. Such a qualification therefore makes it possible that the invariable concomitance of the *sādhya* with the reason be cognized; in this way the qualification of the reason is meaningful.

Now the *siddhāntin* answers to the objections raised against another instance of valid inference which was already mentioned. The inference in question is the following: This place has no smoke having a particular fragrance because it does not have fire arising from sandalwood. Here it is clear that fire arising from sandalwood is the cause of smoke having a particular sort of fragrance. Therefore it is possible to cognize the invariable concomitance of the *sādhya* with the reason in the form of the invariable concomitance of the absence of the effect in the absence of the cause. Hence the qualification 'arising from sandalwood' in the reason of 'absence-of-fire-arising-from-sandalwood', is necessary to cognize the required invariable concomitance. Therefore the reason has no useless qualification.

(c) The *siddhāntin* then answers to the objection raised earlier by the *pūrvapakṣin* that if the former does not admit the qualification of reason, because of logical complexity, the latter cannot for the same reason accept the qualification of the pervader either. This objection is rejected because the qualified is the cause and in this way, it is the pervader. If the qualification were not there, it would not be the cause at all: Fire in general is not the cause of smoke having a particular fragrance, but only fire arising from sandalwood is the cause of smoke having a particular fragrance. And hence only such a fire is the pervader of such a smoke. Hence the qualified, in the present instance, 'fire arising from sandalwood', is the pervader.

The *siddhāntin* further answers the objections of the *pūrvapakṣin* against another inference that is considered valid by him. The form of the inference in question which has already been explained is as follows: Sound inheres in a substance other than the eight substances because it inheres in a substance and it does not inhere in the eight substances. The objection was that in the negative invariable concomitance, if the principle of logical simplicity of the *siddhāntin* is accepted, the absence of the *sādhya* which is really pervaded by the absence of reason would be the simpler 'absence of inherence in a substance' and not the complex 'absence of inherence in a substance other than the eight substances'. The *siddhāntin* answers that there is contradiction in a negative instance for the complex 'absence of inherence in a substance other than the eight substances' i. e. there are difficulties, if sound inheres in earth and so on. Nor is it possible to give in this instance a positive example. Therefore this complex 'absence of inherence in a substance other than the eight substances' could be considered as the pervaded. Therefore the qualified, namely, inherence in a substance other than the eight substance, becomes also the pervader. However, it is not possible to say that everywhere the pervader can have a qualification and hence the qualified is the pervader. When there is no contradiction in the *vipakṣa*, i.e. where there is no supporting argument (*tarka*) the qualified cannot be considered the pervader. An example for this is given: It is possible to establish 'having-an-agent' by means of the reason of 'being-an-effect', but it is not possible to establish 'having-two-agents' by the same reason, i.e. 'having-two-agents' does not pervade 'being-an-effect': There is no harm if 'being-an-effect' exists where there does not exist two agents.

(d) Now the *siddhāntin* rejects an opinion of the *pūrvapakṣin* advanced earlier, namely 'being-produced-by-body' is an integral reason quite different from just 'being-produced'. This is rejected because the reason of 'being-produced-by-body' has no supporting reason. To explain: It has already been shown that, that which is produced has the invariable concomitance of having an agent, and that there is no rule that only that which is produced by body has such an invariable concomitance. This means that it is not necessary that wherever there is 'having-an-agent', there should also be 'being-produced-by-body'. Hence the absence of 'being-produced-by-body' need not establish the absence of having-an-agent. Therefore the counter-reason of absence-of-being-produced-by-body has no invariable concomitance of absence-of-having-an-agent which means that the counter-reason is fallacious since it has no invariable concomitance of the *sādhya*; but actually the reason of the *siddhāntin*, namely, 'being-produced has the invariable concomitance of having an agent. Therefore the *siddhāntin* points out that actually 'absence-of-being-produced' would be an additional condition for the counter-reason of absence of being 'being-produced-by-body', if it is to establish the absence of an agent. In the atoms, there is 'absence-of-having-an-agent' and there is also 'absence-of-being-produced'; hence the additional condition pervades the *sādhya*. In the earth and so on, there is the counter-reason of 'absence-of-being-produced-by-body', but there is no 'absence-of-being-produced'. Hence the additional condition does not pervade the reason.

The *siddhāntin* brings in a general principle to substantiate the absence of invariable concomitance of 'having-an-agent', in 'being-produced-by-body'. When the invariable concomitance of a *sādhya* is perceived in a reason, it would necessarily follow that the absence of the reason would be the pervader of the absence of the *sādhya*, as for instance when the invariable concomitance of fire is established in smoke, it would follow necessarily that wherever there is the absence of fire, there is also absence of smoke, i.e. absence of smoke is the pervader of the absence of fire. In the present instance when the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent is established for the reason of being-produced, it follows that wherever there is the absence-of-having-an-agent, there is absence of 'being-produced', i.e. absence-of-being-produced pervades absence-of-having-an-agent, i.e. 'absence-of-being-produced' is an additional condition in establishing absence-of-having-an-agent even when it is done by the reason of 'absence-of-being-produced-by-body'. Further, when it is established that there is no invariable concomitance of having-an-agent in being-produced-by-body, it follows that there is no invariable concomitance between their negatives also. Hence also, there comes about the fault of having no invariable concomitance of having an agent for the counter-reason.

(e) The *pūrvapakṣin*, now tries to show that absence-of-being-produced cannot be considered an additional condition of the counter-reason. It is held by the *siddhāntin* that being-produced has the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent. In that case absence-of-being-produced which is the negative of the reason in the establishing inference, can be considered an additional condition of the counter-reason, and if so there would be no possibility of the fallacy of having a counter-reason. The reason is that in the way just explained, every counter-reason could be considered to have an additional condition and so it would be impossible to speak of a fallacy of counter-reason. This can be further explained by means of an example; take as establishing inference: Mountain has fire, because of smoke and as counter-inference: Mountain has no fire because of its being rocky. Here in the counter reason, 'absence of smoke' which is the negative of the reason in the establishing inference could be considered an additional condition of the counter-reason. The reason is that 'absence of smoke' pervades absence of fire which is the *sādhya* of the counter-inference. Since the *pūrvapakṣin* gives a counter reason and does not argue that reason does not exist in the subject (*svarupāsiddhi*) it is to be concluded that the reason of smoke exists in the subject according to him also. Therefore in the subject, absence of smoke does not pervade the reason. Thus absence of smoke could be considered an additional condition of the counter-reason. In this way an additional condition could be spoken of for every counter-reason and hence one can never bring forward counter-reason as a fallacy. Therefore the *pūrvapakṣin* would conclude that in the present case also absence of being-produced which is the negative of the reason of being-produced in the establishing inference should not be considered an additional condition of 'absence of-being-produced-by-body' which is the reason in the counter inference.

The *siddhāntin* shows that this is not correct. In an inference, either the reason employed in it or the counter-reason should be able to establish their respective *sādhya-s.* So if the reason in the establishing inference is fallacious, it will not establish the *sādhya* in question and hence the negative of the reason need not necessarily establish the negative of the *sādhya* either. This means that the negative of the reason, does not pervade the negative of the *sādhya.* Therefore the negative of the reason cannot be considered an additional condition of the counter-reason in the counter-inference, since as pointed out, such an additional condition does not pervade the absence of the *sādhya* of the establishing inference which becomes the *sādhya* in the counter-inference. An example for this is the following: In sound non-eternity is established by the reason of being-quality. But the counter-inference tries to establish eternity in sound, by the reason of 'inhering-in-ether-as-its-only-quality'. The reason in the establishing-inference is obviously false because of deviation, since in the atoms of water there is colour which is eternal. Therefore in the case of such fallacious reasons, the negative of the reason in the establishing inference, in the present instance, 'absence-of-being-quality' does not pervade 'absence-of-non-eternity' (i.e. eternity) which is the *sādhya* of the counter-inference. Therefore 'absence-of-being-quality' cannot be considered an additional condition of 'inhering-in-ether-as-its-only-quality' which is the reason in the counter-inference. Thus we can conclude that the negative of the reason in the establishing inference cannot be considered an additional condition of the reason in the counter-inference. Hence the general rule is that the negative of the reason in the establishing inference cannot be considered an additional condition of the reason in the counter-inference, if the reason in the establishing inference is fallacious. But where the reason in the establishing reason is valid as in the case of the inference, the earth and so on have an agent because they are produced, the negative of the reason namely, absence of being-produced is an additional condition of being-not-produced-by-body which is the reason in the counter-inference.

Nor can it be said that when the reason in the establishing reason is invalid, the fallacy that is to be pointed out is that of deviation and not that of counter-reason. It is the general rule that where counter-reason can be proposed, it should be done, since it directly prevents inference. Deviation prevents inference only indirectly by preventing invariable concomitance.

Now the *siddhāntin* tries to show in another way that the counter-reason has an additional condition. When destruction (*dhvaṃsa*) is not included in the subject of the inference establishing the existence of God, and only positive entities like the earth and so on are included in it, then the reason cannot be just 'being-effect', since in that case, there would be deviation in the case of destruction which is also an effect but which is not considered to have an agent. Hence 'being-inherent' or 'being-existent' or 'while-being-an-existent' also enters into the enunciation of the reason. The other parts of the reason in its three different enunciations, namely, 'while being the counter-positive of a prior absence', in the first two enunciations and 'having-origin' in the third, are meant to exclude colour in atoms of water and so on which inheres in these atoms but which are eternal according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. One can make use of any of these three reasons in establishing the existence of an agent. Now the absence of any of the other two could be considered as the additional condition of the counter-reason when one of them is used as the reason. Such an additional condition will not be just a negation of the reason in the establishing inference and therefore in no way will there be the impossibility of the fallacy of counter-reason as the *pūrvapakṣin* urged earlier. Further, since the absence of any of these three reasons is taken as the additional condition, mere absence-of-being-produced is not considered an additional condition.

(f) Now, in another way which is acceptable to old Naiyāyika-s, it is shown that the counter-reason has no invariable concomitance of absence of an agent. If it is impossible to grasp the invariable concomitance of a particular *sādhya* in a particular reason without that reason being qualified by a particular qualification, then the limitor of 'being-pervaded-ness' will indeed be qualified by that particular qualification also. Here in the present instance of the counter-inference, such is not the case, for here absence of an agent is the *sādhya* and the reason is absence-of-being-produced-by-body. But here the limitor of 'being-pervaded-ness' cannot have the qualification of 'body', since it is logically too complex, just as only 'smokeness' and not 'blue smokeness' is the limitor of 'being-pervadedness' in blue smoke. Thus being-produced-by-body' cannot be considered the limitor of 'pervadedness'. On the other hand 'being-produced' cannot also be considered the limitor because it is not the counter-positive of the absence which is the reason in the counter-inference. Therefore the *siddhāntin* concludes that the reason of the counter-inference does not have a limitor and so it has no invariable concomitance of 'absence-of-having-an-agent'.

But the *pūrvapakṣin* persists: One cognizes invariable concomitance when there is no deviation and when there is concomitance. And these are possible in the case of the absence-of-being-produced-by-body. In the atoms we can cognize the 'absence-of-being-produced-by-body' and the absence of 'having-an-agent'. In the jar and so on we can also cognize the absence of 'absence-of-having-an-agent'. Thus there is no deviation and hence the invariable concomitance of absence of an agent can be cognized in the absence-of-being-produced-by-body.

To this the *siddhāntin* answers that indeed deviation can be cognized in the earth and so on. Here, according to him, there is no absence-of-having-an-agent, but there is absence-of-being-produced-by-body. If however it is argued that the doubt of deviation with reference to the subject is no fault at all, then the answer is as follows: Even the *pūrvapakṣin* (who is here the Buddhist) admits that the earth and so on are produced through the unseen; but this also cannot be admitted because the earth and so on are not produced by body. But here by the words *'anye tu'*, Gaṅgeśa does not seem to approve this solution of the problem as proposed by the early Naiyāyika-s. The reason is that being-produced-by-body is an instance of being-produced, just as blue-smoke is an instance of smoke. Therefore it is to be admitted that in these particular instances of the reason, there is invariable concomitance of the respective *sādhya-s*, otherewise it would be impossible to cognize invariable concomitance itself, for it actually exists in individual reasons and not in reason as such.

(4)(a) Thus the *siddhāntin* has answered all the objections raised against the inference establishing the existence of God. But the *pūrvapakṣin* persists and argues that this inferential knowledge is erroneous, i. e. it has no validity (*prāmāṇya*). If the inferential knowledge is erroneous, it follows that the object of this knowledge also is erroneous. He shows the erroneous nature of this inferential knowledge as follows. The inference of the *siddhāntin* establishing the existence of God is taken as the subject. That it is erroneous is the *sādhya*; three reasons are also adduced, and also the examples where the invariable concomitance is cognized are given. Here the reasons and the examples are to be taken in due order. Thus the inferences to establish the error of the inference of the *siddhāntin* are actually three in number and are as follows: This inference is erroneous because it establishes the knowledge of being-an-agent in something that has no body as for example the knowledge that a jar is an agent; again this inference is erroneous, because it establishes eternity in knowledge, desire and action as for example the knowledge of jar and so on, if taken as eternal; lastly this inference is false because it establishes the knowledge of having-an-agent for something that is not produced by body, as for example ether.

Here the *siddhāntin* could raise an objection. Error is to be established in the inference which establishes the existence of an eternal and all knowing agent. Therefore the inference establishing error is the effect and the inference establishing an eternal agent is the cause. This implies that the effect goes against the nature of the cause which in principle cannot be accepted. This objection is denied by the *pūrvapakṣin*: It is true that the inference establishing the existence of an all-knowing agent becomes the subject in the inference establishing error in the former; but its validity also does not become a part of the subject. If the validity also of the inference establishing the existence of God become part of the subject of the inference establishing the invalidity of the former, then there would have been contradiction, but such is not the case. In other words, the validity of the first inference is not the cause of the second.[1]

The answer to this objection is as follows: In the inference establishing the existence of God, the reason has invariable concomitance, as has already been shown: Being-an-effect, has the invariable concomitance of having-an-agent. There is also no additional condition for the reason that it may establish the agent. But the reasons adduced in the inference establishing the invalidity of this inference do not have a supporting reason and so they do not have the desired invariable concomitance. Nor can the *pūrvapakṣin* insist that such an inference has also validity, for otherwise no inference at all would be possible. The reason is that even when fire is established in a mountain by the reason of smoke, one can still object that the mountain has the absence of the kitchen-fire which only has been established as accepted by both parties. If one argues like this no inference would be possible.

It is possible to say that this answer is not acceptable because it is not always necessary to establish the validity of an inference before human action with regard to the *sādhya* of the inference in question follows. Therefore another argument is brought forward to reject the objection of the *pūrvapakṣin*. If there is actually error in the inference, according to the general principle of Nyāya[2] there must be some defect which caused it. It is such an error caused by such a defect that is the object of the inference of the opponent. Now the question is whether this defect itself which causes the error, the reason in the inference establishing the error or is something else the reason. It cannot be the first alternative since one comes to know that there is error in the inference by means of the defect and one knows that there is a defect because of the error of the inference. Nor can one hold as valid the second alternative, namely, defect other than that which produces the error in the inference is the reason in the inference establishing the error, because there is no justification to say that another defect is the reason that establishes error in the inference.

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[1] It should be noted here that the objection of the *Siddhāntin* is made from the point of view of *Mīmāṃsa* according to which the validity of knowledge is grasped along with the knowledge itself. Hence it is obvious that if a subsequent inference establishes the invalidity of the former, it will be contradictory to the first knowledge itself.

[2] *dosofprāmnāyajaṇakah.*

(b) The *pūrvapakṣin* raises another objection against the inference establishing the existence of God. He points out that the supporting argument in favour of the reason of the *siddhāntin* is faulty. He explains it thus: If God be the agent of earth and so on, then he would have knowledge of what is good for him; and besides, his knowledge will not be eternal; if he has effort, he would be acting for some purpose. All these will be against the position of the *siddhāntin*. Further, the *pūrvapakṣin* points out that if the earth and so on have an agent, then that agent should have a body; implied also are the arguments that if the earth and so on have an agent, then that agent will not have eternal knowledge, he would know what is good for him and he would be acting for some purpose. Such arguments are false since there is no contradiction if the opposite were the case, i.e. there is no such rule that an agent should have a body and so on. Besides in the first series of objections there is also the fault of having no subject (*āsryāsiddhi*) since the existence of God is not yet established. In the arguments which make use of the earth as the subject, although there is no absence of subject, there is useless qualification of that which is to be imputed, i.e. if the earth and so on have an agent, he should be an agent-with-a-body; here the qualification of 'body' is useless, since there is no rule that agents should have a body. All these have been discussed earlier.[1]

(c) Now the *pūrvapakṣin* objects in the following manner: Even if it is accepted that there is God as the agent of earth and so on, why should there be only one agent? There is no such invariable concomitance; one sees that a palace, a jar and so on are made by many people together and so they have many agents.

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[1] Similar objections are dealt with in *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p, 38 ff. *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, p.500 ff.

To this an answer could be given: It is simpler to consider God alone as the agent of the earth and so on rather than to suppose that many individual souls are agents. But the opponent rejects this contending that perception, inference and so on are the only means of knowledge and logical simplicity is not considered by any one as a means of valid knowledge. And only that which is produced by a valid means of knowledge can be considered valid knowledge. This answer, however, is not acceptable to the *siddhāntin* who points out that he also does not consider logical simplicity as a separate means of valid knowledge. If such were the case, then the opinion of the *pūrvapakṣin* would have been correct, but such is not the case. It is the valid means of knowledge of inference which establishes that the agent is only one; simplicity is only an auxiliary cause for this inference.

The *pūrvapakṣin* however, rejects this argument contending that not all the inferences have simplicity as an auxiliary cause because there is deviation. Even where there is no simplicity, when there are such causes of inference present, as consideration, subjectness and so on inference occurs. Therefore there is no adequate reason to assert that simplicity is an auxiliary cause of inference.[1] To this an answer could be given: We do not say that in every inference simplicity is an auxiliary cause; only when the inferential knowledge has a simple thing as its object, simplicity is an auxiliary cause; therefore there is no deviation. This cannot obviously be admitted, because then there is mutual dependence: To say that an inference has somethig simple as object means only that the inference in question is produced with the help of simplicity. This means to say that the cause of an inference produced by simplicity, is simplicity. Hence there is mutual dependence.[2]

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[1] Here simplicity (*lāghava*) is to be understood as knowledge of simplicity and not simplicity in itself for only knowledge of simplicity is an auxiliary cause and not simplicity itself.

[2] Actually the fault here is not mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) but dependence on itself (*ātmāśraya*) since finally the statement would mean that knowledge of simplicity is caused by knowlege of simplicity.

Another way of explaining simplicity as auxiliary cause of inference could be proposed: When a particular individual is the object of inference, that inference is produced with the help of simplicity as an auxiliary cause. This also cannot be admitted because in that case when an individual is known, all its characteristics are also known by means of simplicity and therefore there cannot be any doubt about the characteristics of the object of that inference. Such however is not the case. When fire is inferred on a mountain, a doubt still could happen, if the fire is one foot or two feet high. But then another way of establishing only one agent for the earth and so on could be proposed: There is no means of valid knowledge which establishes many agents for the earth and so on, and therefore that agent which is established is indeed only one. This also cannot be admitted, for one can argue in the same way and point out that since there is no means of valid knowledge to establish that the agent is only one, it could as well be asserted that the agents are many.

If it is the case that when a particular characteristic of an object is not actually the object of inferential knowledge, the *sādhya* cannot at all be connected with the subject, then such a characteristic is also the object of the inference in question. Nothing more can be established. Take for example the present instance of inference establishing the existence of an agent for the earth and so on. Here the reason of 'being-an-effect' in the example of a jar establishes an agent having body; but 'being-an-effect' in the earth and so on establishes an invisible agent without a body. Both the reasons have the same generic attribute; yet in the example it establishes an agent with a body, but in the subject, it establishes an invisible agent without a body. In the same way, in the present question if the agent is one or many, when 'having-an-agent' is established, by the force of the relation of the reason to the subject, what is actually established is an agent who is only one and not many. The reason is that in the present case, if a single agent is not established, no agent at all would be established. Thus, this inference, which does not have as object a second agent, by the very fact that it has as object an agent, does not establish a second agent, but establishes only a single agent. If a single agent is not the object of inference, then no agent at all would be the object of inference. If therefore a single agent is the object of inference, then it follows that many agents also could not be the object of inference; it is by means of one that many are known. Thus by reason of the force of the relation of the reason to the subject, only one agent is established and not many agents. This is the opinion of the *siddhāntin*.

To this the *pūrvapakṣīn* answers: If such is the case, the object of this inferential knowledge will not also be the one-ness of the agent, for it is possible to have a knowledge of 'being-an-agent', without at the same time having a knowledge of 'one-ness'. In other words we can have a knowledge of an agent without at the same time knowing that this agent is one. But the *siddhāntin* then answers: If that is the case, let one-ness be not the object of the establishing inference; but in fact the agent which is established is indeed by nature of things themselves, only one, though this 'one-ness' is not explicitly the object of the inference. The answer of the *pūrvapakṣin* to this is that if actually 'one-ness' is not established by inference, even if one-ness is there by reason of the nature of things, it simply cannot be known. Therefore there will be perpetual doubt if God is one or many. Such a doubt can be removed only by a definite and certain inference that there is only one agent for the earth and so on. This according to the *pūrvapakṣin* is just impossible.

The *siddhāntin* gives the final answer to all these objections. Since one-ness has to become a qualifier (*prakāra*) in the inference establishing agent, this one-ness can become the object of cognition only by means of the auxiliary cause of 'simplicity'. By means of knowledge of such 'simplicity', it is possible to cognize also one-ness when there is no contradiction in having such a cognition. This is explained as follows: When a certain means of valid cognition can generate the knowledge of something complex or something simple, the principle of 'simplicity' becomes operative and that which is 'simple' becomes in fact the object of such a cognition. The reason is that when there is the cognition of 'complexity' and 'simplicity', a means of valid knowledge will make us cognize only that which is simple. Such 'simplicity' as auxiliary cause is operative not only in the case of inference, but in all other means of valid knowledge also. Thus by perception we cognize 'being-a-cause', 'being-an-effect', pervasion, counter-positive-ness and so on. In some places, the limitors of these could be something complex or something 'simple'; in such places the valid means of cognition of perception will generate the cognition only of the simple characteristic as the limitor. Thus for instance when a stick is known as a cause of jar, the limitor of 'cause-ness' in the stick is cognized as the characteristic of 'being-stick' which exists in all sticks and not any other characteristics such as 'being-a-substance', 'being-existent' and so on which are common also to things which are not sticks. Characteristics such as 'being-substance', 'being-existent' and so on are present in things other than sticks and so if they are also considered as limitors of cause-ness, then such things also will have to be considered as causes of jar. But if 'being-stick' is only recognized as the limitor, then the cause of jar, will be stick only. In a similar manner, the limitor of 'being-an-effect' which is governed by stick in a jar, is just 'jar-ness' and not 'having-a-round-neck' (*kambugrīvādimattva*). Here jarness is 'simpler' than 'having-a-round-neck' because there are in the latter such elements as neck and so on. In like manner, the limitors of pervasion, counter-positive-ness and so on could be cognized. In the same way, we cognize the limitor of 'being-denotative-power' in that which is light, for example in 'being-a-gayal' and not in 'being-similar-to-a-cow' since the latter is complex. Also, when the denotative power of words is cognized by means of inference, the limitor of 'being-the-denotative-power' is cognized to be that which is 'simple' and not that which is complex, as for example the limitor of 'being-the-denotative-power' of the word 'jar' is cognized as jar-ness and not as 'having-a-round-neck'. Thus it can be concluded that when any means of valid knowledge brings to us the knowledge of things, the cognition of 'simplicity' is an auxiliary cause.

This principle of 'simplicity' is further explained: From our experience, we know what is complex and what is simple. After such a knowledge, we cognize as the limitor of 'being-cause' 'counter-positive-ness' and so on, that characteristic which is simple. If such knowledge of 'simplicity' is not considered as an auxiliary cause of our knowledge, through the means of valid knowledge, then every way of human conversation and usage would be impossible for we will not be able to know precisely what thing is denoted by a particular word and so on. It is thus just impossible not to accept the principle of 'simplicity' in our knowledge. Therefore the conclusion is that in the present instance of inference of God also, the principle of 'simplicity' has to be accepted. This shows that by the inference which establishes God's existence, we can also establish that he is only one.

But then an objection arises: Should not by the principle of 'simplicity' even those objects which in fact do have many agents be established as having only one agent? Thus for instance a particular jar had in fact many agents; but it is not known by any means of valid knowledge that it had many agents. Hence when the inference is made that this jar has an agent, by means of simplicity, it will also be established that this jar has only one agent, as in the case of the inference of God and his unicity. Nor can it be said that such an inference of a single agent for the jar is acceptable since even after such an inference there can be doubt whether the jar has one agent or many agents. Such a doubt can occur only if the inference establishing the unicity of the agent is not certain. This objection is answered in the following way: Even in the case referred to, a single agent is indeed inferred. And for such an inference also knowledge of simplicity, is an auxiliary cause. But the validity of the certainty of the cognition is afterwards doubted. In the present case, one can have a doubt if the certainty about the unicity of the agent is correct or not. Therefore, afterwards by other means of valid knowledge many agents for the jar could be established and then one understands that the previous knowledge of the unicity of the agent was indeed an error.

If such is the answer, the *pūrvapakṣin* argues that even in the case of the inference of the unicity of God, there could be doubt about its validity; there occurs doubt if there is only one God or many. This objection is rejected by the *siddhāntin* pointing out that in the case of inference of the unicity of God, there is afterwards no inference which would establish many agents for the earth and so on and which would make the first inference of the unicity of God erroneous. In the case of jar, however, there is an inference of many agents afterwards which invalidates the previous inference of a single agent. This is the difference and hence the inference about the oneness of God is indeed valid. Nor can the mere fact that there is no distinct reason establishing the unicity of God, establishes many agents for the earth and so on. It has already been shown that by means of simplicity as an auxiliary cause, the inference which establishes God, establishes also his unicity. It is to be noted that here Gaṅgeśa answers these objections on the assumption that in certain inferences, not only what is generated by invariable concomitance and the force of the relation of the reason to the subject that becomes the object, but also that which is brought about by the knowledge of 'simplicity' as an auxiliary cause in producing the inference.[1]

Now another way of establishing the unicity of the agent for the earth and so on is pointed out: Presumably this is the opinion of those who think that in an inference nothing is an object which is not brought into cognition by means of invariable concomitance and the force of the relation of reason to the subject. By means of various inferences, an agent could be established for earth, sprout and so on. Then take as subject any one of these agents and infer in them the non-difference of the other agent. And the reason for this inference will be 'being-an-agent-without-body'. Here there is the possibility of a counter-inference; the agent of the earth is different from the agent of the sprout because he is not agent of sprout just like the agent of the jar. But this counter-inference cannot be admitted because the reason has an additional condition of 'being-the-support-of-non-eternal-knowledge'. This additional condition pervades the *sādhya* of 'potter' and so on and does not pervade the reason of 'being-an-effect' in the earth and so on. But the opinion of these authors who in this way establish the unicity of the agent does not seem to find favour with Gaṅgeśa and so he points out a defect in this. The reason in the inference establishing the unicity of God in this way has no supporting argument, i.e. there is no harm if the agents who have no body are different in the earth and the sprout. Therefore in determining whether there is difference or not in these agents, the final criterion is the consideration of simplicity or complexity.

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[1] Such a theory of course does not contradict the position that the object of all inferences is that which is brought about by invariable concomitance and the relation of the reason to the subject. Simplicity however, can be an auxiliary cause with regard to all forms of valid knowledge, as Jayadeva and others point out.

(d) The *pūrvapakṣin* turns now to another objection. Even if it is granted that God is one only, why should his knowledge be eternal and having everything as object. Here the word knowledge should be understood as standing also for desire and action. One possible answer for this objection is that by the force of the relation of the reason to the subject, an agent with eternal knowledge is established. This principle has already been explained in several places. It only means that the smoke in the mountain establishes only mountain-fire and not kitchen-fire; 'being-an-effect' establishes an agent like a potter in jar, but the same reason establishes in the earth and so on an agent whose knowledge is eternal and has everything as object, for otherwise, the earth and so on cannot be produced. Apparently this answer is rejected by the *pūrvapakṣin*. Even the force of the relation of the reason to the subject establishes only a *sādhya* which is qualified by the limitor of pervasion and not anything else. In the present instance, the pervasion does not have as part of its limitor either 'being-eternal' or 'having-everything-as-object'. Hence an agent whose knowledge is qualified by such characteristics cannot be said to be established by the reason of 'being-an-effect', just as in the given example of a jar such an agent whose knowledge is eternal and has everything as object is not established.

Another possible answer is also proposed: 'Having-an-agent' in the earth and so on cannot be understood in the same way as 'having-an-agent' in jar. 'Having-an-agent' in a jar can be understood and explained adequately even if the agent has only non-eternal knowledge whose object is not everything, but only certain things. But this is not the case in the agent of the earth and so on. Here 'having-an-agent' cannot be understood or explained if the agent has only non-eternal knowledge which does not extend to all things. The stock example for such kind of argument is the following: Fat Devadatta does not eat by day. Therefore to understand and to explain his 'fatness' it should be supposed that Devadatta eats during night. However this kind of argument to establish that the agent of the earth and so on have eternal knowledge which extends to everything cannot be admitted, because in this way every inference by means of negative concomitance would be rendered useless. And in Nyāya inference by negative concomitance is as valid as inference by positive concomitance.

The answer of the old Naiyāyika-s to this problem is supposed to uphold the principle that only the *sādhya* which is qualified by the limitor of pervasion is the object of inference, and on the other hand the answer saves also inference by means of negative invariable concomitance. The answer is as follows: When inference of fire is made in the mountain, if actually fire is not the object of the inference, the mountain will not be the subjunct of the relation whose adjunct is fire. According to this opinion qualifierness (*prakāratā*) in an inferential knowledge will be the adjunctness of the relation that is being cognized; qualificandness (*viśeṣyatā*) will be subjunctness of the relation that is being cognized. Therefore according to this opinion by the relation of smoke to the mountain, fire as pervader of smoke is made the object of cognition as being related to the mountain, i. e. if there is no relation of fire to mountain, there would also be no relation of smoke to mountain; it is because of this incongruity that the *sādhya* is established in the subject. But the incongruity in an inference with negative invariable concomitance is different; the incongruity here is already experienced, as when the incongruity of the fatness of Devadatta who does not eat during the day, is already experienced; and therefore it is surmised that he eats during night. This is the difference between the incongruity in an inference by negative concomitance, and the incongruity in an inference by positive concomitance. So there is no possibility of destroying all inferences with negative invariable concomitance.

Further, the way of the same Naiyāyika-s of the old school to show that the knowledge of God is eternal and that it has as object everything is given. The flow of effects like the dyads and so on are without any beginning. Such a beginningless flow of effects is the subject. An agent who has knowledge of the material causes of these things is the *sādhya*. To have knowledge of these beginningless flow of things is indeed having knowledge of everything. And such a knowledge is also eternal because, if it has any beginning, it will not be able to have as object the beginningless flow of things. And something which is not the counterpositive of a prior absence and which is at the same time an existent, is indeed also not the counter-positive of destruction, like the atoms. And this state of affairs is eternity. But it may be asked when all individual souls have attained their liberation does not this knowledge become practically useless and therefore does it not also cease to exist? No, the knowledge does not cease to exist because that which was not the counterpositive of a prior absence and also existent cannot be also the counterpositive of destruction. And such a knowledge is also the object of inference establishing the existence of God. Such is the answer of the old Naiyāyika-s establishing the existence of only one God whose knowledge is eternal and all-extensive and only one; and the principle underlying all the arguments in support of these positions is that of simplicity which has been often explained.

Now the opinion of the modern Naiyāyika-s about this problem is given. In the enunciation of the subject, it will have the qualification of being-not-produced-by-non-eternal-knowledge; therefore when the *sādhya* as being-produced-by-knowledge is established, that knowledge which is being established would indeed be eternal knowledge, since there would be contradiction if it is produced by non-eternal knowledge, for the subject has been explicitly stated to be not produced by knowledge that is produced. Here it should be noted that knowledge also stands for desire and effort.

Vācaspatimiśra, however, solves the problem in the following manner: By means of the auxiliary cause of logical simplicity, we can establish that knowledge in the *sādhya* is only one. If such a knowledge has a beginning, it cannot obviously be the cause of the series of effects which exist prior to it. Therefore by excluding other possibilities, it should be concluded that the knowledge that is established is eternal. Vācaspati, then proceeds to explain how the knowledge extends to all objects; the determination that a knowledge will have a definite object comes about from the fact of its dependence on its causes. It has already been established that the knowledge of God is eternal and an eternal knowledge cannot have any cause; therefore its object will not be determined, but undetermined and all-extensive; it will not therefore have anything as its cause.

Now another way of establishing God's knowledge, to be all-extensive, is given. According to Vaiśeṣika, there are six existent realities; according to Nyāya, *abhāva*, absence, also is a category. The Veda-s deal with these things and it can be shown that God is the author of the Vedas; therefore God should have knowledge of all these things also and that means he is omniscient. But then some one might object: Although it is now shown that God has knowledge of all things that he has directly created, how can it be shown that he knows also those things which are produced by a potter and so on? An answer is now given to such objections. Individual souls are not the causes of the conjunction of jar with ether, but the jars and so on are material causes of such conjunctions. Therefore in order to produce such conjunctions, God should also know jars and so on which are their material causes. Thus God has knowledge of things created by him directly and also of those things which are produced by individual souls. And in the same way it can be established that he has eternal will and effort, each of which is only one and not many and each of which extends to all things.

Now another objection could be raised: Even if God is omniscient, how can he be the creator of such things as jars? One possible inference is given to establish this:. Jar is made by God since it is an effect like earth. Earlier, taking jar as example, it was established that the earth and so on are produced by God. Now taking earth as example and the same reason of being-an-effect, it could be established that jar is also produced by God. This reasoning cannot be admitted, for by means of this argument, jar is said to have two agents: One the potter and the other, God. Now making use of a jar as example, earth and so on can be shown to have two agents. Thus there will be innumerable Gods. The reason is that since an individual soul cannot be the agent of earth and so on, the supposed two agents of the earth would be two Gods. Now taking such an earth as example a jar could be shown to be produced by two Gods. Such a jar will naturally be produced by a potter also; therefore it will have three makers—two Gods and one potter. Taking this jar as example the earth and so on could be shown to have three makers, namely, three Gods. Thus an infinite number of Gods can be established.

One possible answer to avoid these difficulties of infinite number of Gods is to say that the principle of causality between cause and effect is conceived not in the sense that an effect has two makers, but in the sense that an effect has maker. The difficulty with this answer is that in that case even with regard to earth and so on, it is enough to assert that they have a maker and not that their maker is God. Hence the first inference that a jar is made by God because it is an effect, like earth, is false. It can only be shown that jar has a maker. Hence the *pūrvapakṣin* would conclude that it would be impossible to show that God is also the maker of a jar and so on. But this objection is answered by the *siddhāntin* in the following way: It has already been established that the knowledge of God is eternal and that it extends to all things. Therefore it is necessary that the knowledge of God has as its object also jars and their material causes also. Therefore just as the knowledge of potter is cause of jar, so also the knowledge of God is also the cause of the pot. Such an idea is also expressed by Udayana in the following way: When God is established as the one who directs atoms, unseen and so on because he knows them, it could easily be seen that he directs also the loom and so on.[1] It is not however the case that God is established because the loom and so on need someone to direct them; they can easily be directed by a weaver and so on; but God's knowledge being eternal and all-extensive, God naturally directs them also.

But still it could be urged that God is a superfluous antecedent (*anyathāsiddha*) of a jar and not its real cause, since a jar is produced by such invariably antecedent realities like a potter. The help of the Veda-s is sought to answer this; for the sacred text says: "I am the cause of everything; from me everything is produced". This shows that God knows everything and that he is the cause of everything.

If God is omniscient, it would follow that he knows also the various instances of erroneous knowledge of individual souls also. When a knowledge becomes the object of another knowledge, the latter will have as object not only the former but also its object. Therefore when God knows erroneous knowledge of individual souls, his knowledge will have error also as object. That means his knowledge also will be erroneous. Further, since the knowledge of God is one and eternal, it would follow that his knowledge is at all times erroneous. Thus God would cease to be God. This objection also cannot be admitted: When someone has the knowledge of the erroneous knowledge of another, it certainly does not follow that the knowledge of the former is also erroneous. If a person knows that another has mistaken conch-shell for silver, it does not at all follow that the former also has erroneous knowledge, although the object of his knowledge is the error of another. When some one knows conch-shell as silver, silverness is the qualifier of the knowledge and so it is false; when God knows this knowledge, silverness is not the qualifier, but 'having-silverness-as-qualifier' is the qualifier and therefore his knowledge is true and not false.

(e) Now the question turns to the purpose of God's creation. The normal purpose of happiness and absence of sorrow cannot be admitted in the case of God, for it is admitted by the Naiyāyika-s that God has no happiness; since he has no demerit, he has also no sorrow. Therefore God cannot act for the purpose of happiness or absence of sorrow. Could it not then be admitted that God acts because he wants to remove the sorrow of others, and to give them happiness? But this also cannot be admitted, for in that case God would have created only those who have happiness and would not have created those who have sorrows. This obviously is not true, for in the world we see mostly people who have some kind of sorrow. It may be suggested that God produces the final result of happiness or sorrow, in individual souls according to their merit or demerit. This also cannot be admitted, for in that case, God would be acting out of necessity and the variety of the world could be explained by merit and demerit which are necessarily antecedent, and there would be no need to postulate a God, who has knowledge of all the worms and so on which are totally useless? But then it may be urged that God is necessarily antecedent; merit and demerit could be dispensed with. In that case, since the knowledge and so on of God are eternal, it could come about that creation and destruction are only once or always. If it is proposed that God acts out of compassion, then follows the untenable position that his effort will not be eternal, but something produced. In order to have an effort that is produced, a body would be needed; and in that case, God would be like any individual soul.

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[1] cf. *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, p. 497.

All these objections are now answered: First of all, are these questions raised on the assumption, that there is a God? If one does not admit God, then all these objections have the fallacy of the absence of a subject. If, however, these questions are raised on the assumption that there is a God, then the following is the answer: It has already been shown that the desire of God is all-extensive; therefore the object of God's desire is the world. He can then have knowledge of the means conducive to the realization of his desire; the purpose of God's creation is then the world itself. But this does not seem to be the real answer; hence the true answer according to Gaṅgeśa is given introducing it with the words *vastutastu*. The effort of God is eternal and an eternal effort does not need any purpose to produce an effect;

it is only non-eternal efforts which need a purpose to produce an effect. This is the right answer. The earth and so on could have as extraordinary causes, unseen, time and space; in other words, because of such unseen, at such and such a time, at such and such a place, such and such earth and so on come into existence. When the auxiliary causes for creation are at hand, God produces the world and when the auxiliary causes for destruction are present, God destroys the world. In fact, when the auxiliary causes for creation are at hand, God's desire is indeed desire to create and when the auxiliary causes are present for destruction, God's desire is indeed desire to destroy. This does not however mean that the knowledge of God is superfluous, since the earth and so on are effects, and effects can come into existence only by means of the knowledge of its material causes and so on of the maker. Therefore God's knowledge also is needed so that the earth and so on may be produced. Though happiness and sound have as their inherent causes, soul and ether respectively, still they need their respective instrumental causes in order that they be produced. In the same way the earth and so on also need their instrumental causes so that they also may be produced.

(f) Now another question arises. How can God who has no body teach the Veda-s or the denotative potency of words? Only if someone has a body can he speak and teach; and God has none; if it is supposed that God has a body, then he would be just another individual soul. This question is answered in the following way: In the beginning of creation, by means of the unseen of individual souls, the elements join in the proper way to produce the body of the fish. With this, the contact of individual souls or of God can occur and owing to this there comes about action in the throat and the lips of the fish. God who has knowledge of all the Veda-s, has the desire to teach and so Veda-s begin to be formulated through the movement of the mouth of the fish. In a similar manner there is conjuction of God who has knowledge and so on, with the body of the potter who has the unseen. Therefore there comes about movement in the body of the potter and this movement is conducive to the production of pot. Again, in a similar way, God has conjunction with the body of one who commands and one who is commanded, and God has knowledge and so on needed to impart the usage of words to men. Therefore the one who commands, whose body is joined to God, asks a jar to be brought and one who is commanded whose body is in conjunction with God, brings the jar. The boy who is standing by, seeing these actions understands that the word 'jar' denotes the thing which is brought, namely, jar. This is how the potency of words is taught by God. Here all these bodies in question, belong to individual souls and not to God. Therefore it comes about that God has no body and at the same time he can teach the Veda-s and so on. This way of God's acting through the bodies of individual souls is compared to the action of ghosts who also make use of bodies which are not their own; but the knowledge, desire and effort needed for the movement of these bodies, however, belong to the ghosts.

Even some of those who admit the existence of God are of opinion that omniscient beings other than God existing at the time of creation teach the Vedas to ordinary men. This opinion is explained and rejected. By means of letters of the alphabet, which are written down, we can infer the words and understand their potency. In the same way those who have attained enlightenment in the previous birth but still have the unseen which has to be experienced and so are born again in the beginning of creation, cognize the Veda-s by their Yogic power. Afterwards they teach them to their disciples, or it may be that Manu-s take different bodies and then they teach; these opinions cannot be admitted, because it is too complex to admit too many omniscient beings at the beginning of creation. It could as well be that they are the makers of the earth and so on since being omniscient they will have knowledge also of the material causes of earth and so on. Therefore it would come about that there is no need of God himself.

In the same way also the opinion of those who say that the earth and so on could be produced by those who have become yogins in the previous creation, should be rejected. The argument is as follows: Is there an independent inference to establish the existence of omniscient beings at the beginning of creation or is it established by the inference which establishes the existence of God; it cannot be the first alternative since there is no such independent inference. If it is the second alternative, then by the auxiliary cause of simplicity only one omniscient being is established and this is God as has already been shown.

A last problem is discussed. It was pointed out earlier that God teaches the usage of words by taking the bodies of a teacher and the taught. It is understood by the boy standing near by that the knowledge of the person who is taught, is produced by the use of the words of the teacher; but in fact the person who is taught is God and his knowledge is eternal and not produced by anything. But it is based upon this that the boy standing near learns that the word 'jar' denotes the thing jar. Therefore his knowledge is based upon an error; and therefore all knowledge of the potency of words is erroneous. The *pūrvapakṣin* further points out that if the usage of words is taught by non-eternal omniscient beings, there is no such error, for according to this opinion neither the teacher nor the taught is God. The *siddhāntin* naturally rejects this opinion. He concedes that it is true that the knowledge of the boy that the learner has the knowledge of words because of the words of the teacher, is false for the knowledge of the learner is, in this case, not produced, but eternal, since he is God. But the knowledge of the boy who stands nearby that the word jar brings about the knowledge of the thing 'jar' is correct indeed. There is no contradiction of the object in such a knowledge. Nor is it necessary that every knowledge that proceeds from an error, is erroneous. An example for this, which is acceptable to both parties, is now given: A boy sees that a doll brings a jar when it is so commanded by the man who manipulates the strings. Through this he learns that the word jar has the potency to denote jar. It is indeed an error to think that the doll has knowledge of jar arising from the word jar. However the knowledge of the boy that the word jar denotes the thing jar is correct. If this is also error, then it would be impossible to know the meaning of words, for the doubt if the one who has learnt it, from a living and intelligent being or from a non-living and non-intelligent thing will always be there.

(5) In support of the conclusion that the maker of the earth and so on is God, sacred texts are also adduced. The first text is *madhyṇdinīya-vājasaneyasaṃhita* c. 17 *mantra* 19 and the second is *Gita* c. 15 *śloka*, 17. They have to be understood here in accordance with the theories and assumptions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

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